area handbook series 

Iraq 

a country study 




Iraq 

a country study 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Helen Chapin Metz 
Research Completed 
May 1988 




*vr u * .V." ».'•* » 



On the cover: Samarra Mosque, built approximately A.D. 836 
by the Abbasid caliph Al Muhtasim, who made Samarra his 
capital 



Fourth Edition, 1990, First Printing, 1990. 

Copyright ®1990 United States Government as represented by 
the Secretary of the Army. All rights reserved. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Iraq: A Country Study 

Area Handbook Series, DA Pam 550-31 
Research completed May 1988. 
Bibliography: pp. 269-280. 
Includes index. 

1. Iraq I. Metz, Helen Chapin, 1928- . II. Federal Research 
Division, Library of Congress. III. Area Handbook for Iraq. 
IV. Series: DA Pam 550-31. 

DS70. 61734 1990 56.7— dc20 89-13940 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-31 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being 
prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Con- 
gress under the Country Studies — Area Handbook Program. The 
last page of this book lists the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Acting Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



in 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the fol- 
lowing individuals who wrote the 1979 edition of Iraq: A Country 
Study: Laraine Newhouse Carter, Angus MacPherson, Darrel R. 
Eglin, Rinn S. Shinn, and James D. Rudolph. Their work provided 
the organization of the present volume, as well as substantial por- 
tions of the text. 

The authors are grateful to individuals in various government 
agencies and private institutions who gave their time, research 
materials, and expertise to the production of this book. The authors 
also wish to thank members of the Federal Research Division who 
contributed directly to the preparation of the manuscript. These 
people include Thomas Collelo, who reviewed all drafts and graphic 
material; Richard F. Nyrop, who reviewed all drafts and who served 
as liaison with the sponsoring agency; and Martha E. Hopkins, 
who managed editing and production. Also involved in preparing 
the text were editorial assistants Barbara Edgerton and Izella 
Watson. 

Individual chapters were edited by Sharon Costello, Vincent 
Ercolano, Ruth Nieland, and Gage Ricard. Carolyn Hinton 
performed the final prepublication editorial review, and Shirley 
Kessel compiled the index. Diann Johnson of the Library of Con- 
gress Composing Unit prepared the camera- ready copy, under the 
supervision of Peggy Pixley. 

Special thanks are owed to David P. Cabitto, who designed the 
cover artwork and the illustrations on the title page of each chap- 
ter. Invaluable graphics support also was provided by Sandra K. 
Cotugno and Kimberly A. Lord. Harriett R. Blood assisted in 
preparing the final maps. 

The authors would like to thank several individuals who provided 
research and operational support. Arvies J. Staton supplied infor- 
mation on ranks and insignia, Ly H. Burnham assisted in obtain- 
ing demographic data, Afaf S. McGowan assisted in obtaining 
photographs, and Gwendolyn B. Batts assisted in word processing. 

Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of the many indi- 
viduals and public and private agencies who allowed their photo- 
graphs to be used in this study. 



v 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword in 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xi 

Country Profile xiii 

Introduction xxiii 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Mark Lewis 

ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIA 6 

Sumer, Akkad, Babylon, and Assyria 6 

Iranian and Greek Intrusions 12 

THE ARAB CONQUEST AND THE COMING 

OF ISLAM 15 

The Sunni-Shia Controversy 17 

The Abbasid Caliphate, 750-1258 20 

The Mongol Invasion 24 

THE OTTOMAN PERIOD, 1534-1918 25 

WORLD WAR I AND THE BRITISH MANDATE 31 

IRAQ AS AN INDEPENDENT MONARCHY 40 

REPUBLICAN IRAQ 49 

COUPS, COUP ATTEMPTS, AND FOREIGN 

POLICY 53 

THE EMERGENCE OF SADDAM HUSAYN, 

1968-79 57 

THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT 63 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment .... 67 

Stephen Pelletiere 

GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION 70 

Boundaries 70 

Major Geographical Features 71 

Settlement Patterns 75 

Climate 77 

Population 78 

People \ 80 

Kurds 82 

Other Minorities 85 



vii 



RELIGIOUS LIFE 86 

Islam 86 

Sunni-Shia Relations in Iraq 95 

SOCIAL SYSTEMS 97 

Rural Society 99 

Impact of Agrarian Reform 103 

Urban Society 105 

Stratification and Social Classes 109 

FAMILY AND SOCIETY 110 

EDUCATION AND WELFARE 114 

Education 114 

Health 117 

Welfare 118 

Chapter 3. The Economy 121 

Robert Scott Mason 

GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 124 

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 127 

BANKING AND FINANCE 130 

THE OIL SECTOR 133 

Developments Through World War II 133 

The Turkish Petroleum Company 133 

Post-World War II Through the 1970s 136 

OH in the 1980s 142 

INDUSTRIALIZATION 145 

AGRICULTURE 153 

Water Resources 153 

Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform 156 

Cropping and Livestock 159 

TRANSPORTATION 162 

Roads 163 

Railroads 163 

Ports 166 

Airports 166 

TELECOMMUNICATIONS 167 

ELECTRICITY 167 

FOREIGN TRADE 168 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 173 

Eric Hooglund 

CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 177 

GOVERNMENT 179 

The Revolutionary Command Council 179 

The National Assembly 181 



viii 



The President and the Council of Ministers 182 

The Judiciary 184 

Local Government 185 

Kurdish Autonomy 186 

POLITICS 187 

The Baath Party 187 

The Politics of Alliance: The Progressive National 

Front 194 

Political Opposition 197 

MASS MEDIA 199 

FOREIGN POLICY 200 

The Soviet Union 203 

The West 204 

The Persian Gulf Countries 206 

Iraq and Other Arab Countries 207 

Relations with Other Countries 209 

Participation in International Organizations 210 

Chapter 5. National Security 213 

Joseph A. Kechichian 

NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS 215 

THE REGULAR ARMED FORCES 217 

Size, Equipment, and Organization 217 

Manpower and Training 220 

Conditions of Service and Morale 222 

Military Justice System 223 

Uniforms and Rank Insignia 224 

PARAMILITARY FORCES 224 

FOREIGN MILITARY TIES 228 

Military Ties Prior to the Iran-Iraq War 228 

The Iran-Iraq War and the Quest for New 

Sources of Arms 229 

Arms from the Soviet Union 229 

Arms from France 230 

The Search for Nuclear Technology 231 

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR 232 

Iraqi Offensives, 1980-82 233 

Iraqi Retreats, 1982-84 234 

The War of Attrition, 1984-87 235 

The Tanker War, 1984-87 240 

ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY 241 

Status in National Life 241 

The Sociology of the Military 244 

The Defense Burden 244 



ix 



The Impact of Casualties on the Armed Forces 245 

Treatment of Veterans and Widows 246 

INTERNAL SECURITY 247 

Internal Developments and Security 247 

Internal Security in the 1980s 251 

Incidence of Crime 253 

Criminal Justice System 254 

Appendix. Tables 257 

Bibliography 269 

Glossary 281 

Index 285 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Iraq, 1988 xx 

2 Ancient Mesopotamia 8 

3 The Abbasid Caliphate, A.D. 750 22 

4 The Ottoman Empire in the Mid- Seventeenth Century .... 28 

5 Topography and Drainage 72 

6 Estimated Population Distribution by Age and Sex, 1987 . . 80 

7 Ethnic and Religious Distribution, 1988 82 

8 Petroleum Industry, 1988 138 

9 Economic Activity, 1988 150 

10 Transportation System, 1988 164 

11 Government Organization, 1988 180 

12 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1987 226 

13 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1987 227 

14 Initial Iraqi Attacks on Iran, 1980 236 



x 



Preface 



Like its predecessor, this study is an attempt to treat in a con- 
cise and objective manner the dominant social, political, economic, 
and military aspects of contemporary Iraqi society. Sources of in- 
formation included scholarly journals and monographs, official 
reports of governments and international organizations, news- 
papers, and numerous periodicals. Unfortunately there was a dearth 
of information from official Iraqi sources, as well as a lack of socio- 
logical data resulting from field work by scholars in Iraq in the 
1980s. Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book; brief 
comments on some of the more valuable sources suggested as pos- 
sible further reading appear at the end of each chapter. Measure- 
ments are given in the metric system; a conversion table is provided 
to assist those readers who are unfamiliar with metric measure- 
ments (see table 1, Appendix). A glossary is also included. 

The transliteration of Arabic words and phrases follows a modi- 
fied version of the system adopted by the United States Board on 
Geographic Names and the Permanent Committee on Geographic 
Names for British Official Use, known as the BGN/PCGN sys- 
tem. The modification is a significant one, however, in that dia- 
critical markings and hyphens have been omitted. Moreover, some 
geographical locations, such as the cities of Babylon, Kirkuk, Mosul, 
and Nineveh, are so well known by these conventional names that 
their formal names — Babil, Karkuk, Al Mawsil, and Ninawa, 
respectively, are not used. 



XI 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Republic of Iraq. 
Short Form: Iraq. 
Term for Citizens: Iraqis. 
Capital: Baghdad. 

Geography 

Size: Area of Iraq variously cited as between 433,970 (exclud- 
ing Iraqi half of 3,520 square-kilometer Iraq-Saudi Arabia 



xin 



Neutral Zone shared with Saudi Arabia), and 437,393 square 
kilometers. 

Topography: Country divided into four major regions: desert in 
west and southwest; rolling upland between upper Euphrates and 
Tigris rivers; highlands in north and northeast; and alluvial plain 
in central and southeast sections. 

Society 

Population: Preliminary 1987 census figures give total of 
16,278,000, a 35 percent increase over 1977. Annual rate of growth 
3.1 percent; about 57 percent of population in 1987 under twenty. 

Religious and Ethnic Divisions: At least 95 percent of popula- 
tion adheres to some form of Islam. Government gives number 
of Shias (see Glossary) as 55 percent but probably 60 to 65 percent 
is reasonable figure. Most Iraqi Shias are Arabs. Almost all Kurds, 
approximately 19 percent of population, are Sunnis (see Glossary), 
together with about 13 percent Sunni Arabs. Total Arab popula- 
tion in 1987 given by government as 76 percent. Remainder of 
population small numbers of Turkomans, mostly Sunni Muslims; 
Assyrians and Armenians, predominantly Christians; Yazidis, of 
Kurdish stock with a syncretistic faith; and a few Jews. 

Languages: Arabic official language and mother tongue of about 
76 percent of population; understood by majority of others. Kur- 
dish official language in As Sulaymaniyah, Dahuk, and Irbil gover- 
norates. Minorities speaking Turkic, Armenian, and Persian. 

Education: Rapidly growing enrollment in tuition-free public 
schools. Six years of primary (elementary), three years of inter- 
mediate secondary, and three years of intermediate preparatory 
education. Six major universities, forty-four teacher training schools 
and institutes, and three colleges and technical institutes, all govern- 
ment owned and operated. Dramatic increases since 1977 in num- 
bers of students in technical fields (300 percent rise) and numbers 
of female primary students (45 percent rise). Literacy variously 
estimated at about 40 percent by foreign observers and 70 percent 
by government. Academic year 1985-86: number of students in 
primary schools 2,812,516; secondary schools (general) 1,031,560; 
vocational schools 120,090; teacher training schools and institu- 
tions 34,187; universities, colleges, and technical institutes 53,037. 

Health: High incidence of trachoma, influenza, measles, whoop- 
ing cough, and tuberculosis. Considerable progress has been made 
in control of malaria. Continuing shortage of modern trained 



xiv 



medical and paramedical personnel, especially in rural areas and 
probably in northern Kurdish areas. 

Economy 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): estimated at US$35 billion in 
1986; in 1987 GDP estimated to have a 1.7 percent real growth 
rate, after negative growth rates 1981-86. Following outbreak of 
war with Iran in 1980, oil production decreased sharply. 

Currency: 1,000 fils = 20 dirhams = 1 Iraqi dinar (ID). (For 
value of Iraqi dinar — see Glossary). Data on financial status of Iraq 
are meager because Central Bank of Iraq, which is main source 
of official statistics, has not released figures since 1977. 

Oil Industry: Contribution to GDP in 1986 variously estimated, 
but probably about 33.5 percent. Production of crude oil averaged 
nearly 2.1 million barrels per day (bpd — see Glossary) in 1987; 
estimated at nearly 2.5 million bpd in 1988; oil exports in 1987 
estimated at 1.8 million bpd; oil revenues in 1987 estimated at 
US$1 1 .3 billion. Oil reserves in late 1987 calculated at 100 billion 
barrels definite and 40 billion additional barrels probable. Natural 
gas production in 1987 estimated at 7 million cubic meters; an esti- 
mated 5 million cubic meters burned off and remainder marketed. 
Natural gas reserves of nearly 850 billion cubic meters. 

Manufacturing and Services: Contribution of services (includ- 
ing construction, estimated at 12 percent; transportation and com- 
munications, estimated at 4.5 percent; utilities, estimated at 2 
percent) to GDP in 1986 variously estimated at 52 percent; min- 
ing and manufacturing contributed about 7 percent. Government 
figures put value of industrial output in 1984 at almost ID2 bil- 
lion, up from about ID300 million in 1968. Principal industries 
nonmetallic minerals, textiles, food processing, light manufactur- 
ing, with combination of government-owned and government- and 
private-owned plants. Construction is estimated to employ about 
20 percent of civilian and military labor force (because much con- 
struction is defense related, figures are lacking). Government figures 
showed 1984 industrial labor force at 170,000, with 80 percent of 
workers in state factories, 13 percent in private sector, and 7 per- 
cent in mixed sector. 

Agriculture: Accounted for about 7.5 percent of GDP in 1986; 
employed about 33 percent of the labor force in 1987. Cereal 
production increased almost 80 percent between 1975 and 1985; 



xv 



wheat and barley main crops. Date production dropped sharply 
because of war damage to date palms. 

Exports: Almost US$12 billion (including crude oil) in 1987. Crude 
oil, refined petroleum products, natural gas, chemical fertilizers, 
and dates were major commodities. 

Imports: About US$10 billion in 1987. Government import statis- 
tics in 1984 showed 34.4 percent capital goods, 30 percent raw 
materials, 22.4 percent foodstuffs, and 12.5 percent consumer 
goods. 

Major Trade Areas: Exports (in order of magnitude) in 1986 
mainly to Brazil, Spain, and Japan. Imports (in order of magni- 
tude) in 1986 mainly from Japan, Turkey, Federal Republic of 
Germany (West Germany), Italy, and Britain. 

Transportation 

Roads: Paved road network almost doubled between 1979 and 
1985, to 22,397 kilometers. Also 7,800 kilometers of unpaved secon- 
dary and feeder roads. In 1987 1,000-kilometer-long segment of 
international express highway from Mediterranean to Persian Gulf 
under construction. 

Railroads: By 1985 2,029 kilometers of railroads, of which 1,496 
were standard gauge, rest meter gauge. 

Ports: Basra was main port, together with newer port at Umm 
Qasr. Oil terminals at Mina al Bakr, Khawr al Amayah, and Al 
Faw, latter recaptured from Iran in 1988, and industrial port at 
Khawr az Zubayr. War with Iraq damaged port facilities and 
prevented use of most ports. 

Pipelines: Local lines to Persian Gulf and new spur line from Basra 
area to Saudi Arabia's Petroline (running from Eastern Province 
of Saudi Arabia to Red Sea port of Yanbu), with 500,000 bpd 
capacity, completed in 1985 because Syria cut off use of pipelines 
through Syria following outbreak of Iran-Iraq War. Further parallel 
pipeline to Saudi Arabia with 400,000 bpd capacity under construc- 
tion in 1988. Pipeline from Baiji to Baghdad and from Baghdad 
to Khanaqin; pipeline also between Baiji and Turkish Mediter- 
ranean port of Dortyol opened in 1977 with 800,000 to 900,000 
bpd capacity, expanded by 500,000 bpd capacity in 1987. Small 
pipelines distributed refined products to major consuming 
areas. 



xvi 



Airports: International airports at Baghdad and Basra, with new 
airport under construction at Baghdad. Also ninety-five airfields, 
sixty-one with permanent-surface runways. 

Government and Politics 

Government: In accordance with Provisional Constitution of July 
16, 1970, executive and legislative powers exercised by Revolu- 
tionary Command Council (RCC), chairman of which is also presi- 
dent of country. First parliamentary elections held in June 1980, 
resulting in First National Assembly. Second National Assembly 
elected in October 1984; National Assembly has generally met twice 
annually as provided in Constitution and exercises legislative func- 
tions together with RCC, which has ultimate decision-making 
authority. 

Politics: Political system was under firm control of Baath (Arab 
Socialist Resurrection) Party. Party's high command, called 
Regional Command, was headed in 1988 by President Saddam 
Husayn, who held title of secretary general of the Regional Com- 
mand and was also chairman of the RCC; vice chairman of the 
RCC and presumably successor to Husayn was Izzat Ibrahim; vice 
president was Taha Muhy ad Din Maruf. Government and polit- 
ical leadership interchangeable because members of Regional Com- 
mand also members of RCC. Political activities, where they existed, 
carried out within framework of Progressive National Front (PNF), 
of which Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) was a participant. Some 
Kurdish and independent progressive groups also included in PNF. 
Politics of opposition outside PNF banned for all practical purposes. 

Administrative Divisions: In 1988 eighteen governorates or 
provinces, each divided into districts and subdistricts. Limited self- 
rule was granted to Kurds in three northern governorates officially 
known as Autonomous Region (see Glossary) and popularly known 
as Kurdistan (land of the Kurds). 

Judicial System: Administratively under jurisdiction of Ministry 
of Justice but theoretically independent under the Constitution. 
All judges appointed by president. Court of Cassation, highest court 
of land; personal status disputes handled by religious community 
courts (Islamic law — or sharia — or other). Country divided into 
five appellate districts. 

International Affairs: Major issue was war with Iran since 1980 
and attempts at a peace settlement, which resulted in cease-fire in 
August 1988. In 1980s Iraq moved from close friendship with Soviet 



xvn 



Union to rapprochement with United States (diplomatic relations 
reestablished in 1984), cordial relations with Western Europe, es- 
pecially France, and good relations with Persian Gulf states and 
Jordan. Iraqi relations with Syria, which supported Iran in the war, 
were cool. 

National Security 

Armed Forces (1987): Army — approximately 1 million (includ- 
ing about 480,000 active reserves); navy — about 5,000; air force — 
40,000 (including 10,000 in Air Defense Command). Compulsory 
two-year conscription for males was extended during war. 

Combat Units and Major Equipment (1987) (Equipment esti- 
mates tentative because of wartime losses): Army — seven corps 
headquarters, five armored divisions (each with one armored 
brigade and one mechanized brigade), three mechanized divisions 
(each with one armored brigade and two or more mechanized 
brigades), thirty infantry divisions (including army, volunteer, and 
reserve brigades), one Presidential Guard Force (composed of three 
armored brigades, one infantry brigade, and one commando 
brigade), six Special Forces brigades; about 4,600 tanks, includ- 
ing advanced versions of T-72, about 4,000 armored vehicles, more 
than 3,000 towed and self-propelled artillery pieces; Air Defense 
Command — about 4,000 self-propelled antiaircraft guns, more than 
300 SAMs; Army Air Corps — about 270 armed helicopters. 
Navy — one frigate, eight OSA-class patrol boats with Styx SSMs, 
other small patrol, minesweeping, and supply ships; (being held 
in Italy under embargo in 1988) four Lupo-class frigates, with 
Otomat-2 SSMs and Albatros/Aspide SAMs, six Assad-class cor- 
vettes with Otomat-2 SSMs. Air Force — about 500 combat aircraft 
in 2 bomber squadrons, 11 fighter-ground attack squadrons, 5 inter- 
ceptor squadrons, 1 counterinsurgency squadron, and 2 transport 
squadrons. 

Military Budget: Fiscal year (FY) 1986 estimated at US$11.58 
billion. 

Police, Paramilitary, and State Security Organizations (1987): 

People's Army — estimated 650,000 (constituted majority of para- 
military reserves); Security Forces — 4,800 estimate; Frontier 
Guard, Futuwah (paramilitary youth organization), Department 
of General Intelligence, regular civil police force — sizes unknown. 



xvm 




XX 



^ 3 




Lak$ Urmia 



IRBIL C \ 



y IfULAYMAN/Wy^ 

' /''^■v.Suloymaniyo/N. 

TAM/M / \ f 



International boundary 

Governorate boundary 

® National capital 
• Governorate capital 



O 25 50 100 Kilometers 
I ■— r 




xxi 



Introduction 



IN THE LATE 1980s, Iraq became a central actor in Middle 
Eastern affairs and a force to reckon with in the wider international 
community. Iraq's growing role resulted from the way in which 
it was adapting the principles of Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrec- 
tion) Party socialism to meet the country's needs and from its some- 
what unexpected success in compelling Iran in August 1988 to 
request a cease-fire in the eight-year-old Iran-Iraq War. 

Iraq's reassertion in the 1980s of its role in the region and in 
the world community evoked its ancient history. At one time 
Mesopotamia ("the land between the rivers"), which encompassed 
much of present-day Iraq, formed the center not only of the Mid- 
dle East but also of the civilized world. The people of the Tigris 
and Euphrates basin, the ancient Sumerians, using the fertile land 
and the abundant water supply of the area, developed sophisticated 
irrigation systems and created what was probably the first cereal 
agriculture as well as the earliest writing, cuneiform. Their suc- 
cessors, the Akkadians, devised the most complete legal system of 
the period, the Code of Hammurabi. Located at a crossroads in 
the heart of the ancient Middle East, Mesopotamia was a plum 
sought by numerous foreign conquerors. Among them were the 
warlike Assyrians, from the tenth century through the seventh cen- 
tury B.C., and the Chaldeans, who in the sixth century B.C. created 
the Hanging Gardens of Babylon, one of the Seven Wonders of 
the Ancient World. 

In 539 B.C., Semitic rule of the area ended with the conquest 
of Babylon by Cyrus the Great. The successors of Cyrus paid little 
attention to Mesopotamia, with the result that the infrastructure 
was allowed to fall into disrepair. Not until the Arab conquest and 
the coming of Islam did Mesopotamia begin to regain its glory, 
particularly when Baghdad was the seat of the Abbasid caliphate 
between 750 and 1258. 

Iraq experienced various other foreign rulers, including the Mon- 
gols, the Ottoman Turks, and the British under a mandate estab- 
lished after World War I. The British placed Faisal, a Hashimite 
claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad, on the throne in 
1921. Popular discontent with the monarchy, which was regarded 
as a Western imposition, led in 1958 to a military revolution that 
overthrew the king. 

Ultimately, the military regime installed a government ruled by 
the Baath' s Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and created 



xxiu 



the Provisional Constitution of July 16, 1970, that institutional- 
ized the RCC's role. Within the Baath, power lay primarily in the 
hands of Baathists from the town of Tikrit, the birthplace of Sad- 
dam Husayn, who played an increasingly prominent role in the 
government in the 1970s. (Tikrit was also the hometown of his 
predecessor, Ahmad Hasan al Bakr, who formally resigned the 
leadership in 1979). 

The Baathist government in 1970 granted the Kurdish minor- 
ity a degree of autonomy, but not the complete self-rule the Kurds 
desired, in the predominantly Kurdish regions of Dahuk, Irbil, and 
As Sulaymaniyah (see fig. 1). In the early 1970s, Iraqi casualties 
from the renewed warfare with the Kurds were such as to induce 
Saddam Husayn to sign an agreement with the shah of Iran in 
Algiers in March 1975 recognizing the thalweg, or the midpoint 
of the Shatt al Arab, as the boundary between the two countries. 
The agreement ended the shah's aid to the Kurds, thus eventually 
quelling the rebellion. 

Saddam Husayn then turned his attention to domestic matters, 
particularly to the economy and to an industrial modernization pro- 
gram. He had notable success in distributing land, in improving 
the standard of living, and in increasing health and educational 
opportunities. Rural society was transformed as a result of large 
rural-to-urban migration and the decline of rural handicraft indus- 
tries. Urban society witnessed the rise, particularly in the late 1970s 
and the 1980s, of a class of Baathist technocrats. In addition, the 
Shia (see Glossary) Muslims, who, although they constituted a 
majority, had been largely unrepresented in significant areas of 
Iraqi society, in which the minority Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims 
were the governing element, were integrated to a considerable 
degree into the government, into business, and into the professions. 

Buoyed by domestic success, Saddam Husayn shifted his con- 
centration to foreign affairs. Beginning in the late 1970s, Iraq sought 
to assume a more prominent regional role and to replace Egypt, 
which had been discredited from its position of Arab leadership 
because of signing the Camp David Accords in 1978. Iraq, there- 
fore, gradually modified its somewhat hostile stance toward Saudi 
Arabia and the Persian Gulf states, seeking to win their support. 
Relations with the Soviet Union, Iraq's major source of weapons, 
cooled, however, following the Soviet invasion and occupation of 
Afghanistan that began in December 1979. In contrast, Iraqi ties 
with France improved considerably, and France became Iraq's sec- 
ond most important arms supplier. 

The overthrow of the monarchy in Iran and the coming to power 
in 1979 of Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini — whom 



xxiv 



Saddam Husayn had expelled from Iraq in 1978, reportedly at the 
shah's request — revived the historic hostility between the two coun- 
tries. Saddam Husayn feared the impact on Iraqi Shias of Kho- 
meini's Islamic fundamentalism and resented Iran's attempted 
hegemony in the Persian Gulf region. Believing Iran's military 
forces to be unprepared as a result of the revolutionary purges, 
in September 1980, following a number of border skirmishes, Iraq 
invaded Iranian territory. Thus began a bitter, costly, eight-year- 
long war in which the strength and the revolutionary zeal of Iran 
were clearly demonstrated. 

From late 1980 to 1988, the war took precedence over other mat- 
ters. The Baath high command succeeded in controlling Iraq's mili- 
tary institution to a degree that surprised foreign observers. One 
of the major instruments for accomplishing this control was the 
People's Army, which served as the Baath Party's militia. 

The Baath could do little, however, to counter Iran's superiority 
in manpower and materiel. At times when Iraq considered its sit- 
uation particularly desperate — for example, when Iranian forces 
appeared to be gaining control of substantial areas of Iraqi terri- 
tory, such as Al Faw Peninsula in the south and the northern moun- 
tainous Kurdish area — Iraq unleashed a barrage of missiles against 
Iranian cities. Further, reliable reports indicated that Iraq used 
chemical warfare against the enemy, possibly in the hope of bringing 
Iran to the negotiating table. 

To prevent domestic unrest as a result of the war, Saddam 
Husayn adopted a "guns and butter" economic policy, bringing 
in foreign laborers to replace those called to military service and 
striving to keep casualties low. After drawing down its own reserves, 
Iraq needed the financial support of its Gulf neighbors. Of the lat- 
ter, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 
all provided Iraq with loans to help it prosecute the war. Relations 
with Egypt also improved significantly after the war's outbreak. 
Meanwhile Iraqi hostility toward Syria, its fellow Baathist govern- 
ment but traditional rival, increased as a result of Syria's strong 
support of Iran. 

As part of his wartime economic policies, Saddam Husayn in 

1987 returned agricultural collectives to the private sector, and in 

1988 he took measures to privatize more than forty state-run fac- 
tories because of the inefficiency and unprofitability of agriculture 
and industry when under state control. These privatizing steps 
reflected a desire for greater economic efficiency rather than a 
change in economic ideology. Government controls on the econ- 
omy were decreased by cutting subsidies, by allowing partial foreign 



xxv 



ownership, and by reducing bureaucratic regulation of enterprises, 
thus reducing labor costs. 

Despite the introduction of more liberal economic policies in Iraq 
in the late 1980s, few indications suggested that the political sys- 
tem was becoming less rigid to any significant degree. Ultimate 
decisions in both the economic and the political realms apparently 
remained in the hands of Saddam Husayn rather than in those of 
the constitutionally designated RCC . According to a statement by 
Saddam Husayn to the Permanent Bureau of the Arab Jurists' Fed- 
eration in Baghdad in November 1988, the Baath two years previ- 
ously had approved steps toward democratization, but these had 
been delayed by the Iran-Iraq War. The measures included hav- 
ing a minimum of two candidates for each elective post, allowing 
non-Baathists to run for political office, and permitting the estab- 
lishment of other political parties. In January 1989, following an 
RCC meeting chaired by Saddam Husayn, the formation of a spe- 
cial committee to draft a new constitution was reported; accord- 
ing to unconfirmed reports in November, the new constitution will 
abolish the RCC. Elections for the National Assembly were also 
announced, and this body was authorized to investigate govern- 
ment ministries and departments. The elections took place in early 
April and featured almost 1,000 candidates (among them 62 
women, although none was elected) for the 250 seats; only 160 Baath 
Party members were elected. A number of Baathist candidates also 
were defeated in the September Kurdish regional assembly elec- 
tions. The results of both elections indicated a gradual downgrad- 
ing of the prominence of the Baath. The RCC, moreover, directed 
the minister of information to permit the public to voice complaints 
about government programs in the government-controlled press; 
and government officials were ordered to reply to such complaints. 
The role of Saddam Husayn' s family in government affairs was 
somewhat muted as well. Following the helicopter crash in a sand- 
storm on May 5 that killed Saddam Husayn' s brother-in-law and 
cousin, Minister of Defense Adnan Khayr Allah Talfah, a tech- 
nocrat who did not come from Tikrit, replaced Talfah. 

The internal security apparatus controlled by the Baath Party 
continued to keep a particularly close check on potential dissidents: 
these included Kurds, communists, and members of Shia revival 
movements. These movements, such as Ad Dawah al Islamiyah 
(the Islamic Call), commonly referred to as Ad Dawah, sought to 
propagate fundamentalist Islamic principles and were out of sym- 
pathy with Baath socialism. Furthermore, in 1988 in the final stages 
of the war, both before and after the cease-fire, Iraq was thought 
to have engaged in chemical warfare against the Kurds. Conceivably 



xxvi 



the regime saw an opportunity to instill such fear in the Kurds, 
a significant percentage of whom had cooperated with Iran dur- 
ing the war, that their dissidence would be discouraged. In the 
spring of 1989 the government announced it would depopulate a 
border strip thirty kilometers wide along the frontier with Turkey 
and Iran on the northeast, moving all inhabitants, mainly Kurds, 
from the area; it began this process in May. 

In December 1988, reports surfaced of dissidence within the 
army, in which Saddam Husayn lacked a power base. The projected 
annual Army Day celebrations on January 6, 1989, were cancelled 
and allegedly a number of senior army officers and some civilian 
Baathists were executed. In February the regime announced that 
all units of the People's Army would be withdrawn from the front 
by late March; in July a further announcement disbanded the three- 
division strong 1st Special Army Corps, formed in June 1986, but 
apparendy some time would elapse before soldiers actually returned 
to civilian status. Such measures were probably occasioned by the 
continued success of the cease-fire, initiated in August 1988. The 
cease-fire held, although a number of border incidents occurred, 
of which the most serious was the Iranian flooding of a sixty-four- 
kilometer frontier area northeast of Basra. Informed observers con- 
sidered the flooding designed to put pressure on Iraq to return a 
strip of approximately 1,000 square kilometers of Iranian territory 
on the steppe beyond Baqubah. On October 27, Iran stopped flood- 
ing the area, probably as a prelude to a new United Nations (UN) 
and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) mediation 
effort. 

The peace talks under UN sponsorship, despite a score of face- 
to-face meetings, had made little progress as of mid-December. A 
few exchanges of prisoners of war (POWs), largely of those that 
were ill or wounded, had taken place, but both Iraq and Iran still 
held large numbers of each other's prisoners. Saddam Husayn, who 
had agreed on October 5, 1988, to the ICRC plan for prisoner 
repatriation, in March 1989 proposed in a letter to UN Secretary 
General Javier Perez de Cuellar that the UN guarantee the return 
of the freed POWs to civilian life. Saddam Husayn made his 
proposal in the hope that this guarantee would reassure Iran, which 
held approximately 70,000 Iraqi POWs — whereas Iraq held about 
half that number of Iranians — that the balance of power would not 
be disturbed. Iran has refused to exchange prisoners or to imple- 
ment any of the ten points of UN Security Council Resolution 598 
dealing with the dispute until Iraq returns all Iranian territory. 

A major source of disagreement in the peace negotiations was 
Iraq's insistence on sovereignty over the Shatt al Arab, as opposed 



xxvn 



to the divided ownership created under the 1975 Algiers Agree- 
ment. Failing such a settlement, Iraq threatened to divert the waters 
of the Shatt al Arab above Basra so that it would rejoin the Gulf 
at Umm Qasr, a port that Iraq had announced it would deepen 
and widen. Iraq was eager to have Iran allow the UN to begin clear- 
ing sunken ships from the Shatt al Arab so as to permit Iraqi access 
to the sea. 

Iraq, meanwhile, had launched a diplomatic campaign to im- 
prove its relations with other countries of the region, particularly 
with Jordan and Egypt. In the last half of 1988, beginning even 
before he accepted the cease-fire, Saddam Husayn met five times 
with King Hussein and three times with Egyptian president Husni 
Mubarak. These high-level meetings included symbolic elements, 
such as Saddam Husayn 's accompanying Hussein on a visit in 
Baghdad to the graves of Faisal and Ghazi, the Hashimite kings 
of Iraq, an indication of a considerably more moderate Iraqi 
Baathist attitude toward monarchy than had been evident in the 
past. The meetings were designed to bolster political and economic 
support for Iraq (in December 1988 Iraq concluded a US$800 mil- 
lion trade agreement with Jordan for 1989), as well as to coordinate 
Arab policy toward the Palestine Liberation Organization and 
toward Israel, a revision of Iraq's previous rejection of any Arab- 
Israeli settlement. In addition, Saddam Husayn sought to reassure 
Saudi Arabia, from which Iraq had received substantial financial 
support during the Iran-Iraq War, that Iraq had no intention of 
dominating or of overthrowing the Persian Gulf monarchies. 

In its relations with the Western world, Iraq also exhibited greater 
moderation than it had in the 1970s or early 1980s. For example, 
the United States Department of State indicated in late March 1989 
that Iraq had agreed to pay US$27.3 million compensation to rela- 
tives of the thirty-seven American naval personnel killed in the 1987 
Iraqi attack on the USS Stark. During the war with Iran, Iraq had 
borrowed extensively from France, Britain, Italy, and to a lesser 
extent from the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) 
and Japan. These countries would doubtless play significant roles 
in Iraq's reconstruction and rearmament; in view of their com- 
mercial interest, Iraq has succeeded in having its loan repayments 
rescheduled. For example, Iraq signed an agreement with France 
in September 1989 allowing it to repay its indebtedness, due in 
1989, over a six- to nine-year period, and completing arrangements 
for Iraq's purchase of fifty Mirage 2000s. 

Since the cease-fire in August 1988, Iraq has undertaken an ex- 
tensive rearmament program involving foreign arms purchases and 
the intensified development of its domestic arms industry to generate 



xxvin 



export income as well as to meet domestic needs. The First Bagh- 
dad International Exhibition for Military Production took place 
from April 28 to May 2, 1989, featuring numerous types of Iraqi 
arms. Among weapons Iraq produced in 1989 were a T-74 tank, 
called the Lion of Baghdad, and an Iraqi version of the airborne 
early warning and control (AW ACS) aircraft, developed from the 
Soviet Ilyushin 11-76. Iraq named the plane the Adnan-1 after late 
Minister of Defense Adnan Khayr Allah Talfah. A military devel- 
opment that aroused considerable concern in Israel was Iraq's 
launching from its Al Anbar space research center in early Decem- 
ber of a forty-eight-ton, three-stage rocket capable of putting a satel- 
lite into space orbit. The minister of industry and military 
industrialization also announced that Iraq had developed two 
2,000-kilometer range surface-to-surface missiles. 

Apart from the need to replace lost armaments, the war imposed 
a heavy reconstruction burden on Iraq. To rebuild the infrastruc- 
ture and to prevent disaffection among the population of the south 
who had suffered particularly, the government gave a high priority 
to the rebuilding of Basra. On June 25, Iraq published the com- 
pletion of the basic reconstruction of Basra at a cost of approxi- 
mately US$6 billion, stating that work was then beginning on 
rebuilding Al Faw, which prior to wartime evacuation had about 
50,000 inhabitants. The government has also announced programs 
to create heavy industry, such as new iron and steel and alumi- 
num works, to build another petrochemical complex, to upgrade 
fertilizer plants, and to reconstruct the offshore oil export termi- 
nals at Khawr al Amayah and Mina al Bakr. In June 1989 Iraq 
reported its readiness to accommodate very large crude oil carriers 
at a new terminal at Mina al Bakr. 

Iraq has taken other economic measures to stimulate oil produc- 
tion and to control inflation. Since the cease-fire, Iraq has pumped 
nearly its full OPEC quota of 2.8 billion barrels of oil per day. 
In September 1989, Iraq completed its second crude oil pipeline 
across Saudi Arabia, with a capacity of 1 ,650,000 barrels per day, 
terminating at the Red Sea just south of the Saudi port of Yanbu. 
These major economic ventures have led to inflation. To counter 
price rises, the regime has set weekly prices on fruit and vegeta- 
bles and in late June instituted a price freeze for one year on state- 
produced goods and services. Concurrently it authorized an addi- 
tional monthly salary of 25 Iraqi dinars (approximately US$80) 
for all civil servants and members of the police and military forces. 

The negative economic consequences of the war extended beyond 
the reconstruction of cities and war-damaged infrastructure to 
include postponed development projects. For example, the massive 



xxix 



rural-to-urban migration, particularly in southern Iraq, caused by 
the war had intensified a process begun before the war and had 
created an urgent need for housing, educational, and health facili- 
ties in urban areas. The war also had serious effects on Iraqi soci- 
ety, exacerbating the strained relations of Iraqi Arabs with the 
leading minority, the Kurds. The war, however, exerted a posi- 
tive influence by promoting a greater sense of national unity, by 
diminishing differences between Shias and Sunnis, and by improv- 
ing the role of women. The aftermath of the war permitted modifi- 
cation of traditional Baathist socialist doctrines so as to encourage 
greater privatization of the economy, although the degree to which 
the government would maintain its reduced interference in the eco- 
nomic sphere remained to be seen. 

The end of the war left a number of unknown factors facing the 
Iraqi economy and society. One was the size of the postwar world 
petroleum demand and whether Iraq could sell its potential increased 
output on the international market. An important unanswered social 
question was whether women who had found employment during 
the war would return to domestic pursuits and help increase the birth- 
rate as the government hoped. Although women might remain in 
the work force, presumably, work permits of most foreign workers 
brought in during the war would be terminated. 

An immediate result of the war was an attempt by the govern- 
ment at political liberalization in allowing multiple candidates for 
elected posts and by offering an amnesty for political, but not for 
military, offenders. A test of this liberalization will be whether the 
reforms promised by the end of 1989 — the new constitution, legali- 
zation of political parties other than the Baath, and freedom of the 
press — occur. Measures taken as of mid-December reflected only 
minimal lessening of the personal control of President Saddam 
Husayn over the decision-making process in all spheres of the coun- 
try 's life. 

The end of the war left many security issues unresolved. Although 
the regime had disbanded some armed forces units, would Iraq 
maintain a strong, well-trained army, posing a potential threat to 
its neighbors and to Israel? Also, what of the Iraqi POWs return- 
ing home after several years' indoctrination in POW camps in 
Iran — could the government of Saddam Husayn rely on their 
loyalty? Finally, Iraq faced the problem of its traditional Sunni- 
Shia dichotomy. The war had demonstrated the ability of Iraqi Shias 
to put nationalist commitment above sectarian differences, but the 
influence of fundamentalist Shia Islam in the area, represented by 
the Iranian regime, would continue to threaten that loyalty. 

December 15, 1989 Helen Chapin Metz 



XXX 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 




Calf's head that appears as an ornament on golden harp from Ur, ca. 2500 B. C 



IRAQ, A REPUBLIC since the 1958 coup d'etat that ended the 
reign of King Faisal II, became a sovereign, independent state in 
1932. Although the modern state, the Republic of Iraq, is quite 
young, the history of the land and its people dates back more than 
5,000 years. Indeed, Iraq contains the world's richest known 
archaeological sites. Here, in ancient Mesopotamia (the land 
between the rivers), the first civilization — that of Sumer — appeared 
in the Middle East. Despite the millennium separating the two 
epochs, Iraqi history displays a continuity shaped by adaptation 
to the ebbings and flowings of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers (in 
Arabic, the Dijlis and Furat, respectively). Allowed to flow 
unchecked, the rivers wrought destruction in terrible floods that 
inundated whole towns. When the rivers were controlled by irri- 
gation dikes and other waterworks, the land became extremely 
fertile. 

The dual nature of the Tigris and the Euphrates — their poten- 
tial to be destructive or productive — has resulted in two distinct 
legacies found throughout Iraqi history. On the one hand, 
Mesopotamia's plentiful water resources and lush river valleys 
allowed for the production of surplus food that served as the basis 
for the civilizing trend begun at Sumer and preserved by rulers 
such as Hammurabi (1792-1750 B.C.), Cyrus (550-530 B.C.), 
Darius (520-485 B.C.), Alexander (336-323 B.C.), and the 
Abbasids (750-1258). The ancient cities of Sumer, Babylon, and 
Assyria all were located in what is now Iraq. Surplus food produc- 
tion and joint irrigation and flood control efforts facilitated the 
growth of a powerful and expanding state. 

Mesopotamia could also be an extremely threatening environ- 
ment, however, driving its peoples to seek security from the vicis- 
situdes of nature. Throughout Iraqi history, various groups have 
formed autonomous, self-contained social units. Allegiance to 
ancient religious deities at Ur and Eridu, membership in the Shiat 
Ali (or party of Ali, the small group of followers that supported 
Ali ibn Abu Talib as rightful leader of the Islamic community in 
the seventh century), residence in the asnaj (guilds) or the mahallat 
(city quarters) of Baghdad under the Ottoman Turks, member- 
ship in one of a multitude of tribes — such efforts to build autono- 
mous security-providing structures have exerted a powerful 
centrifugal force on Iraqi culture. 



3 



Iraq: A Country Study 



Two other factors that have inhibited political centralization are 
the absence of stone and Iraq's geographic location as the eastern 
flank of the Arab world. For much of Iraqi history, the lack of stone 
has severely hindered the building of roads. As a result, many parts 
of the country have remained beyond government control. Also, 
because it borders non-Arab Turkey and Iran and because of the 
great agricultural potential of its river valley, Iraq has attracted 
waves of ethnically diverse migrations. Although this influx of people 
has enriched Iraqi culture, it also has disrupted the country's inter- 
nal balance and has led to deep-seated schisms. 

Throughout Iraqi history, the conflict between political fragmen- 
tation and centralization has been reflected in the struggles among 
tribes and cities for the food-producing flatlands of the river valleys. 
When a central power neglected to keep the waterworks in repair, 
land fell into disuse, and tribes attacked settled peoples for pre- 
cious and scarce agricultural commodities. For nearly 600 years, 
between the collapse of the Abbasid Empire in the thirteenth cen- 
tury and the waning years of the Ottoman era in the late nineteenth 
century, government authority was tenuous and tribal Iraq was, 
in effect, autonomous. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Iraq's disconnected, and often antagonistic, ethnic, religious, and 
tribal social groups professed little or no allegiance to the central 
government. As a result, the all-consuming concern of contem- 
porary Iraqi history has been the forging of a nation-state out of 
this diverse and conflict-ridden social structure and the concomi- 
tant transformation of parochial loyalties, both tribal and ethnic, 
into a national identity. 

Beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century, the tanzimat 
reforms (an administrative and legal reorganization of the Otto- 
man Empire), the emergence of private property, and the tying 
of Iraq to the world capitalist market severely altered Iraq's social 
structure. Tribal shaykhs (see Glossary) traditionally had provided 
both spiritual leadership and tribal security. Land reform and 
increasing links with the West transformed many shaykhs into 
profit-seeking landlords, whose tribesmen became impoverished 
sharecroppers. Moreover, as Western economic penetration 
increased, the products of Iraq's once-prosperous craftsmen were 
displaced by machine-made British textiles. 

During the twentieth century, as the power of tribal Iraq waned, 
Baghdad benefited from the rise of a centralized governmental 
apparatus, a burgeoning bureaucracy, increased educational oppor- 
tunities, and the growth of the oil industry. The transformation 
of the urban-tribal balance resulted in a massive rural-to-urban 
migration. The disruption of existing parochial loyalties and the 



4 



Historical Setting 



rise of new class relations based on economics fueled frequent tribal 
rebellions and urban uprisings during much of the twentieth 
century. 

Iraq's social fabric was in the throes of a destabilizing transition 
in the first half of the twentieth century. At the same time, because 
of its foreign roots, the Iraqi political system suffered from a severe 
legitimacy crisis. Beginning with its League of Nations mandate 
in 1920, the British government had laid out the institutional frame- 
work for Iraqi government and politics. Britain imposed a Hashi- 
mite (also seen as Hashemite) monarchy, defined the territorial 
limits of Iraq with little correspondence to natural frontiers or tradi- 
tional tribal and ethnic settlements, and influenced the writing of 
a constitution and the structure of parliament. The British also sup- 
ported narrowly based groups — such as the tribal shaykhs — over 
the growing, urban-based nationalist movement, and resorted to 
military force when British interests were threatened, as in the 1941 
Rashid Ali coup. 

Between 1918 and 1958, British policy in Iraq had far-reaching 
effects. The majority of Iraqis were divorced from the political 
process, and the process itself failed to develop procedures for resolv- 
ing internal conflicts other than rule by decree and the frequent 
use of repressive measures. Also, because the formative experiences 
of Iraq's post- 1958 political leadership centered around clandes- 
tine opposition activity, decision making and government activity 
in general have been veiled in secrecy. Furthermore, because the 
country lacks deeply rooted national political institutions, politi- 
cal power frequently has been monopolized by a small elite, the 
members of which are often bound by close family or tribal ties. 

Between the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 and the emer- 
gence of Saddam Husayn in the mid-1970s, Iraqi history was a 
chronicle of conspiracies, coups, countercoups, and fierce Kurdish 
uprisings. Beginning in 1975, however, with the signing of the 
Algiers Agreement — an agreement between Saddam Husayn and 
the shah of Iran that effectively ended Iranian military support for 
the Kurds in Iraq — Saddam Husayn was able to bring Iraq an 
unprecedented period of stability. He effectively used rising oil 
revenues to fund large-scale development projects, to increase public 
sector employment, and significantly to improve education and 
health care. This tied increasing numbers of Iraqis to the ruling 
Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party. As a result, for the first 
time in contemporary Iraqi history, an Iraqi leader successfully 
forged a national identity out of Iraq's diverse social structure. Sad- 
dam Husayn' s achievements and Iraq's general prosperity, 
however, did not survive long. In September 1980, Iraqi troops 



5 



Iraq: A Country Study 



crossed the border into Iran, embroiling the country in a costly 
war (see fig. 1). 

Ancient Mesopotamia 

Sumer, Akkad, Babylon, and Assyria 

Contemporary Iraq occupies the territory that historians tradi- 
tionally have considered the site of the earliest civilizations of the 
ancient Middle East. Geographically, modern Iraq corresponds to 
the Mesopotamia of the Old Testament and of other, older, Mid- 
dle Eastern texts. In Western mythology and religious tradition, 
the land of Mesopotamia in the ancient period was a land of lush 
vegetation, abundant wildlife, and copious if unpredictable water 
resources. As such, at a very early date it attracted people from 
neighboring, but less hospitable areas. By 6000 B.C., Mesopota- 
mia had been settled, chiefly by migrants from the Turkish and 
Iranian highlands (see fig. 2). 

The civilized life that emerged at Sumer was shaped by two con- 
flicting factors: the unpredictability of the Tigris and Euphrates 
rivers, which at any time could unleash devastating floods that wiped 
out entire peoples, and the extreme fecundity of the river valleys, 
caused by centuries-old deposits of soil. Thus, while the river val- 
leys of southern Mesopotamia attracted migrations of neighbor- 
ing peoples and made possible, for the first time in history, the 
growing of surplus food, the volatility of the rivers necessitated a 
form of collective management to protect the marshy, low-lying 
land from flooding. As surplus production increased and as col- 
lective management became more advanced, a process of urbani- 
zation evolved and Sumerian civilization took root. 

Sumer is the ancient name for southern Mesopotamia. Histori- 
ans are divided on when the Sumerians arrived in the area, but 
they agree that the population of Sumer was a mixture of linguis- 
tic and ethnic groups that included the earlier inhabitants of the 
region. Sumerian culture mixed foreign and local elements. The 
Sumerians were highly innovative people who responded creatively 
to the challenges of the changeable Tigris and Euphrates rivers. 
Many of the great Sumerian legacies, such as writing, irrigation, 
the wheel, astronomy, and literature, can be seen as adaptive 
responses to the great rivers. 

The Sumerians were the first people known to have devised a 
scheme of written representation as a means of communication. 
From the earliest writings, which were pictograms (simplified pic- 
tures on clay tablets), the Sumerians gradually created cuneiform — a 
way of arranging impressions stamped on clay by the wedge-like 



6 



Historical Setting 



section of a chopped-off reed. The use of combinations of the same 
basic wedge shape to stand for phonetic, and possibly for syllabic, 
elements provided more flexible communication than the pictogram. 
Through writing, the Sumerians were able to pass on complex 
agricultural techniques to successive generations; this led to marked 
improvements in agricultural production. 

Another important Sumerian legacy was the recording of litera- 
ture. The most famous Sumerian epic and the one that has sur- 
vived in the most nearly complete form is the epic of Gilgamesh. 
The story of Gilgamesh, who actually was king of the city-state 
of Uruk in approximately 2700 B.C., is a moving story of the ruler's 
deep sorrow at the death of his friend and of his consequent search 
for immortality. Other central themes of the story are a devastat- 
ing flood and the tenuous nature of man's existence. Laden with 
complex abstractions and emotional expressions, the epic of Gil- 
gamesh reflects the intellectual sophistication of the Sumerians, and 
it has served as the prototype for all Middle Eastern inundation 
stories. The precariousness of existence in southern Mesopotamia 
also led to a highly developed sense of religion. Cult centers such 
as Eridu, dating back to 5000 B.C., served as important centers 
of pilgrimage and devotion even before the rise of Sumer. Many 
of the most important Mesopotamian cities emerged in areas sur- 
rounding the pre-Sumerian cult centers, thus reinforcing the close 
relationship between religion and government. 

The Sumerians were pantheistic; their gods more or less per- 
sonified local elements and natural forces. In exchange for sacrifice 
and adherence to an elaborate ritual, the gods of ancient Sumer 
were to provide the individual with security and prosperity. A 
powerful priesthood emerged to oversee ritual practices and to inter- 
vene with the gods. Sumerian religious beliefs also had important 
political aspects. Decisions relating to land rentals, agricultural ques- 
tions, trade, commercial relations, and war were determined by 
the priesthood, because all property belonged to the gods. The 
priests ruled from their temples, called ziggurats, which were 
essentially artificial mountains of sunbaked brick, built with out- 
side staircases that tapered toward a shrine at the top. 

Because the well-being of the community depended upon close 
observation of natural phenomena, scientific or protoscientific 
activities occupied much of the priests' time. For example, the 
Sumerians believed that each of the gods was represented by a num- 
ber. The number sixty, sacred to the god An, was their basic unit 
of calculation. The minutes of an hour and the notational degrees 
of a circle were Sumerian concepts. The highly developed agricul- 
tural system and the refined irrigation and water-control systems 



7 



Iraq: A Country Study 




Historical Setting 



that enabled Sumer to achieve surplus production also led to the 
growth of large cities. The most important city-states were Uruk, 
Eridu, Kish, Lagash, Agade, Akshak, Larsa, and Ur (birthplace 
of the prophet Abraham). The emergence of urban life led to fur- 
ther technological advances. Lacking stone, the Sumerians made 
marked improvements in brick technology, making possible the 
construction of very large buildings such as the famous ziggurat 
of Ur. Sumer also pioneered advances in warfare technology. By 
the middle of the third millennium B.C., the Sumerians had devel- 
oped the wheeled chariot. At approximately the same time, the 
Sumerians discovered that tin and copper when smelted together 
produced bronze — a new, more durable, and much harder metal. 
The wheeled chariot and bronze weapons became increasingly 
important as the Sumerians developed the institution of kingship 
and as individual city-states began to vie for supremacy. 

Historians generally divide Sumerian history into three stages. 
In the first stage, which extended roughly from 3360 B.C. to 
2400 B.C., the most important political development was the emer- 
gence of kings who, unlike the first priestly rulers, exercised dis- 
tinct political rather than religious authority. Another important 
feature of this period was the emergence of warring Sumerian city- 
states, which fought for control of the river valleys in lower 
Mesopotamia. During the second phase, which lasted from 
2400 B.C. to 2200 B.C., Sumer was conquered in approximately 
2334 B.C. by Sargon I, king of the Semitic city of Akkad. Sargon 
was the world's first empire-builder, sending his troops as far as 
Egypt and Ethiopia. He attempted to establish a unified empire 
and to end the hostilities among the city-states. Sargon' s rule intro- 
duced a new level of political organization that was characterized 
by an even more clear-cut separation between religious authority 
and secular authority. To ensure his supremacy, Sargon created 
the first conscripted army, a development related to the need to 
mobilize large numbers of laborers for irrigation and flood-control 
works. Akkadian strength was boosted by the invention of the com- 
posite bow, a new weapon made of strips of wood and horn. 

Despite their military prowess, Akkadian hegemony over 
southern Mesopotamia lasted only 200 years. Sargon 's great- 
grandson was then overthrown by the Guti, a mountain people 
from the east. The fall of the Akkadians and the subsequent reemer- 
gence of Sumer under the king of Ur, who defeated the Guti, 
ushered in the third phase of Sumerian history. In this final phase, 
which was characterized by a synthesis of Sumerian and Akkadian 
cultures, the king of Ur established hegemony over much of 
Mesopotamia. Sumerian supremacy, however, was on the wane. 



9 



Iraq: A Country Study 



By 2000 B.C. the combined attacks of the Amorites, a Semitic peo- 
ple from the west, and the Elamites, a Caucasian people from the 
east, had destroyed the Third Dynasty of Ur. The invaders 
nevertheless carried on the Sumero- Akkadian cultural legacy. 

The Amorites established cities on the Tigris and the Euphrates 
rivers and made Babylon, a town to the north, their capital. Dur- 
ing the time of their sixth ruler, King Hammurabi (1792- 
1750 B.C.), Babylonian rule encompassed a huge area covering 
most of the Tigris-Euphrates river valley from Sumer and the Per- 
sian Gulf in the south to Assyria in the north. To rule over such 
a large area, Hammurabi devised an elaborate administrative struc- 
ture. His greatest achievement, however, was the issuance of a law 
code designed "to cause justice to prevail in the country, to destroy 
the wicked and the evil, that the strong may not oppress the weak. ' ' 
The Code of Hammurabi, not the earliest to appear in the Middle 
East but certainly the most complete, dealt with land tenure, rent, 
the position of women, marriage, divorce, inheritance, contracts, 
control of public order, administration of justice, wages, and labor 
conditions. 

In Hammurabi's legal code, the civilizing trend begun at Sumer 
had evolved to a new level of complexity. The sophisticated legal 
principles contained in the code reflect a highly advanced civiliza- 
tion in which social interaction extended far beyond the confines 
of kinship. The large number of laws pertaining to commerce reflect 
a diversified economic base and an extensive trading network. In 
politics, Hammurabi's code is evidence of a more pronounced sepa- 
ration between religious and secular authority than had existed in 
ancient Sumer. In addition to Hammurabi's legal code, the Babylo- 
nians made other important contributions, notably to the science 
of astronomy, and they increased the flexibility of cuneiform by 
developing the pictogram script so that it stood for a syllable rather 
than an individual word. 

Beginning in approximately 1600 B.C., Indo-European- speaking 
tribes invaded India; other tribes settled in Iran and in Europe. 
One of these groups, the Hittites, allied itself with the Kassites, 
a people of unknown origins. Together, they conquered and 
destroyed Babylon. Hittite power subsequently waned, but, in the 
first half of the fourteenth century B.C., the Hittites reemerged, 
controlling an area that stretched from the Mediterranean Sea to 
the Persian Gulf. The military success of the Hittites has been 
attributed to their monopoly in iron production and to their use 
of the chariot. Nevertheless, in the twelfth century B.C., the Hit- 
tites were destroyed, and no great military power occupied 
Mesopotamia until the ninth century B.C. 



10 



Historical Setting 



One of the cities that flourished in the middle of the Tigris Val- 
ley during this period was that of Ashur, named after the sun-god 
of the Assyrians. The Assyrians were Semitic speakers who occupied 
Babylon for a brief period in the thirteenth century B.C. Invasions 
of iron-producing peoples into the Middle East and into the Aegean 
region in approximately 1200 B.C. disrupted the indigenous 
empires of Mesopotamia, but eventually the Assyrians were able 
to capitalize on the new alignments of power in the region. Because 
of what has been called "the barbarous and unspeakable cruelty 
of the Assyrians," the names of such Assyrian kings as Ashurnasir- 
pal (883-859 B.C.), Tiglath-Pileser III (745-727 B.C.), Sen- 
nacherib (704-681 B.C.), and Ashurbanipal (669-626 B.C.) 
continue to evoke images of powerful, militarily brilliant, but bru- 
tally savage conquerors. 

The Assyrians began to expand to the west in the early part of 
the ninth century B.C.; by 859 they had reached the Mediterra- 
nean Sea, where they occupied Phoenician cities. Damascus and 
Babylon fell to the next generations of Assyrian rulers. During the 
eighth century B.C., the Assyrians' control over their empire 
appeared tenuous, but Tiglath-Pileser III seized the throne and 
rapidly subdued Assyria's neighbors, captured Syria, and crowned 
himself king of Babylon. He developed a highly proficient war 
machine by creating a permanent standing army under the adminis- 
tration of a well-organized bureaucracy. Sennacherib built a new 
capital, Nineveh, on the Tigris River, destroyed Babylon (where 
citizens had risen in revolt), and made Judah a vassal state. 

In 612 B.C., revolts of subject peoples combined with the allied 
forces of two new kingdoms, those of the Medes and the Chalde- 
ans (Neo-Babylonians), effectively to extinguish Assyrian power. 
Nineveh was razed. The hatred that the Assyrians inspired, par- 
ticularly for their policy of wholesale resettlement of subject peo- 
ples, was sufficiently great to ensure that few traces of Assyrian 
rule remained two years later. The Assyrians had used the visual 
arts to depict their many conquests, and Assyrian friezes, executed 
in minute detail, continue to be the best artifacts of Assyrian 
civilization. 

The Chaldeans became heir to Assyrian power in 612 B.C., and 
they conquered formerly Assyrian-held lands in Syria and Pales- 
tine. King Nebuchadnezzar (605-562 B.C.) conquered the king- 
dom of Judah, and he destroyed Jerusalem in 586 B.C. Conscious 
of their ancient past, the Chaldeans sought to reestablish Babylon 
as the most magnificent city of the Middle East. It was during the 
Chaldean period that the Hanging Gardens of Babylon, famed as 
one of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World, were created. 



11 



Iraq: A Country Study 

Because of an estrangement of the priesthood from the king, 
however, the monarchy was severely weakened, and it was unable 
to withstand the rising power of Achaemenid Iran. In 539 B.C., 
Babylon fell to Cyrus the Great (550-530 B.C.). In addition to 
incorporating Babylon into the Iranian empire, Cyrus the Great 
released the Jews who had been held in captivity there. 

Iranian and Greek Intrusions 

Mesopotamia, for 2,000 years a stronghold of Semitic-speaking 
peoples, now fell to Indo-European rule that persisted for 1,176 
years. Cyrus, one of history's truly great leaders, ruled with a firm 
hand, but he was also well attuned to the needs of his subjects. 
Upon assuming power, he immediately replaced the savagery of 
the Assyrians with a respect for the customs and the institutions 
of his new subjects. He appointed competent provincial governors 
(the predecessors of the Persian satraps), and he required from his 
subjects only tribute and obedience. Following Cyrus's death, a 
brief period of Babylonian unrest ensued that climaxed in 522 B.C. 
with a general rebellion of Iranian colonies. 

Between 520 and 485 B.C., the efficient and innovative Iranian 
leader, Darius the Great, reimposed political stability in Babylon 
and ushered in a period of great economic prosperity. His greatest 
achievements were in road building — which significantly improved 
communication among the provinces — and in organizing an effi- 
cient bureaucracy. Darius 's death in 485 B.C. was followed by a 
period of decay that led to a major Babylonian rebellion in 482 B.C. 
The Iranians violently quelled the uprising, and the repression that 
followed severely damaged Babylon's economic infrastructure. 

The first Iranian kings to rule Iraq followed Mesopotamian land- 
management practices conscientiously. Between 485 B.C. and the 
conquest by Alexander the Great in 331 B.C., however, very little 
in Babylon was repaired and few of its once-great cities remained 
intact. Trade also was greatly reduced during this period. The 
established trade route from Sardis to Susa did not traverse Babylo- 
nia, and the Iranian rulers, themselves much closer to the Orient, 
were able to monopolize trade from India and other eastern points. 
As a result, Babylonia and Assyria, which together formed the ninth 
satrapy of the Persian Empire, became economically isolated and 
impoverished. Their poverty was exacerbated by the extremely high 
taxes levied on them: they owed the Iranian crown 1,000 talents 
of silver a year, in addition to having to meet the extortionate 
demands of the local administrators, and they were responsible for 
feeding the Iranian court for four months every year. 



12 




Ruins of a tower at Nimrud, near Kirkuk, 
referred to as Tower of Babel 
Courtesy Matson Collection 

Iranian rule lasted for more than 200 years, from 551 B.C. to 
331 B.C. During this time, large numbers of Iranians were added 
to Mesopotamia's ethnically diverse population. The flow of Ira- 
nians into Iraq, which began during the rein of the Achaemenids, 
initiated an important demographic trend that would continue 
intermittently throughout much of Iraqi history. Another impor- 
tant effect of Iranian rule was the disappearance of the Mesopota- 
mian languages and the widespread use of Aramaic, the official 
language of the empire. 

By the fourth century B.C., nearly all of Babylon opposed the 
Achaemenids. Thus, when the Iranian forces stationed in Baby- 
lon surrendered to Alexander the Great of Macedon in 331 B.C. 
all of Babylonia hailed him as a liberator. Alexander quickly won 
Babylonian favor when, unlike the Achaemenids, he displayed 
respect for such Babylonian traditions as the worship of their chief 
god, Marduk. Alexander also proposed ambitious schemes for 
Babylon. He planned to establish one of the two seats of his empire 
there and to make the Euphrates navigable all the way to the Per- 
sian Gulf, where he planned to build a great port. Alexander's 
grandiose plans, however, never came to fruition. Returning from 
an expedition to the Indus River, he died in Babylon — most prob- 
ably from malaria contracted there in 323 B.C. at the age of 



13 



Iraq: A Country Study 

thirty-two. In the politically chaotic period after Alexander's death, 
his generals fought for and divided up his empire. Many of the 
battles among the Greek generals were fought on Babylonian soil. 
In the latter half of the Greek period, Greek military campaigns 
were focused on conquering Phoenician ports and Babylonia was 
thus removed from the sphere of action. The city of Babylon lost 
its preeminence as the center of the civilized world when political 
and economic activity shifted to the Mediterranean, where it was 
destined to remain for many centuries. 

Although Alexander's major plans for Mesopotamia were unful- 
filled, and his generals did little that was positive for Mesopota- 
mia, the effects of the Greek occupation were noteworthy. Alexander 
and his successors built scores of cities in the Middle East that were 
modeled on the Greek city-states. One of the most important was 
Seleucia on the Tigris. The Hellenization of the area included the 
introduction of Western deities, Western art forms, and Western 
thought. Business revived in Mesopotamia because one of the Greek 
trade routes ran through the new cities. Mesopotamia exported 
barley, wheat, dates, wool, and bitumen; the city of Seleucia 
exported spices, gold, precious stones, and ivory. Cultural inter- 
change between Greek and Mesopotamian scholars was responsi- 
ble for the saving of many Mesopotamian scientific, especially 
astronomical, texts. 

In 126 B.C., the Parthians (or Arsacids), an intelligent, nomadic 
people who had migrated from the steppes of Turkestan to north- 
eastern Iran, captured the Tigris-Euphrates river valley. Having 
previously conquered Iran, the Parthians were able to control all 
trade between the East and the Greco-Roman world. For the most 
part, they chose to retain existing social institutions and to live in 
cities that already existed. Mesopotamia was immeasurably enriched 
by this, the mildest of all foreign occupations of the region. The 
population of Mesopotamia was enormously enlarged, chiefly by 
Arabs, Iranians, and Aramaeans. With the exception of the Roman 
occupation under Trajan (A.D. 98-117) and Septimius Severus 
(A.D. 193-21 1), the Arsacids ruled until a new force of native Ira- 
nian rulers, the Sassanids, conquered the region in A.D. 227. 

Little information is available on the Sassanid occupation, which 
lasted until A.D. 636. The north was devastated by battles fought 
between Romans and Sassanids. For the most part, the Sassanids 
appear to have neglected Mesopotamia. By the time the enfeebled 
Sassanid Empire fell to Muslim Arab warriors, Mesopotamia was 
in ruins, and Sumero- Akkadian civilization was entirely extin- 
guished. Sassanid neglect of the canals and irrigation ditches vital 
for agriculture had allowed the rivers to flood, and parts of the land 



14 



Historical Setting 



had become sterile. Nevertheless, Mesopotamian culture passed 
on many traditions to the West. The basic principles of mathematics 
and astronomy, the coronation of kings, and such symbols as the 
tree of life, the Maltese cross, and the crescent are part of Mesopota- 
mia's legacy. 

The Arab Conquest and the Coming of Islam 

The power that toppled the Sassanids came from an unexpected 
source. The Iranians knew that the Arabs, a tribally oriented peo- 
ple, had never been organized under the rule of a single power 
and were at a primitive level of military development. The Irani- 
ans also knew of the Arabs through their mutual trading activities 
and because, for a brief period, Yemen, in southern Arabia, was 
an Iranian satrapy. 

Events in Arabia changed rapidly and dramatically in the sixth 
century A.D. when Muhammad, a member of the Hashimite clan 
of the powerful Quraysh tribe of Mecca, claimed prophethood and 
began gathering adherents for the monotheistic faith of Islam that 
had been revealed to him (see Religious Life, ch. 2). The conver- 
sion of Arabia proved to be the most difficult of the Islamic con- 
quests because of entrenched tribalism. Within one year of 
Muhammad's death in 632, however, Arabia was secure enough 
for the Prophet's secular successor, Abu Bakr (632-634), the first 
caliph and the father-in-law of Muhammad, to begin the campaign 
against the Byzantine Empire and the Sassanid Empire. 

Islamic forays into Iraq began during the reign of Abu Bakr. 
In 634 an army of 18,000 Arab tribesmen, under the leadership 
of the brilliant general Khalid ibn al Walid (aptly nicknamed "The 
Sword of Islam"), reached the perimeter of the Euphrates delta. 
Although the occupying Iranian force was vastly superior in tech- 
niques and numbers, its soldiers were exhausted from their unre- 
mitting campaigns against the Byzantines. The Sassanid troops 
fought ineffectually, lacking sufficient reinforcement to do more. 
The first battle of the Arab campaign became known as the Battle 
of the Chains because Iranian soldiers were reputedly chained 
together so that they could not flee. Khalid offered the inhabitants 
of Iraq an ultimatum: "Accept the faith and you are safe; other- 
wise pay tribute. If you refuse to do either, you have only yourself 
to blame. A people is already upon you, loving death as you love 
life." 

Most of the Iraqi tribes were Christian at the time of the Islamic 
conquest. They decided to pay the jizya, the tax required of non- 
Muslims living in Muslim-ruled areas, and were not further dis- 
turbed. The Iranians rallied briefly under their hero, Rustam, and 



15 



Iraq: A Country Study 

attacked the Arabs at Al Hirah, west of the Euphrates. There, they 
were soundly defeated by the invading Arabs. The next year, in 
635, the Arabs defeated the Iranians at the Battle of Buwayb. 
Finally, in May 636 at Al Qadisiyah, a village south of Baghdad 
on the Euphrates, Rustam was killed. The Iranians, who outnum- 
bered the Arabs six to one, were decisively beaten. From Al 
Qadisiyah the Arabs pushed on to the Sassanid capital at Ctesi- 
phon (Madain). 

The Islamic conquest was made easier because both the Byzan- 
tine Empire and the Sassanid Empire were culturally and socially 
bankrupt; thus, the native populations had little to lose by cooper- 
ating with the conquering power. Because the Muslim warriors 
were fighting a jihad (holy war), they were regulated by religious 
law that strictly prohibited rape and the killing of women, chil- 
dren, religious leaders, or anyone who had not actually engaged 
in warfare. Further, the Muslim warriors had come to conquer and 
settle a land under Islamic law. It was not in their economic inter- 
est to destroy or pillage unnecessarily and indiscriminately. 

The caliph Umar (634-44) ordered the founding of two garri- 
soned cities to protect the newly conquered territory: Kufah, named 
as the capital of Iraq, and Basra, which was also to be a port. Umar 
also organized the administration of the conquered Iranian lands. 
Acting on the advice of an Iranian, Umar continued the Sassanid 
office of the divan (Arabic form diwan). Essentially an institution 
to control income and expenditure through record keeping and the 
centralization of administration, the divan would be used henceforth 
throughout the lands of the Islamic conquest. Dihqans, minor reve- 
nue collection officials under the Sassanids, retained their func- 
tion of assessing and collecting taxes. Tax collectors in Iraq had 
never enjoyed universal popularity, but the Arabs found them par- 
ticularly noxious. Arabic replaced Persian as the official language, 
and it slowly filtered into common usage. Iraqis intermarried with 
Arabs and converted to Islam. 

By 650 Muslim armies had reached the Amu Darya (Oxus River) 
and had conquered all the Sassanid domains, although some were 
more strongly held than others. Shortly thereafter, Arab expan- 
sion and conquest virtually ceased. Thereafter, the groups in power 
directed their energies to maintaining the status quo while those 
outside the major power structure devoted themselves to political 
and religious rebellion. The ideologies of the rebellions usually were 
couched in religious terms. Frequently, a difference in the interpre- 
tation of a point of doctrine was sufficient to spark armed warfare. 
More often, however, religious disputes were the rationalization 
for underlying nationalistic or cultural dissatisfactions. 



16 



Historical Setting 



The Sunni-Shia Controversy 

The most critical problem that faced the young Islamic commu- 
nity revolved around the rightful successor to the office of caliph. 
Uthman, the third caliph, had encountered opposition during and 
after his election to the caliphate. Ali ibn Abu Talib, the Prophet 
Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law (by virtue of his marrying 
the Prophet's only surviving child, Fatima), had been the other 
contender. 

Ali's pietism was disquieting to certain vested-interest groups, 
who perceived the more conservative Uthman as more likely to 
continue the policies of the previous caliph, Umar. Discontent 
increased, as did Ali's formal opposition to Uthman based on reli- 
gious grounds. Ali claimed that innovations had been introduced 
that were not consonant with Quranic directives. Economics was 
the key factor for most of the members of the opposition, but this, 
too, acquired religious overtones. 

As a result of the rapid military expansion of the Islamic move- 
ment, financial troubles beset Uthman. Many beduins had offered 
themselves for military service in Iraq and in Egypt. Their abstemi- 
ous and hard life contrasted with the leisured life of Arabs in the 
Hijaz (the western part of the Arabian Peninsula), who were 
enjoying the benefits of conquest. When these volunteer soldiers 
questioned the allocation of lands and the distribution of revenues 
and pensions, they found a ready spokesman in Ali. 

Groups of malcontents eventually left Iraq and Egypt to seek 
redress at Medina in the Hijaz. Uthman promised reforms, but 
on their return journey the rebels intercepted a message to the gover- 
nor of Egypt commanding that they be punished. In response, the 
rebels besieged Uthman in his home in Medina, eventually slay- 
ing him. Uthman 's slayer was a Muslim and a son of the first caliph, 
Abu Bakr. The Muslim world was shaken. Ali, who had not taken 
part in the siege, was chosen caliph. 

Two opponents of Ali enlisted Aisha, a widow of the Prophet 
Muhammad, to join them in accusing Ali and demanding retri- 
bution for Uthman' s death. When the three went to Iraq to seek 
support for their cause, Ali's forces engaged theirs near Basra. 
Aisha' s two companions were killed, and Ali was clearly victori- 
ous. Muawiyah, a kinsman of Uthman and the governor of Syria, 
then refused to recognize Ali, and he demanded the right to avenge 
his relative's death. In what was perhaps the most important bat- 
tle fought between Muslims, Ali's forces met Muawiyah' s at the 
Plain of Siffin near the largest bend of the Euphrates River. Mua- 
wiyah's forces, seeing that they were losing, proposed arbitration. 



17 



Iraq: A Country Study 

Accordingly, two arbitrators were chosen to decide whether Uth- 
man's death had been deserved. Such a decision would give his 
slayer status as an executioner rather than as a murderer and would 
remove the claims of Uthman's relatives. When the arbitrators 
decided against Ali, he protested that the verdict was not in accor- 
dance with sharia (Islamic law) and declared his intention to resume 
the battle. 

Ali's decision, however, came too late for the more extreme of 
his followers. Citing the Quranic injunction to fight rebels until 
they obey, these followers insisted that Ali was morally wrong to 
submit to arbitration. In doing so, they claimed, he bowed to the 
judgment of men — as opposed to the judgment of God that would 
have been revealed by the outcome of the battle. These dissenters, 
known as Kharajites (from the verb kharaja — to go out), withdrew 
from battle, an action that had far-reaching political effects on the 
Islamic community in the centuries ahead. Before resuming his 
dispute with Muawiyah, Ali appealed to the Kharajites; when they 
rejected the appeal, he massacred many of them. Furious at his 
treatment of pious Muslims, most of Ali's forces deserted him. He 
was forced to return to Al Kufah — about 150 kilometers south of 
Baghdad — and to await developments within the Islamic com- 
munity. 

A number of Islamic leaders met at Adruh in present-day Jor- 
dan, and the same two arbitrators from Siffin devised a solution 
to the succession problem. At last it was announced that neither 
Ali nor Muawiyah should be caliph; Abd Allah, a son of Umar, 
was proposed. The meeting terminated in confusion, however, and 
no final decision was reached. Both Ali and Muawiyah bided their 
time in their separate governorships: Muawiyah, who had been 
declared caliph by some of his supporters, in newly conquered 
Egypt, and Ali, in Iraq. Muawiyah fomented discontent among 
those only partially committed to Ali. While praying in a mosque 
at Al Kufah, Ali was murdered by a Kharajite in 661 . The ambi- 
tious Muawiyah induced Ali's eldest son, Hasan, to renounce his 
claim to the caliphate. Hasan died shortly thereafter, probably of 
consumption, but the Shias (see Glossary) later claimed that he 
had been poisoned and dubbed him "Lord of All Martyrs." Ali's 
unnatural death ensured the future of the Shia movement — Ali's 
followers returned to his cause — and quickened its momentum. 
With the single exception of the Prophet Muhammad, no man has 
had a greater impact on Islamic history. The Shia declaration of 
faith is: "There is no God but God; Muhammad is his Prophet 
and Ali is the Saint of God." 



18 



Arch of Ctesiphon 
Courtesy Ronald L. Kuipers 



Subsequently, Muawiyah was declared caliph. Thus began the 
Umayyad Dynasty, which had its capital at Damascus. Yazid I, 
Muawiyah' s son and his successor in 680, was unable to contain 
the opposition that his strong father had vigorously quelled. Husayn, 
Ali's second son, refused to pay homage and fled to Mecca, where 
he was asked to lead the Shias — mostly Iraqis — in a revolt against 
Yazid I. Ubayd Allah, governor of Al Kufah, discovered the plot 
and sent detachments to dissuade him. At Karbala, in Iraq, 
Husayn' s band of 200 men and women refused to surrender and 
finally were cut down by a force of perhaps 4,000 Umayyad troops. 
Yazid I received Husayn' s head, and Husayn' s death on the tenth 
of Muharram (October 10, 680) continues to be observed as a day 
of mourning for all Shias. Ali's burial place at An Najaf, about 
130 kilometers south of Baghdad, and Husayn's at Karbala, about 
80 kilometers southwest of Baghdad, are holy places of pilgrimage 
for Shias, many of whom feel that a pilgrimage to both sites is equal 
to a pilgrimage to Mecca (see Religious Life, ch. 2). 

The importance of these events in the history of Islam cannot 
be overemphasized. They created the greatest of the Islamic schisms, 
between the party of Ali (the Shiat Ali, known in the West as Shias 
or Shiites) and the upholders of Muawiyah (the Ahl as Sunna, the 
People of the Sunna — those who follow Muhammad's custom and 
example) or the Sunnis (see Glossary). The Sunnis believe they 



19 



Iraq: A Country Study 

are the followers of orthodoxy. The ascendancy of the Umayyads 
and the events at Karbala, in contrast, led to a Shia Islam which, 
although similar to Sunni Islam in its basic tenets, maintains impor- 
tant doctrinal differences that have had pervasive effects on the Shia 
world view. Most notably, Shias have viewed themselves as the 
opposition in Islam, the opponents of privilege and power. They 
believe that after the death of Ali and the ascension of the "usurper" 
Umayyads to the caliphate, Islam took the wrong path; therefore, 
obedience to existing temporal authority is not obligatory. Further- 
more, in sacrificing his own life for a just cause, Husayn became 
the archetypal role model who inspired generations of Shias to fight 
for social equality and for economic justice. 

During his caliphate, Ali had made Al Kufah his capital. The 
transfer of power to Syria and to its capital at Damascus aroused 
envy among Iraqis. The desire to regain preeminence prompted 
numerous rebellions in Iraq against Umayyad rule. Consequently, 
only men of unusual ability were sent to be governors of Al Basrah 
and Al Kufah. One of the most able was Ziyad ibn Abihi, who 
was initially governor of Al Basrah and later also of Al Kufah. Ziyad 
divided the residents of Al Kufah into four groups (not based on 
tribal affiliation) and appointed a leader for each one. He also sent 
50,000 beduins to Khorasan (in northeastern Iran), the eastern- 
most province of the empire, which was within the jurisdiction of 
Al Basrah and Al Kufah. 

The Iraqis once again became restive when rival claimants for 
the Umayyad caliphate waged civil war between 687 and 692. Ibn 
Yusuf ath Thaqafi al Aajjay was sent as provincial governor to 
restore order in Iraq in 694. He pacified Iraq and encouraged both 
agriculture and education. 

The Abbasid Caliphate, 750-1258 

Many unsuccessful Iraqi and Iranian insurrectionists had fled 
to Khorasan, in addition to the 50,000 beduins who had been sent 
there by Ziyad. There, at the city of Merv (present-day Mary in 
the Soviet Union), a faction that supported Abd al Abbas (a descen- 
dant of the Prophet's uncle), was able to organize the rebels under 
the battle cry, "the House of Hashim." Hashim, the Prophet 
Muhammad's grandfather, was an ancestor of both the Shia line 
and the Abbas line, and the Shias therefore actively supported the 
Hashimite leader, Abu Muslim. In 747, Abu Muslim's army 
attacked the Umayyads and occupied Iraq. In 750, Abd al Abbas 
(not a Shia) was established in Baghdad as the first caliph of the 
Abbasid Dynasty. The Abbasids, whose line was called "the blessed 
dynasty" by it supporters, presented themselves to the people as 



20 



Historical Setting 



divine-right rulers who would initiate a new era of justice and 
prosperity. Their political policies were, however, remarkably simi- 
lar to those of the Umayyads. 

During the reign of its first seven caliphs, Baghdad became a 
center of power where Arab and Iranian cultures mingled to 
produce a blaze of philosophical, scientific, and literary glory. This 
era is remembered throughout the Arab world, and by Iraqis in 
particular, as the pinnacle of the Islamic past. It was the second 
Abbasid caliph, Al Mansur (754-75), who decided to build a new 
capital, surrounded by round walls, near the site of the Sassanid 
village of Baghdad. Within fifty years the population outgrew the 
city walls as people thronged to the capital to become part of the 
Abbasids' enormous bureaucracy or to engage in trade. Baghdad 
became a vast emporium of trade linking Asia and the Mediterra- 
nean (see fig. 3). By the reign of Mansur' s grandson, Harun ar 
Rashid (786-806), Baghdad was second in size only to Constan- 
tinople. Baghdad was able to feed its enormous population and to 
export large quantities of grain because the political administra- 
tion had realized the importance of controlling the flows of the Tigris 
and the Euphrates rivers. The Abbasids reconstructed the city's 
canals, dikes, and reservoirs, and drained the swamps around Bagh- 
dad, freeing the city of malaria. 

Harun ar Rashid, the caliph of the Arabian Nights, actively sup- 
ported intellectual pursuits, but the great flowering of Arabic cul- 
ture that is credited to the Abbasids reached its apogee during the 
reign of his son, Al Mamun (813-33). After the death of Harun 
ar Rashid, his sons, Amin and Al Mamun, quarreled over the suc- 
cession to the caliphate. Their dispute soon erupted into civil war. 
Amin was backed by the Iraqis, while Al Mamun had the support 
of the Iranians. Al Mamun also had the support of the garrison 
at Khorasan and thus was able to take Baghdad in 813. Although 
Sunni Muslims, the Abbasids had hoped that by astute and stern 
rule they would be able to contain Shia resentment at yet another 
Sunni dynasty. The Iranians, many of whom were Shias, had hoped 
that Al Mamun would make his capital in their own country, pos- 
sibly at Merv. Al Mamun, however, eventually realized that the 
Iraqi Shias would never countenance the loss of prestige and eco- 
nomic power if they no longer had the capital. He decided to center 
his rule in Baghdad. 

Disappointed, the Iranians began to break away from Abbasid 
control. A series of local dynasties appeared: the Tahirids (821-873), 
the Suffarids (867-ca. 1495), and the Samanids (819-1005). The 
same process was repeated in the West: Spain broke away in 756, 
Morocco in 788, Tunisia in 800, and Egypt in 868. In Iraq there 



21 



Iraq: A Country Study 




Historical Setting 



was trouble in the south. In 869, Ali ibn Muhammad (Ali the 
Abominable) founded a state of black slaves known as Zanj. The 
Zanj brought a large part of southern Iraq and southwestern Iran 
under their control and in the process enslaved many of their former 
masters. The Zanj Rebellion was finally put down in 883, but not 
before it had caused great suffering. 

The Sunni-Shia split had weakened the effectiveness of Islam 
as a single unifying force and as a sanction for a single political 
authority. Although the intermingling of various linguistic and cul- 
tural groups contributed greatly to the enrichment of Islamic civili- 
zation, it also was a source of great tension and contributed to the 
decay of Abbasid power. 

In addition to the cleavages between Arabs and Iranians and 
between Sunnis and Shias, the growing prominence of Turks in 
military and in political affairs gave cause for discontent and rivalry 
at court. Nomadic, Turkic- speaking warriors had been moving out 
of Central Asia into Transoxiana (i.e., across the Oxus River) for 
more than a millennium. The Abbasid caliphs began importing 
Turks as slave- warriors (Mamluks) early in the ninth century. The 
imperial palace guards of the Abbasids were Mamluks who were 
originally commanded by free Iraqi officers. By 833, however, 
Mamluks themselves were officers and gradually, because of their 
greater military proficiency and dedication, they began to occupy 
high positions at court. The mother of Caliph Mutasim (who came 
to power in 833) had been a Turkish slave, and her influence was 
substantial. By the tenth century, the Turkish commanders, no 
longer checked by their Iranian and Arab rivals at court, were able 
to appoint and depose caliphs. For the first time, the political power 
of the caliphate was fully separated from its religious function. The 
Mamluks continued to permit caliphs to come to power because 
of the importance of the office as a symbol for legitimizing claims 
to authority. 

In 945, after subjugating western Iran, a military family known 
as the Buwayhids occupied Baghdad. Shias from the Iranian 
province of Daylam south of the Caspian Sea, the Buwayhids con- 
tinued to permit Sunni Abbasid caliphs to ascend to the throne. 
The humiliation of the caliphate at being manipulated by Shias, 
and by Iranian ones at that, was immense. 

The Buwayhids were ousted in 1055 by another group of Turkic 
speakers, the Seljuks. The Seljuks were the ruling clan of the Kinik 
group of the Oghuz (or Ghuzz) Turks, who lived north of the Oxus 
River. Their leader, Tughril Beg, turned his warriors first against 
the local ruler in Khorasan. He moved south and then west, con- 
quering but not destroying the cities in his path. In 1055 the caliph 



23 



Iraq: A Country Study 



in Baghdad gave Tughril Beg robes, gifts, and the title, "King of 
the East." Because the Seljuks were Sunnis, their rule was wel- 
comed in Baghdad. They treated the caliphs with respect, but the 
latter continued to be only figureheads. 

There were several lines of Seljuks. The main line, ruling from 
Baghdad, controlled the area from the Bosporus to Chinese Turke- 
stan until approximately 1155. The Seljuks continued to expand 
their territories, but they were content to let Iraqis and Iranians 
simply pay tribute while administering and ruling their own lands. 
One Seljuk, Malek Shah, extended Turkish rule to the countries 
of the eastern Mediterranean, Asia Minor, and to parts of Arabia. 
During his rule, Iraq and Iran enjoyed a cultural and scientific 
renaissance. This success is largely attributed to Malek Shah's bril- 
liant Iranian vizier, Nizam al Mulk, one of the most skillful adminis- 
trators in history. An astronomical observatory was established in 
which Umar (Omar) Khayyam did much of his experimentation 
for a new calendar, and religious schools were built in all the major 
towns. Abu Hamid al Ghazali, one of the greatest Islamic theo- 
logians, and other eminent scholars were brought to the Seljuk capi- 
tal at Baghdad and were encouraged and supported in their work. 

After the death of Malek Shah in 1092, Seljuk power disinte- 
grated. Petty dynasties appeared throughout Iraq and Iran, and 
rival claimants to Seljuk rule dispatched each other. Between 1118 
and 1194, nine Seljuk sultans ruled Baghdad; only one died a 
natural death. The atabegs (see Glossary), who initially had been 
majordomos for the Seljuks, began to assert themselves. Several 
founded local dynasties. An atabeg originated the Zangid Dynasty 
(1 127-1222), with its seat at Mosul. The Zangids were instrumental 
in encouraging Muslims to oppose the invasions of the Christian 
Crusaders. Tughril (1177-94), the last Seljuk sultan of Iraq, was 
killed by the leader of a Turkish dynasty, the Khwarizm shahs, 
who lived south of the Aral Sea. Before his successor could estab- 
lish Khwarizm rule in Iraq, however, Baghdad was overrun by 
the Mongol horde. 

The Mongol Invasion 

In the early years of the thirteenth century, a powerful Mongol 
leader named Temujin brought together a majority of the Mongol 
tribes and led them on a devastating sweep through China. At about 
this time, he changed his name to Chinggis (Genghis) Khan, mean- 
ing "World Conqueror." In 1219 he turned his force of 700,000 
west and quickly devastated Bokhara, Samarkand, Balkh, Merv 
(all in what is now the Soviet Union), and Neyshabur (in present- 
day Iran), where he slaughtered every living thing. Before his death 



24 



Historical Setting 

in 1227, Chinggis Khan, pillaging and burning cities along the way, 
had reached western Azarbaijan in Iran. After Chinggis's death, 
the area enjoyed a brief respite that ended with the arrival of Hulagu 
Khan (1217-65), Chinggis's grandson. In 1258 he seized Bagh- 
dad and killed the last Abbasid caliph. While in Baghdad, Hulagu 
made a pyramid of the skulls of Baghdad's scholars, religious lead- 
ers, and poets, and he deliberately destroyed what remained of 
Iraq's canal headworks. The material and artistic production of 
centuries was swept away. Iraq became a neglected frontier province 
ruled from the Mongol capital of Tabriz in Iran. 

After the death in 1335 of the last great Mongol khan, Abu Said 
(also known as Bahadur the Brave), a period of political confusion 
ensued in Iraq until a local petty dynasty, the Jalayirids, seized 
power. The Jalayirids ruled until the beginning of the fifteenth cen- 
tury. Jalayirid rule was abruptly checked by the rising power of 
a Mongol, Tamerlane (or Timur the Lame, 1336-1405), who had 
been atabeg of the reigning prince of Samarkand. In 1401 he sacked 
Baghdad and massacred many of its inhabitants. Tamerlane killed 
thousands of Iraqis and devastated hundreds of towns. Like Hulagu, 
Tamerlane had a penchant for building pyramids of skulls. Despite 
his showy display of Sunni piety, Tamerlane's rule virtually extin- 
guished Islamic scholarship and Islamic arts everywhere except in 
his capital, Samarkand. 

In Iraq, political chaos, severe economic depression, and social 
disintegration followed in the wake of the Mongol invasions. Bagh- 
dad, long a center of trade, rapidly lost its commercial importance. 
Basra, which had been a key transit point for seaborne commerce, 
was circumvented after the Portuguese discovered a shorter route 
around the Cape of Good Hope. In agriculture, Iraq's once- 
extensive irrigation system fell into disrepair, creating swamps and 
marshes at the edge of the delta and dry, uncultivated steppes far- 
ther out. The rapid deterioration of settled agriculture led to the 
growth of tribally based pastoral nomadism. By the end of the Mon- 
gol period, the focus of Iraqi history had shifted from the urban- 
based Abbasid culture to the tribes of the river valleys, where it 
would remain until well into the twentieth century. 

The Ottoman Period, 1534-1918 

From the sixteenth to the twentieth century, the course of Iraqi 
history was affected by the continuing conflicts between the Safavid 
Empire in Iran and the Ottoman Turks. The Safavids, who were 
the first to declare Shia Islam the official religion of Iran, sought 
to control Iraq both because of the Shia holy places at An Najaf 
and Karbala and because Baghdad, the seat of the old Abbasid 



25 



Iraq: A Country Study 

Empire, had great symbolic value. The Ottomans, fearing that Shia 
Islam would spread to Anatolia (Asia Minor), sought to maintain 
Iraq as a Sunni-controlled buffer state. In 1509 the Safavids, led 
by Ismail Shah (1502-24), conquered Iraq, thereby initiating a 
series of protracted battles with the Ottomans. In 1514 Sultan Selim 
the Grim attacked Ismail's forces and in 1535 the Ottomans, led 
by Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent (1520-66), conquered Bagh- 
dad from the Safavids. The Safavids reconquered Baghdad in 1623 
under the leadership of Shah Abbas (1587-1629), but they were 
expelled in 1638 after a series of brilliant military maneuvers by 
the dynamic Ottoman sultan, Murad IV (see fig. 4). 

The major impact of the Safavid-Ottoman conflict on Iraqi his- 
tory was the deepening of the Shia-Sunni rift. Both the Ottomans 
and the Safavids used Sunni and Shia Islam respectively to mobi- 
lize domestic support. Thus, Iraq's Sunni population suffered 
immeasurably during the brief Safavid reign (1623-38), while Iraq's 
Shias were excluded from power altogether during the longer period 
of Ottoman supremacy (1638-1916). During the Ottoman period, 
the Sunnis gained the administrative experience that would allow 
them to monopolize political power in the twentieth century. The 
Sunnis were able to take advantage of new economic and educa- 
tional opportunities while the Shias, frozen out of the political 
process, remained politically impotent and economically depressed. 
The Shia-Sunni rift continued as an important element of Iraqi 
social structure in the 1980s (see Religious Life, ch. 2). 

By the seventeenth century, the frequent conflicts with the 
Safavids had sapped the strength of the Ottoman Empire and had 
weakened its control over its provinces. In Iraq, tribal authority 
once again dominated; the history of nineteenth-century Iraq is 
a chronicle of tribal migrations and of conflict. The nomadic popu- 
lation swelled with the influx of beduins from Najd, in the Arabian 
Peninsula. Beduin raids on settled areas became impossible to curb. 
In the interior, the large and powerful Muntafiq tribal confedera- 
tion took shape under the leadership of the Sunni Saadun family 
of Mecca. In the desert southwest, the Shammar — one of the big- 
gest tribal confederations of the Arabian Peninsula — entered the 
Syrian desert and clashed with the Anayzah confederation. On the 
lower Tigris near Al Amarah, a new tribal confederation, the Bani 
Lam, took root. In the north, the Kurdish Baban Dynasty emerged 
and organized Kurdish resistance. The resistance made it impos- 
sible for the Ottomans to maintain even nominal suzerainty over 
Iraqi Kurdistan (land of the Kurds). Between 1625 and 1668, and 
from 1694 to 1701, local shaykhs ruled Al Basrah and the 



26 



Historical Setting 



marshlands, home of the Madan (Marsh Arabs). The powerful 
shaykhs basically ignored the Ottoman governor of Baghdad. 

The cycle of tribal warfare and of deteriorating urban life that 
began in the thirteenth century with the Mongol invasions was tem- 
porarily reversed with the reemergence of the Mamluks. In the early 
eighteenth century, the Mamluks began asserting authority apart 
from the Ottomans. Extending their rule first over Basra, the Mam- 
luks eventually controlled the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys 
from the Persian Gulf to the foothills of Kurdistan. For the most 
part, the Mamluks were able administrators, and their rule was 
marked by political stability and by economic revival. The greatest 
of the Mamluk leaders, Suleyman the II (1780-1802), made great 
strides in imposing the rule of law. The last Mamluk leader, Daud 
(1816-31), initiated important modernization programs that 
included clearing canals, establishing industries, training a 
20,000-man army, and starting a printing press. 

The Mamluk period ended in 1831, when a severe flood and 
plague devastated Baghdad, enabling the Ottoman sultan, Mah- 
mud II, to reassert Ottoman sovereignty over Iraq. Ottoman rule 
was unstable; Baghdad, for example, had more than ten gover- 
nors between 1831 and 1869. In 1869, however, the Ottomans 
regained authority when the reform-minded Midhat Pasha was 
appointed governor of Baghdad. Midhat immediately set out to 
modernize Iraq on the Western model. The primary objectives of 
Midhat 's reforms, called the tanzimat, were to reorganize the army, 
to create codes of criminal and commercial law, to secularize the 
school system, and to improve provincial administration. He created 
provincial representative assemblies to assist the governor, and he 
set up elected municipal councils in the major cities. Staffed largely 
by Iraqi notables with no strong ties to the masses, the new offices 
nonetheless helped a group of Iraqis gain administrative experience. 

By establishing government agencies in the cities and by attempt- 
ing to settle the tribes, Midhat altered the tribal-urban balance of 
power, which since the thirteenth century had been largely in favor 
of the tribes. The most important element of Midhat' s plan to 
extend Ottoman authority into the countryside was the 1858 TAPU 
land law (named after the initials of the government office issuing 
it). The new land reform replaced the feudal system of land hold- 
ings and tax farms with legally sanctioned property rights. It was 
designed both to induce tribal shaykhs to settle and to give them 
a stake in the existing political order. In practice, the TAPU laws 
enabled the tribal shaykhs to become large landowners; tribesmen, 
fearing that the new law was an attempt to collect taxes more 
effectively or to impose conscription, registered community-owned 



27 



Iraq: A Country Study 




Historical Setting 



tribal lands in their shaykhs' names or sold them outright to urban 
speculators. As a result, tribal shaykhs gradually were transformed 
into profit-seeking landlords while their tribesmen were relegated 
to the role of impoverished sharecroppers. 

Midhat also attempted to replace Iraq's clerically run Islamic 
school system with a more secular educational system. The new, 
secular schools provided a channel of upward social mobility to chil- 
dren of all classes, and they led slowly to the growth of an Iraqi 
intelligentsia. They also introduced students for the first time to 
Western languages and disciplines. 

The introduction of Western disciplines in the schools accom- 
panied a greater Western political and economic presence in Iraq. 
The British had established a consulate at Baghdad in 1802, and 
a French consulate followed shortly thereafter. European interest 
in modernizing Iraq to facilitate Western commercial interests coin- 
cided with the Ottoman reforms. Steamboats appeared on the rivers 
in 1836, the telegraph was introduced in 1861, and the Suez Canal 
was opened in 1869, providing Iraq with greater access to Euro- 
pean markets. The landowning tribal shaykhs began to export cash 
crops to the capitalist markets of the West. 

In 1908 a new ruling clique, the Young Turks, took power in 
Istanbul. The Young Turks aimed at making the Ottoman Empire 
a unified nation-state based on Western models. They stressed secu- 
lar politics and patriotism over the pan-Islamic ideology preached 
by Sultan Abd al Hamid. They reintroduced the 1876 constitu- 
tion (this Ottoman constitution set forth the rights of the ruler and 
the ruled, but it derived from the ruler and has been called at best 
an "attenuated autocracy"), held elections throughout the empire, 
and reopened parliament. Although the Iraqi delegates represented 
only the well-established families of Baghdad, their parliamentary 
experience in Istanbul proved to be an important introduction to 
self-government . 

Most important to the history of Iraq, the Young Turks aggres- 
sively pursued a "Turkification" policy that alienated the nascent 
Iraqi intelligentsia and set in motion a fledgling Arab nationalist 
movement. Encouraged by the Young Turks' Revolution of 1908, 
nationalists in Iraq stepped up their political activity. Iraqi nation- 
alists met in Cairo with the Ottoman Decentralization Party, and 
some Iraqis joined the Young Arab Society, which moved to Beirut 
in 1913. Because of its greater exposure to Westerners who encour- 
aged the nationalists, Basra became the center from which Iraqi 
nationalists began to demand a measure of autonomy. After nearly 
400 years under Ottoman rule, Iraq was ill-prepared to form a 
nation-state. The Ottomans had failed to control Iraq's rebellious 



29 



Iraq: A Country Study 

tribal domains, and even in the cities their authority was tenuous. 
The Ottomans' inability to provide security led to the growth of 
autonomous, self-contained communities. As a result, Iraq entered 
the twentieth century beset by a complex web of social conflicts 
that seriously impeded the process of building a modern state. 

The oldest and most deeply ingrained conflict was the competi- 
tion between the tribes and the cities for control over the food- 
producing flatlands of the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers. The 
centralization policies of the Sublime Porte (Ottoman government), 
especially in the nineteenth century, constituted a direct threat to 
the nomadic structure and the fierce fighting spirit of the tribes. 
In addition to tribal-urban conflicts, the tribes fought among them- 
selves, and there was a fairly rigid hierarchy between the most 
powerful tribes, the so-called "people of the camel," and the weaker 
tribes that included the "people of the sheep," marshdwellers, and 
peasants. The cities also were sharply divided, both according to 
occupation and along religious lines. The various guilds resided 
in distinct, autonomous areas, and Shia and Sunni Muslims rarely 
intermingled. The territory that eventually became the state of Iraq 
was beset, furthermore, by regional differences in orientation; 
Mosul in the north had historically looked to Syria and to Turkey, 
whereas Baghdad and the Shia holy cities had maintained close 
ties with Iran and with the people of the western and southwestern 
deserts. 

Although Ottoman weakness had allowed Iraq's self-contained 
communities to grow stronger, the modernization initiated by the 
Sublime Porte tended to break down traditional autonomous group- 
ings and to create a new social order. Beginning with the tanzimat 
reforms in 1869, Iraq's mostly subsistence economy slowly was 
transformed into a market economy based on money and tied to 
the world capitalist market. Social status traditionally had been 
determined by noble lineage, by fighting prowess, and by knowledge 
of religion. With the advent of capitalism, social status increasingly 
was determined by property ownership and by the accumulation 
of wealth. Most disruptive in this regard was the TAPU land reform 
of 1858. Concomitantly, Western social and economic penetration 
increased; for example, Iraq's traditional crafts and craftsmen 
gradually were displaced by mass-produced British machine-made 
textiles. 

The final Ottoman legacy in Iraq is related to the policies of the 
Young Turks and to the creation of a small but vocal Iraqi intel- 
ligentsia. Faced with the rapidly encroaching West, the Young 
Turks attempted to centralize the empire by imposing upon it the 
Turkish language and culture and by clamping down on newly won 



30 



Historical Setting 



political freedoms. These Turkification policies alienated many of 
the Ottoman-trained intelligentsia who had originally aligned them- 
selves with the Young Turks in the hope of obtaining greater Arab 
autonomy. Despite its relatively small size, the nascent Iraqi intel- 
ligentsia formed several secret nationalist societies. The most 
important of these societies was Al Ahd (the Covenant), whose 
membership was drawn almost entirely from Iraqi officers in the 
Ottoman army. Membership in Al Ahd spread rapidly in Bagh- 
dad and in Mosul, growing to 4,000 by the outbreak of World 
War I. Despite the existence of Al Ahd and of other, smaller, 
nationalist societies, Iraqi nationalism was still mainly the concern 
of educated Arabs from the upper and the middle classes. 

World War I and the British Mandate 

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Ottoman territo- 
ries had become the focus of European power politics. During the 
previous century, enfeebled Ottoman rule had invited intense com- 
petition among European powers for commercial benefits and for 
spheres of influence. British interest in Iraq significantly increased 
when the Ottomans granted concessions to Germany to construct 
railroad lines from Konya in southwest Turkey to Baghdad in 1899 
and from Baghdad to Basra in 1902. The British feared that a hostile 
German presence in the Fertile Crescent would threaten vital lines 
of communication to India via Iran and Afghanistan, menacing 
British oil interests in Iran and perhaps even India itself. 

In 1914 when the British discovered that Turkey was entering 
the war on the side of the Germans, British forces from India landed 
at Al Faw on the Shatt al Arab and moved rapidly toward Basra. 
By the fall of 1915, when British forces were already well estab- 
lished in towns in the south, General Charles Townshend unsuc- 
cessfully attempted to take Baghdad. In retaliation, the Turks 
besieged the British garrison at Al Kut for 140 days; in April 1916, 
the garrison was forced to surrender unconditionally. The British 
quickly regrouped their forces, however, and resumed their advance 
under General Stanley Maude in December 1916. By March 1917 
the British had captured Baghdad. Advancing northward in the 
spring of 1918, the British finally took Mosul in early November. 
As a result of the victory at Mosul, British authority was extended 
to all the Iraqi wilayat (sing., wilayah-province) with the exception 
of the Kurdish highlands bordering Turkey and Iran, the land 
alongside the Euphrates from Baghdad south to An Nasiriyah, and 
the Shia cities of Karbala and An Najaf. 

On capturing Baghdad, General Maude proclaimed that Brit- 
ain intended to return to Iraq some control of its own affairs. He 



31 



Iraq: A Country Study 

stressed that this step would pave the way for ending the alien rule 
that the Iraqis had experienced since the latter days of the Abbasid 
caliphate. The proclamation was in accordance with the encourage- 
ment the British had given to Arab nationalists, such as Jafar al 
Askari; his brother-in-law, Nuri as Said; and Jamil al Midfai, who 
sought emancipation from Ottoman rule. The nationalists had sup- 
ported the Allied powers in expectation of both the Ottoman defeat 
and the freedom many nationalists assumed would come with an 
Allied victory. 

During the war, events in Iraq were greatly influenced by the 
Hashimite family of Husayn ibn Ali, sharif of Mecca, who claimed 
descent from the family of the Prophet Muhammad. Aspiring to 
become king of an independent Arab kingdom, Husayn had broken 
with the Ottomans, to whom he had been vassal, and had thrown 
in his lot with the British. Anxious for his support, the British gave 
Husayn reason to believe that he would have their endorsement 
when the war ended. Accordingly, Husayn and his sons led the 
June 1916 Arab Revolt, marching northward in conjunction with 
the British into Transjordan, Palestine, and Syria. 

Anticipating the fulfillment of Allied pledges, Husayn' s son, 
Prince Faisal (who was later to become modern Iraq's first king), 
arrived in Paris in 1919 as the chief spokesman for the Arab cause. 
Much to his disappointment, Faisal found that the Allied powers 
were less than enthusiastic about Arab independence. 

At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, under Article 22 of the 
League of Nations Covenant, Iraq was formally made a Class A 
mandate entrusted to Britain. This award was completed on 
April 25, 1920, at the San Remo Conference in Italy. Palestine 
also was placed under British mandate, and Syria was placed under 
French mandate. Faisal, who had been proclaimed king of Syria 
by a Syrian national congress in Damascus in March 1920, was 
ejected by the French in July of the same year. 

The civil government of postwar Iraq was headed originally by 
the high commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, and his deputy, Colonel 
Arnold Talbot Wilson. The British were confronted with Iraq's 
age-old problems, compounded by some new ones. Villagers 
demanded that the tribes be restrained, and tribes demanded that 
their titles to tribal territories be extended and confirmed. Mer- 
chants demanded more effective legal procedures, courts, and laws 
to protect their activities and interests. Municipal authorities 
appealed for defined powers and grants-in-aid in addition to the 
establishment of public health and education facilities. Landlords 
pressed for grants of land, for the building of canals and roads, 
and for the provision of tested seeds and livestock. 



32 




Entrance to the ruins of Babylon 
Courtesy Ronald L. Kuipers 

The holy cities of An Najaf and Karbala and their satellite tribes 
were in a state of near anarchy. British reprisals after the murder 
of a British officer in An Najaf failed to restore order. The Anayzah, 
the Shammar, and the Jubur tribes of the western desert were beset 
by violent infighting. British administration had yet to be estab- 
lished in the mountains of Kurdistan. Meanwhile, from the Hak- 
kari Mountains beyond Iraq's northern frontier and from the plains 
of Urmia in Iran, thousands of Assyrians began to pour into Iraqi 
territory seeking refuge from Turkish savagery. The most strik- 
ing problem facing the British was the growing anger of the 
nationalists, who felt betrayed at being accorded mandate status. 
The nationalists soon came to view the mandate as a flimsy dis- 
guise for colonialism. The experienced Cox delegated governance 
of the country to Wilson while he served in Persia between April 
1918 and October 1920. The younger man governed Iraq with the 
kind of paternalism that had characterized British rule in India. 
Impatient to establish an efficient administration, Wilson used 
experienced Indians to staff subordinate positions within his admin- 
istration. The exclusion of Iraqis from administrative posts added 
humiliation to Iraqi discontent. 

Three important anticolonial secret societies had been formed 
in Iraq during 1918 and 1919. At An Najaf, Jamiyat an Nahda 
al Islamiya (The League of the Islamic Awakening) was organized; 



33 



Iraq: A Country Study 



its numerous and varied members included ulama (religious lead- 
ers), journalists, landlords, and tribal leaders. Members of the 
Jamiyat assassinated a British officer in the hope that the killing 
would act as a catalyst for a general rebellion at Iraq's other holy 
city, Karbala. Al Jamiya al Wataniya al Islamiya (The Muslim 
National League) was formed with the object of organizing and 
mobilizing the population for major resistance. In February 1919, 
in Baghdad, a coalition of Shia merchants, Sunni teachers and civil 
servants, Sunni and Shia ulama, and Iraqi officers formed the Haras 
al Istiqlal (The Guardians of Independence). The Istiqlal had mem- 
ber groups in Karbala, An Najaf, Al Kut, and Al Hillah. 

Local outbreaks against British rule had occurred even before 
the news reached Iraq that the country had been given only man- 
date status. Upon the death of an important Shia mujtahid (reli- 
gious scholar) in early May 1920, Sunni and Shia ulama temporarily 
put aside their differences as the memorial services metamorphosed 
into political rallies. Ramadan, the Islamic month of fasting, began 
later in that month; once again, through nationalistic poetry and 
oratory, religious leaders exhorted the people to throw off the bonds 
of imperialism. Violent demonstrations and strikes followed the Brit- 
ish arrest of several leaders. 

When the news of the mandate reached Iraq in late May, a group 
of Iraqi delegates met with Wilson and demanded independence. 
Wilson dismissed them as a "handful of ungrateful politicians." 
Nationalist political activity was stepped up, and the grand mujta- 
hid of Karbala, Imam Shirazi, and his son, Mirza Muhammad 
Riza, began to organize the effort in earnest. Arab flags were made 
and distributed, and pamphlets were handed out urging the tribes 
to prepare for revolt. Muhammad Riza acted as liaison among 
insurgents in An Najaf and in Karbala, and the tribal confedera- 
tions. Shirazi then issued a Jatwa (religious ruling), pointing out 
that it was against Islamic law for Muslims to countenance being 
ruled by non-Muslims, and he called for a jihad against the British. 

By July 1920, Mosul was in rebellion against British rule, and 
the insurrection moved south down the Euphrates River valley. 
The southern tribes, who cherished their long-held political auton- 
omy, needed little inducement to join in the fray. They did not 
cooperate in an organized effort against the British, however, which 
limited the effect of the revolt. The country was in a state of anar- 
chy for three months; the British restored order only with great 
difficulty and with the assistance of Royal Air Force bombers. Brit- 
ish forces were obliged to send for reinforcements from India and 
from Iran. 



34 



Historical Setting 



Ath Thawra al Iraqiyya al Kubra, or The Great Iraqi Revolu- 
tion (as the 1920 rebellion is called), was a watershed event in con- 
temporary Iraqi history. For the first time, Sunnis and Shias, tribes 
and cities, were brought together in a common effort. In the opin- 
ion of Hanna Batatu, author of a seminal work on Iraq, the build- 
ing of a nation-state in Iraq depended upon two major factors: the 
integration of Shias and Sunnis into the new body politic and the 
successful resolution of the age-old conflicts between the tribes and 
the riverine cities and among the tribes themselves over the food- 
producing flatlands of the Tigris and the Euphrates. The 1920 
rebellion brought these groups together, if only briefly; this con- 
stituted an important first step in the long and arduous process 
of forging a nation-state out of Iraq's conflict-ridden social structure. 

The 1920 revolt had been very costly to the British in both man- 
power and money. Whitehall was under domestic pressure to devise 
a formula that would provide the maximum control over Iraq at 
the least cost to the British taxpayer. The British replaced the mili- 
tary regime with a provisional Arab government, assisted by Brit- 
ish advisers and answerable to the supreme authority of the high 
commissioner for Iraq, Cox. The new administration provided a 
channel of communication between the British and the restive popu- 
lation, and it gave Iraqi leaders an opportunity to prepare for even- 
tual self-government. The provisional government was aided by 
the large number of trained Iraqi administrators who returned home 
when the French ejected Faisal from Syria. Like earlier Iraqi 
governments, however, the provisional government was composed 
chiefly of Sunni Arabs; once again the Shias were underrepresented. 

At the Cairo Conference of 1921, the British set the parameters 
for Iraqi political life that were to continue until the 1958 revolu- 
tion; they chose Faisal as Iraq's first King; they established an 
indigenous Iraqi army; and they proposed a new treaty. To con- 
firm Faisal as Iraq's first monarch, a one-question plebiscite was 
carefully arranged that had a return of 96 percent in his favor. The 
British saw in Faisal a leader who possessed sufficient nationalist 
and Islamic credentials to have broad appeal, but who also was 
vulnerable enough to remain dependent on their support. Faisal 
traced his descent from the family of the Prophet Muhammad, and 
his ancestors had held political authority in the holy cities of Mecca 
and Medina since the tenth century. The British believed that these 
credentials would satisfy traditional Arab standards of political 
legitimacy; moreover, the British thought that Faisal would be 
accepted by the growing Iraqi nationalist movement because of his 
role in the 1916 revolt against the Turks, his achievements as a 



35 



Iraq: A Country Study 

leader of the Arab emancipation movement, and his general leader- 
ship qualities. 

As a counterforce to the nationalistic inclinations of the monar- 
chy and as a means of insuring the king's dependence, the British 
cultivated the tribal shaykhs, whose power had been waning since 
the end of the nineteenth century. While the new king sought to 
create a national consciousness, to strengthen the institutions of 
the emerging state, and especially to create a national military, the 
tribal shaykhs supported a fragmented community and sought to 
weaken the coercive power of the state. A major goal of the British 
policy was to keep the monarchy stronger than any one tribe but 
weaker than a coalition of tribes so that British power would ulti- 
mately be decisive in arbitrating disputes between the two. 

Ultimately, the British-created monarchy suffered from a chronic 
legitimacy crisis: the concept of a monarchy was alien to Iraq. 
Despite his Islamic and pan- Arab credentials, Faisal was not an 
Iraqi, and, no matter how effectively he ruled, Iraqis saw the monar- 
chy as a British creation. The continuing inability of the govern- 
ment to gain the confidence of the people fueled political instability 
well into the 1970s. 

The British decision at the Cairo Conference to establish an 
indigenous Iraqi army was significant. In Iraq, as in most of the 
developing world, the military establishment has been the best 
organized institution in an otherwise weak political system. Thus, 
while Iraq's body politic crumbled under immense political and 
economic pressure throughout the monarchic period, the military 
gained increasing power and influence; moreover, because the 
officers in the new army were by necessity Sunnis who had served 
under the Ottomans, while the lower ranks were predominantly 
filled by Shia tribal elements, Sunni dominance in the military was 
preserved. 

The final major decision taken at the Cairo Conference related 
to the new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Faisal was under pressure from the 
nationalists and the anti-British mujtahids of An Najaf and Karbala 
to limit both British influence in Iraq and the duration of the treaty. 
Recognizing that the monarchy depended on British support — 
and wishing to avoid a repetition of his experience in Syria — Faisal 
maintained a moderate approach in dealing with Britain. The 
twenty-year treaty, which was ratified in October 1922, stated that 
the king would heed British advice on all matters affecting British 
interests and on fiscal policy as long as Iraq was in debt to Britain, 
and that British officials would be appointed to specified posts in 
eighteen departments to act as advisers and inspectors. A subsequent 
financial agreement, which significantly increased the financial 



36 



Historical Setting 



burden on Iraq, required Iraq to pay half the cost of supporting 
British resident officials, among other expenses. British obligations 
under the new treaty included providing various kinds of aid, nota- 
bly military assistance, and proposing Iraq for membership in the 
League of Nations at the earliest moment. In effect, the treaty 
ensured that Iraq would remain politically and economically 
dependent on Britain. While unable to prevent the treaty, Faisal 
clearly felt that the British had gone back on their promises to him. 

After the treaty had been signed, Iraq readied itself for the 
country-wide elections that had been provided for in the May 1922 
Electoral Law. There were important changes in the government 
at this time. Cox resigned his position as high commissioner and 
was replaced by Sir Henry Dobbs; Iraq's aging prime minister, 
Abd ar Rahman al Gailani, stepped down and was replaced by 
Abd al Muhsin as Saadun. In April 1923, Saadun signed a pro- 
tocol that shortened the treaty period to four years. As a result of 
the elections, however, Saadun was replaced by Jafar al Askari, 
a veteran of the Arab Revolt and an early supporter of Faisal. 

The elected Constituent Assembly met for the first time in March 
1924, and it formally ratified the treaty despite strong (and some- 
times physical) opposition on the part of many in the assembly. 
The assembly also accepted the Organic Law that declared Iraq 
to be a sovereign state with a representative system of government 
and a hereditary constitutional monarchy. The newly ratified consti- 
tution — which, along with the treaty, had been hotly debated — 
legislated an important British role in Iraqi affairs. The major issue 
at stake in the constitutional debate revolved around the powers 
of the monarchy. In the final draft, British interests prevailed, and 
the monarchy was granted wide-ranging powers that included the 
right to confirm all laws, to call for a general election, to prorogue 
parliament, and to issue ordinances for the fulfillment of treaty 
obligations without parliamentary sanctions. Like the treaty, the 
constitution provided the British with a means of indirect control 
in Iraq. 

After the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was ratified, the most pressing issue 
confronting the newly established constitutional monarchy was the 
question of boundaries, especially in the former Ottoman wilayah 
of Mosul, now known as Mosul Province. The status of Mosul 
Province was complicated by two factors, the British desire to gain 
oil concessions and the existence of a majority Kurdish popula- 
tion that was seeking independence apart from either Iraq or Tur- 
key. According to the Treaty of Sevres, concluded in 1920 with 
the Ottoman sultan, Mosul was to be part of an autonomous Kurd- 
ish state. The treaty was scrapped, however, when nationalist 



37 



Iraq: A Country Study 

leader Mustafa Kamal (1881-1938 — also known as Ataturk) came 
to power in Turkey and established control over the Kurdish areas 
in eastern Turkey. In 1923, after two failed British attempts to estab- 
lish an autonomous Kurdish province, London decided to include 
the Kurds in the new Iraqi state with the proviso that Kurds would 
hold government positions in Kurdish areas and that the Kurdish 
language would be preserved. The British decision to include Mosul 
in Iraq was based largely on their belief that the area contained 
large oil deposits. 

Before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the British-controlled 
Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) had held concessionary rights 
to the Mosul wilayah. Under the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement — 
an agreement in 1916 between Britain and France that delineated 
future control of the Middle East — the area would have fallen under 
French influence. In 1919, however, the French relinquished their 
claims to Mosul under the terms of the Long-Berenger Agreement. 
The 1919 agreement granted the French a 25 percent share in the 
TPC as compensation. 

Beginning in 1923, British and Iraqi negotiators held acrimoni- 
ous discussions over the new oil concession. The major obstacle 
was Iraq's insistence on a 20-percent equity participation in the 
company; this figure had been included in the original TPC con- 
cession to the Turks and had been agreed upon at San Remo for 
the Iraqis. In the end, despite strong nationalist sentiments against 
the concession agreement, the Iraqi negotiators acquiesced to it. 
The League of Nations was soon to vote on the disposition of Mosul, 
and the Iraqis feared that, without British support, Iraq would lose 
the area to Turkey. In March 1925, an agreement was concluded 
that contained none of the Iraqi demands. The TPC, now renamed 
the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), was granted a concession for 
a period of seventy-five years. 

In 1925 the League of Nations decided that Mosul Province 
would be considered a part of Iraq, but it also suggested that the 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty be extended from four to twenty-five years as 
a protection for the Kurdish minority, who intensely distrusted the 
Iraqi government. The Iraqis also were to give due regard to Kurd- 
ish sensibilities in matters of culture and of language. Although 
reluctant to do so, the Iraqi assembly ratified the treaty in Janu- 
ary 1926. Turkey was eventually reconciled to the loss by being 
promised one-tenth of any oil revenues that might accrue in the 
area, and a tripartite Anglo-Turco-Iraqi treaty was signed in July 
1926. This settlement was to have important repercussions, both 
positive and negative, for the future of Iraq. Vast oil revenues would 
accrue from the Mosul Province, but the inclusion of a large number 



38 



Historical Setting 



of well-armed and restless Kurds in Iraqi territory would continue 
to plague Iraqi governments. 

With the signing of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and the settling of 
the Mosul question, Iraqi politics took on a new dynamic. The 
emerging class of Sunni and Shia landowning tribal shaykhs vied 
for positions of power with wealthy and prestigious urban-based 
Sunni families and with Ottoman-trained army officers and bureau- 
crats. Because Iraq's newly established political institutions were 
the creation of a foreign power, and because the concept of 
democratic government had no precedent in Iraqi history, the poli- 
ticians in Baghdad lacked legitimacy and never developed deeply 
rooted constituencies. Thus, despite a constitution and an elected 
assembly, Iraqi politics was more a shifting alliance of important 
personalities and cliques than a democracy in the Western sense. 
The absence of broadly based political institutions inhibited the 
early nationalist movement's ability to make deep inroads into 
Iraq's diverse social structure. Thus, despite the widely felt resent- 
ment at Iraq's mandate status, the burgeoning nationalist move- 
ment was largely ineffective. 

Nonetheless, through the late 1920s, the nationalists persisted 
in opposing the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and in demanding indepen- 
dence. A treaty more favorable to the Iraqis was presented in 
December 1927. It remained unratified, however, because of 
nationalist demands for an unconditional promise of independence. 
This promise eventually was made by the new high commissioner, 
Sir Gilbert Clayton, in 1929, but the confusion occasioned by the 
sudden death of Clayton and by the suicide of Abd al Muhsin as 
Saadun, the most powerful Iraqi advocate of the treaty, delayed 
the writing of a new treaty. In June 1929, the nationalists received 
their first positive response from London when a newly elected 
Labour Party government announced its intention to support Iraq's 
admission to the League of Nations in 1932 and to negotiate a new 
treaty recognizing Iraq's independence. 

Faisal's closest adviser (and soon-to-be Iraqi strongman), Nuri 
as Said, carried out the treaty negotiations. Despite widespread 
opposition, Nuri as Said was able to force the treaty through parlia- 
ment. The new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was signed in June 1930. It 
provided for a ''close alliance," for "full and frank consultations 
between the two countries in all matters of foreign policy," and 
for mutual assistance in case of war. Iraq granted the British the 
use of air bases near Basra and at Al Habbaniyah and the right 
to move troops across the country. The treaty, of twenty-five years' 
duration, was to come into force upon Iraq's admission to the 
League of Nations. The terms of the treaty gained Nuri as Said 



39 



Iraq: A Country Study 

favor in British eyes but discredited him in the eyes of the Iraqi 
nationalists, who vehemently opposed its lengthy duration and the 
leasing of air bases. The Kurds and the Assyrians also opposed 
the treaty because it offered no guarantees for their status in the 
new country. 

Iraq as an Independent Monarchy 

On October 13, 1932, Iraq became a sovereign state, and it was 
admitted to the League of Nations. Iraq still was beset by a com- 
plex web of social, economic, ethnic, religious, and ideological con- 
flicts, all of which retarded the process of state formation. The 
declaration of statehood and the imposition of fixed boundaries trig- 
gered an intense competition for power in the new entity. Sunnis 
and Shias, cities and tribes, shaykhs and tribesmen, Assyrians and 
Kurds, pan-Arabists and Iraqi nationalists — all fought vigorously 
for places in the emerging state structure. Ultimately, lacking 
legitimacy and unable to establish deep roots, the British-imposed 
political system was overwhelmed by these conflicting demands. 

The Sunni-Shia conflict, a problem since the beginning of domi- 
nation by the Umayyad caliphate in 661, continued to frustrate 
attempts to mold Iraq into a political community. The Shia tribes 
of the southern Euphrates, along with urban Shias, feared complete 
Sunni domination in the government. Their concern was well 
founded; a disproportionate number of Sunnis occupied administra- 
tive positions. Favored by the Ottomans, the Sunnis historically had 
gained much more administrative experience. The Shias' depressed 
economic situation further widened the Sunni-Shia split, and it inten- 
sified Shia efforts to obtain a greater share of the new state's budget. 

The arbitrary borders that divided Iraq and the other Arab lands 
of the old Ottoman Empire caused severe economic dislocations, 
frequent border disputes, and a debilitating ideological conflict. 
The cities of Mosul in the north and Basra in the south, separated 
from their traditional trading partners in Syria and in Iran, suffered 
severe commercial dislocations that led to economic depression. 
In the south, the British-created border (drawn through the desert 
on the understanding that the region was largely uninhabited) 
impeded migration patterns and led to great tribal unrest. Also in 
the south, uncertainty surrounding Iraq's new borders with Kuwait, 
with Saudi Arabia, and especially with Iran led to frequent border 
skirmishes. The new boundaries also contributed to the growth of 
competing nationalisms; Iraqi versus pan- Arab loyalties would 
severely strain Iraqi politics during the 1950s and the 1960s, when 
Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul Nasser held emotional sway over 
the Iraqi masses. 



40 



Historical Setting 



Ethnic groups such as the Kurds and the Assyrians, who had 
hoped for their own autonomous states, rebelled against inclusion 
within the Iraqi state. The Kurds, the majority of whom lived in 
the area around Mosul, had long been noted for their fierce spirit 
of independence and separatism. During the 1922 to 1924 period, 
the Kurds had engaged in a series of revolts in response to British 
encroachment in areas of traditional Kurdish autonomy; moreover, 
the Kurds preferred Turkish to Arab rule. When the League of 
Nations awarded Mosul to Iraq in 1925, Kurdish hostility thus 
increased. The Iraqi government maintained an uneasy peace with 
the Kurds in the first year of independence, but Kurdish hostility 
would remain an intractable problem for future governments. 

From the start, the relationship of the Iraqi government with 
the Assyrians was openly hostile. Britain had resettled 20,000 
Assyrians in northern Iraq around Zakhu and Dahuk after Tur- 
key violently quelled a British-inspired Assyrian rebellion in 1918. 
As a result, approximately three-fourths of the Assyrians who had 
sided with the British during World War I now found themselves 
citizens of Iraq. The Assyrians found this situation both objection- 
able and dangerous. Thousands of Assyrians had been incorpo- 
rated into the Iraq Levies, a British-paid and British-officered force 
separate from the regular Iraqi army. They had been encouraged 
by the British to consider themselves superior to the majority of 
Arab Iraqis by virtue of their profession of Christianity. The Brit- 
ish also had used them for retaliatory operations against the Kurds, 
in whose lands most of the Assyrians had settled. Pro-British, they 
had been apprehensive of Iraqi independence. 

The Assyrians had hoped to form a nation-state in a region of 
their own. When no unoccupied area sufficiently large could be 
found, the Assyrians continued to insist that, at the very least, their 
patriarch, the Mar Shamun, be given some temporal authority. 
This demand was flady refused by both the British and the Iraqis. 
In response, the Assyrians, who had been permitted by the British 
to retain their weapons after the dissolution of the Iraq Levies, 
flaunted their strength and refused to recognize the government. 
In retaliation the Iraqi authorities held the Mar Shamun under 
virtual house arrest in mid- 1933, making his release contingent on 
his signing a document renouncing forever any claims to temporal 
authority. During July about 800 armed Assyrians headed for the 
Syrian border. For reasons that have never been explained, they 
were repelled by the Syrians. During this time, King Faisal was 
outside the country for reasons of health. According to scholarly 
sources, Minister of Interior Hikmat Sulayman had adopted a policy 
aimed at the elimination of the Assyrians. This policy apparently 



41 



Iraq: A Country Study 

was implemented by a Kurd, General Bakr Sidqi, who, after engag- 
ing in several clashes with the Assyrians, permitted his men to kill 
about 300 Assyrians, including women and children, at the Assyrian 
village of Simel (Sumayyil). 

The Assyrian affair marked the military's entrance into Iraqi 
politics, setting a precedent that would be followed throughout the 
1950s and the 1960s. It also paved the way for the passage of a 
conscription law that strengthened the army and, as increasing num- 
bers of tribesmen were brought into military service, sapped strength 
from the tribal shaykhs. The Assyrian affair also set the stage for 
the increased prominence of Bakr Sidqi. 

At the time of independence, tribal Iraq was experiencing a 
destabilizing realignment characterized by the waning role of the 
shaykhs in tribal society. The privatization of property rights, begun 
with the tanzimat reforms in the late 1860s, intensified when the 
British-supported Lazmah land reform of 1932 dispossessed even 
greater numbers of tribesmen. While the British were augment- 
ing the economic power of the shaykhs, however, the tribal-urban 
balance was rapidly shifting in favor of the cities. The accelerated 
pace of modernization and the growth of a highly nationalistic intel- 
ligentsia, of a bureaucracy, and of a powerful military, all favored 
the cities. Thus, while the economic position of the shaykhs had 
improved significantly, their role in tribal society and their status 
in relation to the rapidly emerging urban elite had seriously eroded. 
These contradictory trends in tribal structure and authority pushed 
tribal Iraq into a major social revolution that would last for the 
next thirty years. 

The ascendancy of the cities and the waning power of the tribes 
were most evident in the ease with which the military, led by Bakr 
Sidqi, put down tribal unrest. The tribal revolts themselves were 
set off by the government's decision in 1934 to allocate money for 
the new conscription plan rather than for a new dam, which would 
have improved agricultural productivity in the south. 

The monarchy's ability to deal with tribal unrest suffered a major 
setback in September 1933, when King Faisal died while under- 
going medical treatment in Switzerland. Faisal's death meant the 
loss of the main stabilizing personality in Iraqi politics. He was 
the one figure with sufficient prestige to draw the politicians together 
around a concept of national interest. Faisal was succeeded by his 
twenty-one-year-old son, Ghazi (1933-39), an ardent but inex- 
perienced Arab nationalist. Unlike his father, Ghazi was a product 
of Western education and had little experience with the complexi- 
ties of Iraqi tribal life. Ghazi also was unable to balance national- 
ist and British pressures within the framework of the Anglo-Iraqi 



42 



A statue of a lion at Babylon 
Courtesy Ronald L. Kuipers 
Bas relief, Babylon 
Courtesy Ronald L. Kuipers 



43 



Iraq: A Country Study 

alliance; increasingly, the nationalist movement saw the monar- 
chy as a British puppet. Iraqi politics during Ghazi's reign degener- 
ated into a meaningless competition among narrowly based tribal 
shaykhs and urban notables that further eroded the legitimacy of 
the state and its constitutional structures. 

In 1936 Iraq experienced its first military coup d'etat — the first 
coup d'etat in the modern Arab world. The agents of the coup, 
General Bakr Sidqi and two politicians (Hikmat Sulayman and Abu 
Timman, who were Turkoman and Shia respectively), represented 
a minority response to the pan-Arab Sunni government of Yasin 
al Hashimi. The eighteen-month Hashimi government was the most 
successful and the longest lived of the eight governments that came 
and went during the reign of King Ghazi. Hashimi' s government 
was nationalistic and pan- Arab, but many Iraqis resented its 
authoritarianism and its suppression of honest dissent. Sulayman, 
a reformer, sought to engineer an alliance of other reformers and 
minority elements within the army. The reformers included com- 
munists, orthodox and unorthodox socialists, and persons with more 
moderate positions. Most of the more moderate reformers were 
associated with the leftist-leaning Al Ahali newspaper, from which 
their group took its name. 

The Sidqi coup marked a major turning point in Iraqi history; 
it made a crucial breach in the constitution, and it opened the door 
to further military involvement in politics. It also temporarily dis- 
placed the elite that had ruled since the state was founded; the new 
government contained few Arab Sunnis and not a single advocate 
of a pan- Arab cause. This configuration resulted in a foreign policy 
oriented toward Turkey and Iran instead of toward the Arab coun- 
tries. The new government promptly signed an agreement with 
Iran, temporarily settling the question of boundary between Iraq 
and Iran in the Shatt al Arab. Iran maintained that it had agreed 
under British pressure to the international boundary's being set 
at the low water mark on the Iranian side rather than the usual 
international practice of the midpoint or thalweg. 

After Bakr Sidqi moved against Baghdad, Sulayman formed an 
Ahali cabinet. Hashimi and Rashid Ali were banished, and Nuri 
as Said fled to Egypt. In the course of the assault on Baghdad, Nuri 
as Said's brother-in-law, Minister of Defense Jafar Askari, was 
killed. 

Ghazi sanctioned Sulayman 's government even though it had 
achieved power unconstitutionally; nevertheless, the coalition of 
forces that gained power in 1936 was beset by major contradic- 
tions. The Ahali group was interested in social reform whereas Sidqi 
and his supporters in the military were interested in expansion. 



44 



Historical Setting 



Sidqi, moreover, alienated important sectors of the population: the 
nationalists in the army resented him because of his Kurdish back- 
ground and because he encouraged Kurds to join the army; the 
Shias abhorred him because of his brutal suppression of a tribal 
revolt the previous year; and Nuri as Said sought revenge for the 
murder of his brother-in-law. Eventually, Sidqi's excesses alienated 
both his civilian and his military supporters, and he was murdered 
by a military group in August 1937. 

In April 1939, Ghazi was killed in an automobile accident and 
was succeeded by his infant son, Faisal II. Ghazi's first cousin, 
Amir Abd al Ilah, was made regent. The death of Ghazi and the 
rise of Prince Abd al Ilah and Nuri as Said — the latter one of the 
Ottoman-trained officers who had fought with Sharif Husayn of 
Mecca — dramatically changed both the goals and the role of the 
monarchy. Whereas Faisal and Ghazi had been strong Arab 
nationalists and had opposed the British-supported tribal shaykhs, 
Abd al Ilah and Nuri as Said were Iraqi nationalists who relied 
on the tribal shaykhs as a counterforce against the growing urban 
nationalist movement. By the end of the 1930s, pan-Arabism had 
become a powerful ideological force in the Iraqi military, especially 
among younger officers who hailed from the northern provinces 
and who had suffered economically from the partition of the Otto- 
man Empire. The British role in quelling the Palestine revolt of 
1936 to 1939 further intensified anti-British sentiments in the mili- 
tary and led a group of disgruntied officers to form the Free Officers' 
Movement, which aimed at overthrowing the monarchy. 

As World War II approached, Nazi Germany attempted to 
capitalize on the anti-British sentiments in Iraq and to woo Bagh- 
dad to the Axis cause. In 1939 Iraq severed diplomatic relations 
with Germany — as it was obliged to do because of treaty obliga- 
tions with Britain. In 1940, however, the Iraqi nationalist and 
ardent anglophobe Rashid Ali succeeded Nuri as Said as prime 
minister. The new prime minister was reluctant to break completely 
with the Axis powers, and he proposed restrictions on British troop 
movements in Iraq. 

Abd al Ilah and Nuri as Said both were proponents of close 
cooperation with Britain. They opposed Rashid Ali's policies and 
pressed him to resign. In response, Rashid Ali and four generals 
led a military coup that ousted Nuri as Said and the regent, both 
of whom escaped to Transjordan. Shortly after seizing power in 
1941, Rashid Ali appointed an ultranationalist civilian cabinet, 
which gave only conditional consent to British requests in April 
1941 for troop landings in Iraq. The British quickly retaliated by 
landing forces at Basra, justifying this second occupation of Iraq 



45 



Iraq: A Country Study 

by citing Rashid Ali's violation of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. 
Many Iraqis regarded the move as an attempt to restore British 
rule. They rallied to the support of the Iraqi army, which received 
a number of aircraft from the Axis powers. The Germans, however, 
were preoccupied with campaigns in Crete and with preparations 
for the invasion of the Soviet Union, and they could spare little 
assistance to Iraq. As the British steadily advanced, Rashid Ali and 
his government fled to Egypt. An armistice was signed on May 
30. Abd al Ilah returned as regent, and Rashid Ali and the four 
generals were tried in absentia and were sentenced to death. The 
generals returned to Iraq and were subsequently executed, but 
Rashid Ali remained in exile. 

The most important aspect of the Rashid Ali coup of 1941 was 
Britain's use of Transjordan's Arab Legion against the Iraqis and 
their reimposition by force of arms of Abd al Ilah as regent. Noth- 
ing contributed more to nationalist sentiment in Iraq, especially 
in the military, than the British invasion of 1941 and the reimposi- 
tion of the monarchy. From then on, the monarchy was completely 
divorced from the powerful nationalist trend. Widely viewed as an 
anachronism that lacked popular legitimacy, the monarchy was per- 
ceived to be aligned with social forces that were retarding the coun- 
try 's development. 

In January 1943, under the terms of the 1930 treaty with Brit- 
ain, Iraq declared war on the Axis powers. Iraq cooperated com- 
pletely with the British under the successive governments of Nuri 
as Said (1941-44) and Hamdi al Pachachi (1944-46). Iraq became 
a base for the military occupation of Iran and of the Levant (see 
Glossary). In March 1945, Iraq became a founding member of the 
British-supported League of Arab States (Arab League), which 
included Egypt, Transjordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and 
Yemen. Although the Arab League was ostensibly designed to foster 
Arab unity, many Arab nationalists viewed it as a British-dominated 
alignment of pro- Western Arab states. In December 1945, Iraq 
joined the United Nations (UN). 

World War II exacerbated Iraq's social and economic problems. 
The spiraling prices and shortages brought on by the war increased 
the opportunity for exploitation and significantly widened the gap 
between rich and poor; thus, while wealthy landowners were enrich- 
ing themselves through corruption, the salaried middle class, includ- 
ing teachers, civil servants, and army officers, saw their incomes 
depreciate daily. Even worse off were the peasants, who lived under 
the heavy burden of the 1932 land reform that permitted their land- 
lords (shaykhs) to make huge profits selling cash crops to the Brit- 
ish occupying force. The worsening economic situation of the mass 



46 



Historical Setting 



of Iraqis during the 1950s and the 1960s enabled the Iraqi Com- 
munist Party (ICP) to establish deep roots during this period. 

In addition to its festering socioeconomic problems, post- World 
War II Iraq was beset by a leadership crisis. After the 1941 Rashid 
Ali coup, Iraqi politics had been dominated by the pro-British Nuri 
as Said. The latter' s British orientation and autocratic manner 
increasingly were at variance with the liberal, reformist philosophy 
of Iraq's new nationalists. Even before the end of the war, national- 
ists had demanded the restoration of political activity, which had 
been banned during the war in the interest of national security. 
Not until the government of Tawfiq Suwaidi (February-March 
1946), however, were political parties allowed to organize. Within 
a short period, six parties were formed. The parties soon became 
so outspoken in their criticism of the government that the govern- 
ment closed or curtailed the activities of the more extreme leftist 
parties. 

Accumulated grievances against Nuri as Said and the regent 
climaxed in the 1948 Wathbah (uprising). The Wathbah was a pro- 
test against the Portsmouth Treaty of January 1948 and its provi- 
sion that a board of Iraqis and British be established to decide on 
defense matters of mutual interest. The treaty enraged Iraqi 
nationalists, who were still bitter over the Rashid Ali coup of 1941 
and the continued influence of the British in Iraqi affairs. The 
uprising also was fueled by widespread popular discontent over ris- 
ing prices, by an acute bread shortage, and by the regime's failure 
to liberalize the political system. 

The Wathbah had three important effects on Iraqi politics. First, 
and most directly, it led Nuri as Said and the regent to repudiate 
the Portsmouth Treaty. Second, the success of the uprising led the 
opposition to intensify its campaign to discredit the regime. This 
activity not only weakened the monarchy but also seriously eroded 
the legitimacy of the political process. Finally, the uprising created 
a schism between Nuri as Said and Abd al Ilah. The former wanted 
to tighten political control and to deal harshly with the opposition; 
the regent advocated a more tempered approach. In response, the 
British increasingly mistrusted the regent and relied more and more 
on Nuri as Said. 

Iraq bitterly objected to the 1947 UN decision to partition Pales- 
tine and sent several hundred recruits to the Palestine front when 
hostilities broke out on May 15, 1948. Iraq sent an additional 8,000 
to 10,000 troops of the regular army during the course of the 1948 
Arab-Israeli War; these troops were withdrawn in April 1949. The 
Iraqis had arrived at the Palestine front poorly equipped and under- 
trained because of the drastic reduction in defense expenditures 



47 



Iraq: A Country Study 

imposed by Nuri as Said following the 1941 Rashid Ali coup. As 
a result, they fared very poorly in the fighting and returned to Iraq 
even more alienated from the regime. The war also had a nega- 
tive impact on the Iraqi economy. The government allocated 
40 percent of available funds for the army and for Palestinian refu- 
gees. Oil royalties paid to Iraq were halved when the pipeline to 
Haifa was cut off in 1948. The war and the hanging of a Jewish 
businessman led, moreover, to the departure of most of Iraq's 
prosperous Jewish community; about 120,000 Iraqi Jews emigrated 
to Israel between 1948 and 1952. 

In 1952 the depressed economic situation, which had been exacer- 
bated by a bad harvest and by the government's refusal to hold 
direct elections, triggered large-scale antiregime protests; the pro- 
tests turned especially violent in Baghdad. In response, the govern- 
ment declared martial law, banned all political parties, suspended 
a number of newspapers, and imposed a curfew. The immense size 
of the protests showed how widespread dissatisfaction with the 
regime had become. The middle class, which had grown consider- 
ably as a result of the monarchy's expanded education system, had 
become increasingly alienated from the regime, in large part because 
they were unable to earn an income commensurate with their sta- 
tus. Nuri as Said's autocratic manner, his intolerance of dissent, 
and his heavy-handed treatment of the political opposition had fur- 
ther alienated the middle class, especially the army. Forced under- 
ground, the opposition had become more revolutionary. 

By the early 1950s, government revenues began to improve with 
the growth of the oil industry. New pipelines were built to Tripoli, 
Lebanon, in 1949 and to Baniyas, Syria, in 1952. A new oil agree- 
ment, concluded in 1952, netted the government 50 percent of oil 
company profits before taxes. As a result, government oil revenues 
increased almost fourfold, from US$32 million in 1951 to US$1 12 
million in 1952. The increased oil payments, however, did little 
for the masses. Corruption among high government officials in- 
creased; oil companies employed relatively few Iraqis; and the oil 
boom also had a severe inflationary effect on the economy. Infla- 
tion hurt in particular a growing number of urban poor and the 
salaried middle class. The increased economic power of the state 
further isolated Nuri as Said and the regent from Iraqi society and 
obscured from their view the tenuous nature of the monarchy's 
hold on power. 

In the mid-1950s, the monarchy was embroiled in a series of 
foreign policy blunders that ultimately contributed to its overthrow. 
Following a 1949 military coup in Syria that brought to power Adib 
Shishakli, a military strongman who opposed union with Iraq, a 



48 



Historical Setting 



split developed between Abd al Ilah, who had called for a Syrian- 
Iraqi union, and Nuri as Said, who opposed the union plan. 
Although Shishakli was overthrown with Iraqi help in 1954, the 
union plan never came to fruition. Instead, the schism between 
Nuri as Said and the regent widened. Sensing the regime's weak- 
ness, the opposition intensified its antiregime activity. 

The monarchy's major foreign policy mistake occurred in 1955, 
when Nuri as Said announced that Iraq was joining a British- 
supported mutual defense pact with Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. 
The Baghdad Pact constituted a direct challenge to Egyptian presi- 
dent Gamal Abdul Nasser. In response, Nasser launched a vitupera- 
tive media campaign that challenged the legitimacy of the Iraqi 
monarchy and called on the officer corps to overthrow it. The 1956 
British-French-Israeli attack on Sinai further alienated Nuri as 
Said's regime from the growing ranks of the opposition. In 1958 
King Hussein of Jordan and Abd al Ilah proposed a union of Hashi- 
mite monarchies to counter the recently formed Egyptian-Syrian 
union. At this point, the monarchy found itself completely isolated. 
Nuri as Said was able to contain the rising discontent only by resort- 
ing to even greater oppression and to tighter control over the politi- 
cal process. 

Republican Iraq 

The Hashimite monarchy was overthrown on July 14, 1958, in 
a swift, predawn coup executed by officers of the Nineteenth Brigade 
under the leadership of Brigadier Abd al Karim Qasim and Colonel 
Abd as Salaam Arif. The coup was triggered when King Hussein, 
fearing that an anti-Western revolt in Lebanon might spread to 
Jordan, requested Iraqi assistance. Instead of moving toward Jor- 
dan, however, Colonel Arif led a battalion into Baghdad and 
immediately proclaimed a new republic and the end of the old 
regime. The July 14 Revolution met virtually no opposition and 
proclamations of the revolution brought crowds of people into the 
streets of Baghdad cheering for the deaths of Iraq's two "strong 
men," Nuri as Said and Abd al Ilah. King Faisal II and Abd al 
Ilah were executed, as were many others in the royal family. Nuri 
as Said also was killed after attempting to escape disguised as a 
veiled woman. In the ensuing mob demonstrations against the old 
order, angry crowds severely damaged the British embassy. 

Put in its historical context, the July 14 Revolution was the culmi- 
nation of a series of uprisings and coup attempts that began with 
the 1936 Bakr Sidqi coup and included the 1941 Rashid Ali military 
movement, the 1948 Wathbah Uprising, and the 1952 and 1956 
protests. The revolution radically altered Iraq's social structure, 



49 



Iraq: A Country Study 

destroying the power of the landed shaykhs and the absentee land- 
lords while enhancing the position of the urban workers, the 
peasants, and the middle class. In altering the old power structure, 
however, the revolution revived long-suppressed sectarian, tribal, 
and ethnic conflicts. The strongest of these conflicts were those 
between Kurds and Arabs and between Sunnis and Shias. 

Despite a shared military background, the group of Free Officers 
(see Glossary) that carried out the July 14 Revolution was plagued 
by internal dissension. Its members lacked both a coherent ideology 
and an effective organizational structure. Many of the more senior 
officers resented having to take orders from Arif, their junior in 
rank. A power struggle developed between Qasim and Arif over 
joining the Egyptian-Syrian union. Arif s pro-Nasserite sympathies 
were supported by the Baath Party, while Qasim found support 
for his anti-union position in the ranks of the communists. Qasim, 
the more experienced and higher ranking of the two, eventually 
emerged victorious. Arif was first dismissed, then brought to trial 
for treason and condemned to death in January 1959; he was sub- 
sequently pardoned in December 1962. 

Whereas he implemented many reforms that favored the poor, 
Qasim was primarily a centrist in outlook, proposing to improve 
the lot of the poor while not dispossessing the wealthy. In part, his 
ambiguous policies were a product of his lack of a solid base of sup- 
port, especially in the military. Unlike the bulk of military officers, 
Qasim did not come from the Arab Sunni northwestern towns nor 
did he share their enthusiasm for pan-Arabism: he was of mixed 
Sunni- Shia parentage from southeastern Iraq. Qasim' s ability to 
remain in power depended, therefore, on a skillful balancing of the 
communists and the pan-Arabists. For most of his tenure, Qasim 
sought to counterbalance the growing pan- Arab trend in the military 
by supporting the communists who controlled the streets. He autho- 
rized the formation of a communist-controlled militia, the People's 
Resistance Force, and he freed all communist prisoners. 

Qasim 's economic policies reflected his poor origins and his ties 
with the communists. He permitted trade unions, improved work- 
ers' conditions, and implemented land reform aimed at dismantling 
the old feudal structure of the countryside. Qasim also challenged 
the existing profit-sharing arrangements with the oil companies. 
On December 11, 1961, he passed Public Law 80, which dispos- 
sessed the IPC of 99.5 percent of its concession area, leaving it to 
operate only in those areas currently in production. The new 
arrangement significantly increased oil revenues accruing to the 
government. Qasim also announced the establishment of an Iraq 
National Oil Company (INOC) to exploit the new territory. 



50 



Historical Setting 



In March 1959, a group of disgruntled Free Officers, who came 
from conservative, well-known, Arab Sunni families and who 
opposed Qasim's increasing links with the communists, attempted 
a coup. Aware of the planned coup, Qasim had his communist allies 
mobilize 250,000 of their supporters in Mosul. The ill-planned coup 
attempt never really materialized and, in its aftermath, the com- 
munists massacred nationalists and some well-to-do Mosul fami- 
lies, leaving deep scars that proved to be very slow to heal. 

Throughout 1959 the ranks of the ICP swelled as the party 
increased its presence in both the military and the government. 
In 1959 Qasim reestablished diplomatic relations between Iraq and 
Moscow, an extensive Iraqi-Soviet economic agreement was signed, 
and arms deliveries began. With communist fortunes riding high, 
another large-scale show of force was planned in Kirkuk, where 
a significant number of Kurds (many of them either members of, 
or sympathetic to, the ICP) lived in neighborhoods contiguous to 
a Turkoman upper class. In Kirkuk, however, communist rallies 
got out of hand. A bloody battle ensued, and the Kurds looted and 
killed many Turkomans. The communist-initiated violence at Kir- 
kuk led Qasim to crack down on the organization, by arresting 
some of the more unruly rank-and-file members and by temporarily 
suspending the People's Resistance Force. Following the events at 
Mosul and at Kirkuk, the Baath and its leader, Fuad Rikabi, 
decided that the only way to dislodge the Qasim regime would be 
to kill Qasim (see Coups, Coup Attempts, and Foreign Policy, this 
ch.). The future president, Saddam Husayn, carried out the 
attempted assassination, which injured Qasim but failed to kill him. 
Qasim reacted by softening his stance on the communists and by 
suppressing the activities of the Baath and other nationalist par- 
ties. The renewed communist-Qasim relationship did not last long, 
however. Throughout 1960 and 1961, sensing that the communists 
had become too strong, Qasim again moved against the party by 
eliminating members from sensitive government positions, by crack- 
ing down on trade unions and on peasant associations, and by shut- 
ting down the communist press. 

Qasim's divorce from the communists, his alienation from the 
nationalists, his aloof manner, and his monopoly of power — he was 
frequently referred to as the ''sole leader" — isolated him from a 
domestic power base. In 1961 his tenuous hold on power was fur- 
ther weakened when the Kurds again took up arms against the cen- 
tral government. 

The Kurds had ardently supported the 1958 revolution. Indeed, 
the new constitution put forth by Qasim and Arif had stipulated 
that the Kurds and the Arabs would be equal partners in the new 



51 



Iraq: A Country Study 



state. Exiled Kurdish leaders, including Mullah Mustafa Barzani, 
were allowed to return. Mutual suspicions, however, soon soured 
the Barzani-Qasim relationship; in September 1961, full-scale fight- 
ing broke out between Kurdish guerrillas and the Iraqi army. The 
army did not fare well against the seasoned Kurdish guerrillas, 
many of whom had deserted from the army. By the spring of 1962, 
Qasim's inability to contain the Kurdish insurrection had further 
eroded his base of power. The growing opposition was now in a 
position to plot his overthrow. 

Qasim's domestic problems were compounded by a number of 
foreign policy crises, the foremost of which was an escalating con- 
flict with the shah of Iran. Although he had reined in the com- 
munists, Qasim's leftist sympathies aroused fears in the West and 
in neighboring Gulf states of an imminent communist takeover of 
Iraq. In April 1959, Allen Dulles, the director of the United States 
Central Intelligence Agency, described the situation in Iraq "as 
the most dangerous in the world." The pro-Western shah found 
Qasim's communist sympathies and his claims on Iranian Khuze- 
stan (an area that stretched from Dezful to Ahvaz in Iran and that 
contained a majority of Iranians of Arab descent) to be anathema. 
In December 1959, Iraqi-Iranian relations rapidly deteriorated 
when Qasim, reacting to Iran's reopening of the Shatt al Arab dis- 
pute, nullified the 1937 agreement and claimed sovereignty over 
the anchorage area near Abadan. In July 1961, Qasim further 
alienated the West and pro- Western regional states by laying claim 
to the newly independent state of Kuwait. When the Arab League 
unanimously accepted Kuwait's membership, Iraq broke off diplo- 
matic relations with its Arab neighbors. Qasim was completely 
isolated. 

In February 1963, hemmed in by regional enemies and facing 
Kurdish insurrection in the north and a growing nationalist move- 
ment at home, Qasim was overthrown. Despite the long list of ene- 
mies who opposed him in his final days, Qasim was a hero to 
millions of urban poor and impoverished peasants, many of whom 
rushed to his defense. 

The inability of the masses to stave off the nationalist onslaught 
attested to the near total divorce of the Iraqi people from the politi- 
cal process. From the days of the monarchy, the legitimacy of the 
political process had suffered repeated blows. The government's 
British legacy, Nuri as Said's authoritarianism, and the rapid 
encroachment of the military (who paid only scant homage to the 
institutions of state) had eroded the people's faith in the govern- 
ment; furthermore, Qasim's inability to stem the increasing eth- 
nic, sectarian, and class-inspired violence reflected an even deeper 



52 



Historical Setting 



malaise. The unraveling of Iraq's traditional social structure upset 
a precarious balance of social forces. Centuries-old religious and 
sectarian hatreds now combined with more recent class antagonisms 
in a volatile mix. 

Coups, Coup Attempts, and Foreign Policy 

The Baath Party that orchestrated the overthrow of Qasim was 
founded in the early 1940s by two Syrian students, Michel Aflaq 
and Salah ad Din al Bitar. Its ideological goals of socialism, free- 
dom, and unity reflected the deeply felt sentiments of many Iraqis 
who, during the monarchy, had suffered from the economic dislo- 
cation that followed the breakup of the old Ottoman domain, from 
an extremely skewed income distribution, and from the suppres- 
sion of political freedoms. Beginning in 1952, under the leader- 
ship of Fuad Rikabi, the party grew rapidly, especially among the 
Iraqi intelligentsia. By 1958 the Baath had made some inroads into 
the military. The party went through a difficult period in 1959, 
however, after the Mosul and Kirkuk incidents, the failed attempt 
on Qasim 's life, and disillusionment with Nasser. The Baath 's major 
competitor throughout the Qasim period was the ICP; when Qasim 
was finally overthrown, strongly pitched battles between the two 
ensued. The Baath was able to consolidate its bid for power only 
with the emergence of Ali Salih as Saadi as leader. 

Upon assuming power, the Baath established the National Coun- 
cil of Revolutionary Command (NCRC) as the highest policy- 
making body and appointed Ahmad Hasan al Bakr, one of the Free 
Officers, as prime minister and Arif as president. The real power, 
however, was held by the party leader, Saadi. Despite the domi- 
nance of the newly established NCRC, the Baath' s hold on power 
was extremely tenuous. The organization was small, with an active 
membership of fewer than 1,000, and it was not well represented 
in the officer corps or in the army at large. Its leadership was 
inexperienced, and its ideology was too vague to have any immedi- 
ate relevance to the deep-seated problems besetting Iraq in the early 
1960s. Its ambiguity of purpose had served the party well during 
the Qasim era, enabling it to attract a diverse membership shar- 
ing only a common aversion for "the sole leader." In the post- 
Qasim period, that ambiguity was tearing the party asunder. 

The party's lack of cohesion and lack of a coherent program had 
two major effects on Baath policy. First, it led party "strong man" 
Saadi to establish a one-party state that showed little tolerance for 
opposing views. Second, in the absence of strong ideological ties, 
the Baath increasingly was pervaded by cliques from the same 



53 



Iraq: A Country Study 

village, town, or tribe. This tendency became even more pro- 
nounced during the 1970s. 

Troubled by internal dissension and unable to suppress a new 
wave of Kurdish unrest in the north, the Baath held power for less 
than a year. Most damaging was the foundering of unity talks with 
Nasser and the new Baathist regime in Syria. When the unity plan 
collapsed, Nasser launched a vituperative campaign challenging 
the legitimacy of the Baath in Iraq and in Syria. Nasser's attacks 
seriously eroded the legitimacy of a regime that had continually 
espoused pan-Arabism. Another factor contributing to the party's 
demise was Saadi's reliance on the National Guard — a paramili- 
tary force composed primarily of Baath sympathizers — to counter 
the Baath 's lack of support in the regular army. By bolstering the 
guard, Saadi alienated the regular army. Finally, the Baath was 
sharply divided between doctrinaire hard-liners, such as Saadi, and 
a more pragmatic moderate wing. 

With its party ranks weakened, the Baath was overthrown by 
Arif and a coterie of military officers in a bloodless coup in Novem- 
ber 1963. Upon assuming power, Arif immediately announced that 
the armed forces would manage the country. The governing core 
consisted of Arif; his brother, Abd ar Rahman Arif; and his trusted 
colleague, Colonel Said Slaibi. Arif was chairman of the NCRC, 
commander in chief of the armed forces, and president of the repub- 
lic; his brother was acting chief of staff, and the colonel was com- 
mander of the Baghdad garrison. The Arif brothers, Slaibi, and 
the majority of Arif's Twentieth Brigade were united by a strong 
tribal bond as members of the Jumailah tribe. 

Other groups who participated in the 1963 coup included 
Nasserites — an informal group of military officers and civilians who 
looked to Nasser for leadership and who desired some kind of unity 
with Egypt — and Baathists in the military. By the spring of 1964, 
Arif had adroidy outmaneuvered the military Baathists and had filled 
the top leadership posts with civilian Nasserites. Arif and the Nas- 
serite officers took steps to integrate the military, economic, and 
political policies of Iraq with those of Egypt; this was expected to 
lead to the union of the two countries by 1966. (The United Arab 
Republic [UAR], was founded by Egypt and Syria in 1958; Syria 
withdrew in 1961 leaving Egypt alone. Arif proposed that Iraq join 
[partly as an anticommunist measure] but this union never occurred.) 
In May 1964, the Joint Presidency Council was formed, and 
in December the Unified Political Command was established 
to expedite the ultimate constitutional union of the two countries. 
In July 1964, Arif announced that henceforth all political parties 
would coalesce to form the Iraqi Arab Socialist Union. Most 



54 




o 



|" jj y j 




King Faisal II inaugurating Parliament December 1956 
Courtesy United States Information Agency 



important for the future, Arif adopted Nasser's socialist program, 
calling for the nationalization of insurance companies, banks, and 
such essential industries as steel, cement, and construction — along 
with the tobacco industry, tanneries, and flour mills. Arif s nation- 
alization program proved to be one of the few legacies of the pro- 
posed Egyptian-Iraqi union (see Industrialization, ch. 3). 

By 1965 Arif had lost his enthusiasm for the proposed union, 
which had received only lukewarm support from Nasser. Arif began 
ousting Nasserite officers from the government. As a result, the 
newly appointed prime minister, Brigadier Arif Abd ar Razzaq, 
who was also a leading Nasserite, made an unsuccessful coup 
attempt on September 12, 1965. In response, President Arif cur- 
tailed Nasserite activities and appointed fellow tribal members to 
positions of power. Colonel Abd ar Razzaq an Nayif, a fellow 
Jumailah, became head of military intelligence. Arif also attempted 
to bring more civilians into the government. He appointed the first 
civilian prime minister since the days of the monarchy, Abd ar Rah- 
man Bazzaz. Bazzaz strongly advocated the rule of law and was 
determined to end the erratic, military-dominated politics that had 
characterized Iraq since 1958. He also tried to implement the First 
Five-Year Economic Plan (1965-70) to streamline the bureaucracy 
and to encourage private and foreign investment. 

In April 1966, Arif was killed in a helicopter crash and his 



55 



Iraq: A Country Study 

brother, Major General Abd ar Rahman Arif, was installed in office 
with the approval of the National Defense Council and the cabi- 
net. Abd ar Rahman Arif lacked the forcefulness and the political 
acumen of his brother; moreover, he was dominated by the ambi- 
tious military officers who were responsible for his appointment. 
The government's weak hold on the country thus became more 
apparent. The most pressing issue facing the new government was 
a renewed Kurdish rebellion. 

The 1964 cease-fire signed by Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani 
and Abd as Salaam Arif was short-lived; by April 1965, the two 
sides were again engaged in hostilities. This time military support 
provided by the shah of Iran helped the Kurds win important vic- 
tories over the Iraqi army. Kurdish inroads in the north and escalat- 
ing Iraqi-Iranian tensions prompted Iraq's prime minister Bazzaz 
to propose a more far-reaching settlement to the Kurdish problem. 
Some of the more salient points of Bazzaz' s proposal included 
amnesty, use of the Kurdish language in Kurdish areas, Kurdish 
administration of their educational, health, and municipal insti- 
tutions, and the promise of early elections by which the Kurds would 
gain proportional representation in national as well as in provin- 
cial assemblies. When Barzani indicated that he approved of these 
proposals, the Kurdish conflict appeared to have ended. 

The army, however, which had opposed having Bazzaz as a 
civilian head of the cabinet, feared that he would reduce their pay 
and privileges; consequently, it strongly denounced reconciliation 
with the Kurds. President Arif yielded to pressure and asked for 
Bazzaz 's resignation. This ended the rapprochement with the Kurds 
and led to a collapse of civilian rule. The new prime minister was 
General Naji Talib, a pro-Nasserite who had been instrumental 
in the 1958 Revolution and who strongly opposed the Kurdish peace 
plan. 

Arif also sought to further the improved relations with Iran 
initiated by Bazzaz. This rapprochement was significant because 
it denied the Kurds access to their traditional place of asylum, which 
allowed recovery from Iraqi attacks. Arif visited Tehran in the 
spring of 1967; at the conclusion of his visit, it was announced that 
the countries would hold more meetings aimed at joint oil explo- 
ration in the Naft-e Shah and Naft Khaneh border regions. They 
also agreed to continue negotiations on toll collection and naviga- 
tion rights on the Shatt al Arab and on the demarcation of the Per- 
sian Gulfs continental shelf. 

During the winter of 1966-67, Arif faced a crisis emanating from 
a new source, Syria. The IPC transported oil from its northern 
fields to Mediterranean ports via pipelines in Syria. In 1966 



56 



Historical Setting 



Damascus claimed that the IPC had been underpaying Syria, based 
on their 1955 agreement. Syria demanded back payments and 
immediately increased the transit fee it charged the IPC. When 
the IPC did not accede to Syrian demands, Syria cut off the flow 
of Iraqi oil to its Mediterranean ports. The loss of revenue threa- 
tened to cause a severe financial crisis. It also fueled anti-Talib forces 
and increased public clamor for his resignation. In response, Talib 
resigned, and Arif briefly headed an extremely unsteady group of 
military officers. 

In the opinion of Phebe Marr, a leading authority on Iraq, on 
the eve of the June 1967 War between Israel and various Arab 
states, the Arif government had become little more than a collec- 
tion of army officers balancing the special interests of various eco- 
nomic, political, ethnic, and sectarian groups. The non-intervention 
of Iraqi troops while Israel was overtaking the Egyptian, Syrian, 
and Jordanian armies and was conquering large tracts of Arab ter- 
ritory discredited the Arif regime in the eyes of the masses. To stave 
off rising discontent, Arif reappointed strongman Tahir Yahya as 
prime minister (he had first been appointed by Arif in November 
1963). Yahya' s only accomplishment was to lessen Iraq's economic 
dependence on the Western-owned IPC: on August 6, his govern- 
ment turned over all exploitation rights in the oil-rich North 
Rumailah field to the state-controlled INOC (see Post- World War 
II Through the 1970s, ch. 3). The Arif government, however, had 
lost its base of power. Lacking a coherent political platform and 
facing increasing charges of corruption, the government was only 
hanging on. 

Ultimately two disaffected Arif supporters — Colonel Abd ar Raz- 
zaq an Nayif and Ibrahim ad Daud — were able to stage a successful 
coup against Arif, and the Baath quickly capitalized on the situa- 
tion. Nayif and Daud had been part of a small group of young 
officers, called the Arab Revolutionary Movement, that previously 
had been a major source of support for Arif. By July 1968, however, 
reports of corruption and Arif s increased reliance on the Nasserites 
(whom both Nayif and Daud opposed) had alienated the two officers. 
Nayif and Daud acted independently from the Baath in carrying 
out the coup, but lacked the organizational backing or the grass-roots 
support necessary to remain in power. In only a few weeks, the Baath 
had outmaneuvered Nayif and Daud, and, for the second time in 
five years, had taken over control of the government. 

The Emergence of Saddam Husayn, 1968-79 

The Baath of 1968 was more tightly organized and more deter- 
mined to stay in power than the Baath of 1963. The demise of 



57 



Iraq: A Country Study 

Nasserism following the June 1967 War and the emergence of a 
more parochially oriented Baath in Syria freed the Iraqi Baath from 
the debilitating aspects of pan-Arabism. In 1963 Nasser had been 
able to manipulate domestic Iraqi politics; by 1968 his ideological 
pull had waned, enabling the Iraqi Baath to focus on pressing 
domestic issues. The party also was aided by a 1967 reorganiza- 
tion that created a militia and an intelligence apparatus and set 
up local branches that gave the Baath broader support. In addi- 
tion, by 1968 close family and tribal ties bound the Baath' s ruling 
clique. Most notable in this regard was the emergence of Tikritis — 
Sunni Arabs from the northwest town of Tikrit — related to Ahmad 
Hasan al Bakr. Three of the five members of the Baath' s Revolu- 
tionary Command Council (RCC) were Tikritis; two, Bakr and 
Hammad Shihab, were related to each other. The cabinet posts 
of president, prime minister, and defense minister went to Tikritis. 
Saddam Husayn, a key leader behind the scenes, also was a Tikriti 
and a relative of Bakr. Another distinguishing characteristic of the 
Baath in 1968 was that the top leadership consisted almost entirely 
of military men. Finally, Bakr was a much more seasoned politi- 
cian in 1968 than he had been in 1963. 

Less than two months after the formation of the Bakr govern- 
ment, a coalition of pro-Nasser elements, Arif supporters, and con- 
servatives from the military attempted another coup. This event 
provided the rationale for numerous purges directed by Bakr and 
Saddam Husayn. Between 1968 and 1973, through a series of sham 
trials, executions, assassinations, and intimidations, the party ruth- 
lessly eliminated any group or person suspected of challenging Baath 
rule. The Baath also institutionalized its rule by formally issuing 
a Provisional Constitution in July 1970. This document was a 
modification of an earlier constitution that had been issued in Sep- 
tember 1968. The Provisional Constitution, which with some 
modifications is still in effect, granted the party-dominated RCC 
extensive powers and declared that new RCC members must belong 
to the party's Regional Command — the top policy-making and 
executive body of the Baathist organization (see Constitutional 
Framework, ch. 4). 

Two men, Saddam Husayn and Bakr, increasingly dominated 
the party. Bakr, who had been associated with Arab nationalist 
causes for more than a decade, brought the party popular legiti- 
macy. Even more important, he brought support from the army 
both among Baathist and non-Baathist officers, with whom he had 
cultivated ties for years. Saddam Husayn, on the other hand, was 
a consummate party politician whose formative experiences were 
in organizing clandestine opposition activity. He was adept at 



58 



Historical Setting 



outmaneuvering — and at times ruthlessly eliminating — political 
opponents. Although Bakr was the older and more prestigious of 
the two, by 1969 Saddam Husayn clearly had become the moving 
force behind the party. He personally directed Baathist attempts 
to settle the Kurdish question and he organized the party's institu- 
tional structure. 

In July 1973, after an unsuccessful coup attempt by a civilian 
faction within the Baath led by Nazim Kazzar, the party set out 
to reconsolidate its hold on power. First, the RCC amended the 
Provisional Constitution to give the president greater power. 
Second, in early 1974 the Regional Command was officially desig- 
nated as the body responsible for making policy (see The Revolu- 
tionary Command Council, ch. 4). By September 1977, all Regional 
Command leaders had been appointed to the RCC. Third, the party 
created a more pervasive presence in Iraqi society by establishing 
a complex network of grass-roots and intelligence- gathering organi- 
zations. Finally, the party established its own militia, which in 1978 
was reported to number close to 50,000 men. 

Despite Baath attempts to institutionalize its rule, real power 
remained in the hands of a narrowly based elite, united by close 
family and tribal ties. By 1977 the most powerful men in the Baath 
thus were all somehow related to the triumvirate of Saddam 
Husayn, Bakr, and General Adnan Khayr Allah Talfah, Saddam 
Husayn' s brother-in-law who became minister of defense in 1978. 
All were members of the party, the RCC, and the cabinet, and 
all were members of the Talfah family of Tikrit, headed by Khayr 
Allah Talfah. Khayr Allah Talfah was Saddam Husayn's uncle and 
guardian, Adnan Khayr Allah's father, and Bakr's cousin. Saddam 
Husayn was married to Adnan Khayr Allah's sister and Adnan 
Khayr Allah was married to Bakr's daughter. Increasingly, the most 
sensitive military posts were going to the Tikritis. 

Beginning in the mid-1970s, Bakr was beset by illness and by 
a series of family tragedies. He increasingly turned over power to 
Saddam Husayn. By 1977 the party bureaus, the intelligence 
mechanisms, and even ministers who, according to the Provisional 
Constitution, should have reported to Bakr, reported to Saddam 
Husayn. Saddam Husayn, meanwhile, was less inclined to share 
power, and he viewed the cabinet and the RCC as rubber stamps. 
On July 16, 1979, President Bakr resigned, and Saddam Husayn 
officially replaced him as president of the republic, secretary general 
of the Baath Party Regional Command, chairman of the RCC, 
and commander in chief of the armed forces. 

In foreign affairs, the Baath' s pan- Arab and socialist leanings 
alienated both the pro-Western Arab Gulf states and the shah of 



59 



Iraq: A Country Study 



Iran. The enmity between Iraq and Iran sharpened with the 1969 
British announcement of a planned withdrawal from the Gulf in 
1971. In February 1969, Iran announced that Iraq had not ful- 
filled its obligations under the 1937 treaty and demanded that the 
border in the Shatt al Arab waterway be set at the thalweg. Iraq's 
refusal to honor the Iranian demand led the shah to abrogate the 
1937 treaty and to send Iranian ships through the Shatt al Arab 
without paying dues to Iraq. In response, Iraq aided anti-shah dis- 
sidents, while the shah renewed support for Kurdish rebels. Rela- 
tions between the two countries soon deteriorated further. In 
November 1971, the shah occupied the islands of Abu Musa and 
the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, which previously had been under 
the sovereignty of Ras al Khaymah and Sharjah, both member 
states of the United Arab Emirates. 

The Iraqi Baath also was involved in a confrontation with the 
conservative shaykhdoms of the Gulf over Iraq's support for the 
leftist People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) and 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf. 
The major contention between Iraq and the conservative Gulf states, 
however, concerned the Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Warbah 
that dominate the estuary leading to the southern Iraqi port of Umm 
Qasr. Beginning in the early 1970s, Iraq's desire to develop a deep- 
water port on the Gulf led to demands that the two islands be trans- 
ferred or leased to Iraq. Kuwait refused, and in March 1973 Iraqi 
troops occupied As Samitah, a border post in the northeast corner 
of Kuwait. Saudi Arabia immediately came to Kuwait's aid and, 
together with the Arab League, obtained Iraq's withdrawal. 

The most serious threat facing the Baath was a resurgence of 
Kurdish unrest in the north. In March 1970, the RCC and Mustafa 
Barzani announced agreement to a fifteen-article peace plan. This 
plan was almost identical to the previous Bazzaz-Kurdish settle- 
ment that had never been implemented. The Kurds were immedi- 
ately pacified by the settlement, particularly because Barzani was 
permitted to retain his 15,000 Kurdish troops. Barzani' s troops 
then became an official Iraqi frontier force called the Pesh Merga, 
meaning "Those Who Face Death." The plan, however, was not 
completely satisfactory because the legal status of the Kurdish ter- 
ritory remained unresolved. At the time of the signing of the peace 
plan, Barzani' s forces controlled territory from Zakhu in the north 
to Halabjah in the southeast and already had established de facto 
Kurdish administration in most of the towns of the area. Barzani' s 
group, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), was granted official 
recognition as the legitimate representative of the Kurdish people. 



60 



Historical Setting 



The 1970 agreement unraveled throughout the early 1970s. After 
the March 1974 Baath attempt to assassinate Barzani and his son 
Idris, full-scale fighting broke out. In early 1974, it appeared that 
the Baath had finally succeeded in isolating Barzani and the KDP 
by coopting the ICP and by signing a treaty with the Soviet Union, 
both traditionally strong supporters of the KDP. Barzani, however, 
compensated for the loss of Soviet and ICP support by obtaining 
military aid from the shah of Iran and from the United States, both 
of which were alarmed by increasing Soviet influence in Iraq. When 
Iraqi forces reached Rawanduz, threatening to block the major 
Kurdish artery to Iran, the shah increased the flow of military sup- 
plies to the Kurdish rebels. Using antitank missiles and artillery 
obtained from Iran as well as military aid from Syria and Israel, 
the KDP inflicted heavy losses on the Iraqi forces. To avoid a costly 
stalemate like that which had weakened his predecessors, Saddam 
Husayn sought an agreement with the shah. 

In Algiers on March 6, 1975, Saddam Husayn signed an agree- 
ment with the shah that recognized the thalweg as the boundary 
in the Shatt al Arab, legalized the shah's abrogation of the 1937 
treaty in 1969, and dropped all Iraqi claims to Iranian Khuzestan 
and to the islands at the foot of the Gulf. In return, the shah agreed 
to prevent subversive elements from crossing the border. This agree- 
ment meant an end to Iranian assistance to the Kurds. Almost 
immediately after the signing of the Algiers Agreement, Iraqi forces 
went on the offensive and defeated the Pesh Merga, which was 
unable to hold out without Iranian support. Under an amnesty 
plan, about 70 percent of the Pesh Merga surrendered to the Iraqis. 
Some remained in the hills of Kurdistan to continue the fight, and 
about 30,000 crossed the border to Iran to join the civilian refu- 
gees, then estimated at between 100,000 and 200,000. 

Even before the fighting broke out in March 1974, Saddam 
Husayn had offered the Kurds the most comprehensive autonomy 
plan ever proposed. The major provisions of the plan stated that 
Kurdistan would be an autonomous area governed by an elected 
legislative and an executive council, the president of which would 
be appointed by the Iraqi head of state. The Kurdish council would 
have control over local affairs except in the areas of defense and 
foreign relations, which would be controlled by the central govern- 
ment. The autonomous region did not include the oil-rich district 
of Kirkuk. To facilitate the autonomy plan, Saddam Husayn' s 
administration helped form three progovernment Kurdish parties, 
allocated a special budget for development in Kurdish areas, and 
repatriated many Kurdish refugees then living in Iran. 



61 



Iraq: A Country Study 

In addition to the conciliatory measures offered to the Kurds, 
Saddam Husayn attempted to weaken Kurdish resistance by forc- 
ibly relocating many Kurds from the Kurdish heartland in the 
north, by introducing increasing numbers of Arabs into mixed 
Kurdish provinces, and by razing all Kurdish villages along a 1 , 300- 
kilometer stretch of the border with Iran. Saddam Husayn's com- 
bination of conciliation and severity failed to appease the Kurds, 
and renewed guerrilla attacks occurred as early as March 1976. 
At the same time, the failure of the KDP to obtain significant con- 
cessions from the Iraqi government caused a serious split within 
the Kurdish resistance. In June 1975, Jalal Talabani formed the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The PUK was urban-based 
and more leftist than the tribally based KDP. Following Barzani's 
death in 1975, Barzani's sons, Idris and Masud, took control of 
the KDP. In October 1979, Masud officially was elected KDP chair- 
man. He issued a new platform calling for continued armed struggle 
against the Baath through guerrilla warfare. The effectiveness of 
the KDP, however, was blunted by its violent intra-Kurdish struggle 
with the PUK throughout 1978 and 1979. 

Beginning in 1976, with the Baath firmly in power and after the 
Kurdish rebellion had been successfully quelled, Saddam Husayn 
set out to consolidate his position at home by strengthening the 
economy. He pursued a state-sponsored industrial modernization 
program that tied an increasing number of Iraqis to the Baath- 
controlled government. Saddam Husayn's economic policies were 
largely successful; they led to a wider distribution of wealth, to 
greater social mobility, to increased access to education and health 
care, and to the redistribution of land. The quadrupling of oil prices 
in 1973 and the subsequent oil price rises brought on by the 1979 
Islamic Revolution in Iran greatly enhanced the success of Saddam 
Husayn's program. The more equitable distribution of income tied 
to the ruling party many Iraqis who had previously opposed the 
central government. For the first time in modern Iraqi history, a 
government — albeit at times a ruthless one, had thus achieved some 
success in forging a national community out of the country's dis- 
parate social elements. 

Success on the economic front spurred Saddam Husayn to pur- 
sue an ambitious foreign policy aimed at pushing Iraq to the fore- 
front of the Arab world. Between 1975 and 1979, a major plank 
of Saddam Husayn's bid for power in the region rested on improved 
relations with Iran, with Saudi Arabia, and with the smaller Gulf 
shaykhdoms. In 1975 Iraq established diplomatic relations with 
Sultan Qabus of Oman and extended several loans to him. In 1978 
Iraq sharply reversed its support for the Marxist regime in South 



62 



Historical Setting 



Yemen. The biggest boost to Saddam Husayn's quest for regional 
power, however, resulted from Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's 
signing the Camp David Accords in November 1978. 

Saddam Husayn viewed Egypt's isolation within the Arab world 
as an opportunity for Iraq to play a leading role in Arab affairs. 
He was instrumental in convening an Arab summit in Baghdad 
that denounced Sadat's reconciliation with Israel and imposed sanc- 
tions on Egypt. He also attempted to end his long-standing feud 
with Syrian President Hafiz al Assad, and, in June 1979, Saddam 
Husayn became the first Iraqi head of state in twenty years to visit 
Jordan. In Amman, Saddam Husayn concluded a number of agree- 
ments with King Hussein, including one for the expansion of the 
port of Aqabah, regarded by Iraq as a potential replacement for 
ports in Lebanon and Syria. 

The Iran-Iraq Conflict 

In February 1979, Saddam Husayn's ambitious plans and the 
course of Iraqi history were drastically altered by the overthrow 
of the shah of Iran. Husayn viewed the 1979 Islamic Revolution 
in Iran as both a threat and an opportunity. The downfall of the 
shah and the confusion prevailing in postrevolutionary Iran suited 
Saddam Husayn's regional ambitions. A weakened Iran seemed 
to offer an opportunity to project Iraqi power over the Gulf, to 
regain control over the Shatt al Arab waterway, and to augment 
Iraqi claims to leadership of the Arab world. More ominously, the 
activist Shia Islam preached by the leader of the revolution in Iran, 
Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, threatened to upset 
the delicate Sunni-Shia balance in Iraq, and a hostile Iran would 
threaten Iraqi security in the Gulf. Furthermore, deep-seated per- 
sonal animosities separated the two leaders. The two men held 
widely divergent ideologies, and in 1978 Husayn had expelled 
Khomeini from Iraq— reportedly at the request of the shah — after 
he had lived thirteen years in exile in An Najaf. 

For much of Iraqi history, the Shias have been both politically 
impotent and economically depressed. Beginning in the sixteenth 
century, when the Ottoman Sunnis favored their Iraqi coreligionists 
in the matter of educational and employment opportunities, the 
Shias consistently have been denied political power. Thus, although 
the Shias constitute more then 50 percent of the population, they 
occupy a relatively insignificant number of government posts. On 
the economic level, aside from a small number of wealthy landown- 
ers and merchants, the Shias historically were exploited as 
sharecropping peasants or menially employed slum dwellers. Even 
the prosperity brought by the oil boom of the 1970s only trickled 

63 



Iraq: A Country Study 



down slowly to the Shias; however, beginning in the latter half of 
the 1970s, Husayn's populist economic policies had a favorable 
impact on them, enabling many to join the ranks of a new Shia 
middle class. 

Widespread Shia demonstrations took place in Iraq in Febru- 
ary 1977, when the government, suspecting a bomb, closed Karbala 
to pilgrimage at the height of a religious ceremony. Violent clashes 
between police and Shia pilgrims spread from Karbala to An Najaf 
and lasted for several days before army troops were called in to 
quell the unrest. It was the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, 
however, that transformed Shia dissatisfaction with the Baath into 
an organized religiously based opposition. The Baath leadership 
feared that the success of Iran's Islamic Revolution would serve 
as an inspiration to Iraqi Shias. These fears escalated in July 1979, 
when riots broke out in An Najaf and in Karbala after the govern- 
ment had refused Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir as Sadr's request 
to lead a procession to Iran to congratulate Khomeini. Even more 
worrisome to the Baath was the discovery of a clandestine Shia 
group headed by religious leaders having ties to Iran. Baqir as Sadr 
was the inspirational leader of the group, named Ad Dawah al 
Islamiyah (the Islamic Call), commonly referred to as Ad Dawah. 
He espoused a program similar to Khomeini's, which called for 
a return to Islamic precepts of government and for social justice. 

Despite the Iraqi government's concern, the eruption of the 1979 
Islamic Revolution in Iran did not immediately destroy the Iraqi- 
Iranian rapprochement that had prevailed since the 1975 Algiers 
Agreement. As a sign of Iraq's desire to maintain good relations 
with the new government in Tehran, President Bakr sent a per- 
sonal message to Khomeini offering "his best wishes for the friendly 
Iranian people on the occasion of the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic." In addition, as late as the end of August 1979, Iraqi 
authorities extended an invitation to Mehdi Bazargan, the first 
president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to visit Iraq with the aim 
of improving bilateral relations. The fall of the moderate Bazargan 
government in late 1979, however, and the rise of Islamic mili- 
tants preaching an expansionist foreign policy soured Iraqi-Iranian 
relations. 

The principal events that touched off the rapid deterioration in 
relations occurred during the spring of 1980. In April the Iranian- 
supported Ad Dawah attempted to assassinate Iraqi foreign minister 
Tariq Aziz. Shortly after the failed grenade attack on Tariq Aziz, 
Ad Dawah was suspected of attempting to assassinate another Iraqi 
leader, Minister of Culture and Information Latif Nayyif Jasim. 
In response, the Iraqis immediately rounded up members and 



64 



Historical Setting 



supporters of Ad Dawah and deported to Iran thousands of Shias 
of Iranian origin. In the summer of 1980, Saddam Husayn ordered 
executions of the presumed Ad Dawah leader, Ayatollah Sayyid 
Muhammad Baqr as Sadr, and his sister. 

In September 1980, border skirmishes erupted in the central sec- 
tor near Qasr-e Shirin, with an exchange of artillery fire by both 
sides. A few weeks later, Saddam Husayn officially abrogated the 
1975 treaty between Iraq and Iran and announced that the Shatt 
al Arab was returning to Iraqi sovereignty. Iran rejected this action 
and hostilities escalated as the two sides exchanged bombing raids 
deep into each other's territory. Finally, on September 23, Iraqi 
troops marched into Iranian territory, beginning what was to be 
a protracted and extremely costly war (see The Iran-Iraq War, 
ch. 5). 

The Iran-Iraq War permanently altered the course of Iraqi his- 
tory. It strained Iraqi political and social life, and led to severe eco- 
nomic dislocations (see Growth and Structure of the Economy, 
ch. 3). Viewed from a historical perspective, the outbreak of hostili- 
ties in 1980 was, in part, just another phase of the ancient Persian- 
Arab conflict that had been fueled by twentieth-century border 
disputes. Many observers, however, believe that Saddam Husayn 's 
decision to invade Iran was a personal miscalculation based on 
ambition and a sense of vulnerability. Saddam Husayn, despite 
having made significant strides in forging an Iraqi nation-state, 
feared that Iran's new revolutionary leadership would threaten 
Iraq's delicate Sunni-Shia balance and would exploit Iraq's geo- 
strategic vulnerabilities — Iraq's minimal access to the Persian Gulf, 
for example. In this respect, Saddam Husayn 's decision to invade 
Iran has historical precedent; the ancient rulers of Mesopotamia, 
fearing internal strife and foreign conquest, also engaged in fre- 
quent battles with the peoples of the highlands. 

* * * 

The most reliable work on the ancient history of Iraq is George 
Roux's Ancient Iraq, which covers the period from prehistory through 
the Hellenistic period. Another good source, which places Sumer 
in the context of world history, is J.M. Roberts's The Pelican His- 
tory of the World. A concise and authoritative work on Shia Islam 
is Moojan Momen's An Introduction to Shii Islam. The article by 
D. Sourdel, "The Abbasid Caliphate," in The Cambridge History 
of Islam, provides an excellent overview of the medieval period. 
Stephen Longrigg's and Frank Stoakes's Iraq contains a historical 
summary of events before independence as well as a detailed 



65 



Iraq: A Country Study 



account of the period from independence to 1958. Majid Khad- 
duri's Republican Iraq is one of the best studies of Iraqi politics from 
the 1958 revolution to the Baath coup of 1968. His Socialist Iraq: 
A Study in Iraqi Politics since 1968 details events up to 1977. A semi- 
nal work on Iraqi socioeconomic movements and trends between 
the Ottoman period and the late 1970s is Hanna Batatu's The Old 
Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq. The most com- 
prehensive study of Iraq in the modern period is Phebe Marr's 
The Modern History of Iraq. Another good study, which focuses on 
the political and the economic development of Iraq from its foun- 
dation as a state until 1977, is Edith and E.F. Penrose's Iraq: Inter- 
national Relations and National Development. An excellent recent account 
of the Iraqi Baath is provided by Christine Helms 's Iraq, Eastern 
Flank of the Arab World. (For further information and complete 
citations, see Bibliography.) 



66 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 




Reed huts in the marshes of southern Iraq 



IRAQI SOCIETY IS COMPOSED of sizable and distinct social 
groups with differences and divisions that have been only slowly 
and fitfully challenged by the emergence of a strong, centralized 
political regime and a state apparatus. There are, moreover, 
regional and environmental differences between the scattered moun- 
tain villages for which the economic base is rain-fed grain crops 
and the more densely populated riverine communities to the south 
that depend on intricate irrigation and drainage systems for their 
livelihood. 

There are also linguistic and ethnic differences. The most impor- 
tant exception to the Arab character of Iraq is the large Kurdish 
minority, estimated at 19 percent of the population, or 3,092,820, 
in 1987. According to official government statistics, Turkomans 
and other Turkic-speaking peoples account for only 2 to 3 percent 
of the population. There was previously a large Iranian popula- 
tion settled around the Shia (see Glossary) holy cities of Karbala 
and An Najaf, and the southern port city of Basra; this element 
was largely expelled by government decree in 1971-72 and in 
1979-80; by 1987 only an estimated 133,000 of the Iranian popu- 
lation remained. 

Divisions along religious lines are deep-rooted. Although at least 
95 percent of Iraq's population is Muslim, the community is split 
between Sunnis (see Glossary) and Shias; the latter group, a minor- 
ity in the Arab world as a whole, constitutes a majority in Iraq. 
Of the non-Muslim communities, fragmented Christian sects do 
not constitute more than 1 or 2 percent, concentrated mainly in 
the governorates of Nineveh and Dahuk. A formerly extensive Jew- 
ish community is to all practical purposes defunct. The establish- 
ment of the State of Israel in 1948 and the defeat of the Arab armies 
in 1948 to 1949 rendered the situation of Iraqi Jews untenable and 
led to a mass exodus, both to Israel and to Iran, in 1950. 

Just before the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), the sharp cleavage 
between the rural and the urban communities that had formerly 
characterized Iraqi society had begun to break down as a result of 
policies instituted by the government. The war has accelerated this 
process. Large areas of the rural south have been devastated by con- 
tinuous fighting, which in turn has triggered a massive rural migra- 
tion to the capital. In the late 1980s, Iraqi and foreign observers 
agreed that, for the nation's economic health, this flight from the 
countryside would have to be reversed, and they anticipated that 



69 



Iraq: A Country Study 

the government would undertake measures to accomplish this rever- 
sal once the war ended. 

Geography and Population 
Boundaries 

Iraq's border with Iran has been a continuing source of conflict, 
and it was partially responsible for the outbreak in 1980 of the 
present war. The terms of a treaty negotiated in 1937 under Brit- 
ish auspices provided that in one area of the Shatt al Arab the 
boundary would be at the low water mark on the Iranian side. Iran 
subsequently insisted that the 1937 treaty was imposed on it by 
"British imperialist pressures," and that the proper boundary 
throughout the Shatt was the thalweg (midpoint). The matter came 
to a head in 1969, when Iraq, in effect, told the Iranian govern- 
ment that the Shatt was an integral part of Iraqi territory and that 
the waterway might be closed to Iranian shipping. 

Through Algerian mediation, Iran and Iraq agreed in March 
1975 to normalize their relations, and three months later they signed 
a treaty known as the Algiers Agreement. The document defined 
the common border for the entire length of the Shatt estuary as 
the thalweg. To compensate Iraq for the loss of what formerly had 
been regarded as its territory, pockets of territory along the moun- 
tain border in the central sector of its common boundary with Iran 
were assigned to it. Nonetheless, in September 1980, Iraq went 
to war with Iran, citing among other complaints the fact that Iran 
had not turned over to it the land specified in the Algiers Agree- 
ment. This problem has subsequently proved to be a stumbling 
block to a negotiated settlement of the ongoing conflict. 

In 1988 the boundary with Kuwait was another outstanding 
problem. It had been fixed in a 1913 treaty between the Ottoman 
Empire and British officials acting on behalf of Kuwait's ruling 
family, which in 1899 had ceded control over foreign affairs to Brit- 
ain. The boundary was accepted by Iraq when it became indepen- 
dent in 1932, but, in the 1960s and again in the mid-1970s, the 
Iraqi government advanced a claim to parts of Kuwait. Kuwait 
made several representations to the Iraqis during the Iran-Iraq War 
to fix the border once and for all, but Baghdad has repeatedly 
demurred, claiming that the issue is a potentially divisive one that 
could enflame nationalist sentiment inside Iraq. Hence, in early 
1988, it was likely that a solution would have to wait until the war 
ended. 

In 1922 British officials concluded the Treaty of Mohammara 
with Abd al Aziz ibn Abd ar Rahman Al Saud, who in 1932 formed 



70 



The Society and Its Environment 



the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The treaty provided the basic agree- 
ment for the boundary between the eventually independent nations. 
Also in 1922, the two parties agreed to the creation of the diamond- 
shaped Iraq-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone of approximately 3,520 
square kilometers adjacent to the western tip of Kuwait in which 
neither Iraq nor Saudi Arabia would build permanent dwellings 
or installations (see fig. 1). Beduins from either country could uti- 
lize the limited water and seasonal grazing resources of the zone. 
In April 1975, an agreement signed in Baghdad fixed the borders 
of the countries. Despite a rumored agreement providing for the 
formal division of the Neutral Zone, as of early 1988 such a docu- 
ment had not been published. Instead, Saudi Arabia was continu- 
ing to control oil wells in the offshore Neutral Zone and had been 
allocating proceeds from Neutral Zone oil sales to Iraq as a contri- 
bution to the war costs. 

Major Geographical Features 

Most geographers, including those of the Iraqi government, dis- 
cuss the country's geography in terms of four main zones or regions: 
the desert in the west and southwest; the rolling upland between 
the upper Tigris and Euphrates rivers (in Arabic, the Dijlis and 
Furat, respectively); the highlands in the north and in the north- 
east; and the central and southeastern alluvial plain through which 
the Tigris and Euphrates flow (see fig. 5). Iraq's total land area 
is variously given as 433,970 and 437,520 square kilometers. 

The desert zone, an area lying west and southwest of the 
Euphrates River, is a part of the Syrian Desert, which covers sec- 
tions of Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The region, sparsely 
inhabited by pastoral nomads, consists of a wide, stony plain inter- 
spersed with rare sandy stretches. A widely ramified pattern of 
wadis — watercourses that are dry most of the year — runs from the 
border to the Euphrates. Some wadis are more than 400 kilome- 
ters long, and they carry brief but torrential floods during the winter 
rains. 

The uplands region, between the Tigris north of Samarra and 
the Euphrates north of Hit, is known as Al Jazirah (Arabic for the 
island), and it is part of a larger area that extends westward into 
Syria, between the two rivers, and into Turkey. Water in the area 
flows in deeply cut valleys, and irrigation is much more difficult 
than it is in the lower plain. Much of this zone may be classified 
as desert. 

The northeastern highlands begin just south of a line drawn from 
Mosul to Kirkuk, and they extend to Iraq's borders with Turkey 
and Iran. High ground, separated by broad, undulating steppes, 



71 



Iraq: A Country Study 




Figure 5. Topography and Drainage 



gives way to mountains ranging from 1 ,000 to nearly 4,000 meters 
near the Iranian and Turkish borders. Except for a few valleys, 
the mountain area proper is suitable only for grazing in the foothills 



72 



The Society and Its Environment 




and steppes; adequate soil and rainfall, however, make cultivation 
possible. Here, too, are the great oil fields near Mosul and Kirkuk. 
The northeast is the homeland of most Iraqi Kurds. 



73 



Iraq: A Country Study 

The alluvial plain begins north of Baghdad and extends to the 
Persian Gulf. Here the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers lie above 
the level of the plain in many places, and the whole area is a delta 
interlaced by the channels of the two rivers and by irrigation canals. 
Intermittent lakes, fed by the rivers in flood, also characterize 
southeastern Iraq. A fairly large area (15,000 square kilometers) 
just above the confluence of the two rivers at Al Qurnah and 
extending east of the Tigris beyond the Iranian border is marsh- 
land, known as Hawr al Hammar, the result of centuries of flood- 
ing and inadequate drainage. Much of it is permanent marsh, but 
some parts dry out in early winter, and other parts become marsh- 
land only in years of great flood. 

Because the waters of the Tigris and the Euphrates above their 
confluence are heavily silt laden, irrigation and fairly frequent flood- 
ing deposit large quantities of silty loam in much of the delta area. 
Windborne silt also contributes to the total deposit of sediments. 
It has been estimated that the delta plains are built up at the rate 
of nearly twenty centimeters in a century. In some areas, major 
floods lead to the deposit in temporary lakes of as much as thirty 
centimeters of mud. 

The Tigris and the Euphrates also carry large quantities of salts. 
These, too, are spread on the land by flooding and by sometimes 
excessive irrigation. A high water table and poor surface and sub- 
surface drainage tend to concentrate the salts near the surface of 
the soil. In general, the salinity of the soil increases from Baghdad 
south to the Persian Gulf, a condition which severely limits produc- 
tivity in the region south of Al Amarah. The high degree of salinity 
is reflected in the large lake in central Iraq, southwest of Bagh- 
dad, known as Bahr al Milh (Sea of Salt). There are two other major 
lakes in the country to the north of Bahr al Milh, Buhayrat ath 
Tharthar and Buhayrat al Habbaniyah. 

The Euphrates originates in Turkey, is augmented by the Nahr 
al Khabur (or Khabur River) in Syria, and enters Iraq in the north- 
west. Here it is fed only by the wadis of the western desert during 
the winter rains. It then winds through a gorge, which varies from 
two to sixteen kilometers in width, until it flows out onto the plain 
at Ar Ramadi. Beyond there the Euphrates continues to the Hin- 
diyah Barrage, which was constructed in 1914 to divert the river 
into the Hindiyah Channel (the present-day Shatt al Hillah had 
been the main channel of the Euphrates before 1914). Below Al 
Kifl, the river follows two channels to As Samawah, where it reap- 
pears as a single channel to join the Tigris at Al Qurnah. 

The Tigris also rises in Turkey, but it is significantly augmented 
by several rivers in Iraq, the most important of which are the 



74 



The Society and Its Environment 



Khabur, the Great Zab, the Little Zab, and the Uzaym, all of which 
join the Tigris above Baghdad, and the Diyala, which joins it about 
thirty-six kilometers below the city. At the Kut Barrage much of 
the water is diverted into the Shatt al Gharraf, which was once the 
main channel of the Tigris. Water from the Tigris thus enters the 
Euphrates through the Shatt al Gharraf well above the confluence 
of the two main channels at Al Qurnah. 

Both the Tigris and the Euphrates break into a number of channels 
in the marshland area, and the flow of the rivers is substantially 
reduced by the time they come together at Al Qurnah. Moreover, 
the swamps act as silt traps, and the Shatt al Arab is relatively silt 
free as it flows south. Below Basra, however, the Karun River enters 
the Shatt al Arab from Iran, carrying large quantities of silt that 
present a continuous dredging problem in maintaining a clear chan- 
nel to enable ocean-going vessels to reach the port at Basra. This 
problem has been superseded by a greater obstacle to river traffic, 
however, namely the presence of several sunken hulks that have been 
rusting in the Shatt al Arab since early in the war. 

The waters of the Tigris and Euphrates are essential to the life 
of the country, but they may also threaten it. The rivers are at 
their lowest level in September and in October and are at flood 
in March, April, and May, when they may carry forty times as 
much water as at low mark. Moreover, one season's flood may 
be ten or more times as great as another's. In 1954, for example, 
Baghdad was seriously threatened, and dikes protecting it were 
nearly topped by the flooding Tigris. Since Syria built a dam on 
the Euphrates, the flow of water has been considerably diminished, 
and flooding was no longer a problem in the mid-1980s. In 1988 
Turkey was also constructing a dam on the Euphrates that would 
further restrict the water flow. 

Until the mid- twentieth century, most efforts to control the waters 
were primarily concerned with irrigation. Some attention was given 
to problems of flood control and drainage before the July 14 Revo- 
lution in 1958, but development plans in the 1960s and the 1970s 
were increasingly devoted to these matters, as well as to irrigation 
projects on the upper reaches of the Tigris and the Euphrates and 
the tributaries of the Tigris in the northeast. During the war, 
government officials stressed to foreign visitors that, with the con- 
clusion of a peace settlement, problems of irrigation and flooding 
would receive top priority from the government. 

Settlement Patterns 

In the rural areas of the alluvial plain and in the lower Diyala 
region, settlement almost invariably clusters near the rivers, 



75 



Iraq: A Country Study 

streams, and irrigation canals. The bases of the relationship between 
watercourse and settlement have been summarized by Robert 
McCormick Adams, director of the Oriental Institute of the Univer- 
sity of Chicago. He notes that the levees laid down by streams and 
by canals provide advantages for both settlement and agriculture. 
Surface water drains more easily on the levees' backslope, and the 
coarse soils of the levees are easier to cultivate and permit better 
subsurface drainage. The height of the levees gives some protec- 
tion against floods and the frost that often affect low-lying areas 
and may kill winter crops. Above all, those living or cultivating 
on the crest of a levee have easy access to water for irrigation and 
for household use in a dry, hot country. 

Although there are some isolated homesteads, most rural com- 
munities are nucleated settiements rather than dispersed farmsteads; 
that is, the farmer leaves his village to cultivate the fields outside 
it. The pattern holds for farming communities in the Kurdish high- 
lands of the northeast as well as for those in the alluvial plain. The 
size of the settlement varies, generally with the volume of water 
available for household use and with the amount of land accessi- 
ble to village dwellers. Sometimes, particularly in the lower Tigris 
and Euphrates valleys, soil salinity restricts the area of arable land 
and limits the size of the community dependent upon it, and it also 
usually results in large unsettled and uncultivated stretches between 
the villages. 

Fragmentary information suggests that most farmers in the 
alluvial plain tend to live in villages of more than 100 persons. For 
example, in the mid-1970s a substantial number of the residents 
of Baqubah, the administrative center and major city of Diyala 
Governorate, were employed in agriculture. 

The Marsh Arabs (the Madan) of the south usually live in small 
clusters of two or three houses kept above water by rushes that are 
constantly being replenished. Such clusters often are close together, 
but access from one to another is possible only by small boat. Here 
and there a few natural islands permit slightly larger clusters. Some 
of these people are primarily water buffalo herders, and they lead 
a seminomadic life. In the winter, when the waters are at a low 
point, they build fairly large temporary villages; in the summer, 
they move their herds out of the marshes to the river banks. 

The war has had its effect on the lives of these denizens of the 
marshes. With much of the fighting concentrated in their areas, 
they have either migrated to settled communities away from the 
marshes or have been forced by government decree to relocate 
within the marshes. Also, in early 1988, the marshes had become 
the refuge of deserters from the Iraqi army, who attempted to 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



maintain life in the fastness of these overgrown, desolate areas while 
hiding out from the authorities. These deserters in many instances 
have formed into large gangs that raid the marsh communities. 
For this reason, many of the marsh dwellers have abandoned their 
villages. 

The war has also affected settlement patterns in the northern 
Kurdish areas. There, the persistence of a stubborn rebellion by 
Kurdish guerrillas has goaded the government into applying steadily 
escalating violence against the local communities. Starting in 1984, 
the government launched a scorched-earth campaign to drive a 
wedge between the villagers and the guerrillas in the remote areas 
of two provinces of Kurdistan in which Kurdish guerrillas were 
active. In the process, whole villages were torched and subsequently 
bulldozed, which resulted in the Kurds' flocking into the regional 
centers of Irbil and As Sulaymaniyah. Also as a military precau- 
tion, the government has cleared a broad strip of territory in the 
Kurdish region along the Iranian border of all its inhabitants, hop- 
ing in this way to interdict the movement of Kurdish guerrillas back 
and forth between Iran and Iraq. The majority of Kurdish villages, 
however, remained intact in early 1988. 

In the arid areas of Iraq to the west and to the south, cities and 
large towns are almost invariably situated on watercourses, usually 
on the major rivers or their larger tributaries. In the south, this 
dependence has had its disadvantages. Until the recent develop- 
ment of flood control, Baghdad and other cities were subject to 
the threat of inundation. The dikes needed for protection, moreover, 
have effectively prevented the expansion of the urban areas in some 
directions. The growth of Baghdad, for example, was restricted 
by dikes on its eastern edge. The diversion of water to the Milhat 
ath Tharthar and the construction of a canal transferring water 
from the Tigris north of Baghdad to the Diyala River have facili- 
tated both the irrigation of land outside the limits of the dikes and 
the expansion of settlement. 

Climate 

Roughly 90 percent of the annual rainfall occurs between Novem- 
ber and April, most of it in the winter months from December 
through March. The remaining six months, particularly the hot- 
test ones of June, July, and August, are dry. 

Except in the north and in the northeast, mean annual rainfall 
ranges between ten and seventeen centimeters. Data available from 
stations in the foothills and in the steppes south and southwest of 
the mountains suggest that there is mean annual rainfall of between 
thirty- two and fifty- seven centimeters for that area. Rainfall in the 



77 



Iraq: A Country Study 

mountains is more abundant and may reach 100 centimeters a year 
in some places, but the terrain precludes extensive cultivation. Cul- 
tivation on nonirrigated land is limited essentially to the moun- 
tain valleys, foothills, and steppes, which have thirty or more 
centimeters of rainfall annually. Even in this zone, however, only 
one crop a year can be grown, and shortages of rain have often 
led to crop failures. 

Mean minimum temperatures in the winter range from near 
freezing (just before dawn) in the northern and northeastern foothills 
and the western desert to 2°C-3°C and 4°C-5°C in the alluvial 
plains of southern Iraq. They rise to a mean maximum of about 
15.5°C in the western desert and in the northeast and of 16.6°C 
in the south. In the summer mean minimum temperatures range 
from about 22.2°C to about 29°C and rise to maximums between 
roughly 37.7°C and 43.3°C. Temperatures sometimes fall below 
freezing, and they have fallen as low as -14.4°C at Ar Rutbah 
in the western desert. They are more likely, however, to go over 
46°C in the summer months, and several stations have records of 
more than 48°C. 

The summer months are marked by two kinds of wind. The 
southerly and southeasterly sharqi, a dry, dusty wind with occa- 
sional gusts of eighty kilometers an hour, occurs from April to early 
June and again from late September through November. It may 
last for only a day at the beginning and at the end of the season 
but for several days at other times. This wind is often accompa- 
nied by violent duststorms that may rise to heights of several thou- 
sand meters and that may close airports for brief periods. From 
mid-June to mid-September, the prevailing wind, called the shamal, 
is from the north and northwest. It is a steady wind, absent only 
occasionally during this period. The very dry air brought by this 
shamal permits intensive heating of the land surface by the sun, 
but the breeze has some cooling effect. 

The combination of rain shortage and extreme heat makes much 
of Iraq a desert. Because of very high rates of evaporation, soil 
and plants rapidly lose the little moisture obtained from the rain, 
and vegetation could not survive without extensive irrigation. Some 
areas, however, although arid, do have natural vegetation in con- 
trast to the desert. For example, in the Zagros Mountains in north- 
eastern Iraq there is permanent vegetation, such as oak trees, and 
date palms are found in the south. 

Population 

Although a census occurred in late 1987, only overall popula- 
tion totals and some estimates were available in early 1988. The 



78 



The Society and Its Environment 

latest detailed census information was that from the 1977 census. 
The total population increased from 12,029,000 in 1977 to 
16,278,000 in 1987, an increase of 35.3 percent. 

The population has fluctuated considerably over the region's long 
history. Between the eighth century and the twelfth century A.D. , 
Iraq — particularly Baghdad — was the flourishing center of a bur- 
geoning Arab civilization. At the height of the region's prosperity 
it may have supported a population much larger than the present 
society. (Some estimates range as high as 15 to 29 million people.) 
Decline came swiftly in the late thirteenth century, however, when 
Mongol conquerors massacred the populace, destroyed the cities, 
and ravaged the countryside. The elaborate irrigation system that 
had made possible agricultural production capable of supporting 
a large population was left in ruins. 

A pattern of alternating neglect and oppression characterized the 
Ottoman rule that began in the sixteenth century, and for hundreds 
of years the three wilayat (sing., wilayah, province) of Baghdad, Al 
Basrah, and Mosul — which the British joined to form Iraq in the 
aftermath of World War I — remained underpopulated backward 
outposts of the Ottoman Empire. In the mid- 1800s, the area had 
fewer than 1.3 million inhabitants. 

When Iraq became independent in 1932, the departing British 
officials estimated the population at about 3.5 million. The first 
census was carried out in 1947; it showed a population of approxi- 
mately 4.8 million. The 1957 census gave a population figure of 
about 6.3 million, and the 1965 census returned a count of slightly 
above 8 million. 

The October 1977 census gave the annual rate of population 
growth as 3.2 percent. According to the October 1987 census, the 
annual population growth rate was 3.1 percent, which placed Iraq 
among those countries with high population growth rates (2.8 to 
3.5 percent per year). In common with many developing coun- 
tries, Iraq's population was young; in 1987 approximately 57 per- 
cent of the population was under the age of twenty. The government 
has never sought to implement a birth control program, a policy 
reinforced by the war in order to offset losses in the fighting and 
to mitigate the threat from Iran, the population of which is roughly 
three times that of Iraq (see fig. 6). 

In 1977 about 64 percent of the population was listed as living 
in urban areas; this was a marked change from 1965, when only 
44 percent resided in urban centers. In the 1987 government esti- 
mates, the urban population was given as 70 percent. The increase 
resulted in large measure from the migrations to the cities after 
the start of the war. The partial destruction of Basra by Iranian 



79 



Iraq: A Country Study 



AGE-GROUP 




1.5 750 750 1.5 



POPULATION IN THOUSANDS 



Figure 6. Estimated Population Distribution by Age and Sex, 1987 

artillery barrages has had a particularly devastating effect; by 1988, 
according to some well informed accounts, almost half the residents 
of the city — its population formerly estimated at 800,000 — had fled. 
At the same time, approximately 95,000 persons were identified 
in the 1977 census as nomadic or seminomadic beduins; the 
apparent increase from the 57,000 listed in the 1957 census prob- 
ably reflects either an improved counting procedure or a change 
in classification. Overall, nomads and seminomads constituted less 
than 1 percent of the population, whereas in 1867 they had been 
estimated at about 500,000 or 35 percent of the population (see 
table 2, Appendix). 

The population remains unevenly distributed. In 1987 the Bagh- 
dad Governorate had a population density of about 745 persons 
per square kilometer; the Babylon Governorate, of 21 1 persons per 
square kilometer; and the Al Muthanna Governorate, of only 
6.1 persons per square kilometer. In general the major cities are 
located on the nation's rivers, and the bulk of the rural population 
lives in the areas that are cultivated with water taken from the rivers 
(see table 3, Appendix). 

People 

Although the data are not absolutely reliable, the government 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 



estimates that 76 percent of the people are Arab; 19 percent are 
Kurds; while Turkomans, Assyrians, Armenians, and other rela- 
tively small groups make up the rest. All but a small percentage 
adhere to Islam. The Islamic component is split into two main sects, 
Sunni and Shia; the Shias are in the majority by far. Officially the 
government sets the number of Shias at 55 percent. In the 1980s, 
knowledgeable observers began to question this figure, regarding 
it as low. Because the government does not encourage birth con- 
trol and the Shias, the least affluent in society, have traditionally 
had the highest birthrate, a more reasonable estimate of their num- 
bers would seem to be between 60 and 65 percent. All but a few 
of the estimated 3,088,000 Kurds are Sunni, and thus the Sunni 
Arabs — who historically have been the dominant religious and eth- 
nic group — constitute a decided minority of only about 13 percent 
vis-a-vis the Shia majority (see fig. 7). 

Almost all Iraqis speak at least some Arabic, the mother tongue 
for the Arab majority. Arabic, one of the more widely spoken lan- 
guages in the world, is the mother tongue claimed in 1988 by over 
177 million people from Morocco to the Arabian Sea. One of the 
Semitic languages, it is related to Aramaic, Phoenician, Syriac, 
Hebrew, various Ethiopic languages, and the Akkadian of ancient 
Babylonia and Assyria. 

Throughout the Arab world, the language exists in three forms: 
the Classical Arabic of the Quran; the literary language developed 
from the classical and referred to as Modern Standard Arabic, which 
has virtually the same structure wherever used; and the spoken lan- 
guage, which in Iraq is Iraqi Arabic. Educated Arabs tend to be 
bilingual — in Modern Standard Arabic and in their own dialect 
of spoken Arabic. Even uneducated Arabic speakers, who in Iraq 
constitute about 60 percent of the population, can comprehend the 
meaning of something said in Modern Standard Arabic, although 
they are unable to speak it. Classical Arabic, apart from Quranic 
texts, is known chiefly to scholarly specialists. 

Most of the words of Arabic's rich and extensive vocabulary are 
variations of triconsonantal roots, each of which has a basic mean- 
ing. The sounds of Arabic are also rich and varied; they include 
some made in the throat and back of the larynx which do not occur 
in the major Indo-European languages. Structurally there are 
important differences between Modern Standard Arabic and spoken 
Arabic, such as the behavior of the verb: the voice and the tense 
of the verb are indicated by different internal changes in the two 
forms. In general the grammar of spoken Arabic is simpler than 
that of Modern Standard Arabic, having dropped many noun 
declensions and different forms of the relative pronoun for the 



81 



Iraq: A Country Study 




MAJORITY GROUPS 

WM Sunn, Arab 
KXX A Sunn I Kurd 
II I II Sh.a Arab 

Sunni Arab and Sunni Kurd 
Efc&jil Sunni Arab and Sh,o Arab 

MINORITY GROUPS 

m Yazidi t Chrisf.an 

O Turkoman 



Figure 7. Ethnic and Religious Distribution, 1988 



different genders. Some dialects of spoken Arabic do not use spe- 
cial feminine forms of plural verbs. 

Dialects of spoken Arabic vary greatly throughout the Arab 
world. Most Iraqis speak one common to Syria, Lebanon, and parts 
of Jordan and — as is true of people speaking other dialects — they 
proudly regard theirs as the best. Although they converse in Iraqi 
Arabic, there is general agreement that Modern Standard Arabic, 
the written language, is superior to the spoken form. Arabs gener- 
ally believe that the speech of the beduins resembles the pure clas- 
sical form most closely and that the dialects used by the settled 
villagers and townspeople are unfortunate corruptions. 

Kurds 

Kurds represent by far the largest non-Arab ethnic minority, 
numbering about 3.1 million in 1987. They are the overwhelming 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



majority in the governorates of As Sulaymaniyah, Irbil, and Dahuk. 
Although the government hotly denies it, the Kurds are almost cer- 
tainly also a majority in the region around Kirkuk, Iraq's richest 
oil-producing area. Kurds are settled as far south as Khanaqin. 
Ranging across northern Iraq, the Kurds are part of the larger 
Kurdish population (probably numbering close to 16 million) that 
inhabits the wide arc from eastern Turkey and the northwestern 
part of Syria through Soviet Azarbaijan and Iraq to the northwest 
of the Zagros Mountains in Iran. Although the largest numbers 
(variously estimated at between 3 and 10 million) live in Turkey, 
they are most active politically in Iraq. 

The Kurds inhabit the highlands and mountain valleys, and tradi- 
tionally they have been organized on a tribal basis. In the past, 
it was correct to distinguish the various communities of Kurds 
according to their tribal affiliation. To a large extent this was still 
true in the 1980s; tribes like the Herkki, the Sorchi, and the Zibari 
have maintained a powerful cohesion. Increasingly, however, 
groups of Kurds organized along political lines have grown up 
alongside the tribal units. Hence, the most northern and north- 
eastern areas of Iraq are heavily infiltrated by elements of the 
so-called Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP — see The Emergence 
of Saddam Hasayn, 1968-79, ch. 1). The area surrounding Kirkuk 
and extending south to Khanaqin is the preserve of the Faili Kurds, 
who, unlike the majority of Kurds, are Shias. Many of the Faili 
Kurds belong to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The far 
northwestern region of Iraq around Sinjar is spotted with enclaves 
claimed by the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), and the majority 
of its cadres are composed of Kurds. 

Once mainly nomadic or seminomadic, Kurdish society was 
characterized by a combination of urban centers, villages, and 
pastoral tribes, from at least the Ottoman period. Historical sources 
indicate that, from the eighteenth century onward, Kurds in Iraq 
were mainly peasants engaged in agriculture and arboriculture. 
By the nineteenth century, about 20 percent of Iraqi Kurds lived 
in historic Kurdish cities such as Kirkuk, As Sulaymaniyah, and 
Irbil. The migration to the cities, particularly of the young intel- 
ligentsia, helped develop Kurdish nationalism. 

Since the early 1960s, the urban Kurdish areas have grown 
rapidly. Kurdish migration — in addition to being part of the general 
trend of urban migration — was prompted by the escalating armed 
conflict with the central authorities in Baghdad, the destruction 
of villages and land by widespread bombing, and such natural 
disasters as a severe drought in the 1958 to 1961 period. In addi- 
tion to destroying traditional resources, the severe fighting has 



83 



Iraq: A Country Study 

hindered the development of education, health, and other ser- 
vices. 

The historic enmity between the Kurds and the central Arab 
government has contributed to the tenacious survival of Kurdish 
culture. The Kurds' most distinguishing characteristic, and the one 
that binds them to one another, is their language. There are several 
Kurdish dialects, of which Kirmanji (also seen as Karamanji) tends 
to be the standard written form as well as the language spoken by 
the northern group of Kurds (Kurdi or Sorani is spoken by the 
central group of Kurds.) Kurdish is not a mere dialect of Farsi or 
Persian, as many Iranian nationalists maintain, but one of the three 
major Iranian languages. The other two are Persian and Pashto 
(the Pathan language of eastern Afghanistan and parts of West 
Pakistan). It is not a variant of the Semitic or Turkic tongues but 
a separate language, part of the Indo-European family. 

The Kurds have been locked in an unremittingly violent strug- 
gle with the central government in Baghdad almost since the found- 
ing of the Iraqi republic in 1958 (see Internal Developments and 
Security, ch. 5). It appeared in the early 1970s that the dissident 
Kurds — under the generalship of the legendary leader Mullah 
Mustafa Barzani — might actually carve out an independent Kurd- 
ish area in northern Iraq. In 1975, however, the shah of Iran — 
the Kurds' principal patron — withdrew his support of the Kurds 
as part of the Algiers Agreement between Tehran and Baghdad, 
leading to a sharp decline in the Kurdish movement. The signing 
of the Algiers Agreement caused a breakaway faction to emerge 
from the KDP, led by Masud Barzani, the son of Mullah Mustafa 
Barzani. The faction that left the KDP in opposition to the agree- 
ment formed the PUK under Jalal Talabani. The PUK continued 
to engage in low-level guerrilla activity against the central govern- 
ment in the period from 1975 to 1980. The war between Iraq and 
Iran that broke out in 1980 afforded the PUK and other Iraqi Kurd- 
ish groups the opportunity to intensify their opposition to the 
government. 

The future of the Kurds in Iraq is uncertain because of the war. 
In 1983 the KDP spearheaded an Iranian thrust into northern Iraq, 
and later its cadres fanned out across the border area adjacent to 
Turkey where they established a string of bases. Meanwhile, 
Talabani 's PUK has maintained a fighting presence in the Kirkuk 
region, despite ruthless attempts by the central government to dis- 
lodge them. Thus, as of early 1988, most of the northern areas of 
Iraq — outside the major cities — were under the control of the guer- 
rillas. On the one hand, if the present government in Iraq survives 
the war — which in early 1988 seemed likely — it is almost certain 



84 



A Kurd from Salah ad Din 
Courtesy Mokhless Al- Hariri 



to punish those Kurds who collaborated with the Iranians. On the 
other hand, a number of large and powerful Kurdish tribes as well 
as many prominent Kurds from nontribal families have continued 
to support the central government throughout the war, fighting 
against their fellow Kurds. These loyal Kurds will expect to be 
rewarded for their allegiance once the war ends. 

Other Minorities 

The Yazidis are of Kurdish stock but are distinguished by their 
unique religious fusion of elements of paganism, Zoroastrianism, 
Christianity, and Islam. They live in small and isolated groups, 
mostly in the Sihjar Mountains west of Mosul. They are impover- 
ished cultivators and herdsmen, who have a strictly graded 
religiopolitical hierarchy and who tend to maintain a more closed 
community than other ethnic or religious groups. Historically, they 
have been subject to sharp persecution because of their heretical 
beliefs and practices. 

The Turkomans, who are believed to constitute somewhat less 
than 2 percent of the population, are village dwellers in the north- 
east, along the border between the Kurdish and Arab regions. A 
number of Turkomans live in the city of Irbil. The Turkomans, 
who speak a Turkish dialect, have preserved their language, but 
they are no longer tribally organized. Most are Sunnis who were 
brought in by the Ottomans to repel tribal raids. These early 



85 



Iraq: A Country Study 

Turkomans were settled at the entrances of the valleys that gave 
access to the Kurdish areas. This historic pacification role has led 
to strained relations with the Kurds. By 1986 the Turkomans num- 
bered somewhere around 222,000, and they were being rapidly 
assimilated into the general population. 

The Assyrians are considered to be the third largest ethnic 
minority in Iraq. Although official Iraqi statistics do not refer to 
them as an ethnic group, they are believed to represent about 
133,000 persons, or less than 1 percent of the population. Descen- 
dants of ancient Mesopotamian peoples, they speak Aramaic. The 
Assyrians live mainly in the major cities and in the rural areas of 
northeastern Iraq, where they tend to be professionals and business- 
men or independent farmers. They are Christians, belonging to 
one of four churches: the Chaldean (Uniate), the Nestorian, the 
Jacobite or Syrian Orthodox, and the Syrian Catholic. There is 
also a small number of Armenians. 

Religious Life 

Although members of the ruling Baath (Arab Socialist Resur- 
rection) Party generally are ideologically committed to secularism, 
about 95 percent of Iraqis are Muslim, and Islam is the officially 
recognized state religion. Islam came to the region with the victory 
of the Muslim armies, under Caliph Umar, over the Sassanids, 
in A.D. 637 at the battle of Al Qadisiyah. The majority of inhabit- 
ants, including the Kurds, soon became Muslim, although small 
communities of Christians and Jews remained intact in the area 
of present-day Iraq. Iraq has been the scene of many important 
events in the early history of Islam, including the schism over the 
rightful successor to the Prophet Muhammad. 

Islam 

Islam is a system of religious beliefs and an all-encompassing 
way of life. Muslims believe that God (Allah) revealed to the Prophet 
Muhammad the rules governing society and the proper conduct 
of society's members. It is incumbent on the individual, therefore, 
to live in a manner prescribed by the revealed law and incumbent 
on the community to build the perfect human society on earth 
according to holy injunctions. Islam recognizes no distinctions 
between church and state. The distinction between religious and 
secular law is a recent development that reflects the more pro- 
nounced role of the state in society, and Western economic and 
cultural penetration. The impact of religion on daily life in Muslim 
countries is far greater than that found in the West since the Mid- 
dle Ages. 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



The Ottoman Empire organized society around the concept of 
the millet, or autonomous religious community. The non-Muslim 
"People of the Book" (Christians and Jews) owed taxes to the 
government; in return they were permitted to govern themselves 
according to their own religious law in matters that did not con- 
cern Muslims. The religious communities were thus able to preserve 
a large measure of identity and autonomy. 

The Iraqi Baath Party has been a proponent of secularism. This 
attitude has been maintained despite the fact that the majority of 
Iraqis are deeply religious. At the same time, the Baathists have 
not hesitated to exploit religion as a mobilizing agent, and from 
the first months of the war with Iran, prominent Baathists have 
made a public show of attending religious observances. Iraq's Presi- 
dent Saddam Husayn is depicted in prayer in posters displayed 
throughout the country. Moreover, the Baath has provided large 
sums of money to refurbish important mosques; this has proved 
a useful tactic in encouraging support from the Shias. 

Islam came to Iraq by way of the Arabian Peninsula, where in 
A.D. 610, Muhammad — a merchant of the Hashimite branch of 
the ruling Quraysh tribe in the Arabian town of Mecca — began 
to preach the first of a series of revelations granted him by God 
through the angel Gabriel. A fervent monotheist, Muhammad 
denounced the polytheism of his fellow Meccans. Because the town's 
economy was based in part on a thriving pilgrimage business to 
the shrine called the Kaaba and to numerous other pagan religious 
sites in the area, his censure earned him the enmity of the town's 
leaders. In 622 he and a group of followers accepted an invitation 
to settle in the town of Yathrib, later known as Medina (the city), 
because it was the center of Muhammad's activities. The move, 
or hijra (see Glossary), known in the West as the hegira, marks 
the beginning of the Islamic era and of Islam as a force in history; 
the Muslim calendar begins in 622. In Medina, Muhammad con- 
tinued to preach, and he eventually defeated his detractors in bat- 
tle. He consolidated the temporal and the spiritual leadership in 
his person before his death in 632. After Muhammad's death, his 
followers compiled those of his words regarded as coming directly 
from God into the Quran, the holy scriptures of Islam. Others of 
his sayings and teachings, recalled by those who had known him, 
became the hadith (see Glossary). The precedent of Muhammad's 
personal behavior is called the sunna. Together they form a com- 
prehensive guide to the spiritual, ethical, and social life of the 
orthodox Sunni Muslim. 

The duties of Muslims form the five pillars of Islam, which set 
forth the acts necessary to demonstrate and reinforce the faith. These 



87 



Iraq: A Country Study 

are the recitation of the shahada ("There is no God but God [Allah], 
and Muhammad is his prophet"), daily prayer (salat), almsgiving 
(zakat), fasting (sawm), and pilgrimage (hajj). The believer is to 
pray in a prescribed manner after purification through ritual ablu- 
tions each day at dawn, midday, midafternoon, sunset, and night- 
fall. Prescribed genuflections and prostrations accompany the 
prayers, which the worshiper recites facing toward Mecca. When- 
ever possible, men pray in congregation at the mosque with an 
imam (see Glossary), and on Fridays they make a special effort 
to do so. The Friday noon prayers provide the occasion for weekly 
sermons by religious leaders. Women may also attend public wor- 
ship at the mosque, where they are segregated from the men, 
although most frequently women pray at home. A special func- 
tionary, the muezzin, intones a call to prayer to the entire com- 
munity at the appropriate hour. Those out of earshot determine 
the time by the sun. 

The ninth month of the Muslim calendar is Ramadan, a period 
of obligatory fasting in commemoration of Muhammad's receipt 
of God's revelation. Throughout the month, all but the sick and 
the weak, pregnant or lactating women, soldiers on duty, travel- 
ers on necessary journeys, and young children are enjoined from 
eating, drinking, smoking, or sexual intercourse during the day- 
light hours. Those adults excused are obliged to endure an equiva- 
lent fast at their earliest opportunity. A festive meal breaks the daily 
fast and inaugurates a night of feasting and celebration. The pious 
well-to-do usually do little or no work during this period, and some 
businesses close for all or part of the day. Since the months of the 
lunar year revolve through the solar year, Ramadan falls at vari- 
ous seasons in different years. A considerable test of discipline at 
any time of the year, a fast that falls in summertime imposes severe 
hardship on those who must do physical work. 

All Muslims, at least once in their lifetimes, should make the 
hajj to Mecca to participate in special rites held there during the 
twelfth month of the lunar calendar. Muhammad instituted this 
requirement, modifying pre-Islamic custom, to emphasize sites 
associated with God and Abraham (Ibrahim), founder of monothe- 
ism and father of the Arabs through his son, Ismail. 

The lesser pillars of the faith, which all Muslims share, are jihad, 
or the crusade to protect Islamic lands, beliefs, and institutions; 
and the requirement to do good works and to avoid all evil thoughts, 
words, and deeds. In addition, Muslims agree on certain basic prin- 
ciples of faith based on the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad: 
there is one God, who is a unitary divine being in contrast to the 
trinitarian belief of Christians; Muhammad, the last of a line of 



88 



■ .-5- 



Great Mosque in the Shia holy city of An Najaf 
Courtesy Matson Collection 

prophets beginning with Abraham and including Moses and Jesus, 
was chosen by God to present His message to humanity; and there 
is a general resurrection on the last, or judgment, day. 

During his lifetime, Muhammad held both spiritual and tem- 
poral leadership of the Muslim community. Religious and secular 
law merged, and all Muslims have traditionally been subject to 
sharia, or religious law. A comprehensive legal system, sharia 
developed gradually through the first four centuries of Islam, 
primarily through the accretion of interpretations and precedents 
set by various judges and scholars. During the tenth century, legal 
opinion began to harden into authoritative rulings, and the figura- 
tive bob al ijtihad (gate of interpretation) closed. Thereafter, rather 
than encouraging flexibility, Islamic law emphasized maintenance 
of the status quo. 

After Muhammad's death, the leaders of the Muslim commu- 
nity consensually chose Abu Bakr, the Prophet's father-in-law and 
one of his earliest followers, to succeed him. At that time some per- 
sons favored Ali ibn Abu Talib, Muhammad's cousin and the hus- 
band of his daughter Fatima, but Ali and his supporters (the Shiat 
Ali, or party of Ali) eventually recognized the community's choice. 
The next two caliphs (successors) — Umar, who succeeded in 634, 
and Uthman, who took power in 644 — enjoyed the recognition of 
the entire community. When Ali finally succeeded to the caliphate 



89 



Iraq: A Country Study 

in 656, Muawiyah, governor of Syria, rebelled in the name of his 
murdered kinsman Uthman. After the ensuing civil war, Ali moved 
his capital to Iraq, where he was murdered shortly thereafter. 

Ali's death ended the last of the so-called four orthodox caliphates 
and the period in which the entire community of Islam recognized 
a single caliph. Muawiyah proclaimed himself caliph from Damas- 
cus. The Shiat Ali refused to recognize him or his line, the Umay- 
yad caliphs, and withdrew in the great schism to establish the 
dissident sect, known as the Shias, who supported the claims of 
Ali's line to the caliphate based on descent from the Prophet. The 
larger faction, the Sunnis, adhered to the position that the caliph 
must be elected, and over the centuries they have represented them- 
selves as the orthodox branch. 

Sunnis 

Originally political, the differences between Sunni and Shia 
interpretations rapidly took on theological and metaphysical over- 
tones. In principle, a Sunni approaches God directly: there is no 
clerical hierarchy. Some duly appointed religious figures, however, 
exert considerable social and political power. Imams usually are 
men of importance in their communities, but they need not have 
any formal training; among the beduins, for example, any tribal 
member may lead communal prayers. Committees of socially 
prominent worshipers usually administer mosque-owned land and 
gifts. In Iraq, as in many other Arab countries, the administra- 
tion of waqfs (religious endowments) has come under the influ- 
ence of the state. Qadis (judges) and imams are appointed by the 
government. 

The Muslim year has two religious festivals — Id al Adha, a sacri- 
ficial festival on the tenth of Dhu al Hijjah, the twelfth, or pil- 
grimage, month; and Id al Fitr, the festival of breaking the fast, 
which celebrates the end of Ramadan on the first of Shawwal, the 
tenth month. To Sunnis these are the most important festivals of 
the year. Each lasts three or four days, during which people put 
on their best clothes and visit, congratulate, and bestow gifts on 
each other. In addition, cemeteries are visited. Id al Fitr is celebrated 
more joyfully, as it marks the end of the hardships of Ramadan. 
Celebrations also take place, although less extensively, on the 
Prophet's birthday, which falls on the twelfth of Rabi al Awwal, 
the third month, and on the first of Muharram, the beginning of 
the new year. 

With regard to legal matters, Sunni Islam has four orthodox 
schools that give different weight in legal opinions to prescriptions 
in the Quran, to the hadith or sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



to the consensus of legal scholars, to analogy (to similar situations 
at the time of the Prophet), and to reason or opinion. Named for 
their founders, the Hanafi school of Imam Abu Hanifa, born in 
Al Kufah about 700, is the major school of Iraqi Sunni Arabs. It 
makes considerable use of reason or opinion in legal decisions. The 
dominant school for Iraqi Sunni Kurds is that of Imam Abu Abd 
Allah Muhammad Shafii of the Quraysh tribe of the Prophet, who 
was born in 767, was brought up in Mecca, and later taught in 
both Baghdad and Cairo. He followed a somewhat eclectic legal 
path, laying down the rules for analogy that were later adopted 
by other legal schools. The other two legal schools in Islam, the 
Maliki and the Hanbali, lack a significant number of adherents 
in Iraq. 

Shias 

Shia Muslims hold the fundamental beliefs of other Muslims (see 
Islam, this ch.). In addition to these tenets, however, Shias believe 
in the distinctive institution of Shia Islam, the Imamate. Whereas 
Sunni Muslims view the caliph as a temporal leader only, and con- 
sider an imam to be a prayer leader, Shia Muslims have a heredi- 
tary view of Muslim leadership. They believe the Prophet 
Muhammad designated Ali to be his successor as Imam, exercis- 
ing both spiritual and temporal leadership. Such an Imam must 
have knowledge, both in a general and a religious sense, as well 
as spiritual guidance or walayat, the ability to interpret the inner 
mysteries of the Quran and the sharia. Only those who have walayat 
are free from error and sin and have been chosen by God through 
the Prophet. Each Imam in turn designated his successor — through 
twelve Imams — each holding the same powers. 

The Imamate began with Ali, who is also accepted by Sunni Mus- 
lims as the fourth of the "rightly guided caliphs" to succeed the 
Prophet. Shias revere Ali as the First Imam, and his descendants, 
beginning with his sons Hasan and Husayn, continue the line of 
the Imams until the twelfth, who is believed to have ascended into 
a supernatural state to return to earth on Judgment Day. Shias 
point to the close lifetime association of the Prophet with Ali. When 
Ali was six years old, he was invited by the Prophet to live with 
him, and Shias believe Ali was the first person to make the declara- 
tion of faith in Islam. Ali also slept in the Prophet's bed on the 
night of the hijra, when it was feared that the house would be 
attacked by unbelievers and the Prophet stabbed to death. He fought 
in all the battles the Prophet did, except one, and the Prophet chose 
him to be the husband of his favorite daughter, Fatima. 



91 



Iraq: A Country Study 

Among Shias the term imam traditionally has been used only for 
Ali and his eleven descendants. None of the twelve Imams, with 
the exception of Ali, ever ruled an Islamic government. During 
their lifetimes, their followers hoped that they would assume the 
ruler ship of the Islamic community, a rule that was believed to have 
been wrongfully usurped. Because the Sunni caliphs were cognizant 
of this hope, the Imams generally were persecuted under the Umay- 
yad and Abbasid dynasties. Therefore, the Imams tried to be as 
unobtrusive as possible and to live as far as was reasonable from 
the successive capitals of the Islamic empire. 

During the eighth century, the Caliph Al Mamun, son and suc- 
cessor to Harun ar Rashid, was favorably disposed toward the 
descendants of Ali and their followers. He invited Imam Reza, the 
Eighth Imam (765-816), to come from Medina (in the Arabian 
Peninsula) to his court at Marv (Mary in the present-day Soviet 
Union). While Reza was residing at Marv, Al Mamun designated 
him as his successor in an apparent effort to avoid conflict among 
Muslims. Reza's sister Fatima journeyed from Medina to be with 
her brother, but took ill and died at Qpm, in present-day Iran. 
A major shrine developed around her tomb and over the centuries 
Qpm has become a major Shia pilgrimage and theological center. 

Al Mamun took Reza on his military campaign to retake Bagh- 
dad from political rivals. On this trip, Reza died unexpectedly in 
Khorasan. Reza was the only Imam to reside in, or die in, what 
in now Iran. A major shrine, and eventually the city of Mashhad, 
grew up around his tomb, which has become the most important 
pilgrimage center in Iran. Several important theological schools 
are located in Mashhad, associated with the shrine of the Eighth 
Imam. 

Reza's sudden death was a shock to his followers, many of whom 
believed that Al Mamun, out of jealousy for Reza's increasing 
popularity, had had the Imam poisoned. Al Mamun's suspected 
treachery against Imam Reza and his family tended to reinforce 
a feeling already prevalent among his followers that the Sunni rul- 
ers were untrustworthy. 

The Twelfth Imam is believed to have been only five years old 
when the Imamate descended upon him in 874 at the death of his 
father. Because his followers feared he might be assassinated, the 
Twelfth Imam was hidden from public view and was seen only by 
a few of his closest deputies. Sunnis claim that he never existed, 
or that he died while still a child. Shias believe that the Twelfth 
Imam never died, but disappeared from earth in about 939. Since 
that time, the greater occultation of the Twelfth Imam has been 
in force, which will last until God commands the Twelfth Imam 



92 




93 



Iraq: A Country Study 

to manifest himself on earth again as the Mahdi or Messiah. Shias 
believe that during the occultation of the Twelfth Imam, he is 
spiritually present — some believe that he is materially present as 
well — and he is besought to reappear in various invocations and 
prayers. His name is mentioned in wedding invitations, and his 
birthday is one of the most jubilant of all Shia religious observances. 

The Shia doctrine of the Imamate was not fully elaborated until 
the tenth century. Other dogmas were developed still later. A 
characteristic of Shia Islam is the continual exposition and reinter- 
retation of doctrine. 

A further belief of Shia Muslims concerns divine justice and the 
individual's responsibility for his acts, which are judged by a just 
God. This contrasts with the Sunni view that God's creation of 
man allows minimal possibility for the exercise of free will. 

A significant practice of Shia Islam is that of visiting the shrines 
of Imams both in Iraq and in Iran. These include the tomb of Imam 
Ali in An Najaf and that of his son Imam Husayn in Karbala, 
because both are considered major Shia martyrs. Before the 1980 
Iran-Iraq War, tens of thousands went each year. The Iranians 
have made it a central aim of their war effort to wrest these holy 
cities from the Iraqis. Other principal pilgrimage sites in Iraq are 
the tombs of the Seventh Imam and the Ninth Imam at Kazimayn 
near Baghdad and in Iran, respectively, the tomb of the Eighth 
Imam in Mashhad and that of his sister in Qpm. Such pilgrimages 
originated in part from the difficulty and the expense of making 
the hajj to Mecca in the early days. 

In commemoration of the martyrdom of Husayn, killed near 
Karbala in A.D. 680 during a battle with troops supporting the 
Umayyad caliph, there are processions in the Shia towns and vil- 
lages of southern Iraq on the tenth of Muharram (Ashura), the 
anniversary of his death. Ritual mourning {taaziya) is performed 
by groups of five to twenty men each. Contributions are solicited 
in the community to pay transportation for a local group to go to 
Karbala for taaziya celebrations forty days after Ashura. There is 
great rivalry among groups from different places for the best per- 
formance of the passion plays. 

In the villages, religious readings occur throughout Ramadan 
and Muharram. The men may gather in the mudhif (tribal guest- 
house), the suq (market), or a private house. Women meet in homes. 
The readings are led either by a mumin (a man trained in a religious 
school in An Najaf), or by a mullah who has apprenticed with an 
older specialist. It is considered the duty of shaykhs (see Glossary), 
elders, prosperous merchants, and the like to sponsor these read- 
ings, or qirayas. Under the monarchy these public manifestations 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



were discouraged, as they emphasized grievances against the 
Sunnis. 

Two distinctive and frequently misunderstood Shia practices are 
mutah, temporary marriage, and taqiyah, religious dissimulation. 
Mutah is a fixed-term contract that is subject to renewal. Practiced 
by the first community of Muslims at Medina, it was banned by 
the second caliph. Mutah differs from permanent marriage in that 
it does not require divorce to terminate it. It can be for a period 
as short as an evening or as long as a lifetime. The offspring of 
such an arrangement are the legitimate heirs of the man. 

Taqiyah, condemned by the Sunnis as cowardly and irreligious, 
is the hiding or disavowal of one's religion or its practices in order 
to escape the danger of death from those opposed to the faith. 
Persecution of Shia Imams during the Umayyad and Abbasid 
caliphates reinforced the need for taqiyah. 

Shia practice differs from that of Sunnis concerning both divorce 
and inheritance in that it is more favorable to women. The reason 
for this reputedly is the high esteem in which Fatima, the wife of 
Ali and the daughter of the Prophet, was held. 

Like Sunni Islam, Shia Islam has developed several sects. The 
most important of these is the Twelver or Ithna-Ashari sect, which 
predominates not only in Iraq but in the Shia world generally. 
Broadly speaking, the Twelvers are considered political quietists 
as opposed to the Zaydis, who favor political activism, and the 
Ismailis, who are identified with esoteric and gnostic religious doc- 
trines. Within Twelver Shia Islam there are two major legal schools, 
the Usuli and the Akhbari. Akhbaris constitute a very small group 
and are found primarily around Basra and in southern Iraq as well 
as around Khorramshahr in Iran. The dominant Usuli school is 
more liberal in its legal outlook; it allows greater use of interpreta- 
tion (ijtihad) in reaching legal decisions; and it considers that one 
must obey a mujtahid (learned interpreter of the law) as well as an 
Imam. 

Sunni-Shia Relations in Iraq 

Until the 1980s, the dominant view of contemporary political 
analysts held that Iraq was badly split along sectarian lines. The 
claim was that the Sunnis — although a minority — ran Iraq and sub- 
jected the majority Shias to systematic discrimination. According 
to the prevailing belief, the Shias would drive the Sunnis from 
power, if once afforded an opportunity to do so. 

There was some basis to this notion. For many years Iraq was 
ruled by and large by Arab Sunnis who tended to come from a 
restricted area around Baghdad, Mosul, and Ar Rutbah — the 



95 



Iraq: A Country Study 

so-called Golden Triangle. In the 1980s, not only was President 
Saddam Husayn a Sunni, but he was the vice chairman of the rul- 
ing Baath Party. One of the two deputy prime ministers and the 
defense minister were also Sunnis. In addition, the top posts in 
the security services have usually been held by Sunnis, and most 
of the army's corps commanders have been Sunnis. It is also true 
that the most depressed region of the country is the south, where 
the bulk of the Shias reside. 

Nonetheless, the theory of sectarian strife was undercut by the 
behavior of Iraq's Shia community during Iran's 1982 counter- 
invasion and the fighting thereafter. Although about three-quarters 
of the lower ranks of the army was composed of Shias, as of early 
1988 no general insurrection of Iraqi Shias had occurred. 

Even in periods of major setbacks for the Iraqi army — such as 
the Al Faw debacle in 1986 — the Shias have continued to defend 
their nation and the Baath regime staunchly. They have done so 
despite intense propaganda barrages mounted by the Iranians, call- 
ing on them to join the Islamic revolution. 

It appears, then, that, however important sectarian affiliation 
may have been in the past, in the latter 1980s nationalism was the 
basic determinant of loyalty. In the case of Iraq's Shias, it should 
be noted that they are Arabs, not Persians, and that they have been 
the traditional enemies of the Persians for centuries. The Iraqi 
government has skillfully exploited this age-old enmity in its 
propaganda, publicizing the war as part of the ancient struggle 
between the Arab and Persian empires. For example, Baathist pub- 
licists regularly called the war a modern day "Al Qadisiyah." Al 
Qadisiyah was the battle in 637 in which the Arabs defeated the 
pagan hosts of Persia, enabling Islam to spread to the East. 

The real tension in Iraq in the latter 1980s was between the 
majority of the population, including Sunnis as well as Shias, for 
whom religious belief and practice were significant values, and the 
secular Baathists, rather than between Sunnis and Shias. Although 
the Shias were underrepresented in government posts in the period 
of the monarchy, they made substantial progress in the education, 
business, and legal fields. Their advancement in other areas, such 
as the opposition parties, was such that in the years from 1952 to 
1963, before the Baath Party came to power, Shias held the majority 
of party leadership posts. Observers believed that in the late 1980s 
Shias were represented at all levels of the party roughly in propor- 
tion to government estimates of their numbers in the population. 
For example, of the eight top Iraqi leaders who in early 1988 sat 
with Saddam Husayn on the Revolutionary Command Council 
(RCC) — Iraq's highest governing body — three were Arab Shias 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



(of whom one had served as minister of interior), three were Arab 
Sunnis, one was an Arab Christian, and one a Kurd. On the 
Regional Command Council — the ruling body of the party — Shias 
actually predominated (see The Baath Party, ch. 4). During the 
war, a number of highly competent Shia officers had been promoted 
to corps commanders. The general who turned back the initial Ira- 
nian counterinvasions of Iraq in 1982 was a Shia. 

The Shias continued to make good progress in the economic field 
as well during the 1980s. Although the government did not pub- 
lish statistics that give breakdowns by religious affiliation, quali- 
fied observers noted that many Shias migrated from rural areas, 
particularly in the south, to the cities, so that not only Basra but 
other cities including Baghdad acquired a Shia majority. Many 
of these Shias prospered in business and the professions as well as 
in industry and the service sector. Even those living in the poorer 
areas of the cities were generally better off than they had been in 
the countryside. In the rural areas as well, the educational level 
of Shias came to approximate that of their Sunni counterparts. 

In summary, prior to the war the Baath had taken steps toward 
integrating the Shias. The war created inordinate demands for man- 
power that could be met only by levying the Shia community, and 
this strengthened the regime's resolve to further the integration 
process. In early 1988, it seemed likely that when the war ended, 
the Shias would emerge as full citizens — assuming that the Baath 
survived the conflict. 

Social Systems 

The impact of Western penetration on the indigenous social and 
demographic structure in the nineteenth century was profound. 
Western influence initially took the form of transportation and trad- 
ing links and encouraged the switch from tribal-based subsistence 
agriculture to cash crop production — mostly dates — for export (see 
Agriculture, ch. 3). As this process accelerated, the nomadic popu- 
lation decreased both relatively and in absolute numbers and the 
rural sedentary population increased substantially, particularly in 
the southern region. This was accompanied by a pronounced trans- 
formation of tenurial relations: the tribal, communal character of 
subsistence production was transformed on a large scale into a 
landlord- tenant relationship; tribal shaykhs, urban merchants, and 
government officials took title under the open-ended terms of the 
newly promulgated Ottoman land codes. Incentives and pressures 
on this emerging landlord class to increase production (and thus 
exports and earnings) resulted in expanded cultivation and simul- 
taneously absorbed the "surplus" labor of the tribal, pastoral, and 



97 



Iraq: A Country Study 



nomadic people of Iraqi society. This prolonged process of seden- 
tarization was disrupted by the dismemberment of the Ottoman 
Empire during and after World War I. but it resumed with renewed 
intensity in the British mandate period, when the political struc- 
ture of independent Iraq was formed (see World War I and the 
British Mandate, ch. 1). This threefold transformation of rural 
society — pastoral to agricultural, subsistence to commercial, tribal- 
communal to landlord-peasant — was accompanied by important 
shifts in urban society as well. There was a general increase in the 
number of market towns and in the size of their populations, but 
the destruction of handicraft industries, especially in Baghdad, by 
the import of cheap manufactured goods from the West, led to an 
absolute decline in the population of urban centers. It also indelibly 
stamped the subsequent urban growth with a mercantile and 
bureaucratic-administrative character that is still a strong feature 
of Iraqi society. 

Thus, the general history of Iraqi population dynamics in the 
modern era can be described as a period extending from the mid- 
dle of the nineteenth century to W T orld War II, characterized chiefly 
by urbanization, with a steady and growing movement of people 
from the rural (especially southern) region to the urban (especially 
central) region. Furthermore, the basic trends of the 1980s are 
rooted in the particularly exploitive character of agricultural prac- 
tices in regard to both the land itself and the people who work it. 
Declining productivity of the land, stemming from the failure to 
develop drainage along the irrigation facilities and from the 
wretched condition of the producers, has resulted in a potentially 
harmful demographic trajectory — the depopulation of the coun- 
tryside — that in the late 1980s continued to thwart government 
efforts to reverse the decades-long pattern of declining productivity 
in the agricultural sector. 

The accelerated urbanization process since World War II is 
starkly illustrated in the shrinking proportion of the population liv- 
ing in rural areas: 61 percent in 1947. decreasing to 56 percent 
in 1965. then 36 percent in 1977. and an estimated 29.5 percent 
in 1987; concurrently, between 1977 and 1987, the urban popula- 
tion rose from 7,646,054 to an estimated 11,483,000. The rural 
exodus has been most severe in Al Basrah and Al Qadisiyah gover- 
norates. The proportion of rural to urban population was lowest 
in the governorates of Al Basrah (37 percent in 1965, and 12 per- 
cent in 1987) and Baghdad (48 percent in 1965 and 7 percent in 
1987). It was highest in Dhi Qar Governorate where it averaged 
49 percent in 1987. followed closely by Al Muthanna and Diyala 
governorates, each with a rural population of 48 percent of total 



98 



Christian church, Baghdad 
Courtesy Ronald L. Kuipers 



population. Between 1957 and 1987, the population of Baghdad 
and Al Basrah governorates grew by 73 percent and 41 percent 
respectively. During the same years, the city of Baghdad grew by 
87 percent, and the city of Basra grew by 64 percent. 

Because of the war, the growth of Al Basrah Governorate has 
been reversed while that of Baghdad Governorate has accelerated 
alarmingly to the 1987 census figure for urban Baghdad of 
3,600,000. Iranian forces have mounted an offensive each year of 
the war since 1980, except for early 1988, seeking to capture Basra 
and the adjoining area and subjecting the city to regular bombard- 
ment. As a result, large numbers of the population have fled north- 
ward from Basra and other southern areas, and many have entered 
Baghdad, which was already experiencing overcrowding. The 
government has attempted to deal with this situation by moving 
war refugees out of the capital and resettling them in other smaller 
cities in the south, out of the range of the fighting. 

Rural Society 

Rural Iraq contains aspects of the largely tribal mode of social 
organization that prevailed over the centuries and still survived in 
the 1980s — particularly in the more isolated rural areas, such as 
the rugged tableland of the northwest and the marshes of the south. 
The tribal mode probably originated in the unstable social condi- 
tions that resulted from the protracted decline of the Abbasid 



99 



Iraq: A Country Study 

Caliphate (A.D. 750-1258) and the subsequent cycles of invasion 
and devastation. 

In the absence of a strong central authority and of the urban 
society of a great civilization, society developed into smaller units 
under conditions that placed increasing stress on prowess, deci- 
siveness, and mobility. Under these conditions, the tribal shaykhs 
emerged as a warrior class, and this development facilitated the 
ascendancy of the fighter-nomad over the cultivator. 

The gradual sedentarization that began in the mid-nineteenth 
century brought with it an erosion of the power of shaykhs and 
a disintegration of the tribal system. Under the British mandate, 
and the monarchy that was its creation, a reversal took place. 
Despite the continued decline of the tribe as a viable and organic 
social entity, the enfeebled power of the shaykhs was restored and 
was enhanced by the British. This was done to develop a local rul- 
ing class that could maintain security in the countryside and could 
otherwise head off political challenges to British access to Iraq's 
mineral and agricultural resources and Britain's paramount role 
in the Persian Gulf shaykhdoms (see World War I and the British 
Mandate, ch. 1). Specifically, through the implementation of land 
registration, the traditional pattern of communal cultivation and 
pasturage — with mutual rights and duties between shaykhs and 
tribesmen — was superseded in some tribal areas by the institution 
of private property and by the shaykhs' expropriation of tribal lands 
as private estates. The status of the tribesmen was in many instances 
reduced drastically, to that of sharecroppers and laborers. The 
additional ascription of judicial and police powers to the shaykh 
and to his retinue left the tribesmen-cum-peasants as virtual serfs, 
continuously in debt and in servitude to the shaykh turned land- 
lord and master. The social basis for the shaykhs' power had been 
transformed from military valor and moral rectitude to the pos- 
session of wealth as embodied in vast landholdings and in a claim 
to the greater share of the peasants' production. 

This change was the social dimension of the transformation from 
a subsistence, pastoral economy to an agricultural economy linked 
to the world market. It was, of course, an immensely complicated 
process, and conditions varied in different parts of the country. 
The main impact was in the southern half — the riverine economy — 
more than in the sparsely populated, rain-fed northern area. A more 
elaborate analysis of this process would have to look specifically 
at the differences between Kurdish and Arab shaykhs, between 
political and religious leadership functions, between Sunni and Shia 
shaykhs, and between nomadic and riverine shaykhs, all within 
their ecological settings. In general the biggest estates developed 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



in areas restored to cultivation through dam construction and by 
pump irrigation after World War I. The most autocratic exam- 
ples of shaykhly power were in the rice-growing region near Al 
Amarah, where the need for organized and supervised labor and 
the rigorous requirements of rice cultivation generated the most 
oppressive conditions. 

The role of the tribe as the chief politico-military unit was already 
well eroded by the time the monarchy was overthrown in July 1958. 
The role of some tribal shaykhs had been abolished by the central 
government. The tribal system survived longest in the mid- 
Euphrates area, where many tribesmen had managed to register 
small plots in their own names and had not become mere tenants 
of the shaykh. In such settings, an interesting amalgam developed 
of the traditional customs of the tribes and the more modern prac- 
tices of the civil servants sent to rural regions by the central 
government — both influenced by the expanded government edu- 
cation system. For example, the government engineer responsible 
for the water distribution system, although technically not a major 
administrator, in practice became the leading figure in rural areas. 
He would set forth requirements for the cleaning and the main- 
tenance of the canals (see Agriculture, ch. 3), and the tribal shaykh 
would see to it that the necessary manpower was provided. This 
service, in the minds of tribesmen, replaced the old customary 
obligation of military service that they owed to the shaykh and was 
not unduly onerous. It could readily be combined with work on 
their own grazing or producing lands, and it benefited the tribe 
as a whole. The government administrators usually avoided 
becoming involved in legal disputes that might result from water 
rights, leaving the disputes to be settled by the shaykh in accor- 
dance with traditional tribal practices. Thus, despite occasional ten- 
sions in such government- tribe relationships, the power of the 
central government gradually expanded into regions where Bagh- 
dad's influence had previously been slight or absent. 

Despite the erosion of the historic functions of tribal organiza- 
tion, the prolonged absence of alternative social links has helped 
to preserve the tribal character of individual and group relations. 
The complexity of these relations is impressive. Even in the 
southern, irrigated part of the country there are notable differences 
between the tribes along the Tigris, subject to Iranian influences, 
and those of the Euphrates, whose historic links are with the Arab 
beduin tribes of the desert. Since virtually no ethnographic studies 
on the Tigris peoples existed in the late 1980s, the following is based 
chiefly on research in the Euphrates region. 



101 



Iraq: A Country Study 

The tribe represents a concentric social system linked to the clas- 
sical nomadic structure but modified by the sedentary environment 
and limited territory characteristic of the modern era. The primary 
unit within the tribe is the named agnatic lineage several genera- 
tions deep to which each member belongs. This kinship unit shares 
responsibilities in feuds and in war; it restricts and controls mar- 
riage within itself; and it jointly occupies a specified share of tribal 
land. The requirements of mutual assistance preclude any signifi- 
cant economic differentiation, and authority is shared among the 
older men. The primary family unit rests within the clan, com- 
posed of two or more lineage groups related by descent or adop- 
tion. The clans are units of solidarity in disputes with other clans 
in the tribe, although there may be intense feuding among the line- 
age groups within the clan. The clan also represents a shared ter- 
ritorial interest, because the land belonging to the component 
lineage groups customarily is adjacent. A clan, nevertheless, can 
switch its allegiance from its ancestral tribal unit to a stronger, ascen- 
dant tribe. 

Several clans united under a single shaykh form a tribe (ashira). 
This traditionally has been the dominant politico-military unit 
although, because of unsettled conditions, tribes frequently band 
together in confederations under a paramount shaykh. The degree 
of hierarchy and of centralization operative in a given tribe seems 
to correlate with the length of time it has been sedentary: the Bani 
Isad, for example, which has been settled for several centuries, is 
much more centralized than the Ash Shabana, which has been 
sedentary only since the end of the nineteenth century. 

In the south, only the small hamlets scattered throughout the 
cultivated area are inhabited solely by tribesmen. The most widely 
spread social unit is the village, and most villages have resident 
tradesmen (ahl as suq — people of the market) and government 
employees. The lines between these village dwellers and the tribes- 
people, at least until just before the war, were quite distinct, 
although the degree varied from place to place. As the provision 
of education, health, and other social services to the generally 
impoverished rural areas increases, the number and the social 
influence of these nontribal people increase. Representatives of the 
central government take over roles previously filled by the shaykh 
or by his representatives. The government school competes with 
the religious school. The role of the merchants as middlemen — 
buyers of the peasants' produce and providers of seeds and imple- 
ments as well as of food and clothing — has not yet been superseded 
in most areas by government-sponsored cooperatives and exten- 
sion agencies. Increasingly in the 1980s, government employees 



102 



The Society and Its Environment 



were of local or at least rural origin, whereas in the 1950s they 
usually were Baghdadis who had no kinship ties in the region, who 
wore Western clothing, and who viewed their assignments as exile 
and as punishment. In part, the administrators initially provoked 
the mutual antagonism that later flourished between them and the 
peasants, particularly as Sunni officials were often assigned to Shia 
villages. The merchants, however, were from the some region — if 
not from the same village — and were usually the sons of merchants. 

Despite some commercial developments in rural areas, in the 
late 1980s the economic base was still agriculture and, to a lesser 
but increasing extent, animal husbandry. Failure to resolve the tech- 
nical problem of irrigation drainage contributed to declining rural 
productivity, however, and accentuated the economic as well as 
the political role of the central government. The growth of villages 
into towns — and whatever other signs of recent prosperity there 
were — should be viewed, therefore, more as the result of greater 
government presence than as locally developed economic viability. 
The increased number of government representatives and 
employees added to the market for local produce and, more impor- 
tant, promoted the diffusion of state revenues into impoverished 
rural areas through infrastructure and service projects. Much 
remained to be done to supply utilities to rural inhabitants; just 
before the war, the government announced a campaign to provide 
such essentials as electricity and clean water to the villages, most 
of which still lacked these (see Electricity, ch. 3). The government 
has followed through on several of these projects — particularly in 
the south — despite the hardships caused by the war. The regime 
apparently felt the need to reward the southerners, who had suffered 
inordinately in the struggle. 

Impact of Agrarian Reform 

One of the most significant achievements of the fundamentally 
urban-based revolutionary regime of Abd al Karim Qasim (1958- 
63) was the proclamation and partial implementation of a radical 
agrarian reform program. The scope of the program and the drastic 
shortage of an administrative cadre to implement it, coupled with 
political struggles within the Qasim regime and its successor regimes, 
limited the immediate impact of the program to the expropriation 
stage. The largest estates were easily confiscated, but distribution 
lagged owing to administrative problems and to the wasted, saline 
character of much of the land expropriated; moreover, landlords 
could choose the best of the lands to keep for themselves. 

The impact of the reforms on the lives of the rural masses can 
only be surmised on the basis of uncertain official statistics and 



103 



Iraq: A Country Study 



of rare observations and reports by outsiders, such as officials of 
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. The 
development of cooperatives, especially their capacity as market- 
ing agents, was one of the most obvious failures of the program, 
although there were isolated instances of success. In some of these 
instances, traditional elders were mobilized to serve as coopera- 
tive directors, and former sirkals, clan leaders who functioned as 
foremen for the shaykhs, could bring a working knowledge of local 
irrigation needs and practices to the cooperative. 

The continued impoverishment of the rural masses was evident, 
however, in the tremendous migration that continued, through the 
1960s, 1970s, and into the 1980s, from rural to urban areas. Accord- 
ing to the Ministry of Planning, the average rate of internal migration 
from the countryside increased from 19,600 a year in the mid-1950s 
to 40,000 a year in the 1958 to 1962 period. A study of 1 10 villages 
in the Nineveh and Babylon governorates concluded that depressed 
rural conditions and other variables — rather than job opportunities 
in the modern sector — accounted for most of the migration. 

There was little doubt that this massive migration and land reform 
reduced the number of landless peasants. The most recent compre- 
hensive tenurial statistics available before the war broke out — the 
Agricultural Census of 1971 — put the total farmland (probably 
meaning cultivable land, rather than land under cultivation) at more 
than 5.7 million hectares, of which more than 98.2 percent was 
privately owned. About 30 percent of this had been distributed 
under the agrarian reform. The average size of the holdings was 
about 9.7 hectares, but 60 percent of the holdings were smaller 
than 7.5 hectares, which accounted for less than 14 percent of the 
total area. At the other end of the scale, 0.2 percent of the holdings 
were 250 hectares or larger, which amounted to more than 14 per- 
cent of the total. Fifty- two percent of the total was owner-operated, 
41 percent was farmed under rental agreements, 4.8 percent was 
worked by squatters, and only 0.6 percent was sharecropped. The 
status of the remaining 1.6 percent was uncertain. On the basis 
of limited statistics released by the government in 1985, the amount 
of land distributed since the inception of the reform program totaled 
2,271,250 hectares (see Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform, ch. 3). 

Political instability throughout the 1960s hindered the implemen- 
tation of the agrarian reform program, but after seizing power in 
1968 the Baath regime made a considerable effort to reactivate it. 
Law No. 117 (1970) further limited the maximum size of hold- 
ings, eliminated compensation to the landowner, and abolished pay- 
ments by beneficiaries, thus acknowledging the extremity of peasant 
indebtedness and poverty. 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



The reform created a large number of small holdings. Given the 
experience of similar efforts in other countries, foreign observers 
have surmised that a new stratification has emerged in the coun- 
tryside, characterized by the rise of middle-level peasants who, either 
directly or through their leadership in the cooperatives, control 
much of the agricultural machinery and its use. Membership in 
the ruling Baath Party is an additional means of securing access 
to, and control over, such resources. Prior to the war, the party 
seemed to have few roots in the countryside, but, after the ascent 
of Saddam Husayn to the presidency in 1979, a determined effort 
was made to build bridges between the party cadre in the capital 
and in the provinces. It is noteworthy that practically all party offi- 
cials promoted to the second echelon of leadership at the 1982 party 
congress had distinguished themselves by mobilizing party support 
in the provinces. 

Even before the war, migration created serious labor shortages. 
In the 1980s, as the war has driven whole communities to seek 
refuge in the capital, this shortage has been exacerbated. The 
government has attempted to compensate for this shortage by 
importing turnkey projects with foreign professionals. In the Kurd- 
ish areas of the north, however — and to a degree in the southern 
region infested by deserters — the safety of foreign personnel has 
been difficult to guarantee; therefore, many projects have had to 
be temporarily abandoned. Another government strategy for cop- 
ing with the labor shortage caused by the war has been to import 
Egyptian workers. It has been estimated that as many as 1 .5 mil- 
lion Egyptians have found employment in Iraq since the war began. 

Urban Society 

Iraq's society just before the outbreak of the war was undergoing 
profound and rapid social change that had a definite urban focus. 
The city has historically played an important economic and politi- 
cal role in the life of Middle Eastern societies, and this was cer- 
tainly true in the territory that is present-day Iraq. Trade and 
commerce, handicrafts and small manufactures, and administra- 
tive and cultural activities have traditionally been central to the 
economy and to the society, notwithstanding the overwhelmingly 
rural character of most of the population. In the modern era, as 
the country, and particularly its commercial and administrative 
sectors, witnessed a growing involvement with the world market, 
the growth of a few urban centers, notably Baghdad and Basra, 
has been astounding. The war, however, has altered this pattern 
of growth remarkably — in the case of Baghdad accelerating it, and 
in the case of Basra shrinking it considerably. 



105 



Iraq: A Country Study 

Demographic estimates based on the 1987 census reflected an 
increase in the urban population of from 5,452,000 in 1970, to 
7,646,054 in 1977 and to 11,483,000 in 1987— or to 70.5 percent 
of the population. Census data show the remarkable growth of Bagh- 
dad, in particular, from just over 500,000 in 1947 to 1,745,000 
in 1965; and from 3,226,000 in 1977 to 3,600,000 in 1987. 

The population of other major cities, according to the 1977 cen- 
sus, was 1,540,000 for Basra, 1,220,000 for Mosul, and 535,000 
for Kirkuk (detailed information from the October 1987 census was 
lacking in early 1988). The port of Basra presents a more complex 
picture of accelerated growth up to the time the war erupted, then 
a sharp deceleration once the war started and the effects of the fight- 
ing around the city began to be felt. Between 1957 and 1965, Basra 
actually had a higher growth rate than Baghdad — 90 percent in 
Basra compared with Baghdad's 65 percent. When the Iranians 
managed to sink several tankers in the Shatt al Arab, however, 
the waterway was effectively blocked, and the economy of the port 
city began to deteriorate. By 1988 repeated attempts by Iran to 
capture Basra had further eroded the strength of the city's com- 
mercial sector, and the heavy bombardment had rendered some 
quarters of Basra virtually uninhabitable. Reliable statistics were 
unavailable because of the war but the city's population in early 
1988 was probably less than half that in 1977. 

In the extreme north, the picture was somewhat different. There, 
a number of middle-sized towns have experienced very rapid 
growth — triggered by the unsettled conditions in the region. Early 
in the war, the government determined to fight Kurdish guerrilla 
activity by targeting the communities that allegedly sustained the 
rebels. It therefore cleared the local inhabitants from whole tracts 
of this mountainous region. The residents of the cleared areas fled 
to regional urban centers like Irbil, As Sulaymaniyah, and Dahuk; 
by and large they did not move to the major urban centers such 
as Mosul and Kirkuk. 

Statistical details of the impact of overcrowding on the cities were 
generally lacking in the 1980s. According to accounts by on-the- 
spot observers, in Baghdad — and presumably in the other cities 
as well — there appeared to have been no systematic planning to 
cope with the growth of slum areas. Expansion in the capital until 
the mid-1970s had been quite haphazard. As a result, there were 
many open spaces between buildings and quarters. Thus, the squat- 
ter settlements that mushroomed in those years were not confined 
to the city's fringes. By the late 1950s, the sarifahs (reed and mud 
huts) in Baghdad were estimated to number 44,000, or almost 
45 percent of the total number of houses in the capital. 



106 



A cafe in Baghdad 
Courtesy Mokhless Al- Hariri 



These slums became a special target of Qasim's government. 
Efforts were directed at improving the housing and living condi- 
tions of the sarifah dwellers. Between 1961 and 1963, many of these 
settlements were eliminated, and their inhabitants were moved to 
two large housing projects on the edge of the city — Madinat ath 
Thawra and An Nur. Schools and markets were also built, and 
sanitary services were provided. In time, however, Madinat ath 
Thawra and An Nur, too, became dilapidated, and just before the 
war Saddam Husayn ordered Madinat ath Thawra rebuilt as Sad- 
dam City. This new area of low houses and wide streets has radi- 
cally improved the life-styles of the residents, the overwhelming 
majority of whom were Shias who had migrated from the south. 

Another striking feature of the initial waves of migration to Bagh- 
dad and to other urban centers is that the migrants have tended 
to stay, bringing with them whole families. The majority of migrants 
were peasant cultivators, but shopkeepers, petty traders, and small 
craftsmen came as well. Contacts with their points of rural origin 
were not totally severed, and return visits were fairly common, but 
reverse migration was extremely rare. At least initially, there was 
a pronounced tendency for migrants from the same village to relo- 
cate in clusters to ease the difficulties of transition and to maintain 
traditional patterns of mutual assistance. Whether this pattern has 
continued into the war years is not known, but it seems likely. A 



107 



Iraq: A Country Study 



number of observers have reported neighborhoods in the capital 
that have been formed on the basis of village or even tribal origin. 

An instance of the abrupt population shifts — although in the 
reverse direction — was that of the Iraqi Jews. The establishment 
of the state of Israel led to the mass exodus of this community in 
1950, to be replaced by Shia merchants and traders, many of whom 
were descendants of Iranian immigrants from the heavily Shia popu- 
lated areas of the south. 

The urban social structure has evolved gradually over the years. 
In prerevolutionary Iraq it was dominated by a well-defined rul- 
ing class that was concentrated in Baghdad. This was an internally 
cohesive group, distinguished from the rest of the population by 
its considerable wealth and political power. The economic base of 
this class was landed wealth, but during the decades of the British 
mandate and of the monarchy, as landlords acquired commercial 
interests and merchants and government officials acquired real 
estate, a considerable intertwining of families and interests occurred. 
The result was that the Iraqi ruling class could not be easily sepa- 
rated into constituent parts: the largest commercial trading houses 
were controlled by families owning vast estates; the landowners 
were mostly tribal shaykhs but included many urban notables, 
government ministers, and civil servants. Moreover, the landown- 
ing class controlled the parliament, which tended to function in 
the most narrowly conceived interest of these landlords. 

There was a small but growing middle class in the 1950s and 
the 1960s that included a traditional core of merchants, shopkeep- 
ers, craftsmen, professionals, and government officials, their num- 
bers augmented increasingly by graduates from the school system. 
During the monarchy education had been the only area that was 
relatively independent of British advisers, and thus it was expanded 
as a conspicuous manifestation of government response to popu- 
lar demand. It was completely oriented toward preparing people 
for white-collar, middle-class occupations. Within this middle class, 
and closely connected to the commercial sector, was a small indus- 
trial bourgeoisie whose interests were not completely identical with 
those of the more traditional sector. 

Iraq's class structure at midcentury was characterized by great 
instability. In addition to the profound changes occurring in the 
countryside, there were the economic and social disruptions caused 
by the shortages and the spiraling inflation brought on by World 
War II. A few people made fortunes, but for most there was depri- 
vation and, as a consequence, there was great social unrest. Long- 
time Western observers compared the situation of the urban masses 
unfavorably with conditions in the last years of Ottoman rule. 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



The trend of urban growth, which had begun in the days imme- 
diately preceding the revolution, took off in the mid-1970s, when 
the effects of the sharp increases in the world price of oil began 
to be felt. Oil revenues poured into the cities, where they were 
invested in construction and in real estate speculation. The dis- 
satisfied peasantry then found even more cause to move to the cities 
because jobs — mainly in construction — were available, and even 
part-time, unskilled labor was an improvement over conditions in 
the countryside. 

As for the elite, the oil boom of the 1970s brought greater diver- 
sification of wealth, some of which went to those attached to the 
land, and some to those involved in the regime, in commerce, and, 
increasingly, in manufacturing. The working class grew, but it was 
largely fragmented. Only a relatively small number were employed 
in businesses with ten or more workers, including those in the ser- 
vice sector. Between the elite and the working masses was the lower 
middle class of petite bourgeoisie. This traditional component con- 
sisted of the thousands of employees of small handicraft shops, which 
made up a huge part of the so-called manufacturing sector, and 
the even more numerous owners of one-man stores. The newer 
and more rapidly expanding part of this class consisted of profes- 
sionals and semiprofessionals who were employed in the service 
and public sectors, including the officer corps, and the thousands 
of students looking for jobs. This class became particularly signifi- 
cant in the 1980s because former members of it have become the 
nation's elite. Perhaps the most important aspect of the growth of 
the public sector was the expansion of education facilities, which 
put pressure on the regime to find white-collar jobs for graduates 
in the noncommodity sectors. 

Stratification and Social Classes 

The prerevolutionary political system, with its parliament of land- 
lords and hand-picked government supporters, was increasingly 
incompatible with the changing social reality that accompanied 
growing urban-based economic activity fueled by oil revenues. The 
faction of the elite investing in manufacturing, the petite bour- 
geoisie, and the working classes pressured the state to represent 
their interests. As the armed forces came to reflect this shift in the 
balance of social forces, radical political change became inevitable. 
The social origins and the political inclinations of the Free Officers 
(see Glossary) who carried out the 1958 overthrow of the monar- 
chy as well as the various ideological parties that supported and 
succeeded them clearly reflect the middle-class character of the Iraqi 
revolution. Both the agrarian reform program and the protracted 



109 



Iraq: A Country Study 

campaign against the foreign oil monopoly were aimed at restruc- 
turing political and eonomic power in favor of the urban-based mid- 
dle and lower classes. The political struggle between the self-styled 
radicals and the moderates in the 1960s chiefly concerned the role 
of the state and of the public sector in the economy: the radicals 
promoted a larger role for the state, and the moderates wanted to 
restrict it to the provision of basic services and of physical infra- 
structure. 

There was a shift in the distribution of income after 1958 at the 
expense of the large landowners and the businessmen and in favor 
of the salaried middle class and, to a lesser degree, the wage earn- 
ers and small farmers. The Baath Party, in power since July 1968, 
represented the lower stratum of the middle class, the sons of small 
shopkeepers and of petty officials, and the graduates of training 
schools, law schools, and military academies. In the 1980s, the rul- 
ing class tended to be composed of high- and middle-echelon 
bureaucrats who either had risen through the ranks of the party 
or who had been coopted into the party because of their technical 
competence, i.e., technocrats. The elite also consisted of army 
officers, whose wartime loyalty the government has striven to retain 
by dispensing material rewards and gifts. 

The government's practice of lavishing rewards on the military 
has also affected the lower classes. Martyrs' benefits under the Baath 
have been extremely generous. Thus, the families of youths killed 
in battle could expect to receive at least an automobile and more 
likely a generous pension for life. 

Family and Society 

Kinship groups are the fundamental social units, regulating many 
activities that in Westernized societies are the functions of politi- 
cal, economic, religious, or neighborhood groups. Rights and 
obligations center on the extended family and on the lineage. The 
family remains the primary focus of loyalty; and it is in its con- 
text, rather than in the broader one of corporate loyalties defined 
by sectarian, ethnic, or economic considerations, that the majority 
of Iraqis find the common denominators of their everyday lives. 
A mutually protective attitude among relatives is taken as a mat- 
ter of course. Relatives tend to be preferred as business partners 
because they are believed to be more reliable than people over whom 
one does not have the hold of kinship ties. Deeply ingrained family 
loyalty also manifests itself at higher levels of business and public life. 

The characteristic form of family organization involves a large 
group of kinsmen who are related to one another through descent 
and marriage, that is, an extended family usually consisting of three 



110 



Public transportation in Baghdad 
Courtesy Mokhless A I- Hariri 



generations. The members of such an extended family may all live 
together, which is the more traditional pattern, or they may reside 
in separate nuclear families, but still share the values and func- 
tions of an extended family, such as depending upon one another 
and deferring to the older generations. As Iraqi society has become 
increasingly urbanized, however, the tendency toward nuclear 
family social organization, as opposed to mere nuclear family resi- 
dence, has become more prevalent. The status of an individual is 
traditionally determined by the position of his or her family in 
society and the individual's position within that group. The family 
transmits the values and the standards of behavior of the society 
to its members, and it holds them responsible for each other's con- 
duct. It traditionally determines occupations and selects marriage 
partners. Kinsmen also cooperate in economic endeavors, such as 
farming or trade, and ownership of land and other assets frequently 
is vested in the group as a whole. The sharpest degree of diver- 
gence from these patterns occurs among educated, urban Iraqis, 
an ever-increasing proportion of the society. 

Until 1959, family life was subject only to the regulation of reli- 
gious law and of tradition. All Muslims were brought under a sin- 
gle body of family law for the first time in 1959 with the enactment 
of a secular law on personal status, based on sharia, statutes from 
other Islamic countries, and legal precedents established in Iraqi 



111 



Iraq: A Country Study 

courts; a brief amendment of the law was enacted in 1963. The 
law spells out provisions governing the right to contract marriage, 
the nature of the contract, the economic rights of the partners, 
divorce and child custody, as well as bequests and inheritance. 

The basic structural unit of the family consists of a senior cou- 
ple, their sons, the sons' wives and children, and unmarried daugh- 
ters. Other dependent relatives may also be attached to the group. 
The senior male is the head of the family; he manages its proper- 
ties and has the final voice in decisions. Kinsmen are organized 
into still larger groups. The next level of organization is the line- 
age, composed of all persons, male and female, who trace their 
descent from a common ancestor. The number of generations by 
which this ancestor is removed from the oldest living one varies; 
a depth of four to six generations is usual. 

Individuals or whole families of other descent sometimes attach 
themselves to a particular lineage in an arrangement of mutual 
advantage, becoming recognized after several generations as full 
members of the lineage on equal terms with those born into it. In 
small villages, most people are likely to belong to the same lineage; 
in larger ones, two or more lineages may be represented, but lin- 
eage ties are tempered by economic cooperation, by intermarriage, 
and by the authority of the village leadership or elders. Among 
nontribal Iraqis, kinship organization and traditions of common 
descent do not go beyond the lineage. Awareness of distant ties 
is keen among recent migrants to the cities and among the rural 
population. 

In rural areas, new households are not usually set up until many 
years after the initial recognition of a marriage. In general, the 
wife moves in with her husband's parents, where the young cou- 
ple remains for some time. Often this arrangement is maintained 
until the death of the father. Even when the father dies, the brothers 
sometimes stay together, forming joint family households that 
include themselves, their wives, and their children. 

The actual number of persons who make up the household is 
determined by the family's economic circumstances, its pattern of 
living, and its mode of habitation. In an agricultural setting, as 
long as ownership of land and other possessions is vested in the 
family as a whole, the possibilities for a young man's being able 
to set up an independent household are limited. In urban centers, 
on the other hand, young men can avail themselves of wage-earning 
employment. 

Authority within the family is determined by seniority and by 
gender. The father, in theory, has absolute authority over the activi- 
ties of the members of the household, both within the confines of 



112 



The Society and Its Environment 



the house and outside it. He decides what education his children 
will receive, what occupations his sons will enter, and, usually in 
consultation with his wife, whom his children will marry. These 
authority patterns also have been greatly weakened in the urban 
environment and by the shift of more and more responsibilities 
from the family to larger social institutions, such as the schools. 

An even greater change in the traditional pattern of male domi- 
nance has been brought about by the war. Because Iraq is numeri- 
cally a much smaller nation than Iran, it has experienced 
considerable difficulty in maintaining an adequate defense on the 
battlefront. In order to field a sufficient force, it has had to draw 
down the available labor pool on the home front, and, to compen- 
sate for this, it has mobilized women. In the mid-1980s, observers 
reported that in many ministries the overwhelming proportion of 
employees were women. Foreign contractors have encountered 
women supervisors on huge construction projects, women doctors 
in the hospitals, and even women performing law enforcement roles. 
This emancipation — extraordinary for an Arab country — was sanc- 
tioned by the government, which issued a significant amount of 
propaganda publicizing the role of women in helping to win the 
war. The government further maintained that after the war women 
would be encouraged to retain their newfound work roles; this was 
doubtful, however, because in the same breath the government 
declared its determination to increase the birthrate. 

The Muslim majority has traditionally regarded marriage as 
primarily a civil contract between two families, arranged by par- 
ents after negotiations that may be prolonged and conducted by 
an intermediary. The arrangement of a marriage is a family mat- 
ter in which the needs and the position of the corporate kin group 
are primary considerations. Prospective partners are often known 
to each other, and they frequently come from the same village and 
the same kin group. Among educated urban dwellers, the tradi- 
tional pattern of contracting marriage is giving way to a pattern 
in which the young people make their own choices, but parents 
must still approve. 

With regard to marriage and to divorce, the 1959 Law of Per- 
sonal Status, amended in 1963, liberalized various provisions that 
affected the status of women; in practice, however, the Iraqi 
judiciary up until the revolution tended to be conservative in 
applying the provisions of the law. Specifically, Iraqi law required 
that divorce proceedings be initiated in a court of law, but the hus- 
band still had the controlling role in dissolving the marriage. A 
man who wanted to marry a second wife was required first to get 
approval from the court. Provision was also made for the custody 



113 



Iraq: A Country Study 

of children to be based on consideration of the welfare of the 
child. 

Economic motivation and considerations of prestige and of family 
strength all contribute to the high value placed on large families. 
The greater the number of children, especially sons, the greater 
the prestige of the father, and, through him, that of the family as 
a whole. Boys are especially welcome because they are the carriers 
of the family tradition, and because their economic contribution 
in an agricultural society is greater than that of girls. 

Between the ages of three and of six, children are given free- 
dom to learn by imitating older siblings. Strong emphasis is then 
placed on conformity with elders' patterns and on loyalty and 
obedience. Family solidarity is stressed. The passage from adoles- 
cence to maturity is swift. Upon reaching puberty, there tradition- 
ally is a separation of sexes, and girls are excluded from male society 
except that of their close kin. Great emphasis is placed on premarital 
chastity, and this is one reason for early marriages. Boys have 
greater freedom during adolescence than girls, and at this time they 
begin to be drawn into the company of their fathers and into the 
world of men. 

Education and Welfare 
Education 

The impact of government policies on the class structure and 
on its stratification patterns can be imputed from available statis- 
tics on education and training as well as on employment and wage 
structures. Owing to the historic emphasis on the expansion of edu- 
cation facilities, the leaders of the Baath Party and, indeed, much 
of Iraq's urban middle class were able to move from rural or urban 
lower class origins to middle and even to top positions in the state 
apparatus, the public sector, and the society at large. 

This social history is reflected in the efforts of the government 
to generalize opportunities for basic education throughout the coun- 
try. Between the 1976-77 and the 1985-86 school years, the num- 
ber of primary- school students increased 44 percent, and the 
number of female students increased from 35 to 45 percent of the 
total. The number of primary- school teachers grew 67 percent dur- 
ing this period. At the secondary level, the number of students 
increased 87 percent, and the number of female students increased 
from 30 to 36 percent of the total (see table 4, Appendix). 

Education was provided by the government through a centrally 
organized school system. In the early 1980s, the system included 
a six-year primary (or elementary) level known as the first level. 



114 



Iraq: A Country Study 

The second level, also of six years, consisted of an intermediate- 
secondary level and an intermediate-preparatory level, each of three 
years. Graduates of these schools could enroll in a vocational school, 
in one of the teacher training schools or institutes, or in one of the 
various colleges, universities, or technical institutes. 

The number of students enrolled in primary and in secondary 
schools was highest in the central region and lowest in the north, 
although the enrollment in the northern schools was only slightly 
lower than that in the southern. Before the war, the government 
had made considerable gains in lessening the extreme concentra- 
tion of primary and of secondary educational facilities in the main 
cities, notably Baghdad. Vocational education, which had been 
notoriously inadequate in Iraq, received considerable official atten- 
tion in the 1980s. The number of students in technical fields has 
increased more than 300 percent since 1976-77, to more than 
120,090 in the academic year 1985-86. 

The Baath regime also seemed to have made progress since the 
late 1960s in reducing regional disparities, although these were far 
from being eliminated and no doubt were more severe than statis- 
tics would suggest. Baghdad, for example, was the home of most 
education facilities above the secondary level; it was the site not 
only of the University of Baghdad, which in the academic year 
1985-86 (the most recent year for which statistics were available 
in early 1988) had 44,307 students, but also of the Foundation of 
Technical Institutes with 34,858 students, the University of Al 
Mustansiriyah with 14,886 students, and the University of Tech- 
nology with 7,378 students. The University of Basra, the Univer- 
sity of Mosul, and the University of Salah ad Din in Irbil, taken 
together, enrolled 28 percent of all students in higher education 
in the academic year 1985-86. 

The number of students seeking to pursue higher education in 
the 1980s increased dramatically. Accordingly, in the mid-1980s 
the government made plans to expand the University of Salah ad 
Din. In addition, in January 1988, the government created four 
more public universities, at Tikrit in the central area, at Al Kufah 
and at Al Qadisiyah in the south, and at Al Anbar in the west. 
Details of these universities were not known. 

The outbreak of the war posed a difficult dilemma for the govern- 
ment regarding education. Despite the shortage of wartime man- 
power, the regime was unwilling to tap the pool of available 
university students, arguing that these young people were Iraq's 
hope for the future. As of early 1988, therefore, the government 
routinely exempted students from military service until gradua- 
tion, a policy it has adhered to rigorously. This policy, however, 



116 



The Society and Its Environment 



has probably caused resentment among the poorer classes and 
among those forced to serve multiple tours at the front because of 
continuing manpower shortages. 

Health 

In the 1980s, almost all medical facilities continued to be con- 
trolled by the government, and most physicians were Ministry of 
Health officials. Curative and preventive medical services in 
government-controlled hospitals and dispensaries as well as the ser- 
vices of government physicians were free of charge. The ministry 
included the directorates of health, preventive medicine, medical 
supplies, rural health services, and medical services. The inspec- 
tor general of health, under the ministry, was charged with the 
enforcement of health laws and regulations. Private medical prac- 
tice and private hospitals and clinics were subject to government 
supervision. In each province, Ministry of Health functions were 
carried out by a chief medical officer who, before the war, frequentiy 
had a private practice to supplement his government salary. Provin- 
cial medical officers were occupied mainly with administrative duties 
in hospitals, clinics, and dispensaries. The work of medical officers 
in the rural areas before the war was seriously curtailed by lack 
of transportation. 

One of the most serious problems facing the Ministry of Health 
in the prewar period was its shortage of trained personnel. The 
shortage was accentuated by the fact that most medical personnel 
tended to be concentrated in the major cities, such as Baghdad and 
Basra. Physicians trained at government expense were required 
to spend four years in the public health service, but they strongly 
resisted appointments to posts outside the cities and made every 
effort to return to Baghdad. 

In 1985, the latest year for which detailed statistics were avail- 
able in early 1988, Baghdad Governorate, which had about 24 per- 
cent of the population, had just over 36 percent of the country's 
hospital beds, 18 percent of the government clinics, and 31 per- 
cent of the paramedical personnel. The increasing number of clinics 
in the provinces brought some rudimentary health care within reach 
of the rural population. At the same time, given the unsettled con- 
ditions in the Kurdish areas, it was likely that health care in the 
northern provinces had deteriorated since the start of the war (see 
table 5, Appendix). 

Published information concerning sanitation and endemic 
diseases was scanty. Reportedly, in the mid-1980s Iraq had a 
high incidence of trachoma, influenza, measles, whooping cough, 
and tuberculosis; it had, however, made substantial progress in 



117 



Iraq: A Country Study 

controlling malaria. Prior to the war, poor sanitation and polluted 
water sources were principal factors in the spread of disease. A large 
percentage of the population lived in villages and in towns that were 
along irrigation canals and along rivers polluted with human and 
animal wastes. These waterways, together with the stagnant pools 
of water that sometimes constituted the village reservoir, were the 
major sources of drinking water and of water for bathing, laun- 
dering, and washing food. The periodic flooding of rivers contami- 
nated water supplies and spread waterborne diseases. 

The Tigris and Euphrates rivers and their tributaries serve as 
water sources for Baghdad and for some of the major provincial 
towns. Irbil and As Sulaymaniyah, located in the northern moun- 
tains, have adequate supplies of spring water. In Basra, Mosul, 
and Kirkuk the water is stored in elevated tanks and is chemically 
treated before distribution. In Baghdad, the water is filtered, chlo- 
rinated, and piped into homes or into communal fountains located 
throughout the city. In the smaller towns, however, the water supply 
is unprotected and is only rarely tested for potability. 

Welfare 

Iraq, with its socialist economy, pays considerable attention to 
welfare. This regard for social benefits has been increased by the 
war. No statistics were available in early 1988 by which to judge 
the scope of benefits paid by the government to its servicemen and 
to their families. Nonetheless, journalistic reports indicated that 
martyrs' benefits — for the families of war dead — and subsidies for 
young men who volunteer for service tended to be extremely gener- 
ous. A family that had lost a son in the fighting could expect to 
be subsidized for life; in addition, it was likely to receive loans from 
the state bank on easy terms and gifts of real estate. 

Minimal information was available in early 1988 concerning 
social welfare coverage. The most recent published data was that 
for 1985, when the government gave a figure of 703,776 workers. 
In addition, pensions were paid to retirees and to disabled persons, 
and compensation was given to workers for maternity and for sick 
leave. Observers anticipated that once the war with Iran ended, 
the government would devote greater attention to improving health 
and social welfare services. 

* * * 

Although a number of first rate military analyses of Iraq and 
of the war have appeared since 1980, there has been little useful 
research on social change. Much of the information that would make 



118 



The Society and Its Environment 



up such studies has been withheld by the government because of 
wartime censorship, and in some cases material that has been made 
available appears to be untrustworthy. A number of classics, there- 
fore, continue to be required reading for those interested in the 
society of Iraq. Wilfred Thesiger's The Marsh Arabs graphically 
depicts life among the southern Shias in the mid-and late 1950s. 
Robert Fernea's Shaykh and Effendi describes social conditions in 
the central Euphrates valley and Elizabeth Fernea's Guests of the 
Sheik deals with the role of women particularly. A classic historical 
treatment of the Kurdish question is found in Edmund Ghareeb's 
The Kurdish Question in Iraq. The latest work on the subject is The 
Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf 'by Stephen Pelletiere. For an 
excellent treatment of the Baathist elite see The Old Social Classes 
and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq by Hanna Batatu. Also on 
the same topic is Iraq, Eastern Flank of the Arab World by Christine 
Helms. For the best all-around treatment of Iraq in the recent 
period, see Phebe Marr's The Modern History of Iraq. (For further 
information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



119 



Chapter 3. The Economy 




Watermelons for sale in the marketplace 



FOLLOWING THE 1968 Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) 
Party revolution, Iraq's government pursued a socialist economic 
policy. For more than a decade, the economy prospered, primarily 
because of massive infusions of cash from oil exports. Despite a 
quadrupling of imports between 1978 and 1980, Iraq continued 
to accrue current account surpluses in excess of US$10 billion per 
year. In 1980 on the eve of the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, 
Iraq held reserves estimated at US$35 billion. When Iraq launched 
the war against Iran in 1980, the Iraqis incorrectly calculated that 
they could force a quick Iranian capitulation and could annex Ira- 
nian territory at little cost in either men or money. Using a num- 
ber of means, Iraq opted to keep the human costs of the war as 
low as possible, both on the battlefield and on the home front. In 
battle, Iraq attempted to keep casualties low by expending and by 
losing vast amounts of materiel. Behind the lines, Iraq attempted 
to insulate citizens from the effects of the war and to head off pub- 
lic protest in two ways. First, the government provided a benefits 
package worth tens of thousands of dollars to the surviving rela- 
tives of each soldier killed in action. The government also com- 
pensated property owners for the full value of property destroyed 
in the war. Second, the government adopted a "guns and butter" 
strategy. Along with the war, the government launched an eco- 
nomic development campaign of national scope, employing 
immigrant laborers to replace Iraqi fighting men. 

In 1981, foreign expenditures not directly related to the war effort 
peaked at an all-time high of US$23.6 billion, as Iraq continued 
to import goods and services for the development effort, and con- 
struction continued unabated. Additionally, Iraq was paying an 
estimated US$25 million per day to wage the war. Although the 
Persian Gulf states contributed US$5 billion toward the war effort 
from 1980 to 1981, Iraq raised most of the money needed for war 
purposes by drawing down its reserves over several years. Iraq could 
not replenish its reserves because most of its oil terminals were 
destroyed by Iran in the opening days of the war. Iraqi exports 
dropped by 60 percent in 1981 , and they were cut further in 1982 
when Syria, acting in accord with Iran, closed the vital Iraqi oil 
export pipeline running through Syrian territory. 

The total cost of the war to Iraq's economy was difficult to mea- 
sure. A 1987 study by the Japanese Institute of Middle Eastern 
Economies estimated total Iraqi war losses from 1980 to 1985 at 



123 



Iraq: A Country Study 

US$226 billion. This figure was disaggregated into US$120.8 bil- 
lion in gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) lost in the oil 
sector, US$64 billion GDP lost in the nonoil sector, US$33 billion 
lost in destroyed materiel, and US$8.2 billion lost in damage to 
non-oil sector fixed capital investment. Included in the lost GDP 
was US$65.5 in lost oil revenues and US$43.4 billion in unreal- 
ized fixed capital investment. 

As the 1980s progressed, the Iran-Iraq conflict evolved into a 
protracted war of attrition, in which Iran threatened to overwhelm 
Iraq by sheer economic weight and manpower. Although Iraq 
implemented some cost-cutting measures, the government feared 
that an austerity plan would threaten its stability, so it turned to 
outside sources to finance the war. Iraq's Persian Gulf neighbors 
assumed a larger share of the economic burden of the war, but as 
the price of oil skidded in the mid-1980s, this regional support of 
Iraq diminished. For the first time, Iraq turned to Western credi- 
tors to finance its deficit spending. Iraq's leadership calculated cor- 
rectly that foreign lenders, both government and private, would 
be willing to provide loans and trade credit to preserve their access 
to the Iraqi economy, which would emerge as a major market and 
an oil supplier after the war. But the sustained slump in oil prices 
made foreign creditors more skeptical of Iraq's long-term economic 
prospects, and some lenders apparently concluded that providing 
more loans to Iraq amounted to throwing good money after bad. 
Some creditors were also wary of Iraq's postwar prospects because 
of Iranian demands for tens of billions of dollars in reparations as 
the price for any peace settlement. Although Iraq would probably 
pay only a fraction of the reparations demanded (and that, most 
likely, with the help of other Persian Gulf countries), a large set- 
tlement would nonetheless delay Iraq's postwar economic recovery. 

In 1988, as the war entered its eighth year and Iraq's debt topped 
US$50 billion, the government was implementing comprehensive 
economic reforms it had announced in 1987. Iraq's new economic 
policy was designed to reverse twenty years of socialism by relin- 
quishing considerable state control over the economy to the pri- 
vate sector. It was not immediately clear if this move would result 
in a fundamental and enduring restructuring of Iraq's economy, 
or if it was merely a stopgap measure to boost productivity, to 
cut costs, to tap private sector savings, and to reassure Western 
creditors. 

Growth and Structure of the Economy 

In the 1960s, investment in industry accounted for almost one- 
quarter of the development budget, about twice the amount spent 



124 



The Economy 



under the monarchy in the 1950s. After the 1968 Baath revolu- 
tion, the share allocated to industrial development grew to about 
30 percent of development spending. With the advent of the Iran- 
Iraq War, however, this share decreased to about 18 percent. Devel- 
opment expenditure on agriculture fell from about 40 percent under 
the prerevolutionary regime to about 20 percent under the Baath 
regime in the early 1970s. By 1982, investment in agriculture was 
down to 10 percent of the development budget. 

Total Iraqi GDP, as well as sectoral contribution to GDP, could 
only be estimated in the 1980s. On the eve of the Iran-Iraq War, 
the petroleum sector dominated the economy, accounting for two- 
thirds of GDP. The outbreak of war curtailed oil production, and 
by 1983 petroleum contributed only one-third of GDP. The non- 
petroleum sector of the economy also shrank, and, as a consequence, 
total real GDP dropped about 15 percent per year from 1981 to 
1983. To a lesser extent, nominal GDP also shrank, from about 
US$20 billion to US$18 billion, an indication of high wartime infla- 
tion. The decline in GDP was reversed between 1984 and 1986, 
when oil production grew at about 24 percent per year as the 
government secured oudets and resumed exports. But over the same 
period, the nonpetroleum sector of the economy continued to con- 
tract by about 6 percent per year, offsetting gains from increased 
oil production. In 1986, the petroleum sector revived to the extent 
that it contributed about 33.5 percent of GDP, while the nonpetro- 
leum sector, including services, manufacturing, and agriculture, 
accounted for the remainder. Business services, the largest com- 
ponent of nonpetroleum GDP, amounted to about 23 percent of 
GDP. Agriculture accounted for about 7.5 percent of GDP, min- 
ing and manufacturing for slightly less than 7 percent, construc- 
tion for almost 12 percent, transportation and communications for 
about 4.5 percent, and utilities for between 1 and 2 percent. The 
total estimated GDP for 1986 was equivalent to US$35 billion. 

Projections based on economic trends indicated that total GDP 
would grow about 6 percent annually over the five-year period from 
1987 to 1991. In fact, however, 1987 GDP was estimated at a 
1.7 percent real growth rate. The petroleum sector would continue 
to grow, although at a slower rate of about 8 percent per year, and 
it would account for more than half of GDP. The nonpetroleum 
sector was expected to resume modest growth in 1987. Construc- 
tion would be the fastest growing sector, at about 7 percent per 
year. Agriculture would grow only marginally, and therefore its 
share of overall GDP would decline from 1986 levels. Other non- 
petroleum sectors would grow at a rate of between 3 and 4 percent 
per year and, because these projected growth rates were smaller 



125 



Iraq: A Country Study 

than the overall GDP growth rate, would likewise decline as a per- 
centage of total GDP. 

In early 1988, Iraq's total external liabilities were difficult to 
determine accurately because the Iraqi government did not pub- 
lish official information on its debt. Moreover, Iraqi debt was 
divided into a number of overlapping categories according to the 
type of lender, the terms of disbursement or servicing, and the dis- 
position of the funds. For example, some loans were combined with 
aid grants in mixed credits, and some loans were authorized but 
never disbursed. And, in a process of constant negotiation with 
its creditors, Iraq had deferred payment by rescheduling loans. 
Finally, some loans were partially repaid with oil in counter- trade 
and barter agreements. Nevertheless, experts estimated that Iraqi 
debt in 1986 totaled between US$50 billion and US$80 billion. Of 
this total, Iraq owed about US$30 billion to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
and the other Gulf states. Most of this amount was derived from 
crude oil sales on Iraq's behalf. Iraq promised to provide reim- 
bursement in oil after the war, but the Gulf states were expected 
to waive repayment. 

A second important category of debt was that owed to official 
export credit agencies. The authoritative Wharton Econometric 
Forecasting Associates estimated in 1 986 that Iraqi debt guaranteed 
by export credit agencies totalled US$9.3 billion, of which US$1.6 
billion was short-term debt and US$7.7 billion was medium-term 
debt. 

In the category of private sector debts, Iraq owed up to US$7 
billion to private companies that had not secured the trade credit 
they extended to Iraq with their government export credit agen- 
cies. The firms that were owed the most were based in Turkey, 
in the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and in India, which lacked 
access to official export credit guarantees. European companies were 
also owed large amounts. By the late 1980s, Iraq had placed a pri- 
ority on settling these private sector debts. In addition, Iraq owed 
an estimated US$6.8 billion to commercial banks as of mid- 1986, 
although much of this sum was guaranteed by government export 
credit agencies. 

In the realm of government debts, Iraq had accrued considera- 
ble debts to Western governments for its purchases of military 
materiel. Iraq owed France more than US$1 .35 billion for weapons, 
which it was repaying by permitting Elf-Aquitaine and Compagnie 
Francaise des Petroles-Total (CFP) — two oil companies affiliated with 
the French government — to lift 80,000 barrels of oil per day from 
the Dortyol terminal near Iskenderun, Turkey. Finally, Iraq 
owed money to the Soviet Union and to East European nations. 



126 



The Economy 



Iraq's debt to the Soviet Union was estimated at US$5 billion in 
1987. 

The Role of Government 

Following the Baath Party's accession to power in 1968, the gov- 
ernment began using central planning to manage the national econ- 
omy. The government separated its expenditures into three 
categories: an annual expenditure budget for government opera- 
tions, an annual investment budget to achieve the goals of the five- 
year plans, and an annual import budget. Economic planning was 
regarded as a state prerogative, and thus economic plans were con- 
sidered state secrets. The government rarely published budget or 
planning information, although information on specific projects, 
on total investment goals, and on productivity was occasionally 
released. 

Extremely high revenues from oil exports in the 1970s made 
budgeting and development planning almost irrelevant in Iraq. The 
responsibility of the state was not so much to allocate scarce 
resources as to distribute the wealth, and economic planning was 
concerned more with social welfare and subsidization than with 
economic efficiency. One consistent and very costly development 
goal was to reduce the economy's dependence on a single extrac- 
tive commodity — oil — and, in particular, to foster heavy industry. 
Despite this objective, in 1978 the government began an attempt 
to rationalize the non-oil sector. The process of cost-cutting and 
streamlining entailed putting a ceiling on subsidization by mak- 
ing state-run industries and commercial operations semiautono- 
mous. The expenditures of such public entities were not aggregated 
into the governmental expenditure budget. Instead, state-run com- 
panies were given their own budgets in an attempt to make them 
more efficient. 

Because Iraqi economic development planning was predicated 
on massive expenditure, the onset of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980 
brought central planning to an impasse. Despite an effort to main- 
tain the momentum of its earlier development spending, the govern- 
ment was forced to revert to ad hoc planning as it adjusted to limited 
resources and to deficit spending. Economic planning became not 
just a perceived national security issue, but a real one, as the govern- 
ment devoted its attention and managerial resources to obtaining 
credits. The Fourth Five- Year Plan (1981-85) was suspended, and 
as of early 1988, the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1986-90) had not been 
formulated. 

In early 1987, President Saddam Husayn abruptly reversed the 
course of Iraq's economic policy, deviating sharply from the 



127 



Iraq: A Country Study 



socialist economic ideology that the government had propounded 
since the 1968 Baath revolution. Saddam Hussayn advocated a 
more open, if not free, market, and he launched a program of exten- 
sive reform. Because the liberalization was aimed primarily at deal- 
ing with the nation's mounting and increasingly unmanageable war 
debt, Saddam Husayn's motivation was more strategic than eco- 
nomic. He had four related goals — to conserve money by cutting 
the costs of direct and of indirect government subsidies, to tap pri- 
vate sector savings and to stem capital outflow by offering credi- 
ble investment opportunities to Iraqi citizens, to reduce the balance 
of payments deficit by fostering import substitution and by promot- 
ing exports, and to use the reforms to convince Western commer- 
cial creditors to continue making loans to Iraq. 

The reform process began with Revolutionary Command Coun- 
cil (RCC) Decree Number 652, which in May 1987 abolished Iraq's 
labor law. This law had institutionalized the differences among 
white-collar, blue-collar, and peasant workers. Under the law, every 
adult had been guaranteed lifetime employment, but workers had 
almost no freedom to choose or to change their jobs or places of 
employment, and they had little upward mobility. One result was 
that labor costs in Iraq accounted for 20 percent to 40 percent of 
output, compared to about 10 percent in similar industries in non- 
socialist economies. Nonproductive administrative staff accounted 
for up to half the personnel in state-run enterprises, a much higher 
proportion than in private sector companies in other countries. The 
government immediately laid off thousands of white-collar work- 
ers, most of whom were foreign nationals. Thousands of other white- 
collar civil servants were given factory jobs. Previously, all state 
blue-collar workers had belonged to government-sponsored trade 
unions, while unions for private sector employees were prohibited. 
After the labor law was abolished, the situation was reversed. 
Government workers could no longer be union members, whereas 
private sector employees were authorized to establish and to join 
their own unions. To compensate state blue-collar workers for their 
lost job security, Saddam Husayn established an incentive plan that 
permitted state-enterprise managers to award up to 30 percent of 
the value of any increase in productivity to workers. 

Decree Number 652 aroused resentment and controversy among 
government bureaucrats, many of whom were stalwart Baath Party 
members, not only because it contradicted party ideology, but also 
because it imperiled their jobs. Feeling compelled to justify his new 
economic thinking and to reconcile it to Baathist ideology, Saddam 
Husayn wrote a long article in Ath Thawrah, the major government- 
run newspaper, criticizing the labor law for perpetuating a caste 



128 



Fertilizer plant in Basra 
Courtesy Embassy of Iraq, 
Washington 



Cement factory in Basra 
Courtesy Embassy of Iraq, 
Washington 



and class system that prevented people from being rewarded accord- 
ing to merit and from using their capacities fully. Perhaps writing 
with intentional irony, Saddam Husayn stated that unless people 
were rewarded for producing more, some might start to regard the 
capitalist system as superior because it permitted the growth of 
wealth and the improvement of workers' lives. 

In June 1987, Saddam Husayn went further in attacking the 
bureaucratic red tape that entangled the nation's economy. In a 
speech to provincial governors, he said, "From now on the state 
should not embark on uneconomic activity. Any activity, in any 
field, which is supposed to have an economic return and does not 
make such a return, must be ignored. All officials must pay as much 
attention to economic affairs as political ideology." 

To implement this policy, Saddam Husayn announced a move 
toward privatization of government-owned enterprises. Several 
mechanisms were devised to turn state enterprises over to the pri- 
vate sector. Some state companies were leased on long terms, others 
were sold outright to investors, and others went public with stock 
offerings. Among the state enterprises sold to the public were bus 



129 



Iraq: A Country Study 

companies serving the provinces, about 95 percent of the nation's 
network of gas stations, thousands of agricultural and animal hus- 
bandry enterprises, state department stores, and factories. In many 
instances, to improve productivity the government turned stock 
over to company employees. 

The most significant instance of privatization occurred in August 
1987, when Saddam Husayn announced a decree to abolish the 
State Enterprise for Iraqi Airways by early 1988. Two new ven- 
tures were to be established instead: the Iraqi Aviation Company, 
to operate commercially as the national airline, and the National 
Company for Aviation Services, to provide aircraft and airport ser- 
vices. Stock was to be sold to the public, and the government was 
to retain a minority share of the new companies through the General 
Federation of Iraqi Chambers of Commerce and Industry. 

In a further move consistent with the trend toward privatiza- 
tion, the RCC announced in November 1987 that the government 
would offer new inducements for foreign companies to operate in 
Iraq by loosening direct investment restrictions. Details of the new 
proposal were not specified, but it was expected to entail modifi- 
cation of Resolution Number 1 646 of the RCC , enacted in Novem- 
ber 1980, which forbade foreign capital participation in private 
sector companies. Changes in the long-standing government policy 
of preventing foreign ownership of state institutions might also 
occur. According to the new regulations, all foreign firms engaged 
in development projects would also be exempt from paying taxes 
and duties, and foreign nationals who were employees of these com- 
panies would pay no income tax. At the same time, Saddam Husayn 
announced that development projects would no longer be paid for 
on credit. The new legislation indicated that Iraq was encounter- 
ing difficulty paying for or obtaining credits for turnkey projects 
and was therefore willing to permit foreign companies to retain 
partial ownership of the installations that they built. Previously, 
Iraq had rejected exchanging debt for equity in this manner as an 
infringement on its sovereignty. 

Banking and Finance 

When Iraq was part of the Ottoman Empire, a number of 
European currencies circulated alongside the Turkish pound. With 
the establishment of the British mandate after World War I, Iraq 
was incorporated into the Indian monetary system, which was 
operated by the British, and the rupee became the principal cur- 
rency in circulation. In 1931 , the Iraq Currency Board was estab- 
lished in London for note issue and maintenance of reserves for 
the new Iraqi dinar (ID — for value of the dinar — see Glossary). 



130 



The Economy 



The currency board pursued a conservative monetary policy, main- 
taining very high reserves behind the dinar. The dinar was fur- 
ther strengthened by its link to the British pound. In 1947 the 
government-owned National Bank of Iraq was founded, and in 1949 
the London-based currency board was abolished as the new bank 
assumed responsibility for the issuing of notes and the maintenance 
of reserves. The National Bank of Iraq continued the currency 
board's conservative monetary policy, maintaining 100 percent 
reserves behind outstanding domestic currency. 

Initiated during the last years of Ottoman rule, commercial bank- 
ing became a significant factor in foreign trade during the British 
mandate. British banks predominated, but traditional money deal- 
ers continued to extend some domestic credit and to offer limited 
banking services. The expansion of banking services was hampered 
by the limited use of money, the small size of the economy, and 
the small amount of savings; banks provided services for foreign 
trade almost exclusively. In the mid- 1930s, the Iraqi government 
decided to establish banks in order to make credit available to other 
sectors of the economy. In 1936, the government formed the 
Agricultural and Industrial Bank. In 1940, this bank was divided 
into the Agricultural Bank and the Industrial Bank, each with sub- 
stantially increased capital provided by the government. The 
government established the Rafidayn Bank in 1941 as both the 
primary commercial bank and the central bank, but the National 
Bank of Iraq became the government's banker in 1947. The Real 
Estate Bank was established in 1948, primarily to finance the pur- 
chase of houses by individuals. The Mortgage Bank was established 
in 1951, and the Cooperative Bank in 1956. In addition to these 
government-owned institutions, branches of foreign banks and pri- 
vate Iraqi banks were opened as the economy expanded. 

In 1956 the National Bank of Iraq became the Central Bank of 
Iraq. Its responsibilities included the issuing and the management 
of currency, control over foreign exchange transactions, and the 
regulation and supervision of the banking system. It kept accounts 
for the government, and it handled government loans. Over the 
years, legislation has considerably enlarged the Central Bank's 
authority. 

On July 14, 1964, all banks and insurance companies were 
nationalized, and, during the next decade, banking was consoli- 
dated. By 1987 the banking system consisted of the Central Bank, 
the Rafidayn Bank, and the Agricultural, Industrial, and Real 
Estate banks. 

In the 1980s, the Rafidayn Bank was in the contradictory posi- 
tion of trying to maintain its reputation as a viable commercial bank 



131 



Iraq: A Country Study 

while acting on behalf of the government as an intermediary in 
securing loans from private foreign banks. With deposits of more 
than US$17 billion in 1983, the Rafidayn was reportedly the largest 
commercial bank in the Arab world. It managed to maintain a rela- 
tively sound commercial reputation for the five years of the war, 
and in 1985 its total assets stood at about ID 10. 4 billion and its 
total deposits, at more than ID9.5 billion — both figures having 
tripled since the Iran-Iraq War began in 1980. This huge increase 
in deposits was attributed to increased saving by the public because 
of the scarcity of consumer products. Profits of ID290 million in 
1985 represented an increase of nearly 50 percent over 1980 levels. 
By 1985 the Rafidayn had established 215 branches in Iraq, 104 
of which were in Baghdad; according to the Iraqi government, it 
also had seven branches abroad. In 1986, however, the bank started 
to delay payment of letters of credit owed to foreign exporters, and 
its failure to make installment payments on a syndicated loan of 
500 million Eurodollars forced rescheduling of the debt payments. 
In 1987, with the exception of the Baghdad office of a Yugoslav 
bank, the Rafidayn was Iraq's only commercial bank. In this same 
year, the government ordered the Rafidayn Bank to double its capi- 
tal to ID 100 million. This increase was to enable the bank to 
improve and to extend its commercial services, so that it could tap 
the public for the increased deposits that would enable the bank 
to offer more loans. To the extent that new loans could bolster the 
emerging private sector, the move appeared consistent with other 
government efforts to make state-run operations more fiscally 
efficient. 

The other three banks in Iraq were so-called special banks that 
provided short- to long-term credit in their respective markets. Since 
its establishment in 1936, the Agricultural Bank had grown to forty- 
five branches, of which four were in Baghdad. In 1981, its capital 
stood at ID 150 million and its loans totaled ID 175 million. The 
Agricultural Bank had also started a project whose objective was 
to encourage rural citizens to establish savings accounts. Mean- 
while, the Industrial Bank had grown to nine branches and offered 
loans both to private and to public sector industrial and manufac- 
turing companies. The Real Estate Bank was composed of twenty- 
five branches and provided loans for construction of housing and 
tourist facilities. The Iraq Life Insurance Company, the Iraq 
Reinsurance Company, and the National Life Insurance Company 
conducted the nation's insurance business. Post offices maintained 
savings accounts for small depositors. 



132 



The Economy 



The Oil Sector 

Developments Through World War II 

Natural seepage aroused an early interest in Iraq's oil poten- 
tial. After the discovery of oil at Baku (in what is now the Soviet 
Union, on the west side of the Caspian Sea) in the 1870s, foreign 
groups began seeking concessions for exploration in Iran and in 
the area of the Ottoman Empire that became Iraq after World 
War I. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later renamed the Anglo- 
Iranian Oil Company and still later British Petroleum) was granted 
a concession in Iran and discovered oil in 1908. Shortly before 
World War I, the British government purchased majority owner- 
ship of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. 

The discovery of oil in Iran stimulated greater interest in potential 
Iraqi oil resources, and financial groups from several major nations 
engaged in protracted negotiations and in considerable intrigue with 
the Ottoman Empire in order to obtain concessions to explore for 
oil in Mosul and in Kirkuk, two locations in what later was north- 
central Iraq. Although a few concessions were granted prior to 
World War I, little surveying or exploration was done. 

The Turkish Petroleum Company 

In 1912, several rival groups banded together to establish the 
Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC), which would seek a conces- 
sion to explore for Iraqi oil. The original purpose of the TPC was 
to eliminate rivalry among the partners and to outflank American 
concession seekers. The TPC's guiding hand was Calouste Gul- 
benkian, who had been hired by British banking interests because 
of his knowledge and his ability to influence the decisions of the 
Turkish government. His 5 percent holdings in TPC reputedly 
made him the richest individual in the world for many years, and 
were the source of his nickname, "Mr. Five Percent." 

Establishment of the TPC did not eliminate the rivalry among 
the shareholders representing various national interests. Britain had 
a long-standing strategic interest in Mesopotamia because of its loca- 
tion in relation to Britain's military and commercial routes to India. 
The British government's decision before World War I to convert 
its naval fleet from coal to oil increased the importance of the area. 
By 1914, the British- government-controlled Anglo-Persian Oil Com- 
pany had bought 50 percent of the shares of TPC and was exerting 
pressure on the Turkish government to grant the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company a concession, but World War I delayed negotiations. 

World War I demonstrated to the major powers the importance 
of securing their own sources of oil. The British-French San Remo 



133 



Iraq: A Country Study 

Conference of 1920 provided for permanent British control of any 
company established to develop Mesopotamian oil, but allocated 
Iraqi interests 20 percent if they chose to invest. France claimed 
the German shares of TPC that had been seized as enemy property 
and formed the CFP to hold the French shares in TPC. The Italian 
and United States governments protested their exclusion. After 
prolonged and sharp diplomatic exchanges, American oil compa- 
nies were permitted to buy into TPC, although negotiations were 
not completed until 1928. 

Although Iraq became a British mandate in 1920, that did not 
guarantee TPC an exclusive concession. Using the promise of a 
concession from the prewar Turkish government, TPC began nego- 
tiating for one in 1921. A major point of contention was Iraq's 
20 percent share of any oil development company, a condition stipu- 
lated at the San Remo Conference. By the early 1920s, TPC con- 
sisted almost entirely of oil companies that did not want Iraq's 
representation or its interference in the management of TPC. They 
successfully resisted Iraqi efforts to participate despite pressure by 
the British government to accept Iraqi shareholders. 

A concession was granted to TPC in March 1925. Many Iraqis 
felt cheated from the beginning of the concession. Its term was for 
seventy-five years, and it covered twenty-four plots selected by TPC. 
The Iraqi government was to receive royalties at a flat fee per ton 
to be paid in English pounds sterling, but with a gold clause to 
guard against devaluation of the pound. Royalty payments were 
linked to oil company profits, but this clause became effective only 
after twenty years. The Iraqi government had the right to tax TPC 
at the same rate levied on other industrial concerns. TPC was to 
build a refinery to meet Iraq's domestic needs and a pipeline for 
the export of crude oil. The Iraqi government had the right to lease 
other plots for oil exploration and development, and TPC was not 
excluded from bidding on these additional plots. 

TPC began exploratory drilling after the concession was rati- 
fied by the Iraqi government. Oil was discovered just north of Kir- 
kuk on October 15, 1927. Many tons of oil were spilled before the 
gushing well was brought under control. This indication of a large, 
valuable field soon proved well-founded. 

The discovery of oil hastened negotiations over the composition 
and the functions of TPC . The shareholders signed a formal agree- 
ment in July 1928. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the Dutch 
Shell Group, the CFP, and the Near East Development Corpora- 
tion (which represented the interests of five large American oil com- 
panies) each held 23.7 percent of the shares, and Gulbenkian the 
remaining, but nonvoting, 5 percent. TPC was organized as a 



134 



The Economy 



nonprofit company registered in Britain that produced crude oil 
for a fee for its parent companies, based on their shares. TPC was 
limited to refining and marketing for Iraq's internal needs to prevent 
any competition with the parent companies. The Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company was awarded a 10 percent royalty on the oil produced, 
as compensation for its reduced share in TPC. 

A major obstacle facing United States firms had been a clause 
in the 1914 reorganization of the TPC that stipulated that any oil 
activity in the Ottoman Empire by any shareholder would be shared 
by all partners. Gulbenkian had insisted on the clause so that the 
oil companies could not circumvent his interests by establishing 
other companies without him. This arrangement, continued in the 
1928 reorganization, came to be known as the Red Line Agree- 
ment because the TPC partners were forbidden to act indepen- 
dently within the boundaries of the now-defunct Ottoman Empire. 
This "red line" effectively precluded the United States and other 
TPC partners from concession hunting and from oil development 
in much of the Persian Gulf region until after World War II. 

In 1929 the TPC was renamed the Iraq Petroleum Company 
(IPC). IPC represented oil companies that had diverse and some- 
times conflicting interests. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company and 
Standard Oil of New Jersey (also known as Esso and subsequently 
known as Exxon), for example, had access to major sources of crude 
oil outside Iraq, and they therefore wished to hold the Iraqi con- 
cessions in reserve. CFP and other companies, in contrast, pushed 
for rapid development of Iraqi oil to augment their short crude oil 
supplies. 

IPC's parent companies delayed development of the Iraqi fields, 
and IPC's concession expired because the companies failed to meet 
certain performance requirements, such as the construction of pipe- 
lines and of shipping terminals. IPC's concession was renegotiated 
in 1931 . The new contract gave IPC a seventy-year concession on 
an enlarged 83,200-square-kilometer area, all east of the Tigris 
River. In return, however, the Iraqi government demanded and 
received additional payments and loans as well as the promise that 
IPC would complete two oil pipelines to the Mediterranean by 1935. 

Iraqi politicians remained suspicious of IPC's motives. Many 
Iraqis believed that IPC was deliberately withholding Iraqi crude 
from the market to boost the price of the parent companies' oil 
produced elsewhere. In 1932 Iraq granted a seventy-five-year con- 
cession to the British Oil Development Company (BODC), created 
by a group of Italian and British interests, to 120,000 square kilo- 
meters west of the Tigris River. The terms were more favorable 
to the Iraqi government than those of earlier agreements. BODC 



135 



Iraq: A Country Study 

financing was insufficient, however, and the company was bought 
out by IPC in 1941 and was renamed the Mosul Petroleum Com- 
pany (MPC). IPC shareholders asserted their monopoly position 
again when they won the concession rights to southern Iraq and 
in 1938 founded the Basrah Petroleum Company (BPC) as their 
wholly owned subsidiary to develop the region. 

Transport remained the main obstacle to the efficient export of 
Iraqi oil. When France joined IPC after World War I, it wanted 
the Iraqi pipeline to transit its mandate in Syria to a coastal terminal 
at Tripoli, Lebanon. The Iraqis and the British preferred a terminal 
at Haifa, in Palestine. In 1934, a pipeline was completed from the 
Kirkuk fields to Al Hadithah, where it divided, one branch going 
to Tripoli (the Tripoli branch was closed by Syria — which supported 
Iran — in 1982 after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980) 
and the other to Haifa (the Haifa line was closed in 1948). In 1938, 
nine years after the discovery of oil, Iraq began to export oil in 
significant quantities. Iraqi production averaged 4 million tons per 
year until World War II, when restricted shipping in the Mediter- 
ranean forced production down sharply (see fig. 8). 

Post-World War II Through the 1970s 

With the end of World War II, IPC and its affiliates undertook 
repair and development of facilities in Iraq as rapidly as financing 
and materials became available. Exploration and drilling were 
pressed, particularly in the Basra and the Mosul areas, to meet con- 
cession terms. Although considered a priority, the elimination of 
transport constraints was set back when a larger second, nearly 
completed pipeline to Haifa was abandoned in 1948 as a result of 
the first Arab-Israeli war. Use of the existing Haifa line was also 
discontinued. In 1951, however, commercial exports by the BPC 
of good quality crude began via a new pipeline to Al Faw, on the 
Persian Gulf. Exports were boosted further with the completion in 
1952 of a thirty-inch pipeline linking the Kirkuk fields to the Syrian 
port of Baniyas, which had a throughput capacity of 13 million tons 
per year. In that year, production from Basra and Mosul approached 
2.5 million tons while the Kirkuk fields increased production to more 
than 15 million tons. In the space of a year (1951-52), total Iraqi 
oil production had doubled to almost 20 million tons. 

Iraqi officials still harbored ambitions, dating back to the 1920 
San Remo Conference, to take control of their nation's oil resources. 
The elimination of transportation bottlenecks and the subsequent 
rapid growth of exports encouraged Iraqi assertiveness. IPC's costiy, 
irretrievable investments in Iraq's oil infrastructure gave the govern- 
ment even greater leverage. 



136 



The Economy 



One particularly sore point among the Iraqis concerned IPC's 
contractual obligation to meet Iraq's domestic requirements for 
gasoline and other petroleum products. An IPC subsidiary oper- 
ated a small refinery and distribution company based near Kirkuk 
that supplied two-thirds of Iraq's needs. But IPC imported the 
remaining third from a large refinery in Abadan, Iran. Iraq con- 
sidered this arrangement politically imprudent, a judgment that 
was vindicated when, in the early 1950s, Iranian production was 
cut during that country's oil industry nationalization crisis. In 1951 
the Iraqi government took over, with compensation, the small 
Kirkuk refinery and hired a United States contractor to build a 
refinery near Baghdad. This represented Iraq's first concrete step 
toward taking control of the oil industry. 

In 1952 Iraq followed the examples of Venezuela and of Saudi 
Arabia by demanding and receiving a 50 percent tax on all oil com- 
pany profits made in the country. The tax more than doubled Iraqi 
profits per ton on exported oil. 

The 1958 Iraqi revolution had little effect at first on the govern- 
ment's attitude toward IPC. The government needed the oil reve- 
nues generated by IPC; moreover, Iran's experience when it 
nationalized its oil industry was a vivid reminder to the Iraqis of 
the power the oil companies still wielded. In 1959 and in 1960, 
surpluses led the international oil companies to reduce the posted 
price for Middle Eastern oil unilaterally, which reduced govern- 
ment revenues significantly. IPC's policy of exploiting and develop- 
ing only .5 percent of the total concessions it held in Iraq and of 
holding the remainder in reserve also reduced Iraqi revenues. 
Perhaps in response to the general situation, Iraq convened a meet- 
ing in Baghdad of the major oil-producing nations, which resulted 
in the September 1960 formation of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC). In December 1961, the Iraqi govern- 
ment enacted Law No. 80, which resulted in the expropriation of 
all of the IPC group's concession area that was not in production. 
The expropriation locked the government and the oil companies 
in a controversy that was not resolved for more than a decade. The 
companies had two paramount objectives in seeking to mitigate 
the law's effect. One was to regain control of the concession to the 
North Rumaylah field in southern Iraq, which was expected to be 
a major source of oil. In particular, the companies did not want 
competitors to gain access to it. The companies' second major objec- 
tive was to limit the impact of Iraq's actions on IPC concession 
agreements in other oil-exporting nations. 

In February 1964, the government established the state-owned 
Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) to develop the concession areas 



137 



Iraq: A Country Study 




Figure 8. Petroleum Industry, 1988 

taken over from IPC. INOC was eventually granted exclusive rights 
by law to develop Iraq's oil reserves; granting concessions to other 
oil companies was forbidden, although INOC could permit IPC 



138 



The Economy 




and other foreign companies to participate in the further develop- 
ment of existing concessions. Nevertheless, IPC continued to lift 
the bulk of Iraqi oil from the Kirkuk field that it had retained, and, 



139 



Iraq: A Country Study 

more important, to export and to market it. IPC therefore remained 
the arbiter of existing, if not potential, Iraqi oil production. 

Iraq's disillusionment with newly formed OPEC began just after 
the enactment of Law 80. Iraq applied pressure on OPEC to adopt 
a unified negotiating stance vis-a-vis the oil companies. Instead. 
OPEC members negotiated separately. This allowed the oil com- 
panies to extract concessions that permitted them to switch produc- 
tion away from Iraq and therefore to pressure Iraq with the prospect 
of lower oil revenues. Iraq's relationship with IPC was further 
aggravated in 1966 when Syria raised transit fees on the pipeline 
that carried two-thirds of Iraqi oil to port and demanded retro- 
active payments from IPC. When IPC refused to pay, Syria closed 
the pipeline for several months, an action that cost the Iraqi govern- 
ment much revenue. 

The eight-year shutdown of the Suez Canal that followed the 
June 1967 Arab-Israeli War increased the importance of Mediter- 
ranean oil producers because of their proximity to European mar- 
kets. In 1970 Libya took advantage of this situation to win higher 
prices for its oil. Iraq, which was in the unusual position of exporting 
oil through both the Gulf and the Mediterranean, demanded that 
it be paid for its oil at the Libyan price. IPC countered that Iraqi 
oil, because of its higher sulfur content, was inferior to Libyan oil. 
Meanwhile, exports of Iraqi oil via the Mediterranean began to 
decline, which IPC attributed to falling tanker rates that made Gulf 
oil more competitive. Iraq, however, interpreted the declining 
exports as pressure from the oil companies. In general, Iraq believed 
that IPC was intentionally undercharging customers for oil it sold 
on behalf of Iraq and was cutting back Iraqi production to force 
Iraq to restore the nationalized concession areas. In response, Iraq 
attempted to make INOC a viable substitute for IPC . The INOC 
chairman of the board was given cabinet rank and greater authority, 
but INOC's activities were hampered by lack of experience and 
expertise. Iraq, therefore, sought assistance from countries consid- 
ered immune to potential IPC sanctions and to retaliation. In 1967 
INOC concluded a service agreement with Entreprise des 
Recherches et des Activites Petrolieres (ERAP) — a company owned 
by the French government — covering exploration and development 
of a large segment of southern Iraq, including offshore areas. Some 
foreign observers doubted that the terms of the arrangement were 
more favorable than IPC's terms, but more important from Iraq's 
point of view, the ERAP agreement left control in Iraqi hands. 
By 1976 EPAP started pumping the oil it had discovered, at which 
point INOC took over operation of the fields and began deliver- 
ing the oil to ERAP. 



140 



The Economy 



In 1967 INOC tapped the Soviet Union for assistance in develop- 
ing the North Rumaylah field. The Soviet Union provided more 
than US$500 million worth of tied aid for drilling rigs, pumps, pipe- 
lines, a deep-water port on the Persian Gulf, tankers, and a large 
contingent of technicians. In 1972, the North Rumaylah field started 
production and produced nearly 4 million tons of crude. 

In the same period, Iraq obtained aid from French, Italian, 
Japanese, Indian, and Brazilian oil companies under service con- 
tracts modeled on the 1967 ERAP agreement. The service con- 
tracts, which Iraq did not regard as concessions, allowed the foreign 
oil companies to explore and to develop areas in exchange for bear- 
ing the full costs and the risks of development. If oil were discovered, 
the companies would turn their operations over to INOC, which 
would sell them the oil at a discounted rate. 

Iraq's increasing ability to manage its petroleum resources finally 
induced IPC to negotiate. In 1972 IPC promised to increase its 
production in Iraq and to raise the price it paid for Iraqi oil to the 
Libyan level. In return, IPC sought compensation for its lost con- 
cession areas. Iraq rejected this offer and, on June 1, 1972, nation- 
alized IPC's remaining holdings in Iraq, the original Kirkuk fields. 
A state-owned company, the Iraqi Company for Oil Operations 
(ICOO), was established to take over IPC facilities. BPC was 
allowed to continue its operations. 

In February 1973, Iraq and IPC settled their claims and coun- 
terclaims. IPC acknowledged Iraq's right to nationalize and agreed 
to pay the equivalent of nearly US$350 million to Iraq as compen- 
sation for revenue lost to Iraq over the years when IPC was selling 
Iraqi oil. In return, the government agreed to provide to IPC, free 
of charge, 15 million tons of Kirkuk crude, valued at the time at 
over US$300 million, in final settlement of IPC claims. Some 
observers believed that IPC had received a liberal settlement. 

The October 1973 Arab-Israeli War impelled the Iraqis to take 
complete control of their oil resources, and Iraq became one of the 
strongest proponents of an Arab oil boycott of Israel's supporters. 
Although Iraq was subsequently criticized by other Arab countries 
for not adhering to the agreed-upon production cutbacks, Iraq 
nationalized United States and Dutch interests in BPC. By 1975 
all remaining foreign interests were nationalized. Fifty-three years 
after the humiliating San Remo agreement, Iraq had finally gained 
complete sovereignty over its most valuable natural resource. 

Throughout the mid- to late- 1970s, increases in the price of oil 
caused Iraqi oil revenues to skyrocket even as production fluctu- 
ated. Iraq funneled much of this revenue into expanding the oil 
industry infrastructure. Refinery capacity was doubled, and in 1977 



141 



Iraq: A Country Study 

a key pipeline was completed from the Kirkuk fields across Tur- 
key to a Mediterranean terminal at Dortyol. 

In 1976, the structure of the Iraqi oil industry was revamped. 
A new Ministry of Oil was established to direct planning and con- 
struction in the petroleum sector and to be responsible for oil refin- 
ing, gas processing, and internal marketing of gas products through 
several subsidiary organizations. INOC would be responsible for 
the production, transport, and sale of crude oil and gas. Some of 
its operations were contracted out to foreign service companies. 
The State Organization for Northern Oil (SONO), subordinate 
to INOC, replaced ICOO as the operating company in the north- 
ern fields. In subsequent reorganizations, SONO was renamed the 
Northern Petroleum Organization (NPO), and a Central Petroleum 
Organization (CPO), as well as a Southern Petroleum Organiza- 
tion (SPO) were also established. The State Organization of Oil 
Projects (SOOP) took over responsibility for infrastructure from 
INOC, and the State Organization for Marketing Oil (SOMO) 
assumed responsibility for oil sales, leaving INOC free to oversee 
oil production. 

Oil in the 1980s 

In 1987 petroleum continued to dominate the Iraqi economy, 
accounting for more than one-third of nominal gross national 
product (GNP — see Glossary) and 99 percent of merchandise 
exports. Prior to the war, Iraq's oil production had reached 3.5 mil- 
lion bpd (barrels per day — see Glossary), and its exports had stood 
at 3.2 million bpd. In the opening weeks of the Iran-Iraq War, 
however, Iraq's two main offshore export terminals in the Persian 
Gulf, Mina al Bakr and Khawr al Amayah, were severely damaged 
by Iranian attacks, and in 1988 they remained closed. Oil exports 
were further restrained in April 1982, when Syria closed the pipe- 
line running from Iraq to the Mediterranean. In response, Iraq 
launched a major effort to establish alternative channels for its oil 
exports. As an emergency measure, Iraq started to transport oil 
by tanker-truck caravans across Jordan and Turkey. In 1988 Iraq 
continued to export nearly 250,000 bpd by this method. In 
mid- 1984, the expansion of the existing pipeline through Turkey 
was accomplished by looping the line and by adding pumping sta- 
tions. The expansion raised the line's throughput capacity to about 
1 million bpd. In November 1985, Iraq started work on an addi- 
tional expansion of this outlet by building a parallel pipeline between 
Kirkuk and Dortyol that used the existing line's pumping stations. 
Work was completed in July 1987. The result was an increase in 
exports through Turkey of 500,000 bpd. 



142 



The Economy 



In September 1985, construction of a spur line from Az Zubayr 
in southern Iraq to Saudi Arabia was completed; the spur linked 
up with an existing pipeline running across Saudi Arabia to the 
Red Sea port of Yanbu. The spur line had a carrying capacity of 
500,000 bpd. Phase two of this project was begun in late 1987 by 
a Japanese-South Korean-Italian-French consortium. Phase two 
was to be an independent pipeline, parallel to the existing pipe- 
line, which would run 1 ,000 kilometers from Az Zubayr to Yanbu 
and its own loading terminal. The parallel pipeline was expected 
to add 1.15 million bpd to Iraq's export capacity when completed 
in late 1989. Iraq negotiated with the contractors to pay its bill 
entirely in oil at the rate of 110,000 bpd. According to Minister 
of Petroleum Isam Abd ar Rahim al Jalabi, Iraq negotiated special 
legal arrangements with Saudi Arabia guaranteeing Iraqi owner- 
ship of the pipeline. Iraq also considered construction of a 1 -million 
bpd pipeline through Jordan to the Gulf of Aqaba, but in 1988 
this project was shelved. 

The expansion of export capacity induced Iraq to try to boost 
its oil production, which in 1987 averaged 2.8 million bpd of which 
1.8 million bpd were exported. The remainder was retained for 
domestic use. In addition, Iraq continued to receive oil donations 
of between 200,000 and 300,000 bpd from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 
pumped out of the Neutral Zone on the east end of Iraq's southern 
border with Saudi Arabia. By the end of 1989, Iraq's goal was to 
have the capacity to produce oil for export at the prewar level of 
3.5 million bpd without having to depend on any exports by ship 
through the Persian Gulf; however, at a posted price of approxi- 
mately US$18 per barrel, and with spot prices at less than US$13 
per barrel, oil was worth less than half as much in 1988 as it was 
when the Iran-Iraq War started. Iraq's oil revenue in 1987 was 
estimated at US$11.3 billion, up about 60 percent from the 1986 
level of US$6.8 billion (see table 6, Appendix). 

The expanded export capacity theoretically gave Iraq greater lever- 
age in negotiating an increase in its OPEC quota. For the first several 
years of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq attempted to stay within its OPEC 
quota in order to bring OPEC pressure to bear on Iran to curtail 
its production. In early 1988, this issue was moot, however, because 
Iraq had announced in 1986 that it would not recognize its 
1.54 million bpd quota and would produce whatever amount best 
served Iraqi national interests. In 1987, however, Iraqi oil minister 
Jalabi reasserted Iraq's willingness to hold its oil production to the 
1 .54 million bpd OPEC quota if Iran adhered to an identical quota 
level. This would represent a decrease of about 40 percent from the 
2.61 million bpd that Iran was authorized by OPEC to produce. 



143 



Iraq: A Country Study 

When Jalabi was appointed Iraq's oil minister in March 1987, 
he instituted a new round of reorganizations in the petroleum sec- 
tor. The Ministry of Oil assimilated INOC, thus consolidating 
management of Iraq's oil production and distribution. The NPO 
absorbed the CPO. This organization, along with SOOP, was to 
be granted corporate status in an effort to make it more efficient. 
Jalabi was also concerned about the proper handling of Iraq's large 
hydrocarbon reserves. Although estimates of Iraqi hydrocarbon 
reserves in the late 1980s varied considerably, by all accounts they 
were immense. In 1984, Iraq claimed proven reserves of 65 bil- 
lion barrels plus 49 billion barrels of "semi-proven "reserves. In 
November 1987, Iraq's state-owned Oil Exploration Company cal- 
culated official reserves at 72 billion barrels, but the company's 
director, Hashim al Kharasan, stated that this figure would be 
revised upward to 100 billion barrels in the near future. In late 
1987, oil minister Jalabi said that Iraqi reserves were "100 billion 
barrels definite, and 40 billion barrels probable," which would con- 
stitute 140 years of production at the 1987 rate. Western petroleum 
geologists, although somewhat more conservative in their estimates, 
generally concurred with Iraq's assessment; some said that Iraq 
had the greatest potential for new discoveries of all Middle Eastern 
Countries. 

Besides petroleum, Iraq had estimated natural gas reserves of 
nearly 850 billion cubic meters, almost all of which was associated 
with oil. For this reason, most natural gas was flared off at oil wells. 
Of the estimated 7 million cubic meters of natural gas produced 
in 1987, an estimated 5 million cubic meters were flared. Iraq's 
Fifth Five-Year Plan of 1986-90 included projects to exploit this 
heretofore wasted asset. 

The war did not impede Iraqi investment in the oil sector. On 
the contrary, it spurred rapid development. The government 
announced in 1987 that, during the previous 10 years, 67 oil-related 
infrastructure projects costing US$2.85 billion had been completed 
and that another 19 projects costing US$2.75 billion were under 
way. One Iraqi priority was to exploit natural gas reserves. Because 
natural gas is more difficult to process and to market than petro- 
leum, the Ministry of Oil in late 1987 called for the substitution 
of natural gas for oil in domestic consumption, a move that could 
free more oil for export. 

Therefore, it became a key goal to convey natural gas from oil 
fields to industrial areas, where the gas could then be used. In 1987 
the Soviet Union's Tsevetmetpromexport (TSMPE) was construct- 
ing a main artery for such a system, the strategic trans-Iraq dry 
gas pipeline running northward from An Nasiriyah. In 1986 work 



144 



The Economy 



was started on liquefaction facilities and on a pipeline to transport 
11.3 billion cubic meters per day of natural gas from Iraq's North 
Rumaylah oil field to Kuwait. 

Another focus of Iraqi investment was the maintenance and aug- 
mentation of the oil industry's refining capacity. Before the war, 
Iraq had a refining capacity of 320,000 bpd, 140,000 barrels of 
which were produced by the southern refinery at Basra and 80,000 
of which were produced by the Durah refinery, near Baghdad. In 
the opening days of the Iran-Iraq War, the Basra refinery was 
damaged severely, and as of early 1988 it remained closed. The 
Durah refinery, however, remained in operation, and new instal- 
lations, including the 70,000 bpd Salah ad Din I refinery and the 
150,000 bpd northern Baiji refinery, boosted Iraq's capacity past 
400,000 bpd. About 300,000 bpd were consumed domestically, 
much of which was used to sustain the war effort. 

A second thrust of Iraqi oil policy in the late 1980s was the devel- 
opment, with Soviet assistance, of a major new oil field. In Sep- 
tember 1987, during the eighteenth session of the Iraqi-Soviet Joint 
Commission on Economic and Technical Cooperation, held in 
Baghdad, Iraq's SOOP signed an agreement with the Soviet 
Union's Techno-Export to develop the West Al Qurnah oilfield. 
This oilfield was regarded as one of Iraq's most promising, with 
an eventual potential yield of 600,000 bpd. Techno-Export planned 
to start by constructing the degassing, pumping, storage, and trans- 
portation facilities at West Al Qurnah's Mishrif reservoir, expected 
to produce 200,000 bpd. 

Industrialization 

The nonpetroleum industrial sector of the Iraqi economy grew 
tremendously after Iraq gained independence in 1932. Although 
growth in absolute terms was significant, high annual growth rates 
can also be attributed to the very low level from which industriali- 
zation started. Under Ottoman rule, manufacture consisted almost 
entirely of handicrafts and the products of artisan shops. The avail- 
ability of electricity and lines of communication and transporta- 
tion after World War I led to the establishment of the first large-scale 
industries, but industrial development remained slow in the first 
years after independence. The private sector, which controlled most 
of the nation's capital, hesitated to invest in manufacturing because 
the domestic market was small, disposable income was low, and 
infrastructure was primitive; moreover, investment in agricultural 
land yielded a higher rate of return than did investment in capital 
stock. World War II fueled demand for manufactured goods, and 
large public sector investments after 1951, made possible by the 



145 



Iraq: A Country Study 

jump in state oil revenues, stimulated industrial growth. Manufac- 
turing output increased 10 percent annually in the 1950s. 

Industrial development slowed after the overthrow of the monar- 
chy during the 1958 revolution. The socialist rhetoric and the land 
reform measures frightened private investors, and capital began 
leaving the country. Although the regime led by Abd al Karim 
Qasim excepted industry from the nationalization imposed on the 
agricultural and the petroleum sectors, in July 1964 a new govern- 
ment decreed nationalization of the twenty-seven largest privately 
owned industrial firms. The government reorganized other large 
companies, put a low limit on individual shareholdings, allocated 
25 percent of corporate profits to workers, and instituted worker 
participation in management. A series of decrees relegated the pri- 
vate sector to a minor role and provoked an exodus of managers 
and administrators, accompanied by capital flight. The govern- 
ment was incapable of filling the vacuum it had created, either in 
terms of money or of trained manpower, and industrial develop- 
ment slowed to about 6 percent per year in the 1960s. 

After the 1968 Baath revolution, the government gave a higher 
priority to industrial development. By 1978 the government had 
revamped the public industrial sector by organizing ten semi- 
independent state organizations for major industry sub sectors, such 
as spinning and weaving, chemicals, and engineering. Factory 
managers were given some autonomy, and an effort was made to 
hold them responsible for meeting goals. Despite Iraq's attempt 
to rationalize and reorganize the public sector, state organizations 
remained overstaffed because social legislation made it nearly impos- 
sible to lay off or to transfer workers and bureaucratization made 
the organizations top-heavy with unproductive management. The 
government acknowledged that unused capacity, overstocking of 
inventories, and lost production time, because of shortages or dis- 
ruptions of supply, continued to plague the industrial sector. 

The government attempted to strengthen public sector industry 
by pouring money into it. According to official figures, annual 
investment in the nonpetroleum industrial sector rose from ID39.5 
million in 1968 to ID752.5 million in 1985. As a consequence, 
industrial output rose; the government put the total value of Iraq's 
industrial output in 1984 at almost ID2 billion, up from about 
ID300 million in 1968 and up more than 50 percent from the start 
of the Iran-Iraq War. The total value of industrial input in 1984 
was ID981 million, so value added was in excess of 100 percent. 
Productivity relative to investment, however, remained low. 

Because of revenues from oil exports, the government believed 
it could afford to pursue an ambitious and expensive policy of 



146 



Students learning foundry (tool and dye) skills 
at a technical instruction center 
Courtesy United Nations 

import substitution industrialization that would move the economy 
away from dependence on oil exports to obtain foreign exchange. 
In the early 1970s, Iraq made capital investments in large-scale 
industrial facilities such as steel plants. Many of the facilities were 
purchased from foreign contractors and builders on a turnkey basis. 
But Iraq neglected development of the next stage in the industrial 
process, the transformation of processed raw materials into inter- 
mediate products, such as construction girders, iron pipes, and steel 
parts. These bottlenecks in turn hampered the development of more 
sophisticated industries, such as machinery manufacture. Plant con- 
struction also outpaced infrastructure development. Many plants, 
for example, were inadequately linked by road or rail to outlets. 
Excess capacity remained a problem, as the large industrial plants 
continued to strain the economy's ability to absorb new goods. In 
an attempt to overcome these problems, Iraq imported the finished 
products and materials it required, defeating the purpose of its 
import substitution industrialization strategy and making the large 
extractive industries somewhat redundant. Imports of various basic 
commodities, such as plastics and chemicals, doubled and tripled 
in the 1970s. Most imports were consumed rather than used as 
intermediate components in industry; when imports were used as 
industrial inputs, value added tended to be low. Concurrently, 



147 



Iraq: A Country Study 

tariffs and other trade barriers erected to protect domestic infant 
industry from foreign competition impeded the importation of cer- 
tain vital materials, particularly spare parts and machinery. The 
growth of small-scale industries in the private sector and the rise 
in the standard of living in general were inhibited by such restric- 
tions. Subsidized by oil revenues, the industrialization strategy 
yielded growth, but only at great cost. 

In the late 1980s, the cumulative fiscal effects of the war with 
Iran forced Iraq to reverse priorities and to focus on the export 
side of the trade equation. Although the government previously 
had attempted to diversify the economy in order to minimize 
dependence on natural resources, it was now forced to concentrate 
on generating export income from extractive industry, in which 
it had a comparative advantage, rather than on producing more 
sophisticated manufactured goods. At the same time, in conjunc- 
tion with its gradual move toward privatization, the government 
ceded greater responsibility to the private sector for the manufac- 
ture of light consumer items as import substitutes. In 1983 legisla- 
tion exempted the private sector from customs duties and from 
excise taxes on imported spare parts and on machinery needed to 
build factories. The private sector was also given tax exemptions 
for capital investment and for research and development spend- 
ing. Finally, the replacement of sole proprietorships by joint stock 
companies was encouraged as a means of tapping more private 
investment. In a 1987 reorganization, the Ministry of Light Indus- 
tries was renamed the Ministry of Industry, and the Ministry of 
Industry and Minerals was renamed the Ministry of Heavy Indus- 
try. New ministers were appointed and were charged with improv- 
ing both the the quality and quantity of industrial output; large 
parts of the state bureaucracy that had controlled industry were 
abolished. 

According to official Iraqi figures, the total industrial labor force 
in 1984 consisted of about 170,000 workers. State-operated facto- 
ries employed slightly more than 80 percent of these workers, while 
13 percent worked in the private sector. The remaining 7 percent 
worked in the mixed economy, which consisted of factories oper- 
ated jointly by the state — which held a major share of the com- 
mon stock — and the private sector. Men constituted 87 percent of 
the industrial work force. According to the Iraqi government, in 
1984 there were 782 industrial establishments, ranging in size from 
small workshops employing 30 workers to large factories with more 
than 1,000 employees. Of these, 67 percent were privately owned. 
The private sector owned two-thirds of the factories, but employed 
only 13 percent of the industrial labor force. Privately owned 



148 



The Economy 



industrial establishments were, therefore, relatively numerous, but 
they were also relatively small and more capital-intensive. Only 
three privately owned factories employed more than 250 workers; 
the great majority employed fewer than 100 people each. Private- 
sector plant ownership tended to be dispersed throughout indus- 
try and was not concentrated in any special trade, with the excep- 
tion of the production of metal items such as tools and utensils. 

Although the private sector accounted for 40 percent of produc- 
tion in this area, the metal items sector itself constituted no more 
than a cottage industry. Figures published by the Iraqi Federation 
of Industries claimed that the private sector dominated the con- 
struction industry if measurement were based not on the number 
of employees or on the value of output, but on the amount of capi- 
tal investment. In 1981, such private-sector capital investment in 
the construction industry was 57 percent of total investment. By 
this alternative measurement, private sector involvement in the tex- 
tile and the food processing industries was above average. In con- 
trast, about forty- six state-owned factories employed more than 
1,000 workers apiece, and several industrial sectors, such as min- 
ing and steel production, were entirely state dominated. 

In 1984 Iraq's top industry, as measured by the number of 
employees, was the nonmetallic mineral industry, which employed 
18 percent of industrial workers and accounted for 14 percent of 
the value of total industrial output. The nonmetallic mineral indus- 
try was based primarily on extracting and processing sulfur and 
phosphate rock, although manufacturing of construction materi- 
als, such as glass and brick, was also included in this category. 
Production of sulfur and of sulfuric acid was a priority because much 
of the output was exported; phosphates were likewise important 
because they were used in fertilizer production. Mining of sulfur 
began at Mishraq, near Mosul, in 1972; production capacity was 
1.25 million tons per year by 1988. With the help of Japan, Iraq 
in the late 1980s was augmenting the Mishraq sulfur works with 
the intent of boosting sulfur exports 30 percent from their 1987 
level of 500,000 tons per year and of increasing exports of sulfuric 
acid by 10,000 tons annually. Iraq was also attempting to increase 
the rate of sulfur recovery from oil from its 1987 level of 90 per- 
cent (see fig. 9). 

Phosphate rock reserves were located mainly in the Akashat area 
northwest of Baghdad and were estimated in 1987 at 5.5 billion 
tons — enough to meet local needs for centuries. A fertilizer plant 
at Al Qaim, linked by rail to the Akashat mine, started produc- 
tion in 1984; it was soon converting 3.4 million tons of phosphate 
per year into fertilizer. As the Al Qaim operation came onstream, 



149 



Iraq: A Country Study 




Boundary representation 
nor necessarily authoritative 

39 

j 

L 



Figure 9. Economic Activity, 1988 



Iraq became self-sufficient in fertilizer, and three-quarters of the 
plant's output was exported. Iranian attacks on Iraqi fertilizer plants 
in the Basra area, however, cut Iraq's surplus. In 1986 Iraq obtained 



150 



The Economy 



Lake Urmia 



Caspian^ Sea 



. International boundary g Light industry 

® National capital £J Steel 



Electric power 
Q[ Fertilizer plant 
Food processing 
Cement 



m Textile mill 
"J* Dates 

S Sulfur 

P Phosphate 



Principal agricultural areas 



25 50 100 Kilometers 
I 1 — H 1 — 1 . 

50 100 



IRAQ- "\ 
SAUDI ARABIA \ 4 8 
NEUTRAL ZONE V.. 




(Persian QuCf 




a US$10 million loan from the Islamic Development Bank to import 
urea fertilizer, and in 1987 Iraq continued to import fertilizer as 
an emergency measure. Meanwhile, additional fertilizer plants were 



151 



Iraq: A Country Study 

under construction in 1987 at Shuwairah, near Mosul, and at Baiji. 
Their completion would bring to five the number of Iraqi fertilizer 
plants and would increase exports considerably. 

Another important component of the mineral sector was cement 
production. Iraq's 1987 cement production capacity was 12 mil- 
lion tons, and the government planned a near doubling of produc- 
tion. Domestic consumption in 1986 was 7.5 million tons, and the 
surplus was exported, 1 million tons to Egypt alone. 

In addition to the nonmetallic minerals industry, several other 
industries employed significant percentages of the work force. The 
chemical and petrochemical industry, concentrated at Khawr az 
Zubayr, was the second largest industrial employer, providing work 
for 17 percent of the industrial work force. Chemicals and petro- 
chemicals accounted for a relatively high 30 percent of the total 
value of industrial output because of the high value of raw material 
inputs and the higher value added — more than 150 percent. The 
labor-intensive textile industry employed 15 percent of industrial 
workers but accounted for only 7 percent of the value of total indus- 
trial output. A major state-owned textile factory in Mosul produced 
calico from locally grown cotton. The foodstuffs processing and 
packaging industry, which employed 14 percent of the total indus- 
trial labor force, accounted for 20 percent of total output, but the 
value added was less than 50 percent. Light manufacturing indus- 
tries based on natural resources, such as paper, cigarettes, and 
leather and shoe production, together accounted for 10 percent of 
the value of total industrial output. 

By the mid-1980s, efforts to upgrade industrial capacity from 
the extracting and processing of natural resources to heavy indus- 
try, to the manufacturing of higher technology and to the produc- 
tion of consumer items were still not fully successful. An iron and 
steel works built in 1978 by the French company, Creusot-Loire, 
at Khawr az Zubayr, was expected to attain an annual production 
level of 1.2 million tons of smelted iron ore and 400,000 tons of 
steel. Other smelters, foundries, and form works were under con- 
struction in 1988. (In 1984 this sector of the economy accounted 
for less than 2 percent of total output.) Manufacture of machinery 
and transport equipment accounted for only 6 percent of output 
value, and value added was fairly low, suggesting that Iraq was 
assembling imported intermediate components to make finished 
products. A single factory established in the 1980s with Soviet 
assistance and located at Al Musayyib, produced tractors. In 1981, 
Iraq contracted with a company from the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many (West Germay) to develop the domestic capability to produce 
motor vehicles. Plans called for production of 120,000 passenger 



152 



The Economy 



cars and 25,000 trucks per year, but the project's US$5 billion cost 
led to indefinite delays. 

By the late 1980s, Iraq had had some success in establishing light 
industries to produce items such as spark plugs, batteries, locks, 
and household appliances. The electronics industry, concentrated 
in Baghdad, had grown to account for about 6 percent of output 
with the help of Thompson-CSF (that is, Compagnie sans fil) of 
France and the Soviet Union. Other more advanced industries just 
starting to develop in Iraq in the late 1980s were pharmaceuticals 
and plastics. 

Agriculture 

Since the beginning of recorded time, agriculture has been the 
primary economic activity of the people of Iraq. In 1976, agricul- 
ture contributed about 8 percent of Iraq's total GDP, and it 
employed more than half the total labor force. In 1986, despite a 
ten-year Iraqi investment in agricultural development that totaled 
more than US$4 billion, the sector still accounted for only 7.5 per- 
cent of total GDP, a figure that was predicted to decline. In 1986 
agriculture continued to employ a significant portion — about 
30 percent — of Iraq's total labor force. Part of the reason the agri- 
cultural share of GDP remained small was that the sector was over- 
whelmed by expansion of the oil sector, which boosted total GDP. 

Large year-to-year fluctuations in Iraqi harvests, caused by varia- 
bility in the amount of rainfall, made estimates of average produc- 
tion problematic, but statistics indicated that the production levels 
for key grain crops remained approximately stable from the 1960s 
through the 1980s, with yield increasing while total cultivated area 
declined. Increasing Iraqi food imports were indicative of agricul- 
tural stagnation. In the late 1950s, Iraq was self-sufficient in agricul- 
tural production, but in the 1960s it imported about 15 percent 
of its food supplies, and by the 1970s it imported about 33 percent 
of its food. By the early 1980s, food imports accounted for about 
15 percent of total imports, and in 1984, according to Iraqi statis- 
tics, food imports comprised about 22 percent of total imports. 
Many experts expressed the opinion that Iraq had the potential 
for substantial agricultural growth, but restrictions on water sup- 
plies, caused by Syrian and Turkish dam building on the Tigris 
and Euphrates rivers, might limit this expansion. 

Water Resources 

Iraq has more water than most Middle Eastern nations, which 
led to the establishment of one of the world's earliest and 
most advanced civilizations. Strong, centralized governments — a 



153 



Iraq: A Country Study 

phenomenon known as "hydraulic despotism" — emerged because 
of the need for organization and for technology in order to exploit 
the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Archaeologists believe that the high 
point in the development of the irrigation system occurred about 
500 A.D., when a network of irrigation canals permitted widespread 
cultivation that made the river basin into a regional granary (see 
Ancient Mesopotamia, ch. 1). Having been poorly maintained, 
the irrigation and drainage canals had deteriorated badly by the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when the Mongols destroyed what 
remained of the system (see The Mongol Invasion, ch. 1). 

About one-fifth of Iraq's territory consists of farmland. About 
half of this total cultivated area is in the northeastern plains and 
mountain valleys, where sufficient rain falls to sustain agriculture. 
The remainder of the cultivated land is in the valleys of the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers, which receive scant rainfall and rely 
instead on water from the rivers. Both rivers are fed by snowpack 
and rainfall in eastern Turkey and in northwest Iran. The rivers' 
discharge peaks in March and in May, too late for winter crops 
and too early for summer crops. The flow of the rivers varies con- 
siderably every year. Destructive flooding, particularly of the Tigris, 
is not uncommon, and some scholars have placed numerous great 
flood legends, including the biblical story of Noah and the ark, in 
this area. Conversely, years of low flow make irrigation and agricul- 
ture difficult. 

Not until the twentieth century did Iraq make a concerted effort 
to restore its irrigation and drainage network and to control seasonal 
flooding. Various regimes constructed several large dams and river 
control projects, rehabilitated old canals, and built new irrigation 
systems. Barrages were constructed on both the Tigris and the 
Euphrates to channel water into natural depressions so that floods 
could be controlled. It was also hoped that the water could be used 
for irrigation after the rivers peaked in the spring, but the combi- 
nation of high evaporation from the reservoirs and the absorption 
of salt residues in the depressions made some of the water too brack- 
ish for agricultural use. Some dams that created large reservoirs 
were built in the valleys of tributaries of the Tigris, a measure that 
diminished spring flooding and evened out the supply of water over 
the cropping season. When the Euphrates was flowing at an excep- 
tionally low level in 1984, the government was able to release water 
stored in reservoirs to sustain farmers. 

In 1988 barrages or dam reservoirs existed at Samarra, Dukan, 
Darband, and Khan on the Tigris and Habbaniyah on the 
Euphrates. Two new dams on the Tigris at Mosul and Al Hadithah, 
named respectively the Saddam and Al Qadisiyah, were on the 



154 




Irrigation canal south of Baghdad 
Courtesy Ronald L. Kuipers 

verge of completion in 1988. Furthermore, a Chinese-Brazilian joint 
venture was constructing a US$2 billion dam on the Great Zab 
River, a Tigris tributary in northeastern Iraq. Additional dams 
were planned for Badush and Fathah, both on the Tigris. In 
Hindiyah on the Euphrates and in Ash Shinafiyah on the Euphrates, 
Chinese contractors were building a series of barrages. 

Geographic factors contributed to Iraq's water problems. Like 
all rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates carry large amounts of silt 
downstream. This silt is deposited in river channels, in canals, and 
on the flood plains. In Iraq, the soil has a high saline content. As 
the water table rises through flooding or through irrigation, salt 
rises into the topsoil, rendering agricultural land sterile. In addi- 
tion, the alluvial silt is highly saline. Drainage thus becomes very 
important; however, Iraq's terrain is very flat. Baghdad, for 
example, although 550 kilometers from the Persian Gulf, is only 
34 meters above sea level. This slight gradient makes the plains 
susceptible to flooding and, although it facilitates irrigation, it also 
hampers drainage. The flat terrain also provides relatively few sites 
for dams. Most important, Iraq lies downstream from both Syria 
and Turkey on the Euphrates River and downstream from Tur- 
key on the Tigris River. In the early 1970s, both Syria and Tur- 
key completed large dams on the Euphrates and filled vast 
reservoirs. Iraqi officials protested the sharp decrease in the river's 



155 



Iraq: A Country Study 



flow, claiming that irrigated areas along the Euphrates in Iraq 
dropped from 136,000 hectares to 10,000 hectares from 1974 to 
1975. 

Despite cordial relations between Iraq and Turkey in the late 
1980s, the issue of water allocation continued to cause friction 
between the two governments. In 1986 Turkey completed tunnels 
to divert an estimated one-fifth of the water from the Euphrates 
into the Atatiirk Dam reservoir. The Turkish government reassured 
Iraq that in the long run downstream flows would revert to normal. 
Iraqi protests were muted, because Iraq did not yet exploit 
Euphrates River water fully for irrigation, and the government did 
not wish to complicate its relationship with Turkey in the midst 
of the Iran-Iraq War. 

Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform 

Iraq's system of land tenure and inefficient government imple- 
mentation of land reform contributed to the low productivity of 
farmers and the slow growth of the agricultural sector. Land rights 
had evolved over many centuries, incorporating laws of many cul- 
tures and countries. The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 attempted 
to impose order by establishing categories of land and by requir- 
ing surveys and the registration of land holdings. By World War 
I, only limited registration had been accomplished and land titles 
were insecure, particularly under the system of tribal tenure through 
which the state retained ownership of the land although tribes used 
it. 

By the early 1930s, large landowners became more interested 
in secure titles because a period of agricultural expansion was under 
way. In the north, urban merchants were investing in land develop- 
ment, and in the south tribes were installing pumps and were other- 
wise improving land (see Rural Society, ch. 2). In response, the 
government promulgated a law in 1932 empowering it to settle title 
to land and to speed up the registration of titles. Under the law, 
a number of tribal leaders and village headmen were granted title 
to the land that had been worked by their communities. The effect, 
perhaps unintended, was to replace the semicommunal system with 
a system of ownership that increased the number of sharecroppers 
and tenants dramatically. A 1933 law provided that a sharecropper 
could not leave if he were indebted to the landowner. Because land- 
owners were usually the sole source of credit and almost no 
sharecropper was free of debt, the law effectively bound many 
tenants to the land. 

The land tenure system under the Ottomans, and as modified 
by subsequent Iraqi governments, provided little incentive to 



156 



The Economy 



improve productivity. Most farming was conducted by sharecrop- 
pers and tenants who received only a portion — often only a small 
proportion — of the crop. Any increase in production favored owners 
disproportionately, which served as a disincentive to farmers to 
produce at more than subsistence level. For their part, absentee 
owners preferred to spend their money in acquiring more land, 
rather than to invest in improving the land they had already 
accumulated. 

On the eve of the 1958 revolution, more than two-thirds of Iraq's 
cultivated land was concentrated in 2 percent of the holdings, while 
at the other extreme, 86 percent of the holdings covered less than 
10 percent of the cultivated land. The prerevolutionary govern- 
ment was aware of the inequalities in the countryside and of the 
poor condition of most tenant farmers, but landlords constituted 
a strong political force during the monarchical era, and they were 
able to frustrate remedial legislation. 

Because the promise of land reform kindled part of the popular 
enthusiasm for the 1958 revolution and because the powerful land- 
lords posed a potential threat to the new regime, agrarian reform 
was high on the agenda of the new government, which started the 
process of land reform within three months of taking power. The 
1958 law, modeled after Egypt's law, limited the maximum amount 
of land an individual owner could retain to 1,000 dunums (100 
hectares) of irrigated land or twice that amount of rain-fed land. 
Holdings above the maximum were expropriated by the govern- 
ment. Compensation was to be paid in state bonds, but in 1969 
the government absolved itself of all responsibility to recompense 
owners. The law provided for the expropriation of 75 percent of 
all privately owned arable land. 

The expropriated land, in parcels of between seven and fifteen 
hectares of irrigated land or double that amount of rain-fed land, 
was to be distributed to individuals. The recipient was to repay 
the government over a twenty-year period, and he was required 
to join a cooperative. The law also had temporary provisions main- 
taining the sharecropping system in the interim between expropria- 
tion and redistribution of the land. Landlords were required to 
continue the management of the land and to supply customary 
inputs to maintain production, but their share of the crop was 
reduced considerably. This provision grew in importance as land 
became expropriated much more rapidly than it was being distrib- 
uted. By 1968, 10 years after agrarian reform was instituted, 
1.7 million hectares had been expropriated, but fewer than 440,000 
hectares of sequestered land had been distributed. A total of 645,000 
hectares had been allocated to nearly 55,000 families, however, 



157 



Iraq: A Country Study 

because several hundred thousand hectares of government land were 
included in the distribution. 

The situation in the countryside became chaotic because the 
government lacked the personnel, funds, and expertise to supply 
credit, seed, pumps, and marketing services — functions that had 
previously been performed by landlords. Landlords tended to cut 
their production, and even the best-intentioned landlords found 
it difficult to act as they had before the land reform because of hostil- 
ity on all sides. Moreover, the farmers had little interest in coopera- 
tives and joined them slowly and unwillingly. Rural-to-urban 
migration increased as agricultural production stagnated, and a 
prolonged drought coincided with these upheavals. Agricultural 
production fell steeply in the 1960s and never recovered fully. 

In the 1970s, agrarian reform was carried further. Legislation 
in 1970 reduced the maximum size of holdings to between 10 and 
150 hectares of irrigated land (depending on the type of land and 
crop) and to between 250 and 500 hectares of nonirrigated land. 
Holdings above the maximum were expropriated with compensa- 
tion only for actual improvements such as buildings, pumps, and 
trees. The government also reserved the right of eminent domain 
in regard to lowering the holding ceiling and to dispossessing new 
or old landholders for a variety of reasons. In 1975 an additional 
reform law was enacted to break up the large estates of Kurdish 
tribal landowners. Additional expropriations such as these exacer- 
bated the government's land management problems. Although Iraq 
claimed to have distributed nearly 2 million hectares by the late 
1970s, independent observers regarded this figure as greatly exag- 
gerated. The government continued to hold a large proportion of 
arable land, which, because it was not distributed, often lay fallow. 
Rural flight increased, and by the late 1970s, farm labor shortages 
had become so acute that Egyptian farmers were being invited into 
the country. 

The original purpose of the land reform had been to break up 
the large estates and to establish many small owner-operated farms, 
but fragmentation of the farms made extensive mechanization and 
economies of scale difficult to achieve, despite the expansion of the 
cooperative system. Therefore, in the 1970s, the government turned 
to collectivization as a solution. By 1981 Iraq had established twenty- 
eight collective state farms that employed 1,346 people and culti- 
vated about 180,000 hectares. In the 1980s, however, the govern- 
ment expressed disappointment at the slow pace of agricultural 
development, conceding that collectivized state farms were not 
profitable. In 1983 the government enacted a new law encourag- 
ing both local and foreign Arab companies or individuals to lease 



158 



The Economy 



larger plots of land from the government. By 1984, more than 1 ,000 
leases had been granted. As a further incentive to productivity, 
the government instituted a profit-sharing plan at state collective 
farms. By 1987, the wheel appeared to have turned full circle when 
the government announced plans to reprivatize agriculture by leas- 
ing or selling state farms to the private sector. 

Cropping and Livestock 

Most farming in Iraq entails planting and harvesting a single 
crop per year. In the rain- fed areas the winter crop, primarily grain, 
is planted in the fall and harvested in the spring. In the irrigated 
areas of central and southern Iraq, summer crops predominate. 
A little multiple cropping, usually of vegetables, exists where irri- 
gation water is available over more than a single season. 

Even with some double or triple cropping, the intensity of culti- 
vation is usually on the order of 50 percent because of the practice 
of leaving about half the arable land fallow each year. In the rain-fed 
region, land is left fallow so that it can accumulate moisture. The 
fertility of fallow land is also increased by plowing under weeds 
and other plant material that grow during the fallow period. On 
irrigated land, fallow periods also contribute some humus to the soil. 

Grain, primarily wheat and barley, was Iraq's most important 
crop. Cereal production increased almost 80 percent between 1975 
and 1985, notwithstanding wide variations in the harvest from year 
to year as the amount and the timing of rainfall strongly affected 
both the area planted and the harvest. Between 1980 and 1985, 
the area under wheat cultivation increased steadily for a cumula- 
tive growth of 30 percent, to about 1,566,500 hectares. In 1985, 
the most recent year for which statistics were available in 1988, 
Iraq harvested a bumper crop of 1 .4 million tons of wheat. In 1984, 
a drought year, Iraq harvested less than half the planted area for 
a yield of between 250,000 and 471,000 tons, according to foreign 
and Iraqi sources respectively. The north and central rain-fed areas 
were the principal wheat producers (see table 7, Appendix). 

Barley requires less water than wheat does, and it is more toler- 
ant of salinity in the soil. For these reasons, Iraq started to substi- 
tute barley production for wheat production in the 1970s, 
particularly in southern regions troubled by soil salinity. Between 
1980 and 1985, the total area under barley cultivation grew 44 per- 
cent, and by 1985 barley and wheat production were virtually equal 
in terms both of area cultivated and of total yield. Rice, grown 
in paddies, was Iraq's third most important crop as measured by 
cultivated area, which in 1985 amounted to 24,500 hectares. The 
area under cultivation, however, did not grow appreciably between 



159 



Iraq: A Country Study 

1980 and 1985; 1985 production totaled almost 150,000 tons. Iraq 
also produced maize, millet, and oil seeds in smaller quantities. 

A number of other crops were grown, but acreage and produc- 
tion were limited. With the exception of tobacco, of which Iraq 
produced 17,000 tons on 16,500 hectares in 1985, cash crop produc- 
tion declined steeply in the 1980s. Probably because of domestic 
competition from synthetic imports and a declining export mar- 
ket, production of cotton was only 7,200 tons in 1985, compared 
with 26,000 tons in 1977. Production of sugar beets was halted com- 
pletely in 1983, and sugarcane production declined by more than 
half between 1980 and 1985. 

Iraq may have cut back on production of sugar beets and sugar- 
cane because of an intention to produce sugar from dates. Dates, 
of which Iraq produces eight distinct varieties, have long been a 
staple of the local diet. The most abundant date groves were found 
along the Shatt al Arab. In the early 1960s, more than 30 million 
date palms existed. In the mid-1970s, the Iraqi government esti- 
mated that the number of date palms had declined to about 22 mil- 
lion, at which time production of dates amounted to 578,000 tons. 
The devastation of the Shatt al Arab area during the Iran-Iraq War 
hastened the destruction of date palm groves, and in 1985 the 
government estimated the number of date palms at fewer than 
13 million. Date production in 1987 dropped to 220,000 tons. The 
government-managed Iraqi Date Administration, however, planned 
to increase production in an attempt to boost export revenue. In 
1987 about 150,000 tons, or 68 percent of the harvest, was exported, 
primarily to Western Europe, Japan, India, and other Arab coun- 
tries. The Iraqi Date Administration also devised plans to construct 
large facilities to extract sugar, alcohol, vinegar, and concentrated 
protein meal from dates. Iraq produced a variety of other fruits 
as well, including melons, grapes, apples, apricots, and citrus. 
Production of such fruits increased almost 30 percent between 1975 
and 1985. 

Vegetable production also increased, particularly near urban 
centers, where a comparatively sophisticated marketing system had 
been developed. Vegetable gardening usually employed relatively 
modern techniques, including the use of chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides. Tomatoes were the most important crop, with produc- 
tion amounting to more than 600,000 tons in 1985. Other vegeta- 
bles produced in significant quantity were beans, eggplant, okra, 
cucumbers, and onions. Overall vegetable production increased 
almost 90 percent between 1975 and 1985, even though the produc- 
tion of legumes dropped about 25 percent over the same period. 



160 



Date palms along the Tigris River near Baghdad 
Courtesy Matson Collection 



161 



Iraq: A Country Study 

Crop production accounted for about two-thirds of value added 
in the agricultural sector in the late 1980s, and the raising of 
livestock contributed about one-third. In the past, a substantial part 
of the rural population had been nomadic, moving animals between 
seasonal grazing areas. Sheep and goats were the most important 
livestock, supplying meat, wool, milk, skins, and hair. A 1978 
government survey, which represented the most recent official data 
available as of early 1988, estimated the sheep population at 9.7mil- 
lion and the goat population at 2.1 million. Sheep and goats were 
tended primarily by nomadic and seminomadic groups. The 1978 
survey estimated the number of cattle at 1.7 million, the number 
of water buffalo at 170,000, the number of horses at 53,000, and 
the number of camels at 70,000. 

In the 1970s, the government started to emphasize livestock and 
fish production, in an effort to add protein to the national diet. 
But 1985's red meat production (about 93,000 tons) and milk 
production (375,000 tons) were, respectively, about 24 and 23 per- 
cent less than the in 1975 totals, although other figures indicated 
that total livestock production remained stable between 1976 and 
1985. In the mid-1980s, however, British, West German, and Hun- 
garian companies were given contracts to establish poultry farms. 
At the same time, the government expanded aquaculture and deep- 
sea fishing. Total production of processed chicken and fish almost 
doubled, to about 20,000 tons apiece, from 1981 to 1985, while 
egg production increased substantially, to more than 1 billion per 
year. The government planned to construct a US$160 million deep- 
sea fishing facility in Basra and predicted that, within 10 years, 
freshwater fishing would supply up to 100,000 tons of fish. Iraq 
nevertheless continued to import substantial quantities of frozen 
poultry, meat, and fish to meet local needs for protein. 

Transportation 

Transportation was one of the Iraqi economy's most active sec- 
tors in the late 1980s; it was allocated a large share of the domestic 
development budget because it was important to the government 
for several reasons. Logistics became a crucial factor in Iraq's con- 
duct of the Iran-Iraq War. The government also recognized that 
transportation bottlenecks limited industrial development more than 
any other factor. Finally, the government believed that an expanded 
transportation system played an important political role by promot- 
ing regional integration and by heightening the central govern- 
ment's presence in the more remote provinces. For these reasons, 
the government embarked on an ambitious plan to upgrade and 
to extend road, rail, air, and river transport simultaneously. Iraq's 



162 



The Economy 



main transportation axis ran roughly northwest to southeast from 
Mosul via Kirkuk to Baghdad, and then south to Basra and the 
Gulf. In the 1980s, efforts were underway to link Baghdad more 
closely with the Euphrates River basin to the west (see fig. 10). 

Roads 

The total length of Iraq's network of paved roads almost dou- 
bled between 1979 and 1985, to 22,397 kilometers, augmented by 
an additional 7,800 kilometers of unpaved secondary and feeder 
roads. In 1987 Iraq's major road project was a 1 ,000-kilometer- 
long segment of a six-lane international express highway that would 
eventually link the Persian Gulf states with the Mediterranean. In 
Iraq, the road would stretch from the Jordanian border through 
Ar Rutbah to Tulayah near An Najaf, then to the southern Iraqi 
town of Ash Shaykh ash Shuyukh, and finally to the Kuwaiti border 
at Safwan. Construction was under way in the late 1980s. Plans 
were also being made for another highway, which would link Bagh- 
dad with the Turkish border via Kirkuk and Mosul. There was 
progress as well on a program to build 10,000 kilometers of rural 
roads. 

Railroads 

Iraq possessed two separate railroads at independence, one stan- 
dard gauge and one meter gauge. The standard gauge line ran north 
from Baghdad through Mosul to the Syrian border and to an even- 
tual connection with the Turkish railroad system, and the meter 
gauge line ran south from Baghdad to Basra. Because the two sys- 
tems were incompatible, until the 1960s cargo had to be transloaded 
at Baghdad to be transported between the two halves of the coun- 
try. The Soviet Union helped extend the standard gauge system 
to Basra, and by 1977 fully 1,129 kilometers of Iraq's 1,589 kilo- 
meters of railroad were standard gauge. By 1985 the total length 
of railroad lines had been extended to 2,029 kilometers, of which 
1,496 kilometers were standard gauge. In 1985 the railroads were 
being traveled by 440 standard- gauge locomotives that moved 1 .25 
billion tons of freight per kilometer. A 252-kilometer line linking 
Kirkuk and Al Hadithah was completed by contractors from the 
Republic of Korea (South Korea) in 1987 after five years of work. 
Built at a cost of US$855 million, the line was designed to carry 
more than 1 million passengers and more than 3 million tons of 
freight annually. The system included maintenance and control 
centers and more than thirty bridges crossing the Tigris and 
Euphrates rivers. By the end of the century, Iraq planned to triple 
the line's passenger capacity and to double its freight capacity. 



163 



Iraq: A Country Study 





I ^ I I 

Figure 10. Transportation System, 1988 

A 550-kilometer line, built by a Brazilian company and extending 
from Baghdad to Qusaybah on the Syrian border, was also opened 
in the same year. In 1987 Indian contractors were finishing work 



164 



The Economy 




on a line between Al Musayyib and Samarra. Iraqi plans also called 
for replacing the entire stretch of railroad between Mosul and Basra 
with modern, high-speed track, feeding all lines entering Baghdad 



165 



Iraq: A Country Study 

into a 1 12-kilometer loop around the city, and improving bridges, 
freight terminals, and passenger stations. In addition, Iraq has con- 
ducted intermittent negotiations over the years with Turkey, 
Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia concerning the establishment of rail links 
to complete a continuous Europe-Persian Gulf railroad route. 

Ports 

At independence, Iraq had little port capacity, a fact that reflected 
the low level of foreign trade and the country's traditional over- 
land orientation toward Syria and Turkey rather than toward the 
Gulf. Since then, the Gulf port of Basra has been expanded many 
times, and a newer port was built at Umm Qasr to relieve pres- 
sure on Basra. Oil terminals were located at Khawr al Amayah, 
and Mina al Bakr, Al Faw, and a port was built in tandem with 
an industrial center at Khawr az Zubayr. Because Iraq's access 
to the Gulf was an Iranian target in the Iran-Iraq War, port 
activities were curtailed severely in the 1980s. Before shipping can 
be resumed after the war, the Shatt al Arab will have to be cleared 
of explosives and wreckage, which will take years. 

Despite long-standing government interest in developing the 
Tigris and the Euphrates rivers into major arteries for inland trans- 
port, little had been accomplished by the late 1980s, primarily 
because of the massive scale of such a project. Dredging and the 
establishment of navigation channels had been completed on several 
stretches of the Tigris south of Baghdad, and in 1987 a river freight 
route using barges was opened between Baghdad and Al Amarah. 
Iraq investigated the possibility of opening the entire Tigris River 
between Mosul and Baghdad, as well as the feasibility of opening 
a stretch of the Euphrates between Al Hadithah and Al Qurnah, 
but lack of funds precluded further action. 

Airports 

In 1988 Iraq had two international airports, one at Baghdad and 
one at Basra. In 1979 a French consortium was awarded a US$900 
million contract to build a new international airport at Baghdad. 
By 1987 the facility was partially completed and in use. The Basra 
airport was also being upgraded with an extended 4,000-meter run- 
way and other facilities at a cost in excess of US$400 million. A 
third international airport was planned for Mosul. 

The State Enterprise for Iraqi Airways was the sole domestic 
airline in operation in 1988. The company was established in 1945 
by Iraqi State Railways. In 1987, the airline's fleet included thirty- 
five Soviet-built Antonov and Ilyushin cargo planes and fourteen 
Boeing passenger jets, as well as smaller commuter aircraft and 



166 



The Economy 



VIP jets. The airline provided service throughout the Mediterra- 
nean, the Middle East, and Europe, as well as to Brazil and to 
the Far East. In 1987 Saddam Husayn announced a decree to 
privatize Iraqi Airways. Two new ventures were to be established 
instead: the Iraqi Aviation Company to operate commercially as 
the national airline, and the National Company for Aviation Ser- 
vices to provide aircraft and airport services. Stock would be sold 
to the public, and the government would retain a minority share. 

Telecommunications 

In 1988 Iraq had a good telecommunications network of radio 
communication stations, radio relay links, and coaxial cables. Iraqi 
radio and television stations came under the government's Iraqi 
Broadcasting and Television Establishment, which was responsi- 
ble to the Ministry of Culture and Information. The domestic ser- 
vice had one FM and nine AM stations with two program networks. 
The domestic service broadcast mainly in Arabic, but also in Kurd- 
ish, Turkoman, and Assyrian from Kirkuk. The short wave for- 
eign service broadcast in Arabic, Azeri Turkish, English, French, 
German, Hebrew, Kurdish, Persian, Russian, Spanish, and Urdu. 
Television stations were located in the major cities, and they car- 
ried two program networks. In 1988 Iraq had approximately 
972,000 television sets; the system was connected to both the 
Atlantic Ocean and Indian Ocean systems of the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) as well 
as to one Soviet Intersputnik satellite station. It also had coaxial 
cable and radio relays linking it to Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, and Tur- 
key. Iraq had an estimated 632,000 telephones in 1988. 

Electricity 

Iraqi electric power consumption increased by a factor of four- 
teen in the twenty-year period between 1968 and 1988, and in the 
late 1980s it was expected to double every four to five years. On- 
going rural electrification contributed to increased demand; about 
7,000 villages throughout the nation were provided electricity in 
the same twenty-year period. The destruction in 1980 of power- 
generating facilities near the Iran-Iraq border interrupted only tem- 
porarily the rapid growth in production and consumption. In 1981 
the government awarded US$2 billion in contracts to foreign con- 
struction companies that were building hydroelectric and thermal 
generating plants as well as transmission facilities. By 1983 the 
production and consumption of electricity had recovered to the 
prewar levels of 15.6 billion kwh (kilowatt hours) and 11.7 billion 
kwh, respectively. As previously commissioned projects continued 



167 



Iraq: A Country Study 

to come onstream, Iraq's generating capacity was expected to exceed 
6,000 megawatts by 1986. In December 1987, following the com- 
pletion of power lines designed to carry 400 million kwh of power 
to Turkey, Iraq became the first country in the Middle East to 
export electric power. Iraq was expected to earn US$15 million 
annually from this arrangement. Long-range plans entailed export- 
ing an additional 3 billion kwh to Turkey and eventually provid- 
ing Kuwait with electricity. 

Iraq's plans to develop a nuclear generating capacity were set 
back by Israel's June 1981 bombing of the Osiraq (Osiris-Iraq) 
reactor, then under construction (see The Search for Nuclear Tech- 
nology, ch. 5). In 1988 French, Italian, and Soviet technicians were 
exploring the feasibility of rebuilding the reactor at a different site. 
Saudi Arabia had promised to provide financing, and Brazil and 
Portugal reportedly had agreed to supply uranium. 

Foreign Trade 

The pattern of Iraqi foreign trade in the 1980s was shaped primar- 
ily by the Iran-Iraq War, its resulting deficit and debt problems, 
and developments in the petroleum sector. Iranian attacks on 
petroleum industry infrastructure reduced oil exports sharply and 
Iraq incurred a trade deficit of more than US$10 billion in 1981. 
The pattern continued in 1982 as the value of Iraqi imports peaked 
at approximately US$23.5 billion, while exports reached a nadir 
of US$11.6 billion, leading to a record trade deficit. In 1983, 
however, imports were cut roughly by half. Figures for Iraq's 
imports and exports from 1984 onward vary widely and cannot 
be considered authoritative. Despite the partial recovery of Iraqi 
oil exports in 1986, exports were valued at only about US$7.5 bil- 
lion because of the plunge in world oil prices (see Oil in the 1980s, 
this ch.). In 1987 imports were expected to rise to about US$10 
billion. Export revenues were also expected to rise, as Iraq com- 
pensated for low oil prices with a higher volume of oil exports (see 
table 8, Appendix). 

Iraq had counted heavily on solving its twin debt and deficit 
problems by reestablishing and eventually by augmenting its oil 
export capacity. But increases in volume were insufficient to off- 
set lower prices, and because demand remained low, expanded oil 
exports served only to glut the market and further drive down the 
price of oil. The depressed price of oil and the low prices of other 
raw materials that Iraq exported, coupled with higher prices for 
the goods it imported, trapped the nation in the classic dilemma 
of declining terms of trade. Although Iraq was cutting the volume 
of its imports and was increasing the volume of its exports, the 



168 



The Economy 



relative values of imports and exports had shifted fundamentally. 
More than 95 percent of Iraq's exports were raw materials, primar- 
ily petroleum. Foodstuffs accounted for most additional exports. 
Conversely, nearly half of Iraq's imports were capital goods and 
consumer durables. According to Iraqi statistics, 34.4 percent of 
1984 imports were capital goods, 30 percent were raw materials, 
22.4 percent were foodstuffs, and 12.5 percent were consumer 
items. 

Iraq's declining imports resulted not so much from belt-tightening 
or from import substitution, as from the increasing reluctance of 
trading partners to extend credit. Despite its socialist orientation, 
Iraq had long traded most heavily with Western Europe. Initially, 
Iraq's debt accumulation worked in its favor by creating a hostage 
effect. Western creditors, both governments and private compa- 
nies, continued to supply Iraq in an effort to sustain the country 
until it could repay them. Additionally, the debt helped to secure 
outlets for Iraqi petroleum in a tight international market through 
barter agreements in which oil was exchanged for a reduction in 
debt. In 1987, however, as some West European companies pre- 
pared to cut their losses and to withdraw from the Iraqi market, 
and as others curtailed sales by limiting credits, other countries 
were poised to fill the vacuum by offering goods and services on 
concessional terms. Companies from Brazil, South Korea, India, 
Yugoslavia, and Turkey, backed by their governments' export 
credit guarantees, were winning an increasing share of the Iraqi 
market. In 1987 the Soviet Union and East European nations were 
also offering goods and services on highly concessional terms. Even- 
tually, Iraq's exports might also be diverted from the West toward 
its new trading partners. 

Iraq continued to seek Western imports when it could afford 
them. In 1987 Iraq was forced to ration imports for which pay- 
ment was due in cash, although nonessential imports were pur- 
chased if the seller offered credit. Imports contributing to the war 
effort had top priority. Imports of spare parts and of management 
services for the maintenance of large industrial projects were also 
deemed vital, as Iraq sought to stave off the extremely high costs 
it would incur if facilities were shut down, mothballed, and then 
reopened in the future. Consumer goods were given lowest priority. 

In 1985 Iraq purchased 14.4 percent of its total imports from 
Japan. Iraq bought an array of Japanese products, ranging from 
transport equipment, machinery, and electrical appliances to basic 
materials such as iron and steel, textiles, and rubber goods. In 1987, 
as Iraqi debt to Japan mounted to US$3 billion, the government 
of Japan curtailed the export insurance it had offered Japanese 



169 



Iraq: A Country Study 

companies doing business with Iraq; nevertheless, Japanese com- 
panies continued to trade with Iraq. Iraq bought 9.2 percent of 
its imports from West Germany. Neighboring Turkey provided 
the third largest source of Iraqi imports, accounting for 8.2 percent 
of the total. Italy and France each accounted for about 7.5 percent, 
followed by Brazil with 7 percent and Britain with 6.3 percent. 
Kuwait was Iraq's most important Arab trading partner, contribut- 
ing 4.2 percent of Iraq's imports (see table 9, Appendix). 

In 1985 Brazil was the main destination of Iraqi exports, account- 
ing for 17.7 percent of the total. France was second with 13 percent, 
followed by Italy with 11 percent, Spain with 10.7 percent, Turkey 
and Yugoslavia with about 8 percent each, Japan with about 
6 percent, and the United States with 4.7 percent. 

In April 1987, the government attempted to streamline the trade 
bureaucracy by eliminating five state trading companies that dealt 
in various commodities. Although the state trading companies had 
been established in the 1970s to foster increased domestic produc- 
tion, they had evolved into importing organizations. In view of 
this orientation, their operations were incorporated into the Ministry 
of Trade. Three Ministry of Trade departments, which had admin- 
istered trade with socialist, with African, and with Arab nations, 
were abolished. The responsibilities of these disbanded organiza- 
tions were centralized in a new Ministry of Trade department 
named the General Establishment for Import and Export. 

The Ministry of Trade implemented a national import policy 
by allocating portions of a total budget among imports according 
to priority. The import budget varied from year to year, depend- 
ing on export earnings and on the amount in loans that had been 
secured from foreign creditors. The government's underlying inten- 
tion was gradually to replace imported manufactured products with 
domestic manufactured products and then to increase export sales. 
In the mid-1980s, however, the government recognized that 
increased domestic production required the import of intermedi- 
ate goods. In 1987 state companies were permitted for the first time 
to use private agents or middlemen to facilitate limited imports of 
necessary goods. 

The private sector, which had long been accorded a quota of 
total imports, was also deregulated to a limited extent. In 1985 the 
quota was increased to 7.5 percent of total imports, and the govern- 
ment gave consideration to increasing that percentage further. All 
imports by the private sector had previously been subject to govern- 
ment licensing. In 1985, Law No. 60 for Major Development 
Projects exempted the private sector from the obligation to obtain 
licenses to import basic construction materials that would be used 



170 



The Economy 



in major development projects. In an attempt to increase remit- 
tances from Iraqis abroad, the government also gave special import 
licenses to nonresident Iraqis, if the value of the imports was 
invested in Iraq and was not transferred outside the country. 

In 1987 the rules concerning private sector imports were liber- 
alized further when private sector manufacturers were granted spe- 
cial licenses that permitted them to import raw materials, spare 
parts, packaging, machinery, and equipment necessary for plant 
modernization and for expansion. In some cases no ceiling was 
placed on such imports, while in other cases imports were limited 
to 50 percent of the value of the export earnings that the manufac- 
turer generated. Such imports were not subject to quotas or to for- 
eign exchange restrictions. Moreover, the government announced 
that it would make no inquiry into the companies' sources of financ- 
ing. In a remarkably candid statement in a June 1987 speech, Sad- 
dam Husayn promised that citizens would not be asked where they 
had acquired their money, and he admitted that the private sector 
had not imported any goods because of its fear of prosecution by 
the security services for foreign exchange violations. 

While the government permitted more imports by the private 
sector, it nevertheless continued to promote exports at the same 
time. Starting in 1969 it maintained an Export Subsidy Fund, which 
underwrote the cost of eligible nonpetroleum exports by up to 
25 percent. The Export Subsidy Fund was financed with a tax of 
.5 percent levied on imports of capital goods and .75 percent levied 
on imports of consumer goods. Most imports were also charged 
both duty and a customs surcharge that varied from item to item. 
Export licenses were granted freely both to public and to private 
sector firms with only a few exceptions. The Board of Regulation 
of Trade had the authority to prohibit the export of any commodity 
when domestic supplies fell short of demand, and the control over 
export of certain items was reserved for the General Organization 
of Exports. The degree to which government economic policies 
would be liberalized in the late 1980s remained to be seen. The 
government had taken several steps in that direction but state con- 
trols continued to play a major role in the economy in 1988. 

* * * 

Both primary and secondary source information on the Iraqi 
economy tends to be scant and dated. The government of Iraq has 
regarded data on national economic performance as a state secret, 
particularly since the start of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. The 
government does not publish a budget, although it releases 



171 



Iraq: A Country Study 



a yearbook, the Annual Abstract of Statistics, which contains some 
economic figures. The Iran-Iraq War has also diverted scholarly 
attention from economic issues. One exception is Phebe Marr's 
The Modern History of Iraq, which contains a chapter titled "Eco- 
nomic and Social Changes under the Revolutionary Regime." The 
most detailed and authoritative periodic reports on the Iraqi econ- 
omy are produced by the Wharton Econometric Forecasting 
Associates in their semiannual Middle East Economic Outlook. The 
Economist Intelligence Unit's Country Report: Iraq, a quarterly, con- 
tains much useful information and analysis. Another good source 
of up-to-date information is the Middle East Economic Digest. (For 
further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



172 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 




Bas relief of a warrior from Nimrud, ca. end of the eighth century B. C. 



THE POLITICAL SYSTEM in 1988 was in what was officially 
characterized as a "transitional" phase. This description meant 
that the current method of rule by decree, which had been in effect 
since 1968, would continue until the goal of a socialist, democratic 
republic with Islam as the state religion was attained. The end of 
the transition period was to be marked by the formal enactment 
of a permanent constitution. The timing and the specific circum- 
stances that would terminate the transitional stage had not been 
specified as of early 1988. 

The country remained under the regime of the Baath (Arab 
Socialist Resurrection) Party, which had seized power through a 
coup d'etat in July 1968. The legality of government institutions 
and actions was based on the Provisional Constitution of July 16, 
1970, which embodied the basic principles of the Baath Party — 
Arab unity, freedom, and socialism. These principles were in turn 
rooted in the pan- Arab aspirations of the party, aspirations sanc- 
tified through identification with the historic right and destiny of 
all Arabs to unite under the single leadership of "the Arab Nation. ' ' 

The most powerful decision-making body in Iraq, the ten- 
member Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which func- 
tioned as the top executive and legislative organ of the state, was 
for all practical purposes an arm of the Baath Party. All members 
of the RCC were also members of the party's Regional Command, 
or state apparatus. President Saddam Husayn was both the chair- 
man of the RCC and the secretary general of the Baath' s Region- 
al Command. He was generally recognized as the most powerful 
political figure in the country. 

From its earliest days, the Baath Party was beset by personality 
clashes and by factional infighting. These problems were a primary 
cause of the failure of the first Baath attempt to govern Iraq in 1963. 
After the Baath returned to power in 1968, intraparty fissures were 
generally held in check, albeit not eliminated, by President Ahmad 
Hasan al Bakr. When Saddam Husayn succeeded to the presidency 
in 1979, he also commanded the loyalty of the major elements of 
the Baath. 

Saddam Husayn and other Baath leaders have always regarded 
the ability to balance endemic intraparty tensions — such as those 
between military and civilian elements and among personalities 
across boundaries of specialization — as the key to success in Bagh- 
dad. Above all, they perceived harmony in the military- civilian 



175 



Iraq: A Country Study 

coalition as pivotal. Although the Baath had begun recruiting within 
the Iraqi military as early as 1958, and within ten years military 
members constituted the backbone of the party's power, civilian 
Baath leaders maintained overall control of the party. 

Iraqi politics under the Baath regime were generally geared 
toward mobilizing support for the regime. Loyal opposition had 
no place, and it was not recognized as legitimate. The party lead- 
ers believed competitive politics ill-suited to Iraq, at least during 
the indefinite transitional period. They condemned partisan politi- 
cal activity, which they insisted had had damaging consequences 
on national unity and integration. The Baath also invoked Iraq's 
unhappy legacy of ethnic and regional cleavages as justification for 
harsh curbs on political rights. 

In 1988, twenty years after the Baath had come to power, it still 
was not possible to assess popular attitudes toward Saddam Husayn, 
toward the Baath Party, toward political institutions, or toward 
political issues because there had been insufficient field research 
in the country. Even though elections for a National Assembly had 
been held in 1980 and again in 1984, these had been carefully con- 
trolled by the government, and genuinely free elections had not 
been held for more than thirty years. Politicians or groups opposed 
to the principles of the 1968 Baath Revolution of July 17 to 30 were 
not permitted to operate openly. Those who aspired to be politi- 
cally active had few choices: they could join the highly selective 
Baath Party, remain dormant, go underground or into exile, or 
join the Baath-sponsored Progressive National Front (PNF). 

The PNF, which came into existence in 1974, was based on a 
national action charter that called for collaboration between the 
Baath and each of the other parties considered to be both progressive 
and nationalist. The PNF served as the only risk-free, non-Baath 
forum for political participation, although even this channel was 
denied to those whose loyalties to the regime were suspect. The 
Baath Party's objectives in establishing the front were to provide 
the semblance of broad popular support for the government as well 
as to provide the facade of alliance among the Baath and other par- 
ties. The Baath, however, held a dominant position within the front 
and therefore assumed sole responsibility for carrying out the 
decisions of the front's executive commission, which was composed 
of the Baath' s most important members and sympathizers. 

In early 1988, the war with Iran continued to preoccupy Sad- 
dam Husayn and his associates. Approximately 75,000 Iraqis had 
been killed in the war, and about 250,000 had been wounded; more 
than 50,000 Iraqis were being held as prisoners of war in Iran. 
Property damage was estimated in the tens of billions of dollars; 



176 



Government and Politics 



destruction was especially severe in the southern part of the coun- 
try (see Introduction). 

Constitutional Framework 

The Provisional Constitution of July 16, 1970, upon which Iraq's 
governmental system was based in 1988, proclaims Iraq to be "a 
sovereign people's democratic republic" dedicated to the ultimate 
realization of a single Arab state and to the establishment of a 
socialist system. Islam is declared to be the state religion, but free- 
dom of religion and of religious practices is guaranteed. Iraq is said 
to be formed of two principal nationalities, Arab and Kurd. A 
March 1974 amendment to the Constitution provides for autonomy 
for the Kurds in the region where they constitute a majority of the 
population. In this Autonomous Region (see Glossary) both Arabic 
and Kurdish are designated as official languages for administra- 
tive and educational purposes. The Constitution also prescribes, 
however, that the "national rights" of the Kurds as well as the 
"legitimate rights" of all minorities are to be exercised only within 
the framework of Iraqi unity, and the document stipulates that no 
part of Iraq can be relinquished. 

The Constitution sets forth two basic aims, the establishment 
of a socialist system based on "scientific and revolutionary princi- 
ples," and pan-Arab economic unity. The state is given an active 
role in "planning, directing, and guiding" the economy. National 
resources and the principal means of production are defined as "the 
property of the people" to be exploited by the state "directly in 
accordance with the requirements of the general planning of the 
national economy." The Constitution describes public properties 
and the properties of the public sector as inviolable. 

The Constitution classifies the ownership of property as "a social 
function that shall be exercised within the limits of society's aims 
and the state's programs in accordance with the provisions of the 
law"; nevertheless, the Constitution also guarantees private owner- 
ship and individual economic freedom "within the limits of the 
law, provided that individual ownership will not Contradict or be 
detrimental to general economic planning." The Constitution stipu- 
lates that private property may not be expropriated except for the 
public interest and then only with just compensation. The size of 
private agricultural land holdings is to be defined by law, and the 
excess is to be regarded as the property of the people. The Consti- 
tution also bars foreign ownership of real estate, although individu- 
als may be granted a legal exemption from this prohibition. 

Articles 19 through 36 of the Constitution spell out fundamen- 
tal rights and duties in detail. The right to fair trial through due 



177 



Iraq: A Country Study 



process, the inviolability of person and of residence, the privacy 
of correspondence, and the freedom to travel are guaranteed to 
all citizens. The Constitution also assures citizens of their right to 
religious freedom: to the freedom of speech, of publication, and 
of assembly: and to the freedom to form political parties, trade 
unions, and professional societies. The Constitution directs the state 
to eliminate illiteracy and to ensure the right of citizens to free edu- 
cation from elementary school through the university level. Accord- 
ing to Article 28. the aims of education include instilling opposition 
to "'the doctrines of capitalism, exploitation, reaction. Zionism, 
and colonialism" in order to ensure the achievement of the Baathist 
goals of Arab unity, freedom, and socialism. The Constitution also 
requires the state to provide every citizen with employment and 
with free medical care. 

The Constitution defines the powers and the functions of the 
different government institutions. These include the RCC. the 
National Assembly, the presidency, the Council of Ministers, or 
cabinet, and the judiciary (see fig. 11). According to Article 37. 
the RCC "is the supreme body in the State.'" Article 43 assigns 
to the RCC. by a vote of two-thirds of its members, authority to 
promulgate laws and regulations, to deal with national security, 
to declare war and conclude peace, and to approve the government's 
budget. Article 38 stipulates that all newly elected members of the 
RCC must be members of the Baath Party Regional Command. 
The Constitution also provides for an appointed Council of 
Ministers that has responsibility for carrving out the executive 
decisions of the RCC. 

The chief executive of the RCC is the president, who serves as 
the commander m chief of the armed forces and as the head of both 
the government and the state. The powers of the president, 
according to the Constitution, include appointing, promoting, and 
dismissing personnel of the judiciary, civil service, and military. 
The president also has responsibility for preparing and approving 
the budget. The first president. Ahmad Hasan al Bakr. was in office 
from 1968 to 1979. when he resigned and was succeeded by Sad- 
dam Husayn. 

Articles 47 through 56 of the Constitution provide for an elected 
National Assembly, but its powers are to be defined by the RCC. 
Elections for the Assembly took place for the first time in June 1980. 
Subsequent National assembly elections were held in October 1984. 

The Constitution can be amended only by a two-thirds majority 
vote of the RCC. Although the 1970 Constitution is officially desig- 
nated as provisional, it is to remain in force until a permanent con- 
stitution is promulgated. 



178 



Government and Politics 



Government 

The Constitution provides for a governmental system that, in 
appearance, is divided into three mutually checking branches, the 
executive, the legislative, and the judicial. In practice, neither the 
legislature nor the judiciary has been independent of the executive. 

The Revolutionary Command Council 

In 1988 the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) continued 
to be the top decision-making body of the state. The RCC was 
first formed in July 1968, and since then it has exercised both 
executive and legislative powers. The chairman of the RCC is the 
president of the republic. The number of RCC members has varied 
over time; in 1988 there were ten members. 

According to the Constitution, the RCC is the supreme organ 
of the state, charged with the mission of carrying out the popular 
will by removing from power the reactionary, the dictatorial, and 
the corrupt elements of society and by returning power to the peo- 
ple. The RCC elects its chairman, who serves concurrently as presi- 
dent of the republic, by a two-thirds majority vote. In case of the 
chairman's official absence or incapacitation, his constitutional pow- 
ers are to be exercised by the vice-chairman, who also is elected 
by the RCC from among its members. Thus the vice-chairman 
(in 1988 Izzat Ibrahim, who had served since 1979) is first in line 
of succession. 

The members of the RCC, including both the chairman and the 
vice-chairman, are answerable only to the RCC itself, which may 
dismiss any of its members by a two-thirds majority vote and may 
also charge and send to trial for wrongdoing any member of the 
council, any deputy to the president, or any cabinet minister. Since 
1977 the Baath Party has regarded all members of the Baath Party 
Regional Command as members of the RCC. The interlocking 
leadership structure of the RCC and the Regional Command has 
served to emphasize the party's dominance in governmental affairs. 

The RCC's constitutional powers are wide ranging. It may 
perform legislative functions, both in collaboration with, and inde- 
pendently of, the National Assembly; approve government recom- 
mendations concerning national defense and internal security; 
declare war, order general mobilization, conclude peace, and ratify 
treaties and international agreements; approve the state's general 
budget; lay down the rules for impeachment of its members and 
set up the special court to try those impeached; authorize the chair- 
man or the vice-chairman to exercise some of the council's powers 
except for legislative ones; and provide the internal regulations and 



179 



Iraq: A Country Study 




i : 










CO 




co 








O 




o 


z 




z 


Z3 




13 


O 




o 


o 




o 


tr 




DC 


< 




< 


_3 












Q- 




CL 


2 













8 



so 

3 



180 



Government and Politics 



working procedures of the council. The chairman is specifically 
empowered to preside over the council's closed sessions, to sign 
all laws and decrees issued by the council, and to supervise the work 
of cabinet ministers and the operation of the institutions of the state. 

The National Assembly 

Although the 1970 Constitution provides for a parliament called 
the National Assembly, this body was not instituted until 1980. The 
RCC first circulated a draft law creating the assembly in December 
1979; after some changes this was promulgated as law the follow- 
ing March. According to the law, the National Assembly consists 
of 250 members elected by secret ballot every four years. All Iraqi 
citizens over eighteen are eligible to vote for assembly candidates. 
The country is divided into 250 electoral districts, each with an 
approximate population of 250,000. One representative is elected 
to the assembly from each of these constituencies. The National 
Assembly law also stipulates, however, that there is to be a single 
electoral list. Furthermore, the qualifications of all candidates for 
the assembly must be reviewed and be approved by a government- 
appointed election commission. In practice, these provisions have 
enabled the Baath Party to control the National Assembly. 

To qualify as a candidate for National Assembly elections, indi- 
viduals need to meet certain conditions. For example, prospective 
candidates must be at least twenty-five years of age, must be Iraqi 
by birth, must not be married to foreigners, and must have Iraqi 
fathers. Having a non-Iraqi mother is grounds for disqualification 
except in those cases where the mother is of Arab origins and from 
another Arab country. In addition, persons who were subject to 
property expropriation under the land reform or nationalization 
laws are not eligible candidates. Furthermore, all aspiring candi- 
dates are required to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the elec- 
tion commission that they believe in the principles of the 1968 Baath 
Revolution, that is, in the Baath Party's objectives. 

The first parliamentary elections since Iraq became a republic 
in 1958 were held in June 1980, and the First National Assembly 
convened at the end of that month. Baath Party candidates won 
75 percent, or 187, of the 250 seats. The remaining 25 percent were 
won by parties allied with the Baath and by independent parties. 
Elections for the Second National Assembly were held in October 
1984. Approximately 7,171,000 votes were cast in that election, 
and the Baath won 73 percent (183) of the seats. Thirty-three 
women were elected to the assembly. Saadun Hammadi was elected 
chairman of the assembly, and two years later he was made a mem- 
ber of the RCC. 



181 



Iraq: A Country Study 

Since 1980 the National Assembly generally has held two ses- 
sions per year in accordance with Article 48 of the Constitution. 
The first session is held in April and May, and the second session 
in November and December. During the few weeks each year that 
the National Assembly is in session, it carries out its legislative duties 
in tandem with the RCC. The assembly's primary function is to 
ratify or reject draft legislation proposed by the RCC. In addition, 
it has limited authority to enact laws proposed by a minimum of 
one-fourth of its membership, to ratify the government's budget 
and international treaties, and to debate domestic and international 
policy. It also has authority to supervise state agencies and to ques- 
tion cabinet ministers. Although the assembly has served as a forum 
for limited public discussion of issues, its actual powers were 
restricted and ultimate decision-making authority pertaining to 
legislation continued to reside with the RCC in 1988. 

The President and the Council of Ministers 

The president is the chief executive authority of the country. He 
may exercise authority directly or through the Council of Ministers, 
the cabinet. He must be a native-born Iraqi. The Constitution does 
not stipulate the president's term of office, nor does it provide for 
his successor. President Bakr served for eleven years before retir- 
ing for health reasons in 1979. He was succeeded by Saddam 
Husayn, the former vice-chairman of the RCC, who continued 
to hold the office of president in early 1988. 

The position of vice-chairman, rather than the office of vice- 
president, appeared to be the second most powerful political one. 
The vice-presidency appeared to be a largely ceremonial post, and 
the vice-president seemed to be appointed or dismissed solely at 
the discretion of the president. In 1988 the vice-president was Taha 
Muhy ad Din Maruf, who was first appointed by Bakr in 1974, 
and was subsequently kept in office by Saddam Husayn. The vice- 
chairman of the RCC, who would presumably succeed Saddam 
Husayn, was Izzat Ibrahim. 

The Council of Ministers is the presidential executive arm. 
Presidential policies are discussed and translated into specific pro- 
grams through the council. The council's activities are closely moni- 
tored by the diwan, or secretariat of the presidency. The head of 
the diwan is a cabinet-rank official, and his assistants and support 
staff are special appointees. The members of the diwan are not sub- 
ject to the regulations of the Public Service Council, the body which 
supervises all civil service matters. 

Cabinet sessions are convened and presided over by the presi- 
dent. Some senior members of the RCC are represented on the 



182 




President Saddam Husayn 
Courtesy Embassy of Iraq, Washington 



183 



Iraq: A Country Study 

cabinet. By convention, about one-third of the cabinet positions 
may be reserved for members of the Baath Party. In early 1988, 
the cabinet consisted of forty-one members including president Sad- 
dam Husayn and vice-president Maruf. Ministerial portfolios 
included those for agriculture and agrarian reform, communica- 
tions, culture and arts, defense, education, finance, foreign affairs, 
health, higher education and scientific research, industry and min- 
erals, information, interior, irrigation, justice, labor and social 
affairs, oil, planning, public works and housing, religious trusts, 
trade, and transport. Additionally, there were seven ministers of 
state and seven presidential advisers with ministerial status. Of the 
cabinet members, the president and the minister of defense, the 
minister of foreign affairs, the minister of interior, and the minister 
of trade were also members of the powerful RCC. 

The Judiciary 

Although the Constitution guarantees an independent judiciary, 
it contains no provisions for the organization of courts. Conse- 
quently, the legal system has been formed on the basis of laws 
promulgated by the RCC. In early 1988 the judicial system con- 
sisted of courts that had jurisdiction over civil, criminal, adminis- 
trative, religious and other matters. The courts were under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, and all judges were appointed 
by the president. The secular courts continued to function partly 
on the basis of the French model, first introduced prior to 1918 
when Iraq was under Ottoman rule and subsequently modified, 
and partly on Islamic law. The three dominant schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence were the Hanafi among the Sunni Arabs, the Shafii 
among the Sunni Kurds (see Glossary), and the Jafari among Shia 
Arabs. The Christian and Jewish minorities had their own reli- 
gious courts for the adjudication of personal status issues, such as 
marriage, divorce, and inheritance. 

For judicial administration, the country was divided into five 
appellate districts centered, respectively, in Baghdad, Basra, Al 
Hillah (Babylon), Kirkuk, and Mosul. Major civil and commer- 
cial cases were referred to the courts of first instance, which were 
of two kinds: 18 courts of first instance with unlimited powers, and 
150 courts of first instance with limited powers. The former were 
established in the capitals of the eighteen governorates (provinces); 
the latter, all of which were single-judge courts, were located in 
the district and subdistrict centers, and in the governorate capitals 
(see fig. 1). Six peace courts, two in Baghdad and one in each of 
the other four judicial district centers, handled minor litigation. 



184 



Government and Politics 



Decisions of these courts could be appealed to the relevant district 
court of appeals. 

Wherever there were civil courts, criminal cases were judged by 
magistrates. Six sessions courts reviewed cases appealed from the 
lower magistrates' courts. The personal status of both Shia Mus- 
lims and Sunni Muslims and disputes arising from administration 
of waqfs (religious trusts or endowments) were decided in sharia 
(Islamic law) courts. Sharia courts were located wherever there were 
civil courts. In some places sharia courts consisted of specially 
appointed qadis (religious judges), and in other places of civil court 
judges. Christians, Jews, and other religious minorities had their 
own separate communal councils to administer personal status laws. 

Civil litigation against government bodies and the "socialist sec- 
tor' ' and between government organizations were brought before 
the Administrative Court, set up under a law promulgated in 
November 1977. Jurisdictional conflicts between this court and 
other courts were adjudicated by the Court of Cassation, which 
on appeal could also review decisions of the Administrative Court. 
Offenses against the internal or external security of the state — 
whether economic, financial, or political offenses — were tried before 
the Revolutionary Court. Unlike the other courts described above, 
the Revolutionary Court was not under the jurisdiction of the appel- 
late court system. In addition, the RCC periodically established 
special security courts, under the jurisdiction of the secret security 
police, to handle cases of espionage, of treason, and of "antistate" 
activities. The proceedings of the Revolutionary Court and of the 
special security courts, in contrast to the practice of all other courts, 
were generally closed (see Criminal Justice System, ch. 5). 

The court of last resort for all except security cases was the Court 
of Cassation. It consisted of a president; vice-presidents; no fewer 
than fifteen permanent members; and a number of deputized 
judges, reporting judges, and religious judges. It was divided into 
general, civil, criminal, administrative affairs, and personal sta- 
tus benches. In addition to its appellate function, the Court of Cas- 
sation assumed original jurisdiction over crimes committed by high 
government officials, including judges. The Court of Cassation also 
adjudicated jurisdictional conflicts between lower courts. 

Local Government 

In 1988 there were eighteen governorates (alwiya, sing., liwa), 
each administered by a governor appointed by the president. Each 
governorate was divided into districts (aqdhiya, sing. , qadhd) headed 
by district officers (qaimaqamun; sing., qaimaqam); each district 
was divided into subdistricts (nawahy; sing., nahiyah) under the 



185 



Iraq: A Country Study 

responsibility of subdistrict officers (mudara; sing., mudir). Mayors 
headed cities and towns. Municipalities were divided into several 
categories depending upon the size of local revenues. Baghdad, the 
national capital, had special administrative status. The mayor of 
Baghdad and the mayors of other cities were presidential appointees. 

In 1971 President Bakr promulgated the National Action 
Charter, a broad statement of Baath Party political, economic, 
social, and foreign policy objectives. This document called for the 
formation of popular councils in all administrative subdivisions. 
These councils were to be given the right to supervise, to inspect, 
and to criticize the work of the government. The first councils were 
appointed in 1973 in accordance with a law promulgated by the 
RCC. As late as 1988, however, there was insufficient empirical 
research available to determine whether the popular councils were 
autonomous forums for the channeling of grievances or were merely 
Baath Party-dominated institutions used to encourage active popu- 
lar support of, and involvement in, government-initiated activities. 

Kurdish Autonomy 

Three governorates in the north — Dahuk, Irbil, and As Sulay- 
maniyah — constitute Iraqi Kurdistan, a region that historically has 
had a majority population of Kurds. Ever since Iraq became 
independent in 1932, the Kurds have demanded some form of self- 
rule in the Kurdish areas. There were clashes between Kurdish 
antigovernment guerrillas and army units throughout most of the 
1960s. When the Baath Party came to power in July 1968, the prin- 
cipal Kurdish leaders distrusted its intentions and soon launched 
a major revolt (see The Emergence of Saddam Husayn, 1968-79, 
ch. 1). In March 1970, the government and the Kurds reached 
an agreement, to be implemented within four years, for the crea- 
tion of an Autonomous Region consisting of the three Kurdish 
governorates and other adjacent districts that have been determined 
by census to have a Kurdish majority. Although the RCC issued 
decrees in 1974 and in 1975 that provided for the administration 
of the Autonomous Region, these were not acceptable to all Kurd- 
ish leaders and a major war ensued. The Kurds were eventually 
crushed, but guerrilla activities continued in parts of Kurdistan. 
In early 1988, antigovernment Kurds controlled several hundred 
square kilometers of Irbil and As Sulaymaniyah governorates 
adjacent to the Iranian frontier. 

In early 1988, the Autonomous Region was governed accord- 
ing to the stipulations of the 1970 Autonomy Agreement. It had 
a twelve-member Executive Council that wielded both legislative 
and executive powers and a Legislative Assembly that advised the 



186 



Government and Politics 



council. The chairman of the Executive Council was appointed by 
President Saddam Husayn and held cabinet rank; the other mem- 
bers of the council were chosen from among the deputies to the 
popularly elected Legislative Assembly. 

The Legislative Assembly consisted of fifty members elected for 
three-year terms from among candidates approved by the central 
government. The Legislative Assembly chose its own officers, includ- 
ing its cabinet-rank chairman, a deputy chairman, and a secretary. 
It had authority to ratify laws proposed by the Executive Council 
and limited powers to enact legislation relating to the development 
of "culture and nationalist customs of the Kurds" as well as other 
matters of stricdy local scope. The Legislative Assembly could ques- 
tion the members of the Executive Council concerning the latter' s 
administrative, economic, educational, social, and other varied 
responsibilities; it could also withhold a vote of confidence from one 
or more of the Executive Council members. Both the assembly and 
the council were located in the city of Irbil, the administrative center 
of Irbil Governorate. Officials of these two bodies were either Kurds 
or "persons well- versed in the Kurdish language," and Kurdish was 
used for all official communications at the local level. The first Legis- 
lative Assembly elections were held in September 1980, and the 
second elections took place in August 1986. 

Despite the Autonomous Region's governmental institutions, 
genuine self-rule did not exist in Kurdistan in 1988. The central 
government in Baghdad continued to exercise tight control by 
reserving to itself the power to make all decisions in matters per- 
taining to justice, to police, to internal security, and the adminis- 
tration of the frontier areas. The Baath Party, through the minister 
of state for regional autonomy and other ministerial representa- 
tives operating in the region, continued to supervise activities of 
all governing bodies in the region. The minister of justice and a 
special oversight body set up by the Court of Cassation reviewed 
all local enactments and administrative decisions, and they coun- 
termanded any local decrees that were deemed contrary to the "con- 
stitution, laws, or regulations" of the central government. The 
central government's superior authority has been most dramati- 
cally evident in the frontier areas, where government security units 
have forcibly evacuated Kurdish villagers to distant lowlands (see 
The Kurds, ch. 2). 

Politics 

The Baath Party 

In early 1988, the Baath Party continued to stress parallelism 



187 



Iraq: A Country Study 

focused on "regional" (qutri) and "national" (qawmi) goals, fol- 
lowing the Baath doctrine that the territorially and politically divided 
Arab countries were merely "regions" of a collective entity called 
"The Arab Nation." Hence the Baath movement in one country 
was considered merely an aspect of, or a phase leading to, "a uni- 
fied democratic socialist Arab nation." That nation, when it materi- 
alized, would be under a single, unified Arab national leadership. 
Theoretically, therefore, success or failure at the regional level would 
have a corresponding effect on the movement toward that Arab 
nation. Moreover, the critical test of legitimacy for any Baath regime 
would necessarily be whether or not the regime's policies and actions 
were compatible with the basic aims of the revolution — aims 
epitomized in the principles of "unity, freedom, and socialism." 

The Baath Party in Iraq, like its counterparts in other Arab 
regions (states), derived from the official founding congress in 
Damascus in 1947. This conclave of pan-Arab intellectuals was 
inspired by the ideas of two Syrians, Michel Aflaq and Salah ad 
Din al Bitar, who are generally regarded as the fathers of the Baath 
movement. Several Iraqis, including Abd ar Rahman ad Damin 
and Abd al Khaliq al Khudayri, attended this congress and became 
members of the party. Upon their return to Baghdad, they formed 
the Iraqi branch of the Baath. Damin became the first secretary 
general of the Iraqi Baath. 

From its early years, the Iraqi Baath recruited converts from 
a small number of college and high school students, intellectuals, 
and professionals — virtually all of whom were urban Sunni Arabs. 
A number of Baath high school members entered the Military Col- 
lege, where they influenced several classmates to join the party. 
Important military officers who became Baath members in the early 
1950s included Ahmad Hasan al Bakr, Salih Mahdi Ammash, and 
Abd Allah Sultan, all of whom figured prominently in Iraqi politi- 
cal affairs in later years. 

During the 1950s, the Baath was a clandestine party, and its 
members were subject to arrest if their identities were discovered. 
The Baath Party joined with other opposition parties to form the 
underground United National Front and participated in the activi- 
ties that led to the 1958 revolution. The Baathists hoped that the 
new, republican government would favor pan- Arab causes, espe- 
cially a union with Egypt, but instead the regime was dominated 
by non-Baathist military officers who did not support Arab unity 
or other Baath principles. Some younger members of the party, 
including Saddam Husayn, became convinced that Iraqi leader Abd 
al Karim Qasim had to be removed, and they plotted his assassi- 
nation. The October 1959 attempt on Qasim 's life, however, was 



188 



Government and Politics 



bungled; Saddam Husayn fled Iraq, while other party members 
were arrested and tried for treason. The Baath was forced under- 
ground again, and it experienced a period of internal dissension 
as members debated over which tactics were appropriate to achieve 
their political objectives. The party's second attempt to overthrow 
Qasim, in February 1963, was successful, and it resulted in the 
formation of the country's first Baath government. The party, 
however, was more divided than ever between ideologues and more 
pragmatic members. Because of this lack of unity, the Baath' s coup 
partners were able to outmaneuver it and, within nine months, 
to expel all Baathists from the government. It was not until 1965 
that the Baath overcame the debilitating effects of ideological and 
of personal rivalries. The party then reorganized under the direc- 
tion of General Bakr as secretary general with Saddam Husayn 
as his deputy. Both men were determined to return the Baath to 
power. In July 1968, the Baath finally staged a successful coup. 

After the Baath takeover, Bakr became president of the regime, 
and he initiated programs aimed at the establishment of a "socialist, 
unionist, and democratic" Iraq. This was done, according to the 
National Action Charter, with scrupulous care for balancing the 
revolutionary requirements of Iraq on the one hand and the needs 
of the "Arab nation" on the other. According to a Baath Party 
pronouncement in January 1974, "Putting the regional above the 
national may lead to statism, and placing the national over the 
regional may lead to rash and childish action." This protestation 
notwithstanding, the government's primary concerns since 1968 
have been domestic issues rather than pan-Arab ones. 

In 1968 the Baath regime confronted a wide range of problems, 
such as ethnic and sectarian tensions, the stagnant condition of 
agriculture, commerce, and industry, the inefficiency and the cor- 
ruption of government, and the lack of political consensus among 
the three main sociopolitical groups — the Shia Arabs, the Sunni 
Arabs, and the Kurds. The difficulties of consensus building were 
compounded by the pervasive apathy and mistrust at the grass- 
roots levels of all sects, by the shortage of qualified party cadres 
to serve as the standard-bearers of the Baath regime, and by the 
Kurdish armed insurgency. Rivalry with Syria and with Egypt for 
influence within the Arab world and the frontier dispute with Iran 
also complicated the regime's efforts to build the nation. 

Since 1968 the Baath has attempted to create a strong and uni- 
fied Iraq, through formal government channels and through political 
campaigns designed to eradicate what it called "harmful prerevolu- 
tionary values and practices," such as exploitation, social inequi- 
ties, sectarian loyalties, apathy, and lack of civil spirit. Official 



189 




190 




1 I.M 



Tahrir Square, Baghdad, showing the Monument of Liberty 

Courtesy United Nations 



191 



Iraq: A Country Study 

statements called for abandonment of traditional ways in favor of 
a new life-style fashioned on the principles of patriotism, national 
loyalty, collectivism, participation, selflessness, love of labor, and 
civic responsibility. These "socialist principles and practices" would 
be instilled by the party's own example, through the state educa- 
tional system, and through youth and other popular organizations. 
The Baath particularly emphasized "military training" for youth; 
such training was considered essential for creating "new men in 
the new society" and for defending the republic from the hostile 
forces of Zionism, imperialism, anti-Arab chauvinism (e.g., from 
Iran), rightists, opportunists, and reactionaries (see Paramilitary 
Forces; Internal Security, ch. 5). 

The Baath' s major goal since 1968 has been to socialize the 
economy. By the late 1980s, the party had succeeded in socializ- 
ing a significant part of the national economy (see The Role of 
Government, ch. 3), including agriculture, commerce, industry, 
and oil. Programs to collectivize agriculture were reversed in 1981, 
but government investment in industrial production remained 
important in the late 1980s. Large-scale industries such as iron, 
steel, and petrochemicals were fully owned and managed by the 
government, as were many medium-sized factories that manufac- 
tured textiles, processed food, and turned out construction 
materials. 

The Baath' s efforts to create a unified Arab nation have been 
more problematic. The party has not abandoned its goal of Arab 
unity. This goal, however, has become a long-term ideal rather 
than a short-term objective. President Saddam Husayn proclaimed 
the new view in 1982 by stating that Baathists now "believe that 
Arab unity must not take place through the elimination of the local 
and national characteristics of any Arab country. . . . but must 
be achieved through common fraternal opinion." In practice this 
meant that the Iraqi Baath Party had accepted unity of purpose 
among Arab leaders, rather than unification of Arab countries, as 
more important for the present. 

As of early 1988, the Baath Party claimed about 10 percent of 
the population, a total of 1.5 million supporters and sympathizers; 
of this total, full party members, or cadres, were estimated at only 
30,000, or 0.2 percent. The cadres were the nucleus of party orga- 
nization, and they functioned as leaders, motivators, teachers, 
administrators, and watchdogs. Generally, party recruitment proce- 
dures emphasized selectivity rather than quantity, and those who 
desired to join the party had to pass successfully through several 
apprentice-like stages before being accepted into full membership. 
The Baath' s elitist approach derived from the principle that the 



192 



Government and Politics 



party's effectiveness could only be measured by its demonstrable 
ability to mobilize and to lead the people, and not by "size, num- 
ber, or form." Participation in the party was virtually a requisite 
for social mobility. 

The basic organizational unit of the Baath was the party cell or 
circle (halaqah). Composed of between three and seven members, 
cells functioned at the neighborhood or the village level, where mem- 
bers met to discuss and to carry out party directives. A minimum 
of two and a maximum of seven cells formed a party division (firqah). 
Divisions operated in urban quarters, larger villages, offices, fac- 
tories, schools, and other organizations. Division units were spread 
throughout the bureaucracy and the military, where they functioned 
as the ears and eyes of the party. Two to five divisions formed a 
section (shabah). A section operated at the level of a large city 
quarter, a town, or a rural district. Above the section was the branch 
(fira), which was composed of at least two sections and which oper- 
ated at the provincial level. There were twenty-one Baath Party 
branches in Iraq, one in each of the eighteen provinces and three 
in Baghdad. The union of all the branches formed the party's con- 
gress, which elected the Regional Command. 

The Regional Command was both the core of party leadership 
and the top decision-making body. It had nine members, who were 
elected for five-year terms at regional congresses of the party. Its 
secretary general (also called the regional secretary) was the party's 
leader, and its deputy secretary general was second in rank and 
power within the party hierarchy. The members of the command 
theoretically were responsible to the Regional Congress that, as 
a rule, was to convene annually to debate and to approve the party's 
policies and programs; actually, the members were chosen by 
Saddam Husayn and other senior party leaders to be "elected" 
by the Regional Congress, a formality seen as essential to the legiti- 
mation of party leadership. 

Above the Regional Command was the National Command of 
the Baath Party, the highest policy-making and coordinating council 
for the Baath movement throughout the Arab world. The National 
Command consisted of representatives from all regional commands 
and was responsible to the National Congress, which convened peri- 
odically. It was vested with broad powers to guide, to coordinate, 
and to supervise the general direction of the movement, especially 
with respect to relationships among the regional Baath parties and 
with the outside world. These powers were to be exercised through 
a national secretariat that would direct policy-formulating bureaus. 

In reality, the National Command did not oversee the Baath 
movement as a whole in 1988 because there continued to be no 



193 



Iraq: A Country Study 

single command. In 1966 a major schism within the Baath move- 
ment had resulted in the creation of two rival National Commands, 
one based in Damascus and the other in Baghdad. Both commands 
claim to be the legitimate authority for the Baath, but since 1966 
they have been mutually antagonistic. Michel Aflaq, one of the 
original cofounders of the Baath Party, was the secretary general 
of the Baghdad-based National Command, and Saddam Husayn 
was the vice-chairman. In practice, the Syrian Regional Command, 
under Hafiz al Assad, controlled the Damascus-based National 
Command of the Baath Party, while the Iraqi Regional Command 
controlled the Baghdad-based National Command. 

Theoretically, the Iraqi Regional Command made decisions 
about Baath Party policy based on consensus. In practice, all deci- 
sions were made by the party's secretary general, Saddam Husayn, 
who since 1979 had also been chairman of the RCC and president 
of the republic. He worked closely with a small group of support- 
ers, especially members of the Talfah family from the town of Tikrit 
(see The Emergence of Saddam Husayn, 1968-79, ch. 1); he also 
dealt ruthlessly with suspected opposition to his rule from within 
the party. In 1979 several high-ranking Baathists were tried and 
were executed for allegedly planning a coup; other prominent party 
members were forcibly retired in 1982. Saddam Husayn' s detrac- 
tors accused him of monopolizing power and of promoting a cult 
of personality. 

The Politics of Alliance: The Progressive National Front 

In 1988 Iraq was no nearer to the goal of democracy than it had 
been when the Baath came to power in 1968. The establishment 
of "popular democracy" as a national objective remained essen- 
tially unfulfilled. Political activities were restricted to those defined 
by the Baath regime. The party, however, recognized that not all 
citizens would become party members, and it sought to provide 
a controlled forum for non-Baathist political participation. It created 
the Progressive National Front (PNF) in 1974 to ally the Baath 
with other political parties that were considered to be progressive. 
As a basis for this cooperation President Bakr had proclaimed the 
National Action Charter in 1971 . In presenting the charter for pub- 
lic discussion, the Baath had invited "all national and progressive 
forces and elements" to work for the objective of a "democratic, 
revolutionary, and unitary" Iraq by participating in the "broadest 
coalition among all the national, patriotic, and progressive forces." 

The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) was one of the important 
political groups that the Baathists wanted involved in the PNF. Dis- 
cussions between the Baath and the ICP took place periodically 



194 



Government and Politics 



over three years before the latter was induced to join the PNF in 
1974. For Baath leaders, the PNF was a means of containing poten- 
tial opposition to their policies on the part of the ICP. Although 
the ICP was too small to pose a serious armed challenge to the 
Baath, it was regarded as a major ideological rival. The ICP's roots 
were as deep as those of the Baath, because the former party had 
been formed by Iraqi Marxists in the 1930s. Like the Baath, the 
ICP was an elitist party that advocated socialist programs to benefit 
the masses and that appealed primarily to intellectuals. Despite these 
similarities, there had been a long history of antagonism between 
the two parties. Baathists tended to suspect the communists of ulti- 
mate loyalty to a foreign power, the Soviet Union, rather than to 
the Arab nation, even though the Baathists themselves regarded 
the Soviet Union as a friendly and progressive state after 1968. 

In return for participation in the PNF, the ICP was permitted 
to nominate its own members for some minor cabinet posts and 
to carry on political and propaganda activities openly. The ICP 
had to agree, however, not to recruit among the armed forces and 
to accept Baath domination of the RCC. The ICP also recognized 
the Baath Party's "privileged" or leading role in the PNF: of the 
sixteen-member High Council that was formed to direct the PNF, 
eight positions were reserved for the Baath, five for other progres- 
sive parties, and only three for the communists. The ICP also agreed 
not to undertake any activities that would contravene the letter or 
spirit of the National Action Charter. 

The ICP may have hoped that the PNF would gradually evolve 
into a genuine power- sharing arrangement. If so, these expecta- 
tions were not realized. The Baath members of the High Council 
dominated the PNF, while the party retained a firm grip over 
government decision making. By 1975, friction had developed 
between the ICP and the Baath. During the next two years, at least 
twenty individual ICP members were arrested, tried, and sentenced 
to prison for allegedly attempting to organize communist cells within 
the army in contravention of the specific ban on such activities. 
The April 1978 Marxist coup d'etat in Afghanistan seemed to serve 
as a catalyst for a wholesale assault on the ICP. Convicted com- 
munists were retried, and twenty-one of them were executed; there 
were virulent attacks on the ICP in the Baathist press; and scores 
of party members and sympathizers were arrested. The ICP com- 
plained, to no apparent avail, that communists were being purged 
from government jobs, arrested, and tortured in prisons. By April 
1979, those principal ICP leaders who had not been arrested had 
either fled the country or had gone underground. In 1980 the ICP 
formally withdrew from the PNF and announced the formation 



195 



Iraq: A Country Study 

of a new political front to oppose the Baath government. Since then, 
however, ICP activities against the Baathists have been largely 
limited to a propaganda campaign. 

The various Kurdish political parties were the other main focus 
of Baath attention for PNF membership. Three seats on the PNF 
were reserved for the Kurds, and initially the Baath intended that 
these be filled by nominees from the Kurdish Democratic Party 
(KDP), the oldest and largest Kurdish party. By the time the PNF 
was established in 1974, however, the KDP was already involved 
in hostilities against the government. The KDP, which originally 
had been formed in 1946 in Iran where Mullah Mustafa Barzani 
and other party cofounders had fled following the collapse of a 1945 
revolt, was suspicious of the Baath' s ultimate intentions with respect 
to self-rule for the Kurdish region. Even though Barzani himself 
had negotiated the March 1970 Autonomy Agreement with Sad- 
dam Husayn, he rejected Baghdad's March 1974 terms for imple- 
menting autonomy. Subsequently, full-scale warfare erupted 
between central government forces and KDP-organized fighters, 
the latter receiving military supplies covertly from Iran and from 
the United States. The Kurdish rebellion collapsed in March 1975, 
after Iran reached a rapprochement with the Baath regime and with- 
drew all support from the Kurds. The KDP leaders and several 
thousand fighters sought and obtained refuge in Iran. Barzani even- 
tually resettled in the United States, where he died in 1979. Fol- 
lowing Barzani 's death, his son Masud became leader of the KDP; 
from his base in Iran he directed a campaign of guerrilla activities 
against Iraqi civilian and military personnel in the Kurdish region. 
After Iraq became involved in war with Iran, Masud Barzani gener- 
ally cooperated with the Iranians in military offensives in Iraqi 
Kurdistan (see Internal Developments and Security, ch. 5). 

Barzani 's decision to fight Baghdad was not supported by all 
Kurdish leaders, and it led to a split within the KDP. Some of these 
Kurds, including Barzani's eldest son, Ubaydallah, believed that 
the Autonomy Agreement did provide a framework for achieving 
practical results, and he preferred to cooperate with the Baath. 
Other leaders were disturbed by Barzani's acceptance of aid from 
Iran, Israel, and the United States, and they refused to be associated 
with this policy. Consequently, during 1974, rival KDP factions, 
and even new parties such as the Kurdish Revolutionary Party and 
the Kurdish Progressive Group, emerged. Although none of these 
parties seemed to have as extensive a base of popular support as 
did the KDP, their participation in the PNF permitted the Baath 
to claim that its policies in the Autonomous Region had the back- 
ing of progressive Kurdish forces. 



196 



Government and Politics 



The unanticipated and swift termination of KDP-central govern- 
ment hostilities in March 1975 resulted in more factional splits from 
the party. One breakaway group, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK) under the leadership of Jalal Talabani, was committed to 
continuing the armed struggle for Kurdish autonomy. Until 1985, 
however, most of the PUK's skirmishes were with fellow Kurdish 
fighters of the KDP, and Talabani himself held intermittent negotia- 
tions with Baathist representatives about joining the PNF. Other 
KDP splinter groups agreed to cooperate with the central govern- 
ment. In order to accommodate them, and in recognition of the 
fact that no single political party represented the Kurds, two addi- 
tional seats, bringing the total to eighteen, were created in the PNF. 
Thus, the number of Kurdish representatives increased from three 
to five. The composition of the PNF changed again in 1980, fol- 
lowing the withdrawal of the three ICP members; the number of 
Kurds remained constant. 

In 1975 the Baath invited two independent progressive groups 
to nominate one representative each for the unreserved seats on 
the PNF. These seats went to the leaders of the Independent 
Democrats and the Progressive Nationalists. Neither of these groups 
was a formally organized political party, but rather each was an 
informal association of non-Baathist politicians who had been active 
before 1968. These groups had demonstrated to the satisfaction 
of the Baath Party that their members had renounced the former 
"reactionary" ideas of the various prerevolutionary parties to which 
they had belonged. 

In 1988 the Baath Party continued to hold the position that the 
PNF was indispensable as long as the Arab revolutionary move- 
ment faced dangers in Iraq and in other parts of the Arab homeland. 
The Baath insisted that its policy of combining its "leading role" 
within the front and a cooperative relationship based on "mutual 
respect and confidence" among itself and the front's members was 
correct and that, in fact, this was a major accomplishment of its 
rule. Nevertheless, the PNF was not an independent political insti- 
tution. Although it served as a forum in which policy could be dis- 
cussed, the Baath actually controlled the PNF by monopolizing 
executive positions, by holding half of the total seats, and by requir- 
ing that all PNF decisions must be by unanimous vote. 

Political Opposition 

Although the Baath in 1988 permitted the existence of several 
non-Baathist political parties, it did not tolerate political opposi- 
tion to its policies. An effective security police apparatus had 
forced underground those groups opposed to the Baath (see Internal 



197 



Iraq: A Country Study 



Security, ch. 5). Other opposition groups operated in exile in 
Europe. Iran, and Syria. These included the ICP. the KDP. the 
PUK, a Baath splinter that supported the Damascus-based National 
Command, and several Islamic parties. Although various opposi- 
tion parties periodically succeeded in carrying out acts of violence 
against regime targets, especially in Kurdistan, for the most part 
their activities within Iraq did not seriously challenge the Baath 
regime. 

The opposition to the Baath historically has been fragmented, 
and efforts to form alliances — such as the ICP's November 1980 
initiative to create a Democratic and Patriotic Front of Kurdish 
and Arab secular parties — foundered over ideological divisions. Per- 
sonality clashes and feuds also prevented the various Kurdish and 
Arab secular parties from cooperating. In addition, many of the 
opposition parties seemed to have a weak internal base of popular 
support because of the prevailing perception that they had collabo- 
rated with enemies of Iraq at a time when the countrv was engaged 
in war with Iran. 

The religious opposition to the Baath was primarily concentrated 
among the devout Shia population. The most important opposi- 
tion party was Ad Dawah al Islamiyah (the Islamic Call), popu- 
larly known as Ad Dawah, which originally had been established 
by Shia clergy in the early 1960s. After the Baath came to power 
in 1968, Ad Dawah opposed the regime's secular policies, and 
consequently many prominent clergy associated with the party, as 
well as some who had no connections to Ad Dawah, were per- 
secuted. In 1979. apparently to contain any radicalization of the 
Iraqi Shia clergy like that which had occurred in Iran, the regime 
arrested and subsequently executed Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad 
Baqir as Sadr. the country's most respected Shia leader. Sadr"s 
precise relationship to Ad Dawah w 7 as not established, but his death 
precipitated widespread, violent demonstrations and acts of 
sabotage. Ad Dawah was banned in 1980. and membership in the 
organization was made a capital offense. After the war with Iran 
had begun. Ad Dawah and other Shia political groups reorganized 
in exile in Europe and in Iran. 

In late 1982, the Iranian authorities encouraged the Iraqi Shia 
parties to unite under one umbrella group known as the Supreme 
Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI i. Headquar- 
tered in Tehran, SAIRI was under the chairmanship of Muham- 
mad Baqir al Hakim, a prominent clergyman whose father had 
been the leading ayatollah of Iraq in the 1960s. SAIRI' s aim was 
to promote the cause of Islamic revolution in Iraq by overthrow- 
ing the Baathist regime. To further that objective, in 1983 SAIRI 



198 



Government and Politics 



established a government-in-exile. SAIRI's activities brought harsh 
reprisals against members of the extended Hakim family still liv- 
ing in Iraq but were generally ineffective in undermining the politi- 
cal controls of the Baath. Another opposition element included in 
SAIRI was the Organization of Islamic Action, headed by Iraqi- 
born Muhammad Taqi al Mudarrissi. 

Mass Media 

In early 1988, all radio and television broadcasting in Iraq was 
controlled by the government. Radio Iraq had both domestic and 
foreign services. The domestic service broadcast in Arabic, Kurd- 
ish, Syriac, and Turkoman; the foreign service, in English, French, 
German, Russian, Swahili, Turkish, and Urdu. Two radio sta- 
tions based in Baghdad broadcast all day, and they could be picked 
up by the overwhelming majority of the estimated 2.5 million radio 
receivers in the country. There were also separate radio stations 
with programs in Kurdish and Persian. 

Baghdad Television was the main government television station. 
It broadcast over two channels throughout the day. Government- 
owned commercial television stations also broadcast from Basra, 
Kirkuk, Mosul, and nineteen other locations for an average of six 
hours a day. A Kurdish-language television station aired programs 
for eight hours each day. There were an estimated 750,000 pri- 
vately owned television sets in the country in 1986, the latest year 
for which such statistics were available. 

In 1988 there were six national daily newspapers, all of which 
were published in Baghdad. One of these papers, the Baghdad 
Observer, was published in English; it had an estimated circulation 
of 220,000. Another daily, Al Iraq, with a circulation of abut 30,000, 
was published in Kurdish. The largest of the four Arabic-language 
dailies was Al Jumhuriya, which had a circulation of approximately 
220,000. Ath Thawra, with a circulation of about 22,000, was the 
official organ of the Baath Party. There were also seven weekly 
papers, all published in Baghdad. The government's Iraqi News 
Agency (INA) distributed news to the foreign press based in, or 
passing through, Iraq. 

Although Article 26 of the Provisional Constitution guarantees 
freedom of opinion and publication "within the limits of the law," 
newspapers, books, and other publications were subject to censor- 
ship. The Ministry of Guidance monitored published material to 
ensure that all writing was "in line with the nationalist and pro- 
gressive line of the revolution." The Ministry of Culture and 
Information's National House for Publishing and Distributing 



199 



Iraq: A Country Study 

Advertising had the sole authority to import and to distribute all 
foreign newspapers, magazines, and periodicals. 

Foreign Policy 

Iraq's relations with other countries and with international orga- 
nizations are supervised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1988 
the minister of foreign affairs was Tariq Aziz, who had served in 
that post since 1983. Aziz was a member of the RCC and an 
influential leader of the Baath Party. Before becoming minister of 
foreign affairs, he had been director of the party's foreign affairs 
bureau. Aziz, Saddam Husayn, and the other members of the RCC 
formulated foreign policy, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
bureaucracy implemented RCC directives. The Baath maintained 
control over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and over all Iraqi diplo- 
matic missions outside the country through its party cells that oper- 
ated throughout the ministry and in all embassies abroad. 

In 1988 Iraq's main foreign policy issue was the war with Iran. 
This war had begun in September 1980, when Saddam Husayn 
sent Iraqi forces across the Shatt al Arab into southwestern Iran 
(see Iran-Iraq Conflict, ch. 1). Although the reasons for Saddam 
Husayn 's decision to invade Iran were complicated, the leaders 
of the Baath Party had long resented Iranian hegemony in the Per- 
sian Gulf region and had especially resented the perceived Iranian 
interference in Iraq's internal affairs both before and after the 1979 
Islamic Revolution. They may have thought that the revolution- 
ary turmoil in Tehran would enable Iraq to achieve a quick victory. 
Their objectives were to halt any potential foreign assistance to the 
Shias and to the Kurdish opponents of the regime and to end Ira- 
nian domination of the area. The Baathists believed a weakened 
Iran would be incapable of posing a security threat and could not 
undermine Iraq's efforts to exercise the regional influence that had 
been blocked by non-Arab Iran since the mid-1960s. Although the 
Iraqis failed to obtain the expected easy victory, the war initially 
went well for them. By early 1982, however, the Iraqi occupation 
forces were on the defensive and were being forced to retreat from 
some of their forward lines. In June 1982, Saddam Husayn ordered 
most of the Iraqi units to withdraw from Iranian territory; after 
that time, the Baathist government tried to obtain a cease-fire based 
on a return of all armed personnel to the international borders that 
prevailed as of September 21, 1979. 

Iran did not accept Iraq's offer to negotiate an end to the war. 
Similarly, it rejected a July 1982 United Nations (UN) Security 
Council resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire. Subse- 
quently, Iranian forces invaded Iraq by crossing the Shatt al Arab 



200 




Khalafa Street, Baghdad 
Courtesy Ronald L. Kuipers 



Rashid Hotel, Baghdad 
Courtesy Ronald L. Kuipers 




201 



Iraq: A Country Study 

in the south and by capturing some mountain passes in the north. 
To discourage Iran's offensive, the Iraqi air force initiated bomb- 
ing raids over several Iranian cities and towns. The air raids brought 
Iranian retaliation, which included the aerial bombing of Bagh- 
dad. Although Iraq eventually pushed back and contained the Ira- 
nian advances, it was not able to force Iranian troops completely 
out of Iraqi territory. The perceived threat to Iraq in the summer 
of 1982 thus was serious enough to force Saddam Husayn to request 
the Non-Aligned Movement to change the venue of its scheduled 
September meeting from Baghdad to India; nevertheless, since the 
fall of 1982, the ground conflict had generally been a stalemated 
war of attrition — although Iran made small but demoralizing ter- 
ritorial advances as a result of its massive offensives in the reed 
marshes north of Basra in 1984 and in 1985, in Al Faw Peninsula 
in early 1986, and in the outskirts of Basra during January and 
February 1987. In addition, as of early 1988 the government had 
lost control of several mountainous districts in Kurdistan where, 
since 1983, dissident Kurds have cooperated militarily with Iran. 

Saddam Husayn' s government has maintained consistently since 
the summer of 1982 that Iraq wants a negotiated end to the war 
based upon the status quo ante. Iran's stated conditions for ceas- 
ing hostilities, namely the removal of Saddam Husayn and the 
Baath from power, however, have been unacceptable. The main 
objective of the regime became the extrication of the country from 
the war with as little additional damage as possible. To further this 
goal, Iraq has used various diplomatic, economic, and military 
strategies; none of these had been successful in bringing about a 
cease-fire as of early 1988 (see Introduction). 

Although the war was a heavy burden on Iraq politically, eco- 
nomically, and socially, the most profound consequence of the war's 
prolongation was its impact on the patterns of Iraq's foreign rela- 
tions. Whereas trends toward a moderation of the Baath Party's 
ideological approach to foreign affairs were evident before 1980, 
the war helped to accelerate these trends. Two of the most dra- 
matic changes were in Iraq's relationships with the Soviet Union 
and with the United States. During the course of the war Iraq 
moved away from the close friendship with the Soviet Union that 
had persisted throughout the 1970s, and it initiated a rapproche- 
ment with the United States. Iraq also sought to ally itself with 
Kuwait and with Saudi Arabia, two neighboring countries with 
which there had been considerable friction during much of the 
1970s. The alignment with these countries was accompanied by 
a more moderate Iraqi approach to other Arab countries, such as 
Egypt and Jordan, which previously Iraq had perceived as hostile. 



202 



Government and Politics 



The Soviet Union 

When the Baath Party came to power in 1968, relations between 
Iraq and the West were strained. The Baathists believed that most 
Western countries, and particularly the United States, opposed the 
goal of Arab unity. The Baathists viewed the 1948 partition of Pales- 
tine and the creation of Israel as evidence of an imperialist plot 
to keep the Arabs divided. Refusal to recognize Israel and support 
for the reestablishment of Palestine consequently became central 
tenets of Baath ideology. The party based Iraq's relations with other 
countries on those countries' attitudes toward the Palestinian issue. 
The Soviet Union, which had supported the Arabs during the June 
1967 Arab-Israeli War and again during the October 1973 Arab- 
Israeli War, was regarded as having an acceptable position on the 
Palestine issue. Thus, the Baath cultivated relations with Moscow 
to counter the perceived hostility of the United States. 

In 1972 the Baathist regime signed a Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation with the Soviet Union. Article 1 stated that the treaty's 
objective was to develop broad cooperation between Iraq and the 
Soviet Union in economic, trade, scientific, technical, and other 
fields on the basis of "respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and non-interference in one another's internal affairs." Under the 
treaty, Iraq obtained extensive technical assistance and military 
equipment from the Soviet Union. 

Despite the importance that both the Bakr and the Saddam 
Husayn governments attached to the relationship with the Soviet 
Union, they were reluctant to have Iraq become too closely entan- 
gled with the Soviet Union or with its sphere of influence. Ideo- 
logically, the Baath Party espoused nonalignment vis-a-vis the 
superpower rivalry, and the party perceived Iraq as being part of 
the Non-Aligned Movement. Indeed, as early as 1974, the more 
pragmatic elements in the party advocated broadening relations 
with the West to counterbalance those with the East and to ensure 
that Iraq maintained a genuine nonaligned status. The dramatic 
increase in oil revenues following the December 1973 quadrupling 
of prices by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) provided the government with the financial resources to 
expand economic relations with numerous private and public enter- 
prises in Western Europe, Japan, and the United States. Iraq also 
was able to diversify its source of weapons by purchasing arms from 
France. 

The major impetus for Iraq's retreat from its close relationship 
with the Soviet Union was not economic, despite Iraq's increas- 
ing commercial ties with the West, but political. Iraqis were shocked 



203 



Iraq: A Country Study 

by the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Sad- 
dam Husayn's government took a lead among the Arab states in 
condemning the invasion. Additional strain was placed on Iraqi- 
Soviet relations in the fall of 1980, when the Soviet Union cut off 
arms shipments to Iraq (and to Iran) as part of its efforts to induce 
a cease-fire. This action angered Saddam Husayn and his col- 
leagues, because Iraq had already paid more than US$1 billion 
dollars for the interdicted weapons. Although Moscow resumed 
arms supplies to Iraq in the summer of 1982, following the Iranian 
advance into Iraqi territory, Iraqi leaders remained bitter over the 
initial halt. 

Despite Iraq's apparent ambivalence about its relationship with 
the Soviet Union, in early 1988 relations remained correct. The 
Soviets were still the main source of weapons for the Iraqi mili- 
tary, a fact that restrained public criticism. Nevertheless, the Sad- 
dam Husayn government generally suspected that the Soviet Union 
was more interested in gaining influence in Iran than in preserv- 
ing its friendship with Iraq. Consequently, Iraqi leaders were skep- 
tical of Soviet declarations that Moscow was trying to persuade 
Iran to agree to a cease-fire. They expressed disappointment in 
late 1987 that the Soviet Union had not exerted sufficient pressure 
upon Iran to force it to cooperate with the UN Security Council 
cease-fire resolution of July 1987. 

The West 

Iraq's disappointment in its relations with the Soviet Union 
gradually led to a tilt toward the West. This process began as early 
as 1974 when prominent Baathists such as Bakr, Saddam Husayn, 
and Aziz expressed the need for a more pragmatic, less ideologi- 
cal approach to relations with "the Western capitalist world." For 
example, the government stated in January 1974 that the West was 
not composed "totally of enemies and imperialists," that some 
countries were relatively moderate, and that there were contradic- 
tions among the principal Western nations. These views became 
the basis on which the regime established generally cordial rela- 
tions with Britain, Italy, France, the Federal Republic of Germany 
(West Germany), and Japan. 

Iraq's closest ties were with France, which came to rank second 
to the Soviet Union as a source of foreign weapons. Iraq imported 
billions of dollars worth of French capital and consumer goods dur- 
ing the 1970s and signed several agreements with French compa- 
nies for technical assistance on development projects. A major 
project was the Osiraq (Osiris-Iraq) nuclear reactor, which French 
engineers were helping to construct at Tuwaitha near Baghdad 



204 



Government and Politics 



before it was bombed by Israel in June 1981. Because Iraq was 
a signatory to the nuclear weapons Nonproliferation Treaty and 
had previously agreed to permit on-site inspections of its nuclear 
energy facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency and 
because France expected to reap considerable economic benefits 
from Iraqi goodwill, France agreed to assist in the reconstruction 
of the nuclear power station; however, as of early 1988 no major 
reconstruction work had been undertaken. 

Economic links with France became especially important after 
the war with Iran had begun. Arms purchases from France, for 
example, continued in the 1980 to 1982 period when the Soviet 
Union was withholding weapons supplies. France also provided 
Iraq generous credits, estimated at US$7 billion, during 1980 to 
1983 when oil revenues were severely reduced on account of the 
war-related decline in exports. To demonstrate its support further, 
in 1983 France provided Iraq with advanced weapons, including 
Exocet missiles and Super Etendard jets, which Iraq subsequently 
used for attacks on Iranian oil loading facilities and on tankers 
carrying Iranian oil. 

Iraq's ties with the United States developed more slowly, primar- 
ily because the Baathists were antagonistic to the close United States- 
Israeli relationship. Relations had been severed following the June 

1967 Arab-Israeli War, before the Baath came to power, but after 

1968 the government became interested in acquiring American tech- 
nology for its development programs. State organizations were 
therefore permitted to negotiate economic contracts, primarily with 
private American firms. In discussing the United States during the 
1970s, the government emphasized, however, that its ties were eco- 
nomic, not political, and that these economic relations involving 
the United States were with "companies," not between the two 
countries. 

Even though Iraqi interest in American technical expertise was 
strong, prior to 1980 the government did not seem to be seriously 
interested in reestablishing diplomatic relations with the United 
States. The Baath Party viewed the efforts by the United States 
to achieve "step-by-step" interim agreements between Israel and 
the Arab countries and the diplomatic process that led to the Camp 
David Accords as calculated attempts to perpetuate Arab disunity. 
Consequentiy, Iraq took a leading role in organizing Arab oppo- 
sition to the diplomatic initiatives of the United States. After Egypt 
signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, Iraq succeeded in getting 
members of the League of Arab States (Arab League) to vote unani- 
mously for Egypt's expulsion from the organization. 



205 



Iraq: A Country Study 

Concern about the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and about 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan prompted Iraq to reexamine 
seriously the nature of its relationship with the United States. This 
process led to a gradual warming of relations between the two coun- 
tries. In 1981 Iraq and the United States engaged in low-level, offi- 
cial talks on matters of mutual interest such as trade and regional 
security. The following year the United States extended credits to 
Iraq for the purchase of American agricultural commodities, the 
first time this had been done since 1967. More significant, in 1983 
the Baathist government hosted a United States special Middle East 
envoy, the highest-ranking American official to visit Baghdad in 
more than sixteen years. In 1984, when the United States inaugu- 
rated "Operation Staunch" to halt shipment of arms to Iran by 
third countries, no similar embargo was attempted against Iraq 
because Saddam Husayn's government had expressed its desire 
to negotiate an end to the war. All of these initiatives prepared the 
ground for Iraq and the United States to reestablish diplomatic 
relations in November 1984. 

In early 1988, Iraq's relations with the United States were gener- 
ally cordial. The relationship had been strained at the end of 1986 
when it was revealed that the United States had secretly sold arms 
to Iran during 1985 and 1986, and a crisis occurred in May 1987 
when an Iraqi pilot bombed an American naval ship in the Persian 
Gulf, a ship he mistakenly thought to be involved in Iran-related 
commerce. Nevertheless, the two countries had weathered these 
problems by mid- 1987. Although lingering suspicions about the 
United States remained, Iraq welcomed greater, even if indirect, 
American diplomatic and military pressure in trying to end the 
war with Iran. For the most part, the government of Saddam 
Husayn believed the United States supported its position that me 
war was being prolonged only because of Iranian intransigence. 

The Persian Gulf Countries 

Iraq's closest relations in 1988 were with the countries of the 
Arabian Peninsula, especially Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This was 
a reversal of the pattern of relations that had persisted in the 1970s. 
The original Baathist view of the Arabian Peninsula shaykhdoms 
was that they were regimes that had been set up by the imperialist 
powers to serve their own interests. This attitude was reinforced 
in the period between 1968 and 1971 , when Britain was preparing 
the countries of Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) for complete independence. Iraq wished to have 
an influence on the governments that would come to power, and 
it provided clandestine assistance to various groups opposed to the 



206 



Government and Politics 



pro-British rulers. Iraqi support of dissident movements was par- 
ticularly evident in Oman, where an organized guerrilla force was 
fighting the government from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s. 

The Baathist perception of Iran's role in the Persian Gulf was 
an important factor in Iraqi views of the Arabian Peninsula states. 
In 1969 Iran, which was then providing aid to dissident Iraqi Kurds, 
unilaterally abrogated a 1937 treaty that had established the Shatt 
al Arab boundary along the low water on the Iranian shore; in 1971 
Iran forcibly occupied three small islands in the lower gulf near 
the approaches to the Strait of Hormuz; and by 1972 Iran was again 
giving assistance to antigovernment Kurds. As Iraq became 
increasingly concerned about Iranian policies, it tried to enlist the 
cooperation of the Arab monarchies in an effort to keep the Persian 
Gulf independent of Iranian influence. Iraq believed it was possi- 
ble to collaborate with the Arab kings and shaykhs because the latter 
had proven their Arab nationalism by participating in the 1973 
oil boycott against the Western countries supporting Israel. Despite 
Iraq's new friendliness, the rulers in countries like Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia did not easily forget their suspicions of Iraqi radicalism. 
Nevertheless, political discussions were initiated, and progress was 
made toward resolving disputes over borders, over oil pricing policy, 
and over support for subversion. 

By the time the Islamic Revolution occurred in Iran in 1979, 
Iraq had succeeded in establishing generally correct relations with 
the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. The war with Iran served as 
a catalyst to develop these relations even further. Although the Gulf 
states proclaimed their neutrality in the war, in practice they gave 
Iraq crucial financial support. The unexpected prolongation of the 
war and the closing of Iraqi ports early in the war had produced 
a severe economic crunch by the beginning of 1981. In response, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE all provided loans to 
help replace revenues that Iraq had lost because of the decline of 
its oil exports. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were particularly gener- 
ous, providing an estimated US$50 billion in interest-free loans 
up through 1987. In addition, a major portion of Iraq's nonmili- 
tary imports were shipped to Kuwaiti harbors, then transported 
overland to Iraq. Saudi Arabia also agreed to provide to Iraqi con- 
tract customers part of its own oil from the Neutral Zone, juris- 
diction over which it shared with Iraq; it was understood that Iraq 
would repay this oil "loan" after the war had ended. 

Iraq and Other Arab Countries 

The war with Iran changed the Baathist perception of what con- 
stituted the principal threat to Arab unity. Prior to 1980, the Baath 



207 



Iraq: A Country Study 

leaders had identified Zionism as the main danger to Arab nation- 
alism. After the war had begun, Iranian nationalism was perceived 
as the primary force threatening the Arabs. Under the pressures 
of war, Iraq became reconciled with Egypt and moderated its once- 
uncompromising stance on Israel. This reconciliation was ironic, 
because Iraq had taken the lead in 1978 and in 1979 in ostracizing 
Egypt for recognizing Israel and for signing a separate peace treaty 
with the latter state. The war with Iran helped to transform Egypt 
from an excoriated traitor into a much-appreciated ally. Factories 
in Egypt produced munitions and spare parts for the Iraqi army, 
and Egyptian workers filled some of the labor shortages created 
by the mobilization of so many Iraqi men. As early as 1984, Iraq 
publicly called for Egypt's readmission into pan- Arab councils, and 
in 1987 Iraq was one of the countries leading the effort to have 
Egypt readmitted to the Arab League. 

The Baath also abandoned its former hostility to countries such 
as Jordan, Morocco, and the Yemen Arab Republic (North 
Yemen). On a smaller scale than Egypt, Jordan provided Iraq with 
tanks and with laborers, and it served as a transshipment point 
for goods intended for Iraq. 

The most ideologically significant consequence of the war was 
the evolution of Baathist views on the issue of Palestine. Prior to 
1980, Iraq had opposed any negotiations that might lead to the 
creation of a Palestinian state on the Israeli-occupied West Bank 
and in the Gaza Strip on the ground that these territories constituted 
only part of historic Palestine. Accordingly, Iraq supported the most 
extreme Palestinian guerrilla groups, the so-called "rejectionist" 
factions, and was hostile toward the mainstream Palestine Libera- 
tion Organization (PLO). Thus, Iraq provided financial and mili- 
tary aid to such forces as George Habash's Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Palestine Liberation Front, and 
the Arab Liberation Front. The latter group had actually been 
founded by the Baath in 1969. In addition, Iraq was widely believed 
to have links to various Palestinian terrorist groups such as the "Spe- 
cial Operations Branch" of the PFLP, Black June, the Arab Orga- 
nization of the 15th May, and the Abu Nidal Organization. 

Beginning in 1980, Iraq gradually retreated from its long-held 
position that there could never be any recognition of Israel. In 1983 
Baath leaders accepted the de facto partition of pre- 1948 Palestine 
by stating publicly that there could be negotiations with Israel for 
a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Consequently, 
Iraq cut its ties to the extremist Palestinian factions, including that 
of Abu Nidal, who was expelled from the country in November; 
he subsequently established new headquarters in Syria. Iraq shifted 



208 



Government and Politics 



its support to the mainstream Palestinian groups that advocated 
negotiations for a Palestinian state. Yasir Arafat's Al Fatah organi- 
zation was permitted to reopen an office in Baghdad. Arafat, whose 
proposed assassination for alleged treason against the Palestinians 
had been clandestinely supported by Iraq in the late 1970s, was 
even invited to visit the country. This shift represented a fundamen- 
tal revolution in the thinking of the Iraqi Baath. In effect, by 1986 
the Baath Party was saying that the Palestinians had to determine 
for themselves the nature of their relationship with Israel. 

Iraq's most bitter foreign relationship was with the rival Baath 
government in Syria. Although there were periods of amity between 
the two governments — such as the one immediately after the 
October 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the one in October 1978, when 
Iraq and Syria both opposed Egypt's plans for a separate peace 
with Israel — the governments generally were hostile to one another. 
Relations began to deteriorate once again at the end of 1980 fol- 
lowing the outbreak of the war with Iran. Syria criticized Iraq for 
diverting Arab attention from the real enemy (Israel) and for attack- 
ing a regime (Iran) supportive of the Arab cause. Relations wors- 
ened throughout 1981 as each country accused the other of assisting 
antiregime political groups. In April 1982, Syria closed its borders 
with Iraq and cut off the flow of Iraqi oil through the pipeline that 
traversed Syrian territory to ports on the Mediterranean Sea. The 
cessation of Iraqi oil exports via this pipeline was a severe economic 
blow; Iraq interpreted the move as a confirmation of Syria's de 
facto alliance with Iran in the war. 

The hostility between Iraq and Syria has been a source of con- 
cern to the other Arab states. King Hussein of Jordan, in particu- 
lar, tried to reconcile the Iraqi and Syrian leaders. Although his 
efforts to mediate a meeting between Saddam Husayn and Syrian 
president Hafiz al Assad were finally realized in early 1987, these 
private discussions did not lead to substantive progress in resolv- 
ing the issues that divided the two countries. Intense diplomatic 
efforts by Jordan and by Saudi Arabia also resulted in the atten- 
dance of both presidents, Husayn and Assad, at the Arab League 
summit in Amman in November 1987. The Iraqis were irritated, 
however, that Syria used its influence to prevent the conference 
from adopting sanctions against Iran. The animosities that have 
divided the rival Iraqi and Syrian factions of the Baath appeared 
to be as firmly rooted as ever in early 1988. 

Relations with Other Countries 

In 1988 Iraq maintained cordial relations with Turkey, its 
non-Arab neighbor to the north. Turkey served as an important 



209 



Iraq: A Country Study 

transshipment point for both Iraqi oil exports and its commodity 
imports. A pipeline transported oil from the northern oil fields of 
Iraq through Turkey to the Mediterranean Sea. Trucks carrying 
a variety of European manufactured goods used Turkish highways 
to bring imports into Iraq. There was also trade between Turkey 
and Iraq, the former selling Iraq small arms, produce, and tex- 
tiles. In addition, Iraq and Turkey have cooperated in suppress- 
ing Kurdish guerrilla activities in their common border area. 

Outside the Middle East, Iraq maintained correct relations with 
other countries. Iraq identified itself as part of the Non- Aligned 
Movement of primarily African and Asian nations, actively par- 
ticipated in its deliberations during the late 1970s, and successfully 
lobbied to have Baghdad chosen as the site for its September 1982 
conference. Although significant resources were expended to pre- 
pare facilities for the conference, and Saddam Husayn would have 
emerged from the meeting as a recognized leader of the Nonaligned 
Movement, genuine fears of an Iranian bombing of the capital dur- 
ing the summer of 1982 forced the government reluctantly to request 
that the venue of the conference be transferred to New Delhi. Since 
that time, preoccupation with the war against Iran, which also is 
a member of the Nonaligned Movement, has tended to restrict the 
scope of Iraqi participation in that organization. 

Participation in International Organizations 

Iraq is a member of the UN and of its affiliated agencies. It also 
is a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF — see Glos- 
sary), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Interna- 
tional Labour Organisation (ILO). The Iraqi Red Crescent is 
affiliated with the International Committee of the Red Cross. Iraq 
is one of the founding members of OPEC. Iraq also belongs to 
several pan- Arab organizations including the Arab League and the 
Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. 

* * * 

A good overview of Iraqi politics from the overthrow of the 
monarchy in 1958 until the mid-1980s is Phebe Marr's The Modern 
History of Iraq. An excellent source for details about Iraqi politics 
during the first ten years of Baath Party rule is Majid Khadduri's 
Socialist Iraq. The social origins of the Baath leaders are exhaus- 
tively examined in Hanna Batatu's The Old Social Classes and the 
Revolutionary Movements of Iraq. An analysis of the early years of 
Saddam Husayn 's presidency is Christine Moss Helms 's study Iraq, 
Eastern Flank of the Arab World. Tim Niblock edited a collection of 



210 



Government and Politics 

essays on the state of politics at the beginning of the 1980s called 
Iraq: The Contemporary State. For background on the war with Iran 
see Jasim Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis. (For fur- 
ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography). 



211 



I 



The golden helmet of Maskalam-dug, king of Ur, ca. 2450 B. C. 



SOCIAL UPHEAVALS HAVE PLAYED a major role in Iraq's 
perception of its national security. Internal political instability, cou- 
pled with recurrent revolts by the Kurdish minority, mobilized the 
energies of successive regimes to crush opposition forces and to 
restore order. During the mid- and late 1970s, however, the Baath 
(Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party leaders succeeded in establishing 
a revolutionary government, which temporarily subdued the Kurd- 
ish revolt in northern Iraq and, using repressive measures, con- 
solidated its power. 

The higher prices of petroleum following the October 1973 Arab- 
Israeli War, and the Arab oil embargo, resulted in an accumula- 
tion of wealth that enabled Iraq to expand its armed forces in an 
attempt to match, in strength as well as in strategic importance, the 
capacity of its neighbor, Iran. Having signed a border treaty with 
Tehran in 1975, Baghdad assumed that its search for military parity 
would not result in conflict, in particular because the two states 
enjoyed economic prosperity; however, regional events, ranging from 
the Soviet Union's expulsion from Egypt in 1972 to Egypt's even- 
tual expulsion from the League of Arab States (Arab League) in 
1979, following the signing of the separate Israeli-Egyptian Peace 
Treaty, strengthened Baghdad's resolve to make a bid for regional 
leadership. Armed with modern weapons and with sophisticated 
equipment from the Soviet Union and France, Iraq gained a sense 
of invincibility and, when the opportunity arose, implemented its 
resolve. Threatened by the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and by 
its potential influence on Iraq's majority Shia (see Glossary) popu- 
lation, Iraq attacked Iran on September 22, 1980. 

For most of the 1980s, Iraq has been preoccupied with that war. 
In contrast to the first forty years of Iraqi independence, when the 
military participated in several coups, the Iraqi armed forces demon- 
strated growing professionalism in the 1980s by limiting their direct 
role in the country's political life. The armed forces' loyalty has 
also been assured by the Baath Party, however, which — after con- 
ducting purges against the military during the 1970s — continued 
to maintain a close eye on every aspect of military life and national 
security in the late 1980s. 

National Security Concerns 

Like most developing states, but perhaps to a greater extent 
because of internal schisms, Iraq was plagued with insecurity and 



215 



Iraq: A Country Study 

with political instability after independence in 1932. When Brit- 
ain and France redrew boundaries throughout the Middle East fol- 
lowing the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire after World 
War I, the region that eventually became Iraq (under the Sykes- 
Picot Agreement) included a wide variety of ethnic and religious 
groups with little sense of national unity (see World War I and 
the British Mandate, ch. 1). The absence of nation-building ele- 
ments encouraged various sectors of Iraqi society to oppose the 
establishment of central authority, often for personal and ideolog- 
ical reasons. Consequently, clandestine activities against the state's 
budding political and military institutions threatened Iraq's politi- 
cal leaders. Insecurity arising from domestic opposition to the state 
was compounded by Iraq's long-standing isolation from neighboring 
countries because of ideological rivalries, ethnic and religious differ- 
ences, and competition for influence in the Persian Gulf. The Iraqi 
political agenda was further burdened in the late 1970s by the newly 
inherited Arab leadership role that came with Egypt's isolation in 
the wake of the Camp David Accords and the ensuing separate 
Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty. 

The Baath Party that ruled Iraq in early 1988 came to power 
in July 1968 determined to restore order to a country where politi- 
cal turmoil was the norm (see The Emergence of Saddam Husayn, 
1968-79, ch. 1). Despite several coup attempts during the inter- 
vening twenty years, notably in 1970 and in 1973, the Baath suc- 
cessfully ended the political turbulence of the 1950s and the 1960s. 
Yet, this level of stability was achieved only through harsh methods 
imposed by an increasingly disciplined, if intolerant, party. Anti- 
state conspirators, including fellow Baathists, were rushed into exile, 
were kept under house arrest, or were executed. Actual or alleged 
coup attempts were forcefully put down and were followed by sys- 
tematic purges of the bureaucracy and the armed forces; moreover, 
the party's vigilance on internal security was supported by a 
thorough indoctrination program to gain and to maintain formerly 
uncertain loyalties, both within the armed forces and in the civilian 
population. 

Baathist success in maintaining internal security resulted partly 
from its 1975 limited victory against the Kurds (see People, ch. 2; 
Internal Security, this ch.). The Iraqi-Iranian border agreement 
of March 1975, subsequently formalized in the Baghdad Treaty 
in June 1975, resolved a number of disputes between the two states. 
Its provisions ended Iranian support for Iraqi Kurds, whose strug- 
gles for autonomy had troubled Iraqi governments since 1932. 
Bolstered by this limited success, Baghdad adopted a variety of 
measures in the succeeding decade in order to emerge from its 



216 



National Security 



political isolation and assert its strategic value. The 1970s closed 
under a cloud of insecurity, however, as the Baathists took stock 
of the revolutionary Islamic regime in Tehran. Threatened by 
Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini's repeated calls to 
Iraqi Shias to follow in the Iranian people's footsteps by overthrow- 
ing usurpers of power, the Baathist leadership embarked on an 
adventurous war. Seven years later, Baghdad was nowhere near 
its objective, and it was struggling to avoid a military defeat. 
Nevertheless, the Baath Party continued to maintain its influence 
in Iraq throughout the early and mid-1980s. For the most part, 
the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and its chairman, 
President Saddam Husayn (also seen as Hussein), maintained their 
political positions through repressive means and by what was justi- 
fied as a defensive Iraqi war against a perceived threat. Foreign 
observers believed that the government remained vulnerable to 
challenges to its authority because of the lack of any legitimate 
means of political dissent and because of the reverberations of a 
war of attrition with mounting casualties. 

Iraq had enjoyed a relatively favorable national security situa- 
tion in the late 1970s, but practically all its perceived politico- 
military gains were lost after it attacked Iran in 1980, and in 1988 
Iraq faced serious economic and military difficulties. 

The Regular Armed Forces 
Size, Equipment, and Organization 

During the late 1970s and the mid-1980s, the Iraqi armed forces 
underwent many changes in size, structure, arms supplies, hier- 
archy, deployment, and political character. Headquartered in Bagh- 
dad, the army — of an estimated 1.7 million or more Iraqis, 
including reserves (actual numbers not available) and paramili- 
tary — in 1987 had seven corps, five armored divisions (each with 
one armored brigade and one mechanized brigade), and three 
mechanized divisions (each with one armored brigade and two or 
more mechanized brigades). An expanded Presidential Guard Force 
was composed of three armored brigades, one infantry brigade, 
and one commando brigade. There were also thirty infantry divi- 
sions, composed of the People's Army (Al Jaysh ash Shaabi — also 
cited as the Popular Army or People's Militia) brigades and the 
reserve brigades, as well as six Special Forces brigades. 

This growth in the manpower and equipment inventories of the 
Iraqi armed forces was facilitated by Iraq's capacity to pay for a 
large standing army and was occasioned by Iraq's need to fight 
a war with Iran, a determined and much larger neighbor. Whereas 



217 



Iraq: A Country Study 

in 1978 active-duty military personnel numbered fewer than 
200,000, and the military was equipped with some of the most 
sophisticated weaponry of the Soviet military arsenal, by 1987 the 
quality of offensive weapons had improved dramatically, and the 
number of men under arms had increased almost fourfold (see 
table 10, Appendix). 

Army equipment inventories increased significantly during the 
mid-1980s. Whereas in 1977 the army possessed approximately 
2,400 tanks, including several hundred T-62 models, in 1987 the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that Iraq 
deployed about 4,500 tanks, including advanced versions of the 
T-72. Other army equipment included about 4,000 armored 
vehicles, more than 3,000 towed and self-propelled artillery pieces, 
a number of FROG- 7 and Scud-B surface-to-surface missiles with 
a range of up to 300 kilometers, and an array of approximately 
4,000 (some self-propelled) antiaircraft guns. The vast majority of 
the army's equipment inventory was of Soviet manufacture, 
although French and Brazilian equipment in particular continued 
to be acquired in Iraq's ongoing attempt to diversify its sources 
of armaments (see table 11, Appendix). This mammoth arsenal 
gave Iraq a clear-cut advantage over Iran in 1987. Iraq had an 
advantage of more than four to one in tanks (4,500 to 1,000); four 
to one in armored vehicles (4,000 to 1 ,000); and two to one in artil- 
lery and antiaircraft pieces (7,330 to 3,000). Despite this quantitative 
and qualitative superiority, the Iraqi army by the end of 1987 had 
not risked its strength in a final and decisive battle to win the war. 

Headquartered in Basra, the 5,000-man navy was the smallest 
branch of the armed forces in early 1988, and, in contrast to the 
Iranian navy, had played virtually no role in the war. Iraq's second 
naval facility at Umm Qasr took on added importance after 1980, 
in particular because the Shatt al Arab waterway, which leads into 
Basra, was the scene of extensive fighting. It was at Umm Qasr 
that most of the Iraqi navy's active vessels were based in early 1988. 
Between 1977 and 1987, Iraq purchased from the Soviet Union 
eight fast-attack OSA-class patrol boats — each equipped with Styx 
surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). In late 1986, Iraq obtained from 
Italy four Lupo class frigates, and six Wadi Assad class corvettes 
equipped with Otomat-2 SSMs. Although the four frigates and the 
six corvettes was held in Italy under an embargo imposed by the 
Italian government, these purchases signaled Iraq's intention to 
upgrade its naval power. Observers speculated that the end of the 
war with Iran could be followed by a rapid expansion of the Iraqi 
navy, which could exercise its influence in northern Persian Gulf 
waters (see table 12, Appendix). 



218 



National Security 



In 1987 the Iraqi air force consisted of 40,000 men, of whom 
about 10,000 were attached to its subordinate Air Defense Com- 
mand. The air force was headquartered in Baghdad, and major 
bases were located at Basra, H-3 (site of a pump station on the 
oil pipeline in western Iraq), Kirkuk, Mosul, Rashid, and Ash 
Shuaybah. Iraq's more than 500 combat aircraft were formed into 
two bomber squadrons, eleven fighter- ground attack squadrons, 
five interceptor squadrons, and one counterinsurgency squadron 
of 10 to 30 aircraft each. Support aircraft included two transport 
squadrons. As many as ten helicopter squadrons were also opera- 
tional, although these formed the Army Air Corps. The Air Defense 
Command piloted the MiG-25, MiG-21, and various Mirage inter- 
ceptors and manned Iraq's considerable inventory of surface-to- 
air missiles (SAMs). 

The equipment of the air force and the army's air corps, like that 
of the other services, was primarily of Soviet manufacture. After 
1980, however, in an effort to diversify its sources of advanced 
armaments, Iraq turned to France for Mirage fighters and for attack 
helicopters. Between 1982 and 1987, Iraq received or ordered a vari- 
ety of equipment from France, including more than 100 Mirage 
F-ls, about 100 Gazelle, Super-Frelon, and Alouette helicopters, 
and a variety of air-to- surface and air-to-air missiles, including 
Exocets. Other attack helicopters purchased included the Soviet Hind 
equipped with AT-2 Swatter, and BO- 105s equipped with AS-1 1 
antitank guided weapons. In addition, Iraq bought seventy F-7 
(Chinese version of the MiG-21) fighters, assembled in Egypt. Thus 
Iraq's overall airpower was considerable (see table 13, Appendix). 

Although Iraq expanded its arms inventory, its war efforts may 
have been hindered by poor military judgment and by lack of 
resolve. Saddam Husayn was the country's head of state and pre- 
mier as well as the chairman of both the RCC and the Baath Party; 
moreover, in 1984 he assumed the rank of field marshal and 
appointed himself commander in chief of the Iraqi armed forces. 
Iraqi propaganda statements claimed that Saddam Husayn had 
"developed new military ideas and theories of global importance," 
but few Western military analysts gave credence to such claims. 
Since 1980 General Adnan Khairallah, who served as both deputy 
commander in chief of the armed forces and minister of defense, 
was the highest officer in the military chain of command. In 1987 
he also assumed the position of deputy prime minister. His multi- 
ple roles reflected the predominance of the army in the organiza- 
tional structure of the armed forces. Sattar Ahmad Jassin was 
appointed secretary general of defense and adjutant of the armed 
forces in 1985. General Abd al Jabar Shanshal assumed the position 



219 



Iraq: A Country Study 

of chief of the armed forces general staff in 1984. Frequent changes 
at the general staff level indicated to foreign observers that Iraq's 
military failures were primarily the result of poor leadership and 
an overly rigid command structure. Defective leadership was evi- 
dent in the lack of clear orders and in the poor responses by the 
army in the occupation of Susangerd. In October 1980, armored 
units twice advanced and withdrew from the city, and later in the 
same operation, the army abandoned strategic positions near 
Dezful. Rigid control of junior officers and of noncommissioned 
officers (NCOs) frustrated their initiative and may have been the 
reason for the high casualty figures in the infantry, where initia- 
tive and spontaneity in decision making can be of paramount impor- 
tance. The command structure reportedly was even more inflexible 
and slow in the People's Army detachments, where political com- 
manders routinely made military decisions. 

Manpower and Training 

Historically, under Turkish rule, Iraqi conscripts were often 
transported to distant locations within the vast Ottoman Empire, 
and they were not allowed to return home for many years. During 
the early years of independence, conditions of service were nearly 
as onerous: pay was irregular, troops were misused, and retention 
beyond the compulsory period remained a common practice. 
Throughout modern history, the majority of conscripts have ful- 
filled much of their service obligation in the rugged mountains of 
northern Iraq, where conditions were Spartan at best and were often 
very dangerous. Although conditions improved markedly during 
the 1970s, and conscription was no longer as widely resented as 
it had been for more than a century, there were still draft dodgers, 
and they were routinely court-martialed and executed in public. 

In the past, deferments and exemptions from conscription were 
usually granted generously. Until 1958 exemptions could be bought. 
In 1988 deferments were still available to full-time students, to hard- 
ship cases, and to those with brothers serving in the military. The 
increase in manpower needs created by the rapid growth of the 
army after 1973 and the war with Iran after 1980 resulted in a tight- 
ening of previously liberal exemption policies, however. In 1987 
observers estimated that a total of 3 million Iraqi males, aged eigh- 
teen to forty-five, were fit for military service. An additional 2 mil- 
lion Iraqi females in the same age group were potentially available 
for military service. 

Males were liable to conscription until the age of forty-five. In 
1980 the two-year compulsory period of service was extended 
without specific time limitations, to support the war effort; many 



220 



National Security 



trained technicians started serving as long as five years. A man 
could also volunteer — for a two-year term that could be extended 
by periods of two years — as an alternative to conscription or for 
additional service at any time between ages eighteen and forty-three. 
After two years of compulsory active service, both conscripts and 
volunteers were obliged to spend eighteen years in a reserve unit. 
These reserve units received intensive training during the mid-1980s 
because many reservists were called up to fill manpower shortages 
caused by the Iran-Iraq War and to relieve temporarily those on 
active duty. 

Although women were not conscripted, under a law passed in 
1977 they could be commissioned as officers if they held a health- 
related university degree, and they could be appointed as warrant 
officers or NCOs in army medical institutes if they were qualified 
nurses. The vast majority of women in the armed forces held 
administrative or medical- related positions, but an increasing num- 
ber of women performed in combat functions after 1981. Women 
were serving in combat roles both in the air force and in the Air 
Defense Command in 1987. This integration of women into the 
military reflected the shortage of trained males. 

Most army officers came from the Military College in Baghdad, 
which was founded in 1924. Candidates for the college were physi- 
cally qualified, secondary- school graduates of Iraqi nationality, who 
had demonstrated political loyalty. Cadets were divided into two 
groups, combatant (combat arms) and administrative (technology 
and administration). They studied common subjects during the first 
two years, and they specialized according to their group designa- 
tion in the final year. On graduation cadets received commissions 
as second lieutenants in the regular army. Some were granted higher 
ranks because of voluntary service on the war front. 

Another source of army officers was the Reserve College founded 
in 1952. This school enrolled two classes annually, one for those 
who held professional degrees, such as medicine and pharmacy, 
and one for secondary- school graduates. During the 1970s, approxi- 
mately 2,000 reserve officers were graduated each year; those with 
professional degrees were commissioned as second lieutenants, and 
those without a college education were appointed as warrant officers. 
The army also maintained a system of service schools for training 
in combat arms as well as in technical and administrative services. 
Most of those schools, located in or near Baghdad, have conducted 
additional courses for both officers and NCOs since 1980. Since 
1928 the army has also maintained a two-year staff college to train 
selected officers in all services for command and staff positions. 



221 



Iraq: A Country Study 

In mid- 1977 the navy opened its own officer training academy. 
This comparatively new institution was called the Arabian Gulf 
Academy for Naval Studies. Since 1933 the air force has main- 
tained its own college as a source of officer personnel. In 1971 the 
college was moved from Rashid Airbase (southeast of Baghdad) 
to Tikrit. It offered administrative and flight training courses as 
well as training for technical specialists. (Iraqi officers and pilots 
received training in several foreign countries as well in the 1970s; 
pilots were trained in India and in France, and especially in the 
Soviet Union.) 

The highest level of military training in Iraq was a one-year 
course conducted at Al Bakr University for Higher Military Studies 
(also called the War College) in Baghdad, founded in 1977. At the 
War College, high-ranking officers studied modern theories and 
methods of warfare in preparation for assuming top command and 
staff positions in the armed forces. Little was known about the con- 
tent of Iraq's military training, although political and ideological 
indoctrination appeared to accompany military training at all levels. 
In any case, the seven years of combat in the Iran-Iraq War could 
only have enhanced technical skills; many of these officers presum- 
ably applied their theoretical training in conducting the war. By 
Western accounts, however, the battlefield performance of mili- 
tary leaders did not reflect sophisticated grasp of strategy and tactics 
(see The Iran-Iraq War, this ch.). 

Conditions of Service and Morale 

Conditions of service in the Iraqi army historically have been 
poor. In addition to receiving low and irregular pay, during much 
of the country's modern history Iraqi soldiers were involved in a 
costly and unpopular war with Kurdish rebels. Having to fight the 
Kurds caused morale problems and desertions, particularly among 
the army's Kurdish recruits, and on at least two occasions between 
1975 and 1979 the government offered amnesties to all soldiers and 
security personnel who had deserted during Kurdish conflicts. 
Between 1975 and 1980, Baghdad made some progress in solving 
long-standing morale problems and in improving conditions of ser- 
vice. The 1975 victory against the Kurds and increased oil income 
contributed to these improvements. A reversal recurred in 1981, 
however, when many of the Iraqi military failed to cope with combat 
stress, and thousands experienced psychological problems because 
of their war experiences. The surrender rate was also high, as 
prisoner-of-war statistics indicated, and that further demoralized 
loyal troops. 



222 



National Security 



In 1975 Baghdad adopted a comprehensive Military Service and 
Pension Law that established pay scales, allowances, benefits, and 
retirement pay designed to attract officers and enlisted men from 
the civilian sector. A second lieutenant was authorized ID65 (ID 
or Iraqi dinar — for value of dinar, see Glossary) a month as base 
pay, with an increase of ID20 for each higher rank. Moreover, an 
adjustable cost-of-living allowance was established, as was a family 
allowance amounting to a 5 percent increase in salary for each 
dependent. Service allowances were also granted to those with spe- 
cial skills or duties. Retirement pay was commensurate with rank 
and with civilian retirement benefits, and indemnities were estab- 
lished for the families of soldiers disabled or killed in action. 

After the military defeats of 1982, the entire chain of command 
suffered low morale. On several occasions, signs of mutiny in oppo- 
sition to the war emerged. According to unverified Iraqi dissident 
reports, the number of deserters reached 100,000, and in central 
and in southern Iraq, they formed armed groups that were opposed 
to the regime. Many soldiers refused to fight in Kurdistan, and 
many more joined the armed Kurdish resistance movement. 

Military Justice System 

Both political offenders and ordinary criminal offenders in the 
armed forces were tried in the military courts, but Iraq's military 
courts had no jurisdiction over civilians accused of security-related 
crimes. Such cases were reviewed by revolutionary courts. Mili- 
tary tribunals were held in camera and were often summary in 
nature. Although little information was available in early 1988, 
observers believed that the system of military justice differed little 
from the system in operation at the time of the 1968 Baath Revo- 
lution. At that time a permanent military court of at least five mem- 
bers was usually established at each division headquarters and 
wherever large concentrations of nondivision troops were stationed. 
In addition, emergency military courts could be set up in combat 
areas to expedite the trial of offenders there. Such courts usually 
consisted of three members, a president with the rank of lieutenant 
colonel and two members with the rank of major or above. 

The highest court was the Military Court of Cassation, which 
sat in Baghdad. It was appointed by the minister of defense and 
was composed of a president with the rank of brigadier general or 
above and two members with the rank of colonel or above. Appeals 
from the sentences of lower military courts were heard in the Mili- 
tary Court of Cassation; it also conducted trials of the first instance 
of senior officers. 



223 



Iraq: A Country Study 

A number of changes were introduced into the Penal Code of 
the Popular Army since 1980. Law No. 32 of 1982, for example, 
made several offenses by service personnel punishable by death. 
In its 1985 report, Amnesty International noted that RCC Reso- 
lution No. 1370 reaffirmed the death penalty for various offenses. 
These included fleeing or defaulting from military service, con- 
spiring against the state, espionage, and joining the Ad Dawah al 
Islamiyah (the Islamic Call), commonly referred to as Ad Dawah. 

Uniforms and Rank Insignia 

In the late 1980s, Iraqi uniforms consisted of service and field 
attire for both summer and winter and a dress uniform and mess 
jacket for officers. The winter service dress uniform, of olive drab 
wool, consisted of a single-breasted coat having patch pockets with 
flaps, a khaki shirt and tie, and trousers that were usually cuffless. 
The summer uniform was similar but was made of light tan mate- 
rial. The winter field uniform consisted of an olive drab shirt, wool 
trousers, and a waist-length jacket. The summer field uniform was 
identical in style but was made of lighter material. Both field uni- 
forms included a web belt, a beret or helmet, and high- top shoes. 

Commissioned officers' rank insignia were identical for the army 
and for the air force except that shoulder boards were olive drab 
for the army and were blue for the air force. Naval officer rank 
insignia consisted of gold stripes worn on the lower sleeve. Army 
and air force enlisted personnel wore stripes on the sleeve to desig- 
nate rank, while the top noncommissioned officer rank, sergeant 
major and chief master sergeant, respectively, consisted of a gold 
bar on top of the shoulders (see fig. 12 and fig. 13). 

Paramilitary Forces 

In 1987 the People's Army (Al Jaysh ash Shaabi — also cited as 
the Popular Army or People's Militia), standing at an estimated 
650,000, approached the regular armed forces' manpower strength. 
Officially, it was the Iraqi Baath Party Militia and included a spe- 
cial youth section. Formed in 1970, the People's Army grew rapidly, 
and by 1977 it was estimated to have 50,000 active members. Sub- 
sequently, a phenomenal growth, giving the militia extensive inter- 
nal security functions, occurred. Whereas its original purpose was 
to give the Baath Party an active role in every town and village, 
the People's Army in 1981 began its most ambitious task to date, 
the support of the regular armed forces. 

The official functions of the People's Army were to act as back- 
up to the regular armed forces in times of war and to safeguard 
revolutionary achievements, to promote mass consciousness, to 



224 



National Security 



consolidate national unity, and to bolster the relationship between 
the people and the army in times of peace. The People's Army 
dispatched units to Iraqi Kurdistan before 1980 and to Lebanon 
to fight with Palestinian guerrillas during the 1975-76 Civil War. 
Foreign observers concluded, however, that the primary function 
of the People's Army was political in nature; first, to enlist popu- 
lar support for the Baath Party, and second, to act as a counter- 
weight against any coup attempts by the regular armed forces. 

Beginning in 1974, Taha Yasin Ramadan, a close associate of 
President Saddam Husayn, commanded the People's Army, which 
was responsible for internal security. The command of such a large 
military establishment gave Ramadan so much power, however, 
that some foreign observers speculated that the primary function 
of his second in command was to keep him from using the Peo- 
ple's Army as a personal power base. 

People's Army members were recruited from among both women 
and men (who had completed their regular army service) eighteen 
years of age and older. It was unclear whether or not Baath Party 
membership was a prerequisite — especially after 1981, when the 
numerical strength of the People's Army ballooned — but, clearly, 
party indoctrination was at least as important as military training. 
Members usually underwent a two-month annual training period, 
and they were paid from party funds. Although the extent of their 
training was unknown in early 1988, all recruits were instructed 
in the use of a rifle. Graduates were responsible for guarding govern- 
ment buildings and installations, and they were concentrated around 
sensitive centers in major towns. Militia members possessed some 
sophisticated arms, and it was possible that disgruntied officers con- 
templating a challenge to Saddam Husayn could rally the support 
of a force of such militiamen. 

Futuwah (Youth Vanguard) was a paramilitary organization for 
secondary- school students founded by the Baath Party in 1975. Boys 
and girls between the ages of fourteen and eighteen could join 
Futuwah and receive training in light arms, in the use of grenades, 
and in civil defense work. By early 1988, several thousand Iraqi 
youth had volunteered for Futuwah training, and they had been 
organized into youth platoons. Unverified reports claimed that some 
People's Army units and Futuwah units were dispatched to the war 
front for short periods of time in 1983 and 1985. Visitors to Bagh- 
dad in the 1980s, however, reported that most civil defense activi- 
ties in the capital were performed by young People's Army 
members. 



225 



Iraq: A Country Study 




National Security 




Iraq: A Country Study 

Foreign Military Ties 

Military Ties Prior to the Iran-Iraq War 

Iraq's armed forces were heavily dependent on foreign military 
assistance after the fall of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World 
War I. In 1921 British Mandate authorities undertook the train- 
ing of Iraqi soldiers who had served under the Ottomans. The Brit- 
ish reorganized the former Ottoman units into a force designed 
to uphold internal law and order and to serve British interests by 
putting down frequent tribal revolts. Until 1958 British officers 
guided the development of the armed forces, and British influence 
was reflected in the organization, training, and equipment of the 
Iraqi military. Senior Iraqi officers regularly were sent to Britain 
or to India to receive advanced training. Iraq's generally Western- 
oriented military posture throughout this period culminated in the 
1955 Baghdad Pact. 

The revolution of July 14, 1958, and the coming to power of 
Abd al Karim Qasim completely altered Iraq's military orienta- 
tion. Disagreement with the British (and with the Western world's) 
stance vis-a-vis Israel and growing pan-Arab sentiment led Qasim 
to abrogate the Baghdad Pact and to turn to the Soviet Union for 
arms. Since 1959 the Soviet Union has been Iraq's chief arms sup- 
plier and its most essential foreign military tie. In April 1972, the 
two states signed a fifteen-year Treaty of Friendship and Coopera- 
tion in which Iraq and the Soviet Union agreed to "continue to 
develop cooperation in the strengthening of the defense capabili- 
ties of each." 

By no means, however, was Iraq a "satellite" of the Soviet 
Union. Baghdad consistently insisted on its independence in policy 
making, and on a number of key issues, including the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, Syria's role in Lebanon, and the Nonaligned Movement, 
the two states held opposing views. Furthermore, Iraq's Baathist 
ideology remained fundamentally antithetical to communism. As 
a further sign of its staunch independence, Iraq insisted on its free- 
dom to purchase weapons from Western sources, and in 1980 it 
demonstrated its intention to diversify its source of armaments. 
Although France and Britain both had sold some arms to Iraq dur- 
ing the 1966 to 1968 regime of Abd ar Rahman Arif, between 1974 
and 1980 Iraq increased its purchases from France by acquiring 
helicopters, antitank missiles, and high performance Mirage jet 
fighters. 

Despite these expressions of Iraqi independence, both mutual 
interests and practical necessity dictated the Iraqi air forces' s reliance 



228 



National Security 



on Soviet support. Total Soviet military aid to Iraq between 1958 
and 1974 was estimated at the equivalent of US$1.6 billion; in 1975 
alone such Soviet aid was estimated at US$1 billion. Soviet deliv- 
eries of military hardware of increasingly higher quality between 
1976 and 1980 were estimated at US$5 billion. In 1977, for exam- 
ple, Iraq ordered the Ilyushin 11-76 long-range jet transport, the 
first such Soviet aircraft provided to a foreign state. Until 1980 
nearly 1,200 Soviet and East European advisers, as well as 150 
Cuban advisers, were in Iraq. Iraqi military personnel were also 
trained in the use of SAMs, and observers estimated that between 
1958 and 1980, nearly 5,000 Iraqis received military training in 
the Soviet Union. 

Although receiving arms and training from foreign sources itself, 
Iraq provided some military aid to irregular units engaged in pro- 
Iraqi "national liberation movements" in the Middle East and in 
Africa prior to 1980. Most of this aid was in monetary grants and 
in armaments, which amounted to more than US$600 million 
annually. Pro-Iraqi Palestinian groups, such as the Arab Libera- 
tion Front, received the bulk of the aid, but several African 
organizations, including the Eritrean Liberation Front, also received 
some. Volunteer Iraqi soldiers fought on the side of Palestinian 
guerrillas in Lebanon on at least two occasions, in 1976 against 
Syrian troops and in March 1978 against Israeli troops. 

The Iran-Iraq War and the Quest for New Sources of Arms 

As a result of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq was obliged to extend its 
search for arms in 1981. By the time the war entered its eighth 
year in September 1987, Iraq had become the world's biggest single 
arms market. In addition to its purchases from the Soviet Union 
and France, Iraq sought to buy armaments from China, the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany (West Germany), Italy, Brazil, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Egypt, among others. The United States Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency estimated in 1987 that Iraq had 
imported about US$24 billion worth of military equipment dur- 
ing the period from 1981 to 1985. 

Arms from the Soviet Union 

From 1972 to 1979, the percentage of Iraq's military equipment 
supplied by the Soviet Union declined from 95 to 63 percent. Even 
so, in 1987 the Soviet Union, having provided more than US$8 
billion worth of weapons since 1980, was Iraq's most important 
arms supplier. In its 1987 annual study, Soviet Military Power, the 
United States Department of Defense stated that, while maintain- 
ing official neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War, the Soviet Union had 



229 



Iraq: A Country Study 

provided extensive military assistance to Iraq and, at the same time, 
continued its efforts to gain leverage on Iran. In early 1987, Moscow 
delivered a squadron of twenty-four MiG-29 Fulcrums to Bagh- 
dad. Considered the most advanced fighter in the Soviet arsenal, 
the MiG-29 previously had been provided only to Syria and India. 
The decision to export the MiG-29 to Iraq also assured Iraq a more 
advantageous payment schedule than any offered by the West and 
it reflected Soviet support for one of its traditional allies in the Mid- 
dle East. Caught in a financial crisis, Baghdad welcomed the low- 
interest loans Moscow extended for this equipment. 

Although the Soviets might not receive payments for several 
years, the sale of military hardware remained a critical source of 
revenue for them, and they have tried to retain Iraq as a customer. 
In May 1987, for example, the Soviets provided Iraq with better 
financial terms in a successful effort to prevent Iraq from buying 
sixty French Mirage 2000 fighters for an estimated US$3 billion. 
An additional US$3 billion in sales of helicopters and radar equip- 
ment may also have been denied to the French, although it was 
not possible to determine whether the Soviets agreed to fulfill both 
requirements. In early 1988, Iraq owed the Soviet Union between 
US$8 billion and US$10 billion in military debts alone. 

Arms from France 

France became a major military supplier to Iraq after 1975 as 
the two countries improved their political relations. In order to 
obtain petroleum imports from the Middle East and strengthen its 
traditional ties with Arab and Muslim countries, France wanted 
a politico-military bridge between Paris and Baghdad. 

Between 1977 and 1987, France contracted to sell a total of 133 
Mirage F-l fighters to Iraq. The first transfer occurred in 1978, 
when France supplied eighteen Mirage F-l interceptors and thirty 
helicopters, and even agreed to an Iraqi share in the production 
of the Mirage 2000 in a US$2 billion arms deal. In 1983 another 
twenty-nine Mirage F-ls were exported to Baghdad. And in an 
unprecedented move, France "loaned" Iraq five Super-Etendard 
attack aircraft, equipped with Exocet AM39 air- to- surface missiles, 
from its own naval inventory. The Super-Etendards were used 
extensively in the 1984 tanker war before being replaced by several 
F-ls. The final batch of twenty-nine F-ls was ordered in Septem- 
ber 1985 at a cost of more than US$500 million, a part of which 
was paid in crude oil. 

In 1987 the Paris-based Le Monde estimated that, between 1981 
and 1985, the value of French arms transfers to Iraq was US$5.1 
billion, which represented 40 percent of total French arms exports. 



230 



National Security 



France, however, was forced to reschedule payment on most of its 
loans to Iraq because of Iraq's hard-pressed wartime economy and 
did so willingly because of its longer range strategic interests. French 
president Francois Mitterand was quoted as saying that French 
assistance was really aimed at keeping Iraq from losing the war. 
Iraqi debts to France were estimated at US$3 billion in 1987. 

French military sales to Iraq were important for at least two rea- 
sons. First, they represented high-performance items. Iraq received 
attack helicopters, missiles, military vehicles, and artillery pieces 
from France. Iraq also bought more than 400 Exocet AM39 air- 
to-surface missiles and at least 200 AS30 laser-guided missiles 
between 1983 and 1986. Second, unlike most other suppliers, 
France adopted an independent and unambiguous arms sales policy 
toward Iraq. France did not tie French arms commitments to Bagh- 
dad's politico-military actions, and it openly traded with Iraq even 
when Iranian- inspired terrorists took French hostages in Lebanon. 
In late 1987, however, the French softened their Persian Gulf policy, 
and they consummated a deal with Tehran involving the exchange 
of hostages for detained diplomatic personnel. It was impossible 
in early 1988 to determine whether France would curtail its arms 
exports to Iraq in conjunction with this agreement. 

The Search for Nuclear Technology 

On June 7, 1981, Israeli air force planes flew over Jordanian, 
Saudi, and Iraqi airspace to attack and destroy an Iraqi nuclear 
facility near Baghdad. In a statement issued after the raid, the Israeli 
government stated that it had discovered from "sources of unques- 
tioned reliability" that Iraq was producing nuclear bombs at the 
Osiraq (acronym for Osiris-Iraq) plant, and, for this reason, Israel 
had initiated a preemptive strike. Baghdad, however, reiterated 
a previous statement that the French atomic reactor was designed 
for research and for the eventual production of electricity. 

The attack raised a number of questions of interpretation regard- 
ing international legal concepts. Those who approved of the raid 
argued that the Israelis had engaged in an act of legitimate self- 
defense justifiable under international law and under Article 51 
of the charter of the United Nations (UN). Critics contended that 
the Israeli claims about Iraq's future capabilities were hasty and 
ill-considered and asserted that the idea of anticipatory self-defense 
was rejected by the community of states. In the midst of this con- 
troversy, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) came 
under fire from individuals and from governments who complained 
that the Vienna-based UN agency had failed to alert the world to 
developments at Osiraq. IAEA officials denied these charges and 



231 



Iraq: A Country Study 

reaffirmed their position on the Iraqi reactor, that is, that no 
weapons had been manufactured at Osiraq and that Iraqi officials 
had regularly cooperated with agency inspectors. They also pointed 
out that Iraq was a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons (informally called the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
or NPT) and that Baghdad had complied with all IAEA guide- 
lines. The Israeli nuclear facility at Dimona, it was pointed out, 
was not under IAEA safeguards, because Israel had not signed the 
NPT and had refused to open its facilities to UN inspections. 

After the raid, Baghdad announced that it planned to rebuild 
the destroyed facility. Although France agreed in principle to pro- 
vide technical assistance, no definitive timetable had been 
announced as of early 1988. 

The Iran-Iraq War 

Of the many conflicts in progress around the world in early 1988, 
the Iran-Iraq War was by far the bloodiest and the costliest. The 
Iran-Iraq War was multifaceted and included religious schisms, 
border disputes, and political differences. Conflicts contributing 
to the outbreak of hostilities ranged from centuries-old Sunni-versus- 
Shia (for Sunni — see Glossary) and Arab-versus-Persian religious 
and ethnic disputes to a personal animosity between Saddam 
Husayn and Ayatollah Khomeini. Above all, Iraq launched the 
war in an effort to consolidate its rising power in the Arab world 
and to replace Iran as the dominant Persian Gulf state. Phebe Marr, 
a noted analyst of Iraqi affairs, stated that "the war was more 
immediately the result of poor political judgement and miscalcu- 
lation on the part of Saddam Hussein," and "the decision to invade, 
taken at a moment of Iranian weakness, was Saddam's" (see The 
Iran-Iraq Conflict, ch. 1). 

Iraq and Iran had engaged in border clashes for many years and 
had revived the dormant Shatt al Arab waterway dispute in 1979. 
Iraq claimed the 200-kilometer channel up to the Iranian shore as 
its territory, while Iran insisted that the thalweg — a line running 
down the middle of the waterway — negotiated last in 1975, was 
the official border. The Iraqis, especially the Baath leadership, 
regarded the 1975 treaty as merely a truce, not a definitive set- 
tlement. 

The Iraqis also perceived revolutionary Iran's Islamic agenda 
as threatening to their pan-Arabism. Khomeini, bitter over his 
expulsion from Iraq in 1977 after fifteen years in An Najaf, vowed 
to avenge Shia victims of Baathist repression. Baghdad became 
more confident, however, as it watched the once invincible Imperial 
Iranian Army disintegrate, as most of its highest ranking officers 



232 



National Security 



were executed. In Khuzestan (Arabistan to the Iraqis), Iraqi intel- 
ligence officers incited riots over labor disputes, and in the Kurd- 
ish region, a new rebellion caused the Khomeini government severe 
troubles. 

As the Baathists planned their military campaign, they had every 
reason to be confident. Not only did the Iranians lack cohesive 
leadership, but the Iranian armed forces, according to Iraqi intel- 
ligence estimates, also lacked spare parts for their American-made 
equipment. Baghdad, on the other hand, possessed fully equipped 
and trained forces. Morale was running high. Against Iran's armed 
forces, including the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard) troops, led 
by religious mullahs with little or no military experience, the Iraqis 
could muster twelve complete mechanized divisions, equipped with 
the latest Soviet materiel. In addition, the area across the Shatt 
al Arab posed no major obstacles, particularly for an army equipped 
with Soviet river-crossing equipment. Iraqi commanders correctly 
assumed that crossing sites on the Khardeh and Karun rivers were 
lightly defended against their mechanized armor divisions; 
moreover, Iraqi intelligence sources reported that Iranian forces 
in Khuzestan, which had formerly included two divisions distributed 
among Ahvaz, Dezful, and Abadan, now consisted of only a num- 
ber of ill-equipped battalion- sized formations. Tehran was further 
disadvantaged because the area was controlled by the Regional 1 st 
Corps headquartered at Bakhtaran (formerly Kermanshah), 
whereas operational control was directed from the capital. In the 
year following the shah's overthrow, only a handful of company- 
sized tank units had been operative, and the rest of the armored 
equipment had been poorly maintained. 

For Iraqi planners, the only uncertainty was the fighting ability 
of the Iranian air force, equipped with some of the most sophisti- 
cated American-made aircraft. Despite the execution of key air force 
commanders and pilots, the Iranian air force had displayed its might 
during local riots and demonstrations. The air force was also active 
in the wake of the failed United States attempt to rescue Ameri- 
can hostages in April 1980. This show of force had impressed Iraqi 
decision makers to such an extent that they decided to launch a 
massive preemptive air strike on Iranian air bases in an effort similar 
to the one that Israel employed during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli 
War. 

Iraqi Offensives, 1980-82 

On September 22, 1980, formations of Iraqi MiG-23s and 
MiG-21s attacked Iran's air bases at Mehrabad and Doshen- 
Tappen (both near Tehran), as well as Tabriz, Bakhtaran, 



233 



Iraq: A Country Study 



Ahvaz, Dezful, Urmia (sometimes cited as Urumiyeh), Hamadan, 
Sanandaj, and Abadan. Iranian defenses were caught by surprise, 
but the Iraqi raids failed because Iranian jets were protected in 
specially strengthened hangars and because bombs designed to 
destroy runways did not totally incapacitate Iran's very large air- 
fields. Within hours, Iranian F-4 Phantoms took off from the same 
bases, successfully attacked strategically important targets close to 
major Iraqi cities, and returned home with very few losses. 

Concurrently with its air attack, Iraq ordered six of its divisions 
across the border into Iran, where they drove as far as eight kilo- 
meters inland and occupied 1,000 square kilometers of Iranian ter- 
ritory. As a diversionary move, a mechanized division overwhelmed 
the border garrison at Qasr-e Shirin, while five armored and 
mechanized divisions invaded Khuzestan on two axes, one cross- 
ing over the Shatt al Arab near Basra, which led to the siege and 
eventual occupation of Khorramshahr, and the second heading for 
Susangerd, which had Ahvaz, the major military base in Khuzestan, 
as its objective. In addition, Dehloran and several other towns were 
targeted and were rapidly occupied to prevent reinforcement from 
Bakhtaran and from Tehran. By mid-October, a full division 
advanced through Khuzestan headed for Khorramshahr and 
Abadan and the strategic oil fields nearby (see fig. 14). 

Iraq's blitz-like assaults against scattered and demoralized Iranian 
forces led many observers to think that Baghdad would win the 
war within a matter of weeks. Indeed, Iraqi troops did capture the 
Shatt al Arab and did seize a forty-eight-kilometer-wide strip of 
Iranian territory. But Tehran rejected a settlement offer and held 
the line against the militarily superior Iraqi force. It refused to accept 
defeat, and slowly began a series of counteroffensives in January 
1981. Iran stopped Iraqi forces on the Karun River and, with 
limited military stocks, unveiled its "human wave" assaults, which 
used thousands of Basij (Popular Mobilization Army or People's 
Army) volunteers. The recapture of Abadan, Iran's first major vic- 
tory, came in September 1981. 

Iraqi Retreats, 1982-84 

In March 1982, Tehran launched its Operation Undeniable Vic- 
tory, which marked a major turning point, as Iran penetrated Iraq's 
"impenetrable" lines, split Iraq's forces, and forced the Iraqis to 
retreat. In late June 1982, Baghdad stated its willingness to negotiate 
a settlement of the war and to withdraw its forces from Iran. Iran 
refused, and in July 1982 Iran launched Operation Ramadan on 
Iraqi territory, near Basra. Tehran used Pasdaran forces and Basij 
volunteers in one of the biggest land battles since 1945. Ranging 



234 



National Security 



in age from only nine to more than fifty, these eager but relatively 
untrained soldiers swept over minefields and fortifications to clear 
safe paths for the tanks. In doing so, the Iranians sustained an 
immense number of casualties, but they enabled Iran to recover 
some territory before the Iraqis could repulse the bulk of the 
invading forces. 

By the end of 1982, Iraq had been resupplied with new Soviet 
materiel, and the ground war entered a new phase. Iraq used newly 
acquired T-55 tanks and T-62 tanks, BM-21 Stalin Organ rocket 
launchers, and Mi-24 helicopter gunships to prepare a Soviet-type 
three-line defense, replete with obstacles, minefields, and fortified 
positions. The Combat Engineer Corps proved efficient in con- 
structing bridges across water obstacles, in laying minefields, and 
in preparing new defense lines and fortifications. 

In 1983 Iran launched three major, but unsuccessful, human- 
wave offensives, with huge losses, along the frontier. On Febru- 
ary 6, Tehran, using 200,000 "last reserve" Pasdaran troops, 
attacked along a 40-kilometer stretch near Al Amarah, about 200 
kilometers southeast of Baghdad. Backed by air, armor, and artil- 
lery support, Iran's six-division thrust was strong enough to break 
through. In response, Baghdad used massive air attacks, with more 
than 200 sorties, many flown by attack helicopters. More than 6,000 
Iranians were killed that day, while achieving only minute gains. 
In April 1983, the Mandali-Baghdad north-central sector witnessed 
fierce fighting, as repeated Iranian attacks were stopped by Iraqi 
mechanized and infantry divisions. Casualties were very high, and 
by the end of 1983, an estimated 120,000 Iranians and 60,000 Iraqis 
had been killed. Despite these losses, in 1983 Iran held a distinct 
advantage in the attempt to wage and eventually to win the war 
of attrition. 

The War of Attrition, 1984-87 

Most foreign military analysts feel that neither Iraq nor Iran has 
used its modern equipment efficiently. Frequently, sophisticated 
materiel had been left unused, when a massive modern assault could 
have won the battle for either side. Tanks and armored vehicles 
were dug in and used as artillery pieces, instead of being maneu- 
vered to lead or to support an assault. William O. Staudenmaeir, 
a seasoned military analyst, reported that "the land-computing 
sights on the Iraqi tanks [were] seldom used. This lower [ed] the 
accuracy of the T-62 tanks to World War II standards." In addi- 
tion, both sides frequently abandoned heavy equipment in the battie 
zone because they lacked the skilled technical personnel needed to 
carry out minor repairs. 



235 



Iraq: A Country Study 




Figure 14. Initial Iraqi Attack on Iran, 1980 



Analysts also assert that the two states' armies have shown little 
coordination and that some units in the field have been left to fight 
largely on their own. In this protracted war of attrition, soldiers 
and officers alike have failed to display initiative or professional 
expertise in combat. Difficult decisions, which should have had 
immediate attention, were referred by section commanders to the 
capitals for action. Except for the predictable bursts on important 
anniversaries, by the mid-1980s the war was stalemated. 

In early 1984, Iran had begun Operation Dawn V, which was 
meant to split the Iraqi 3rd Army Corps and 4th Army Corps near 
Basra. In early 1984, an estimated 500,000 Pasdaran and Basij 
forces, using shallow boats or on foot, moved to within a few kilo- 
meters of the strategic Basra-Baghdad waterway. Between Febru- 
ary 29 and March 1 , in one of the largest battles of the war, the 



236 



National Security 



two armies clashed and inflicted more than 25,000 fatalities on each 
other. Without armored and air support of their own, the Iranians 
faced Iraqi tanks, mortars, and helicopter gunships. Within a few 
weeks, Tehran opened another front in the shallow lakes of the 
Hawizah Marshes, just east of Al Qurnah, in Iraq, near the con- 
fluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Iraqi forces, using Soviet- 
and French-made helicopter gunships, inflicted heavy casualties 
on the five Iranian brigades (15,000 men) in this Battle of Majnun. 

Lacking the equipment to open secure passages through Iraqi 
minefields, and having too few tanks, the Iranian command again 
resorted to the human- wave tactic. In March 1984, an East Euro- 
pean journalist claimed that he "saw tens of thousands of children, 
roped together in groups of about twenty to prevent the faint-hearted 
from deserting, make such an attack." The Iranians made little, 
if any, progress despite these sacrifices. Perhaps as a result of this 
performance, Tehran, for the first time, used a regular army unit, 
the 92nd Armored Division, at the Battie of the Marshes a few weeks 
later. 

Within a four- week period between February and March 1984, 
the Iraqis reportedly killed 40,000 Iranians and lost 9,000 of their 
own men, but even this was deemed an unacceptable ratio, and 
in February the Iraqi command ordered the use of chemical 
weapons. Despite repeated Iraqi denials, between May 1981 and 
March 1984, Iran charged Iraq with forty uses of chemical weapons. 
The year 1984 closed with part of the Majnun Islands and a few 
pockets of Iraqi territory in Iranian hands. Casualties notwithstand- 
ing, Tehran had maintained its military posture, while Baghdad 
was reevaluating its overall strategy. 

The major development in 1985 was the increased targeting of 
population centers and industrial facilities by both combatants. In 
May Iraq began aircraft attacks, long-range artillery attacks, and 
surface-to-surface missile attacks on Tehran and on other major 
Iranian cities. Between August and November, Iraq raided Khark 
Island forty-four times in a futile attempt to destroy its installa- 
tions. Iran responded with its own air raids and missile attacks on 
Baghdad and other Iraqi towns. In addition, Tehran systematized 
its periodic stop-and-search operations, which were conducted to 
verify the cargo contents of ships in the Persian Gulf and to seize 
war materiel destined for Iraq. 

The only major ground offensive, involving an estimated 60,000 
Iranian troops, occurred in March 1985 near Basra; once again, 
the assault proved inconclusive except for heavy casualties. In 1986, 
however, Iraq suffered a major loss in the southern region. On 
February 9, Iran launched a successful surprise amphibious assault 



237 



Iraq: A Country Study 

across the Shatt al Arab and captured the abandoned Iraqi oil port 
of Al Faw. The occupation of Al Faw, a logistical feat, involved 
30,000 regular Iranian soldiers who rapidly entrenched themselves. 
Saddam Husayn vowed to eliminate the bridgehead "at all costs," 
and in April 1988 the Iraqis succeeded in regaining the Al Faw 
Peninsula. 

Late in March 1986, the UN secretary general, Javier Perez de 
Cuellar, formally accused Iraq of using chemical weapons against 
Iran. Citing the report of four chemical warfare experts whom the 
UN had sent to Iran in February and March 1986, the secretary 
general called on Baghdad to end its violation of the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol on the use of chemical weapons. The UN report concluded 
that Iraqi forces had used chemical warfare against Iranian forces; 
the weapons used included both mustard gas and nerve gas. The 
report further stated that the use of chemical weapons appeared 
to be more extensive in 1981 than in 1984. Iraq attempted to deny 
using chemicals, but the evidence, in the form of many badly burned 
casualties flown to European hospitals for treatment, was over- 
whelming. According to a British representative at the Conference 
on Disarmament in Geneva in July 1986, Iraqi chemical warfare 
was responsible for about 10,000 casualties. In March 1988, Iraq 
was again charged with a major use of chemical warfare while retak- 
ing Halabjah, a Kurdish town in northeastern Iraq, near the Iranian 
border. 

Unable in 1986, however, to dislodge the Iranians from Al Faw, 
the Iraqis went on the offensive; they captured the city of Mehran 
in May, only to lose it in July 1986. The rest of 1986 witnessed 
small hit-and-run attacks by both sides, while the Iranians massed 
almost 500,000 troops for another promised "final offensive," which 
did not occur. But the Iraqis, perhaps for the first time since the 
outbreak of hostilities, began a concerted air-strike campaign in 
July. Heavy attacks on Khark Island forced Iran to rely on 
makeshift installations farther south in the Gulf at Sirri Island and 
Larak Island. Thereupon, Iraqi jets, refueling in midair or using 
a Saudi military base, hit Sirri and Larak. The two belligerents 
also attacked 111 neutral ships in the Gulf in 1986. 

Meanwhile, to help defend itself, Iraq had built impressive for- 
tifications along the 1,200-kilometer war front. Iraq devoted par- 
ticular attention to the southern city of Basra, where concrete-roofed 
bunkers, tank- and artillery-firing positions, minefields, and 
stretches of barbed wire, all shielded by an artificially flooded lake 
30 kilometers long and 1 ,800 meters wide, were constructed. Most 
visitors to the area acknowledged Iraq's effective use of combat 
engineering to erect these barriers. 



238 



Iraqi tank outside Khorramshahr, Iran, October 1980 

Courtesy Photri/Lehtikuva 



239 



Iraq: A Country Study 

On December 24, 1986, Iran began another assault on the Basra 
region. This annual "final offensive" resulted in more than 40,000 
dead by mid-January 1987. Although the Iranian push came close 
to breaking Iraq's last line of defense east of Basra, Tehran was 
unable to score the decisive breakthrough required to win outright 
victory, or even to secure relative gains over Iraq". 

The Tanker War, 1984-87 

Naval operations came to a halt, presumably because Iraq and 
Iran had lost many of their ships, by early 1981; the lull in the 
fighting lasted for two years. In March 1984, Iraq initiated sus- 
tained naval operations in its self-declared 1,126-kilometer mari- 
time exclusion zone, extending from the mouth of the Shatt al Arab 
to Iran's port of Bushehr. In 1981 Baghdad had attacked Iranian 
ports and oil complexes as well as neutral tankers and ships sailing 
to and from Iran; in 1984 Iraq expanded the so-called tanker war 
by using French Super- Etendard combat aircraft armed with Exocet 
missiles. Neutral merchant ships became favorite targets, and the 
long-range Super-Etendards flew sorties farther south. Seventy- 
one merchant ships were attacked in 1984 alone, compared with 
forty-eight in the first three years of the war. Iraq's motives in 
increasing the tempo included a desire to break the stalemate, 
presumably by cutting off Iran's oil exports and by thus forcing 
Tehran to the negotiating table. Repeated Iraqi efforts failed to 
put Iran's main oil exporting terminal at Khark Island out of com- 
mission, however. Iran retaliated by attacking first a Kuwaiti oil 
tanker near Bahrain on May 1 3 and then a Saudi tanker in Saudi 
waters five days later, making it clear that if Iraq continued to inter- 
fere with Iran's shipping, no Gulf state would be safe. 

These sustained attacks cut Iranian oil exports in half, reduced 
shipping in the Gulf by 25 percent, led Lloyd's of London to 
increase its insurance rates on tankers, and slowed Gulf oil sup- 
plies to the rest of the world; moreover, the Saudi decision in 1984 
to shoot down an Iranian Phantom jet intruding over Saudi ter- 
ritorial waters played an important role in ending both belliger- 
ents' attempts to internationalize the tanker war. Iraq and Iran 
accepted a 1984 UN-sponsored moratorium on the shelling of 
civilian targets, and Tehran later proposed an extension of the 
moratorium to include Gulf shipping, a proposal the Iraqis rejected 
unless it were to include their own Gulf ports. 

Iraq began ignoring the moratorium soon after it went into effect 
and stepped up its air raids on tankers serving Iran and Iranian 
oil-exporting facilities in 1986 and 1987, attacking even vessels that 
belonged to the conservative Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Iran 



240 



National Security 



responded by escalating its attacks on shipping serving Arab ports 
in the Gulf. As Kuwaiti vessels made up a large portion of the targets 
in these retaliatory raids, the Kuwaiti government sought protec- 
tion from the international community in the fall of 1986. The Soviet 
Union responded first, agreeing to charter several Soviet tankers 
to Kuwait in early 1987. Washington, which had been approached 
first by Kuwait and which had postponed its decision, eventually 
followed Moscow's lead. United States involvement was sealed by 
the May 17, 1987, Iraqi missile attack on the USS Stark, in which 
thirty-seven crew members were killed. Baghdad apologized and 
claimed that the attack was a mistake. Ironically, Washington used 
the Stark incident to blame Iran for escalating the war and sent its 
own ships to the Gulf to escort eleven Kuwaiti tankers that were 
"reflagged" with the American flag and had American crews. Iran 
refrained from attacking the United States naval force directly, but 
it used various forms of harassment, including mines, hit-and-run 
attacks by small patrol boats, and periodic stop-and-search opera- 
tions. On several occasions, Tehran fired its Chinese-made Silk- 
worm missiles on Kuwait from Al Faw Peninsula. When Iranian 
forces hit the reflagged tanker Sea Isle City in October 1987, Wash- 
ington retaliated by destroying an oil platform in the Rostam field 
and by using the United States Navy's Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) 
commandos to blow up a second one nearby. 

Within a few weeks of the Stark incident, Iraq resumed its raids 
on tankers but moved its attacks farther south, near the Strait of 
Hormuz. Washington played a central role in framing UN Secu- 
rity Council Resolution 598 on the Gulf war, passed unanimously 
on July 20; Western attempts to isolate Iran were frustrated, 
however, when Tehran rejected the resolution because it did not 
meet its requirement that Iraq should be punished for initiating 
the conflict. 

In early 1988, the Gulf was a crowded theater of operations. At 
least ten Western navies and eight regional navies were patrolling 
the area, the site of weekly incidents in which merchant vessels were 
crippled. The Arab Ship Repair Yard in Bahrain and its counter- 
part in Dubayy, United Arab Emirates (UAE), were unable to keep 
up with the repairs needed by the ships damaged in these attacks. 

Armed Forces and Society 

Status in National Life 

In modern Iraq, the armed forces have intervened in the politi- 
cal life of the state. Military interventions were concentrated in 
two periods, the first from 1936 to 1941, when there were seven 



241 



Iraq: A Country Study 

coups d'etat, and the second between 1958 and 1968, when there 
were five military seizures of power. Because Iraq had a highly 
developed military institution and chronically weak civilian regimes, 
the armed forces felt that they alone were capable of providing strong 
and stable governments; however, personal and ideological faction- 
alization within the armed forces fostered heightened instability and 
a cycle of coups that culminated in the Baathist takeover on July 17, 
1968. 

As the leadership in the previous military regime became increas- 
ingly fragmented and weak, and as resistance movements grew, 
Baathist officers, intending to end the cycle of military interven- 
tion in the government, carried out a coup. Baath Party officials 
believed the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) and various Kurdish 
movements were using the military as a vehicle to promote their 
own interests. Consequently, the Baath decided to weaken the mili- 
tary's political power gradually and to turn the army into a loyal 
and strong defensive force. Accordingly, they steadily reduced mili- 
tary participation in the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC); 
whereas the five-member 1968 RCC was composed exclusively of 
military men, only three of the RCC's twenty- two members in 1978 
were active-duty officers. 

To transform the military into an ideological army (Al Jaysh al 
Aqidi), the Baath undertook purges of the armed forces and granted 
military posts to civilians. They also tried to "purify" the armed 
forces by providing propaganda pamphlets and indoctrination 
lectures. 

To institutionalize its control of the army, the Baath Party 
adopted an eclectic strategy. First, it restricted admission to mili- 
tary colleges and institutions to members of the Baath Party. Those 
accepted could expect generous financial rewards if they remained 
loyal, but, if they did not, they could expect the death penalty. 
Second, discrimination, in recruitment and in promotion, on reli- 
gious and nationality grounds was intensified. At one point in 1979, 
all senior posts were restricted to officers related to Saddam Husayn 
or to other individuals from Tikrit. 

The Ideological Army advocated national socialism, and the Baath 
Party used the army to fulfill Baath objectives. By 1980 the Ideo- 
logical Army was an organized, modern force capable of rapid move- 
ment and had been strengthened by an overwhelming feeling of 
historical responsibility. The officers were firmly convinced that theirs 
was an elite role, that of the leading patriotic force in Iraqi society, 
and they, too, were inspired to carry out the national "historical 
mission." In short, the Baathization of the armed forces, based 
on an indoctrination in national socialism, in reliance on force, 



242 



Iraqi units at Khorramshahr, Iran, October 1980 
Courtesy Photri/Lehtikuva 

and in a vision of this historical mission, completed the emergence 
of the new army as a national force. 

During the 1970s, military officers unsuccessfully attempted to 
overthrow the Baathist regime, however, on at least two occasions. 
In January 1970, an attempted coup led by two retired officers, 
Major General Abd al Ghani ar Rawi and Colonel Salih Mahdi 
as Samarrai, was discovered and thwarted as the conspirators 
entered the Republican Palace. In June 1973, a plot by Nazim 
Kazzar, a Shia and the director of internal security, to assassinate 
President Ahmad Hasan al Bakr and Saddam Husayn was foiled. 
Kazzar, who resented both Sunni and Tikriti domination of the 
Baath Party, had taken a prominent part in organizing the mas- 
sacre of communists in the anarchy that followed the military's sei- 
zure of power in February 1963. He had acquired a reputation 
as a torturer, and the old palace that he had taken over as head- 
quarters was known as "Qasr an Nihayah," the "Palace of the 
End. ' ' Few who entered ever came out, nor did their bodies receive 
public burial. When his coup plans failed, Kazzar fled toward the 
Iranian border. Before being apprehended, he killed the minister 
of defense, Hammad Shihab, who happened to be in the area 
inspecting border posts. Shortly afterward he was executed. Both 
coup attempts were followed by summary trials, executions, and 
purges of the armed forces. 



243 



Iraq: A Country Study 

Although rumors about foiled coup attempts have circulated peri- 
odically, the most serious attempt to assassinate Saddam Husayn 
reportedly occurred in 1982, after both a military defeat on the 
battlefield and an erosion in the economy. On July 11, 1982, the 
presidential party was traveling through the mixed Shia-Sunni vil- 
lage of Ad Dujayl, about sixty kilometers northeast of Baghdad, 
when it was surrounded by Shia villagers and held for several hours 
before it was rescued by the army. Subsequent reports revealed 
that a number of Saddam's bodyguards and of the villagers were 
killed. As punishment, the Baath government deported the villagers 
to Iran and razed their houses. 

The Sociology of the Military 

The armed forces in 1988 conceivably could have been expected 
to reflect the varied ethnic, religious, and class components of Iraqi 
society, because universal male conscription has been compulsory 
since 1934. To a certain extent the enlisted men did reflect society, 
especially after seven years of war. Indeed, for the purpose of unify- 
ing the diverse minority groups in this extremely heterogeneous 
country, the armed forces was one of the most important institu- 
tions in Iraq. For political reasons, this unification was never fully 
accomplished, however. Selective recruitment policies for the Mili- 
tary College, for example, were instituted by the British in the 1920s 
to favor the Sunni Arab community, and this bias was perpetuated 
by the Sunni political and military elite, which has also tended to 
dominate the Baath Party. The Shia majority was represented in 
the officer corps, but in a proportion far below that of their numeri- 
cal presence in society. 

The majority of the officers were of lower middle class urban 
background; they were the sons of minor government officials and 
small traders, for whom a career in the military promised consider- 
able social advancement. Family ties to officers also played an 
important role in the recruitment of new personnel, and in the 
mid-1980s, Iraq's top military commanders were from the small 
town of Tikrit on the Euphrates River in the heart of Iraq's Sunni 
Arab community. 

The Defense Burden 

Military expenditures before 1980 fluctuated between 15 and 21 
percent of the gross national product (GNP — see Glossary). In 1975, 
for example, Iraq allocated to its defense budget an estimated US$3 
billion, representing 17.4 percent of GNP, whereas in 1979, military 
expenditures were estimated at US$6.4 billion, or 14.9 percent of 
GNP. After 1980, however, defense expenditures skyrocketed, 



244 



National Security 



exceeding 50 percent of GNP by 1982. The 1986 military budget 
was estimated at US$11.58 billion. 

The war's staggering financial and economic costs have proved 
to be more severe than anticipated, and, because of them, most 
large-scale infrastructure development projects have been halted. 
In 1980 Iraqi revenues from oil exports amounted to US$20 bil- 
lion, which, when added to Iraq's estimated US$35 billion in for- 
eign exchange reserves, permitted the country to sustain rapid 
increases in military expenditures. By 1984, however, oil revenues 
were so low that Iraq sought loans from the Gulf Cooperation Coun- 
cil (GCC) states and from its foreign creditors. In 1986 annual oil 
revenues were estimated at US$5 to US$8 billion, whereas the war 
cost between US$600 million and US$1 billion per month. Mili- 
tary and financial experts estimated that by the end of 1987, Iraq 
had exhausted its US$35 billion reserves, and had incurred an 
additional US$40 to US$85 billion debt. Most of the money (US$30 
to US$60 billion) came from GCC members, particularly Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait, which, some experts believed, may not demand 
repayment. The Baathist regime adopted a strategy of "guns and 
butter," trying to absorb the economic shock of the war without 
imposing undue hardships on the population. Through a subsidy 
program, the government continued to provide ample food and 
basic necessities to the population. The policy succeeded, but it 
also mortgaged the state's future. In early 1988, as the war dragged 
on and as military expenditures rose, it was difficult to ascertain 
whether this strategy could be sustained (see Introduction). 

The Impact of Casualties on the Armed Forces 

Casualty figures in the Iran-Iraq War could not be estimated 
accurately because neither belligerent permitted independent 
observers to assist in verifying records, and both belligerents rarely 
allowed foreign observers to visit combat areas. At the end of 1986, 
the most frequently cited estimate of casualties since September 
1980 was about 1 million— 350,000 dead and 650,000 wounded. 
According to this estimate, 250,000 Iranians and 100,000 Iraqis 
had been killed, while 500,000 Iranians and 150,000 Iraqis had 
been wounded. These estimates were probably conservative. 
Another reliable source claimed that the combined death toll was 
between 600,000 and 800,000. In 1987, the Iraqi minister of defense 
reported that as many as 1 million Iranians had been killed and 
almost 3 million had been wounded, but this was impossible to 
verify. During large offensives, reports indicated that casualty 



245 



Iraq: A Country Study 



figures ranged between 10,000 and 40,000, primarily because of 
Iran's "human wave" tactics. The impact of this loss of life on 
both societies was immense as was that of the high number of 
prisoners of war (POWs). The Geneva-based International Com- 
mittee of the Red Cross estimated the number of POWs at nearly 
50,000 Iraqis and 10,000 Iranians in early 1988. 

For Iraq, the most damaging social repercussion in 1988 was 
the knowledge that the toll in casualties would continue to increase. 
Drafting young men, and at times women, from school and from 
work became unpopular, and the loss of young life weakened the 
regime. This human drain also created shortages in the labor force. 
These shortages forced an integration of women into the work force, 
a move that further disrupted Iraq's traditional social environment. 

The war also forced cutbacks in Iraq's economic development, 
and it wiped out the relative prosperity of the late 1970s. Individuals 
were pressured to donate savings and gold holdings to the war ef- 
fort. Experts believed in 1988 that these hardships, endured from 
1980 onward, would gradually erode what social cohesion and 
progress had been achieved over the previous decade, should the 
war continue for a few more years. 

Opposition to the war continued to grow. There were sporadic 
attempts on the lives of military officers, and especially on the lives 
of Saddam Husayn's relatives. As funerals in every neighborhood 
reminded the masses of the realities they faced, Iraqi morale con- 
tinued to diminish. 

Treatment of Veterans and Widows 

The regime, at least initially, provided substantial sums of money 
to the families of war "heroes." Parents received, as a lump pay- 
ment, enough for a car, a piece of land, and a new house. In addi- 
tion, a victim's brother was assigned a monthly pension of 
ID500 — which was equivalent in purchasing power to somewhat 
less than the same amount in US dollars in 1987 — and his sister, 
in keeping with "Iraqi tradition," received a pension of half that 
amount. A widow and surviving children also received monthly 
pensions, in addition to a guarantee of free university education 
for the children. 

The government reduced its benefits packages in 1 985 , especially 
after revenues declined. Survivors of a soldier killed in battle con- 
tinued to receive the equivalent of US$10,000, and veterans received 
monthly pensions equivalent to US$500, but women whose hus- 
bands and sons were away fighting found it increasingly difficult 
to make ends meet. 



246 



Iraqi soldiers at Qasr-e Shirin, Iran, June 1981 
Courtesy Photri/Lehtikuva 

Internal Security 

Internal Developments and Security 

In maintaining internal security, the Baath regime focused on 
three main sources of opposition — the Kurds, living primarily near 
the borders of Iran and Turkey, the ICP and its splinter factions, 
and Shia revival movements not in sympathy with Baath social- 
ism. In dealing with these groups, the government tended either 
to provide them with benefits so as to coopt them into the regime, 
or to take repressive measures against them. 

The Kurdish Problem 

The Kurdish minority offered the most persistent and militarily 
effective security threat of Iraq's modern history (see People, ch. 2). 
Although the Kurds had traditionally opposed any central govern- 
ments in both Iran and Iraq, most Kurdish leaders initially saw 
the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran as a possible vehicle for promot- 
ing Kurdish aspirations toward self-government. The Iranian 
government's antiminority attitude, however, along with Iraq's 
attempts to support the Iranian Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), 
dashed all hopes for a unified Kurdish independent state. The Iraqi 
and Iranian regimes each chose to support a Kurdish faction oppos- 
ing the other's government, and this intervention divided the Kurds 



247 



Iraq: A Country Study 

along "national" lines. As a result, during the 1980s Kurds in Iraq 
tended to hope for an Iranian victory in the Iran-Iraq War, while 
a number of Kurds in Iran thought that an Iraqi victory would 
best promote their own aspirations. Because most Kurds were Sunni 
Muslims, however, their enthusiasm for a Shia government in either 
country was somewhat limited. 

Following the outbreak of hostilities and the ensuing stalemate 
in the Iran-Iraq War, Kurdish opponents of the Iraqi regime revived 
their armed struggle against Baghdad. In response to deportations, 
executions, and other atrocities allegedly perpetrated by the Baath, 
the Kurds seemed in the 1980s to have renewed their political con- 
sciousness, albeit in a very limited way. Differences between the 
brothers Masud and Idris Barzani, who led the KDP, and Jalal 
Talabani, leader of the Iraqi-supported Patriotic Union of Kur- 
distan (PUK), as well as the Kurdish leadership's periodic shifts 
into progovernment and antigovernment alliances, benefited Bagh- 
dad, which could manipulate opposing factions. What the Iraqi 
government could not afford, however, was to risk the opening of 
a second hostile front in Kurdistan as long as it was bogged down 
in its war with Iran. Throughout the 1980s, therefore, Baghdad 
tolerated the growing strength of the Kurdish resistance, which, 
despite shortcomings in its leadership, continued its long struggle 
for independence. 

The Iraqi Communists and Baathist Iraq 

The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) has seen its fortunes rise and 
fall repeatedly since its founding by Yusuf Salman Yusuf (known 
as Comrade Fahd, or the Leopard) in 1934. During the next fifty 
years, the party's fortunes fluctuated with the successes of particu- 
lar regimes in Baghdad. Although the ICP was legalized in 1937, 
and again in 1973, the Baath Party regularly suppressed it after 
1963 and outlawed it altogether in 1985 (see Political Opposition, 
ch. 4). 

In general, Iraqis rejected communism as contrary to both Islam 
and Arab nationalism. Yet, the clandestine ICP survived under 
the repressive policies of the monarchy, which had determined that 
because of its widespread appeal, the dissemination of communist 
theory among the armed forces or the police could be punished 
with death or with penal servitude for life. This persecution under 
the Hashimite monarchy raised communists to a status near that 
of martyrs in the eyes of the antimonarchical postrevolutionary lead- 
ers plotting the 1958 uprising. Ironically, the ICP was able to use 
the army to promote its goals and to organize opposition to the 
monarchy. In August 1949, for example, one of the army units 



248 



National Security 



returning from Palestine smuggled in a stencil printing machine 
for the ICP. 

Between 1958 and 1963, the ICP became closely aligned with 
the Qasim regime, which used the communist militia organization 
to suppress its traditional opponents brutally (see Republican Iraq, 
ch. 1). By 1963 Qasim's former allies, except the ICP, had all 
deserted him. When he was overthrown in February 1963, the new 
Baathist leaders carried out a massive purge in which thousands 
of communists were executed for supporting the hated Qasim. Sur- 
vivors fled to the relatively isolated mountainous regions of Kur- 
distan. This first Baathist rise to power was short-lived, however, 
and under Abd as Salam Arif (1963-66) and his brother, Abd ar 
Rahman Arif (1966-68), both ICP and Baath cadre members were 
suppressed, largely because of their close connections with the Com- 
munist Party of Egypt and, in turn, the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union. Although the Baath hierarchy had earlier perceived 
the ICP as a Soviet arm ready to interfere in internal affairs, after 
the successful 1968 coup d'etat, Baath leaders joined ICP officials 
in calling for a reconciliation of their decade-long rivalry. 

This reconciliation was short-lived, however, and in May 1978 
Baghdad announced the execution of twenty-one ICP members, 
allegedly for organizing party cells within the armed forces. For- 
eign observers contended that the executions, which took place long 
after the alleged crimes were committed, were calculated to show 
that the Baath would not tolerate communist penetration of the 
armed forces with the ultimate aim of seizing control, probably 
with Soviet assistance. Attempts to organize new communist cells 
within the armed forces were crushed, as the government argued 
that according to the 1973 agreement creating the Progressive 
National Front (PNF), only the Baath Party could organize politi- 
cal activities within the military (see The Politics of Alliance: The 
Progressive National Front, ch. 4). Unverified reports suggested 
that several hundred members of the armed forces were questioned 
at that time concerning their possible complicity in what was 
described as a plot to replace Baath leaders with military officers 
more sympathetic to the Soviet Union. 

Despite several decades of arrests, imprisonments, repression, 
assassinations, and exile, in the late 1980s the ICP remained a credi- 
ble force and a constant threat to the Baath leadership. After the 
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, the ICP came to depend 
heavily on outside support for its survival. Syria, for example, 
provided material support to the ICP's struggle against the Sad- 
dam Husayn regime, and the Syrian Communist Party cooperated 
with the ICP in strongly condemning the war with Iran. 



249 



Iraq: A Country Study 

In addition to relying more heavily on outside financial and moral 
support, the ICP initiated significant structural and ideological 
changes in the 1980s. Four Arab leaders (two Shias, two Sunnis) 
were dropped from the Politburo, and four Central Committee 
members were reportedly expelled from the party in 1984. Although 
the reasons for these changes were not clear, observers speculated 
at the time that party boss Aziz Muhammad and his Kurdish com- 
patriots had gained control of the ICP and that Kurdish interests 
therefore outweighed national interests. Muhammad's tenacity in 
supporting the armed struggle of Iraqi Kurds and in totally oppos- 
ing the Iran-Iraq War helped to bring about a split in the ICP 
leadership. His keynote address to the 1985 Fourth Party Congress 
analyzed in detail the course of the Iran-Iraq War; he assigned par- 
tial responsibility for the war to Iran, but he blamed the Baath 
government in Baghdad for prolonging the conflict. In September 
1986, the ICP declared the communists' fight against the Baath 
regime to be inextricably linked to the achievement of peace between 
Iraq and Iran. A 1986 joint statement of the Tudeh (the Tudeh 
Party being the leading Marxist party of Iran) and the ICP called 
for an end to the war and for establishment of "a just democratic 
peace with no annexations whatsoever, on the basis of respect for 
the two countries' state borders at the start of the war, each peo- 
ple's national sovereignty over its territory, and endorsing each 
people's right to determine the sociopolitical system they desire." 

Reliable data on ICP membership were unavailable in early 1988. 
One 1984 estimate was 2,000 members, but other foreign sources 
indicated a considerably larger ICP membership. Because it was 
a clandestine party fighting for the overthrow of the Baathist regime, 
the ICP's true membership strength may never be known, espe- 
cially because it directed its organizational efforts through the Kurd- 
ish Democratic National Front (DNF). The ICP headquarters was 
partially destroyed in May 1984 following limited Turkish incur- 
sions to help Iraq protect its oil pipeline to and through Turkey 
and was apparently relocated in territories controlled by the DNF 
in 1988. Ideologically split and physically mauled, the ICP may 
have lost much of its strength, and it had no influence in the Peo- 
ple's Army, which remained in the hands of the Baath Party. 

Impact of the Iranian Revolution on Iraqi Shias 

In 1964 Ayatollah Khomeini was expelled from Iran to Turkey, 
and he was then granted asylum by Iraq (see The Iran-Iraq Con- 
flict, ch. 1). His theological erudition and idealism earned him a 
significant following in An Najaf, where ulama (religious leaders) 
and students from throughout the Shia world formed an important 



250 



National Security 



circle of learned men. The Baath socialist regime, however, with 
its secular, anticlerical stance, was never comfortable with Shia 
religious leaders and their followers. 

Relations between the Iraqi regime and the Shia clerics deterio- 
rated during the Imam Husayn celebrations in February 1977, 
when police interference in religious processions resulted in mas- 
sive antigovernment demonstrations in An Najaf and in Karbala. 
Several thousand participants were arrested, and eight Shia dig- 
nitaries, including five members of the clergy, were sentenced to 
death and were executed. In 1978, in an effort to quell the Shia 
unrest and to satisfy the shah's request, Baghdad expelled Ayatol- 
lah Khomeini, who sought refuge in France. 

In another attempt to minimize Shia dissent, the Iraqi govern- 
ment had deported to Iran 60,000 Shias of Iranian origin in 1974. 
In the months following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the 
Iraqi government deported nearly 35,000 more ethnic Iranians. 

Deportations, the suppression of the Shia ulama, and the death 
under suspicious circumstances of Shia leader Imam Musa as Sadr 
all contributed to the deterioration of relations between Baathist 
Iraq and Islamic Iran. The ranking Shia religious leader, Sayyid 
Abu al Qasim al Khoi, refrained from either sanctioning or oppos- 
ing the Baath government, but the government feared Sadr because 
of his leadership qualities and because of his close association with 
Khomeini. 

Beginning in 1980, Iran actively promoted its own revolution- 
ary vision for Iraq. All anti-Iraqi Islamic organizations, including 
Ad Dawah al Islamiyah, commonly called Ad Dawah (see Politi- 
cal Opposition, ch. 4) and the Organization of Islamic Action were 
based in Tehran, where they came under the political, religious, 
and financial influence of the ruling clergy. To control rivalry and 
infighting among the different groups, Iran helped to set up the 
Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI) on 
November 17, 1982. It was headed by Iraqi cleric Hujjat al Islam 
Muhammad Baqir al Hakim. Establishing SAIRI was viewed as 
a step toward unifying the political and military work of all groups 
and as an attempt to unite them under a single command directly 
supervised by their Iranian counterparts. In return, SAIRI acknowl- 
edged the leadership of Khomeini as the supreme commander of 
the Islamic nation. Nevertheless, the majority of Iraqi Shias resisted 
Tehran's control and remained loyal to Iraq. 

Internal Security in the 1980s 

In addition to the regular armed forces, Iraq's state security sys- 
tem consisted of at least six organizations charged with a wide 



251 



Iraq: A Country Study 



variety of security functions. Little was publicly known about these 
paramilitary and police organizations, but their importance was 
undisputed. In addition to the People's Army, discussed above, 
internal security organizations consisted of the Security Troops (or 
Presidential Guard), the Border Guard, the Frontier Force, the 
regular civil police, and the Mukhabarat (or Department of General 
Intelligence). 

The Security Troops formed an elite group of 4,800 whose 
primary task was to protect the Baath leadership in Iraq. Their 
ranks were filled with the most loyal troops serving in the Iraqi 
armed forces, whose dedication to Baathism and to Saddam Husayn 
personally had been tested on numerous occasions. These troops 
faced considerable danger because the frequent assassination 
attempts on the president and on his close associates usually meant 
loss of life among bodyguards. Survivors were generously rewarded, 
however. 

The Frontier Guard and the Mobile Force accounted for an esti- 
mated 50,000 additional men within the security system. Unlike 
the People's Army, these forces consisted of full-time, professional 
men-at-arms. Frontier Guard personnel were stationed principally 
in northern Iraq along the borders with Iran, Turkey, and Syria 
to guard against smuggling and infiltrations. Before 1974 the Fron- 
tier Guard was under the control of local Kurds, but, after the defeat 
of the Kurdish revolt in 1975, it was administered by the central 
government. The Mobile Force was a strike force used to support 
the regular police in the event of major internal disorders. It was 
armed with infantry weapons, with artillery, and with armored 
vehicles, and it contained commando units trained to deal with guer- 
rilla activities. 

The regular civil police handled state security in addition to their 
routine duties of fighting crime, controlling traffic, and the like. 
After 1982, many of these routine functions were taken over by 
People's Army "volunteers" to free more able-bodied men for duty 
on the war front. The regular police were under the Ministry of 
Interior, and they were commanded by the director of police in 
Baghdad. There were thought to be several specialized components 
of the police, including forces assigned exclusively to traffic, to nar- 
cotics investigation, and to railroad security. The police operated 
at least two schools: the Police College for those with secondary 
degrees and the Police Preparatory School for those without second- 
ary education. Police officers held military ranks identical to those 
of the regular armed forces, and many were called to serve in the 
war with Iran. 



252 



-X 



Iranian soldiers in a prisoner of war camp at Ar Ramadi, Iraq 
Courtesy International Committee of the Red Cross 

Photo by J.J. Kurz 

The Department of General Intelligence was the most notorious 
and possibly the most important arm of the state security system. 
It was created in 1973 after the failed coup attempt by Director 
of Internal Security Nazim Kazzar. In 1982 the Department of 
General Intelligence underwent a personnel shake-up. At that time, 
it was headed by Saadun Shakir, who was an RCC member and, 
like Saddam Husayn, a Tikriti, and who was assisted by Saddam 
Husayn's younger half-brother, Barazan Husayn. Foreign observ- 
ers believed that the president was dissatisfied because the agency 
had not anticipated the assassination attempt at Ad Dujayl. It was 
also believed that several separate intelligence networks were incor- 
porated within the department, and that Iraqi intelligence agents 
operated both at home and abroad in their mission to seek out and 
eliminate opponents of the Baghdad regime. 

Incidence of Crime 

The Baathist regime introduced a variety of laws, of which the 
most important was a 1969 penal code that expanded the defini- 
tion of crime to include acts detrimental to the political, the eco- 
nomic, and the social goals of the state. Baathist hegemony in the 
political sphere, for example, was enforced by a law making it a 
crime to insult the state or its leaders publicly. Economic goals were 



253 



Iraq: A Country Study 

also enforced by several laws — a 1970 trade regulation, for exam- 
ple, made both the selling of goods at prices other than those fixed 
by the state and the production of inferior products felonies. The 
government's free education program was enforced by a law mak- 
ing it a crime to refuse to participate. 

The more traditionally defined kinds of crime, including theft, 
forgery, bribery, the misappropriation of public funds, and murder, 
followed the pattern of most developing states. No adequate statisti- 
cal data for Iraq were available in 1987, however. Amnesty Inter- 
national reported in 1986 that degrading treatment of prisoners, 
arbitrary arrests, and denial of fair public trials were common. In 
1985 and in 1986, several high-ranking officials, including the 
mayor of Baghdad, were tried for corruption, were found guilty, 
and were executed. Presumably, the purpose of these sentences was 
to make it clear that criminals would be punished, regardless of 
their status. 

Criminal Justice System 

The regular criminal justice system consisted of courts of first 
instance (including magistrate courts), courts of sessions, and the 
Court of Cassation. Major crimes against state security were tried 
in the revolutionary courts, which operated separately from the 
regular judicial system. In general this court system followed the 
French pattern as first introduced during the rule of the Ottoman 
Turks, although the system had undergone several modifications 
during the twentieth century. Juries were not used anywhere in 
the Iraqi criminal court system. 

Most petty crimes, or contraventions, which carried penalties 
of imprisonment from one day to three months or of fines up to 
ID30, were tried in local magistrate courts. These third-class courts, 
which were found in all local municipalities, were presided over 
by municipal council members or by other local administrative offi- 
cials. First- and second-class criminal matters, which corresponded 
to felonies and to misdemeanors, respectively, were tried within 
appropriate penal courts attached to civil courts of first instance, 
located in provincial capitals and in district and subdistrict centers. 
Misdemeanors were punishable by three months' to five years' 
imprisonment; felonies by five years' to life imprisonment or by 
the death penalty. One judge conducted the trials for criminal mat- 
ters at each of these courts of original jurisdiction. 

In 1986 the six courts of session continued to hold jurisdiction 
in the most serious criminal matters, and they acted as courts of 
appeal in relation to lower penal or magistrate courts. Four of these 



254 



National Security 



courts were identical to the civil courts of appeal; two were presided 
over by local judges from the courts of first instance. Three judges 
heard cases tried in the courts of session. 

The Court of Cassation was the state's highest court for crimi- 
nal matters. At least three judges were required to be present in 
its deliberations, and in cases punishable by death, five judges were 
required. The Court of Cassation also served as the highest court 
of appeals, and it confirmed, reduced, remitted, or suspended sen- 
tences from lower courts. It assumed original jurisdiction over 
crimes committed by judges or by high-ranking government 
officials. 

The revolutionary courts, composed of three judges, sat perma- 
nently in Baghdad to try crimes against the security of the state; 
these crimes were defined to include espionage, treason, smuggling, 
and trade in narcotics. Sessions were held in camera, and the right 
of defense reportedly was severely restricted. It was also believed 
that regular judicial procedures did not apply in these special courts, 
summary proceedings being common. 

On several occasions during the 1970s — after the attempted coups 
of 1970 and of 1973, after the 1977 riots in An Najaf and in Karbala, 
and after the 1979 conspiracy against the regime — the RCC decreed 
the establishment of special temporary tribunals to try large num- 
bers of security offenders en masse. Each of these trials was presided 
over by three or four high government officials who, not being 
bound by ordinary provisions of criminal law, rendered swift and 
harsh sentences. In 1970 fifty-two of an estimated ninety accused 
persons were convicted, and thirty-seven of these were executed 
during three days of proceedings. It was believed that about thirty- 
five had been sentenced to death and about twenty had been 
acquitted, during two days of trials in 1973. In a one-day trial in 
1977, eight were sentenced to death, and fifteen were sentenced 
to life imprisonment; eighty-seven persons were believed to have 
been acquitted. Thirty-eight Iraqis were executed between May 24 
and May 27, 1978. The majority of them were members of the 
armed forces, guilty of political activity inside the military. An 
additional twenty-one leading members of the party, including 
ministers, trade union leaders, and members of the RCC, were 
tried in camera and executed in 1979. In general, those sentenced 
to death were executed, either by hanging or by firing squad, 
immediately after the trials. 

Administered by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, the 
penal system was dominated by the central prison at Abu Ghurayb 
near Baghdad, which housed several thousand prisoners, and by 
three smaller branch prisons located in the governorates of Al 



255 



Iraq: A Country Study 

Basrah, Babylon, and Nineveh. Additional detention centers were 
located throughout the country. In early 1988, it was impossible 
to determine the full number of imprisonments in Iraq. 

Internal security was a matter of ongoing concern for Iraq in 
the late 1980s. The end of the war with Iran would presumably 
bring opportunities for liberalizing the security restrictions imposed 
by the Baathist regime. 

English-language literature on the subject of Iraqi national secu- 
rity was scarce in 1988, largely because of the government's almost 
obsessive secrecy with respect to security affairs and because of the 
Iran-Iraq War. Frederick W. Axelgard's Iraq in Transition: A Politi- 
cal, Economic, and Strategic Perspective was the most comprehensive 
and up-to-date study of the subject in 1988. Majid Khadduri's 
Socialist Iraq, dealing with military and security affairs in the larger 
context of post- 1968 political developments, continued to be indis- 
pensable. Mohammad A. Tarbush's The Role of the Military in Politics: 
A Case Study of Iraq to 1941, and Hanna Batatu's The Old Social Classes 
and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, provided invaluable back- 
ground information. The rapid growth, in both manpower and 
equipment, of Iraq's armed forces was best documented in the 
annual The Military Balance, published by the International Insti- 
tute for Strategic Studies. Accounts by Efraim Karsh in The Iran- 
Iraq War, and a series of articles by Anthony H. Cordesman, 
thoroughly discussed the Iran-Iraq War. (For further information 
and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



256 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Population Distribution by Governorate, 1987 

3 Area and Population Density, 1987 

4 Teachers, Students, and Schools, School Years 1976-77 to 

1985-86, Selected Years 

5 Medical Personnel and Facilities, 1985 

6 Crude Oil Production and Oil Revenues, 1982-87 

7 Production and Area of Major Crops, 1981-85, Selected Years 

8 Principal Exports and Imports, 1984 

9 Direction of Trade, 1985 and 1986 

10 Armed Forces Manpower, 1977-87 

11 Major Army Equipment, 1987 

12 Major Navy Equipment, 1987 

13 Major Air Force Equipment, 1987 



257 



Iraq: A Country Study 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know 


Multiply by 




To find 






0.04 




inches 






0.39 




inches 










ieet 






0.62 




miles 




Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 


2.47 




acres 






0.39 




square miles 






35.3 




cubic feet 






0.26 




gallons 










pounds 






0.98 




long tons 






1.1 




short tons 






2,204 




pounds 






, , , , 9 




degrees Fahrenheit 


(Centigrade) 


divide by 5 










and add 32 








Table 2. Population Distribution by Governorate, 1987 




1 


(in thousands) 








Administrative Division 


Female Male 


Urban 


Rural 


Total 


Governorate 










Al Anbar 


390 428 


538 


280 


818 




438 434 


782 


90 


872 




160 153 


163 


150 


313 




280 281 


321 


240 


561 


An Najaf 


362 361 


568 


155 


723 


At Tamim 


255 338 


473 


120 


593 




557 552 


669 


440 


1,109 


Baghdad 


1,890 1,955 


3,600 


245 


3,845 


Dhi Qar 


445 473 


468 


450 


918 


Diyala 


445 455 


465 


435 


900 




229 227 


341 


115 


456 




244 256 


275 


225 


500 




745 762 


982 


525 


1,507 




350 374 


400 


324 


724 


Wasit 


225 235 


260 


200 


460 


Autonomous Region 2 










As Sulaymaniyah 


433 510 


543 


400 


943 


Dahuk 


125 168 


160 


133 


293 


Irbil 


340 403 


475 


268 


743 


TOTAL 


7,913 1 8,365 1 


11,483 


4,795 


16,278 


1 From October 17, 1987, census; remaining figures are estimates. 



2 See Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from Joint Publications Research Service, Daily Report: Near 
East and South Asia, October 20, 1987, 22, and October 21, 1987, 25. 



258 



Appendix 

Table 3. Area and Population Density, 1987 



Land Area Density 
(in square Population (persons per 

Administrative Division kilometers) 1 (in thousands) square kilometer) 



Governorate 

Al Anbar 137,723 818 5.9 

Al Basrah 19,070 872 45.7 

Al Muthanna 51,029 313 6.1 

Al Qadisiyah 8,507 561 65.9 

An Najaf 27,844 723 26.0 

At Tamim 10,391 593 57.1 

Babylon 5,258 1,109 2 210.9 

Baghdad 5,159 3,845 2 745.3 

Dhi Qar 13,626 918 67.4 

Diyala 19,292 900 46.7 

Karbala 5,034 456 90.6 

Maysan 14,103 500 35.5 

Nineveh 37,698 1,507 2 40.0 

Salah ad Din 29,004 724 25.0 

Wash ... 17,308 460 26.6 

Autonomous Region 3 

As Sulaymaniyah 15,756 943 59.9 

Dahuk 6,120 293 47.9 

Irbil 14,471 743 51.3 

TOTAL 437,393 16,278 2 37.2 



1 From Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1985. 

2 From October 17, 1987, census; remaining figures are estimates. 

3 See Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organi- 
zation, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1985, Baghdad, n.d., 10; and Joint Publications 
Research Service, Daily Report: Near East and South Asia, October 20, 1987, 22 and 
October 21, 1987, 25. 



259 



Iraq: A Country Study 



Table 4. Teachers, Students, and Schools, 
School Years 1976-77 to 1985-86, Selected Years 





Number of 


Number of 


I otal 


Number of 


Level 


Teachers 


Students 


Students 


Schools 






Female 


Male 






Kindergarten 












1976-77 


2,291 


24,223 


27,617 


51,840 


276 


1979-80 


3,079 


33,156 


47,262 


80,418 


358 


1982-83 


4,175 


38,137 


41,319 


79,456 


507 


1985-86 


4,657 


38,604 


42,827 


81,431 


584 


Primary 












1976-77 


70,799 


687,220 


1,259,962 


1,947,182 


8,156 


1979-80 


92,644 


1,174,866 


1,434,067 


2,608,933 


11,316 


1982-83 


107,364 


1,214,410 


1,400,517 


2,614,927 


10,223 


1985-86 


118,492 


1,258,434 


1,554,082 


2,812,516 


8,127 


Secondary 












1976-77 


19,471 


164,442 


387,600 


552,042 


1,319 


1979-80 


28,002 


271,112 


626,588 


897,700 


1,774 


1982-83 


32,556 


334,897 


636,930 


Q71 P.97 


1 Q77 

i ,y / / 


1985-86 


35,051 


371,214 


660,346 


1 ,031 ,560 


2,238 


Vocational 1 












1976-77 


1,906 


n.a. 


n.a. 


28,365 


82 


1979-80 


3,928 


n.a. 


n.a. 




1 9fi 


1982-83 


4,733 


n.a. 


n.a. 


1 , JO J 


1 =17 
1 J / 


1985-86 


6,405 


31,252 


88,838 


i zu,uyu 


937 
Z. J 1 


Teacher Training Schools 2 










1977-78 


666 


12,685 


4,652 


17,337 


32 


1982-83 


1,022 


15,936 


10,255 


9fi 1 Q1 


JO 


1985-86 


209 


3,355 


2,928 




7 


Teacher Training Institutes 3 










1977-78 


241 


3,233 


3,019 


6,252 


13 


1982-83 


219 


3,286 


3,197 


6,483 


7 


1985-86 


1,202 


16,820 


11,083 


27,903 


37 


University, College, or 










Technical Institutes 


4 










1976-77 


4,008 


24,584 


56,914 


81,498 


9 


1979-80 


5,680 


9,298 


21,884 


31,182 


9 


1982-83 


6,674 


10,536 


23,626 


34,162 


9 


1985-86 


7,616 


17,015 


36,022 


53,037 


9 



n.a. — not available. 

1 Includes commercial, technical, and agricultural schools. 

2 A three-year course for those who had completed intermediate studies. 

3 A two-year course for secondary school graduates. 

4 Includes Iraqi, other Arab, and foreign faculty and students at University of Baghdad, University 
of Basra, Foundation of Technical Institutes, University of Mosul, University of Al Mustansiriyah, 
University of Salah ad Din, University of Technology, and the religious colleges affiliated with the 
University of Baghdad and the University of Al Mustansiriyah. 

Source: Based on information from Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organi- 
zation, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1985, Baghdad, n.d., 203-33. 



260 



Appendix 



Table 5. Medical Personnel and Facilities, 1985 



Administrative 
Division 


Estimated 
Population 
(in thousands) 1 


Hospitals 


Hospital 
Beds 


Doctors 


Paramedics 


Governorate 












A 1 A „ 1 


Q 1 O 

olo 


1 1 




ZUO 


0Z0 


A 1 T) 1 

Al Basrah 


oil 


14 


O O 1 o 


3QO 

oyy 


1 ^CO 
1 ,00/ 


Al Muthanna .... 


31 3 
01 


K 
J 


■tyy 


4.QQ 

tyy 


0U/ 


Al ^adisiyan 


001 


1 1 
1 1 


/ty 


1 £3 

loo 


4-00 


A — XT rt ^ « C 


1 to 


Q 

o 


1 3^ 


ZU/ 


Ool 


At Tamim 


593 


8 


869 


146 


488 




1,109 2 


7 


859 


203 


623 


T> „ „L J „ J 


9 Q/1E 2 

O,ot0 




1 n nnfi 


9 1 

Z, 1^0 


^,000 




Q1 ft 


1 R 
1 J 


1 1 09 


1 fin 


fiflft 
ouu 




you 


1 A 
1U 


Old 

OJD 


1 4Q 

14-o 


A CA 

4-0't 




456 


4 


488 


118 


287 


Maysan 


500 


10 


956 


126 


546 


Nineveh 


1,507 2 


21 


2,223 


498 


1,011 


Salah ad Din .... 


724 


6 


775 


125 


403 


Wasit 


460 


10 


590 


137 


506 


Autonomous Region 3 












As Sulaymaniyah . 


943 


11 


1,187 


124 


630 


Dahuk 


293 


7 


490 


124 


344 


Irbil 


743 


17 


1,684 


196 


848 


TOTAL 


16,278 


216 


27,705 


5,724 


4,683 



1 For 1987. 

2 From October 17, 1987, census. 

3 See Glossary. 



Source: Based on information from Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organi- 
zation, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1985, Baghdad, n.d., 192-96; and Joint Publi- 
cations Research Service, Daily Report: Near East and South Asia, October 20, 1987, 
22 and October 21, 1987, 25. 



Table 6. Crude Oil Production and Oil Revenues, 1982-87 



1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 



Production 

(in thousands of 

barrels per day) .. 972 922 1,203 1,437 1,746 2,076 

Revenue 

(in millions of 
United States 

dollars) $10,250* $9,650* $10,000* $11,900* $6,813* $11,300* 

'Estimated. 

Source: Based on information from Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 
Economic and Energy Indicators, June 3, 1988, 9, and The Middle East and North Africa, 
1989, London: Europa, 1988, 475. 



261 



Iraq: A Country Study 



Table 7. Production and Area oj Major Crops, Selected Years, 1981-85 



Production Cultivated Area 

(in thousands of tons) (in thousands of hectares) 



Crop 1981 1983 1985 1981 1983 1985 

Wheat 902 841 1,406 484.7 512.6 626.6 

Barley 925 835 1,331 419.5 556.6 579.5 

Rice 162 111 149 22.9 22.7 24.5 

Cotton 13 12 7 4.5 5.5 4.3 

Tobacco 12 14 17 4.8 5.8 6.6 

Tomatoes 425 439 612 16.4 14.9 19.1 

Eggplant 83 112 232 3.0 3.8 5.6 

Watermelon 491 583 757 17.1 18.8 21.9 



Source: Based on information from Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organi- 
zation, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1985, Baghdad, n.d., 59-64. 



Table 8. Principal Exports and Imports, 1984 



Exports 
(in millions of Iraqi dinars*) 




Imports 
(in millions of Iraqi dinars*) 




Oil, gas and related products 


7,028 


Machinery, including aircraft 


65,067 


Foodstuffs 


681 


Manufactured goods 


48,786 


Raw materials 

(including fertilizers, cement) 


287 


Foodstuffs 


43,828 


Manufactured goods 


241 


Chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
and explosives 

Heating, medical equipment, 
furniture, and clothes 


17,225 
10,285 


Other items 


36 


Other items 


10,653 


TOTAL 


8,273 




195,844 



*For value of the Iraqi dinar — see Glossary. 



Source: Based on information from Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organi- 
zation, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1985, Baghdad, n.d., 164. 



262 



Appendix 



Table 9. Direction of Trade, 1985-86 
(in percentages) 



Country 1985 1986 
Exports 

Brazil 17.7 n.a. 

Britain n.a. 1.2 

France 13.0 7.0 

Italy 11.0 8.1 

Japan 6.0 10.5 

Spain 10.7 n.a. 

Turkey 8.1 8.1 

United States 4.7 5.8 

West Germany n.a. 10.5 

Yugoslavia 8.0 8.1 

Imports 

Brazil 7.0 n.a. 

Britain 6.3 8.0 

France 7.5 6.8 

Italy 7.6 8.0 

Japan 14.4 14.8 

Kuwait 4.2 n.a. 

Turkey 8.2 9.0 

United States n.a. 5.7 

West Germany 9.2 8.0 

Yugoslavia n.a. 4.5 

n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from the International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade 
Statistics, cited in the Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Iraq, No. 1, 1987, 
2 and No. 1, 1988, 2. 



Table 10. Armed Forces Manpower, Selected Years, 1977-87 





1977 


1979 


1981 


1983 


1985 


1987 


Armed Forces 
Army 
Navy 
Air Force 
Air Defense 


160,000 
3,000 
15,000 
10,000 


190,000 
4,000 
18,000 
10,000 


210,000 1 
4,250 1 
28,000 1 
10,000 1 


475,000 1 
4,250 1 
28,000 1 
10,000 1 


475,000 1 
5,000 1 
30,000 1 
10,000 1 


475,000 
5,000 
30,000 
10,000 


TOTAL 


188,000 


222,000 


252,250 1 


517,250 », 2 


520,000 1 


520,000 


Reserves 


250,000 


250,000 


250,000 


75,000 


75,000 


480,000 


Paramilitary 

People's Army 
Security Forces 
Frontier Guard 


50,000 
4,800 


75,000 
4,800 


250,000 3 
4,800 


250,000 
4,800 
n.a. 


450,000 
4,800 
n.a. 


650,000 
4,800 
n.a. 



n.a. — not available. 

1 Losses make estimates tentative. 

2 In addition, 10,000 armed forces personnel from Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan served in Iraq. 

3 75,000 of these mobilized. 



263 



Iraq: A Country Study 



Table 11. Major Army Equipment, 1987* 



TYPE 



DESIGNATION 



INVENTORY 



Armored fighting vehicles 
Heavy and medium tanks 



Light tanks 
TOTAL 



T-54, T-55, T-62, T-72 

T-59, T-69 II 

Chieftain Mark 3/5, M-60, 

M-47 
M-77 

PT-76 



2,790 
1,500 

150 
60 

100 
4,600 



Armored vehicles 

Mechanized infantry combat 
vehicles 

Reconnaissance vehicles 



Armored personnel carriers 

TOTAL 
Artillery guns 

Guns/howitzers 

Howitzers 



TOTAL 

Multiple rocket launchers 
TOTAL 



BMP 

BRDM-2, FUG-70, ERC-90, 
MOWAG Roland, EE-9 
Cascavel, EE-3 Jararaca 

BTR-50, BTR-60, BTR-152, 
OT-62, OT-64, VC-TH 
(with HOT antitank guided 
weapons), M-113A1, Panhard 
M-3, EE- 11 Urutu 



122mm: D-74; 

130mm: M-46, Type 59-1; 

155mm: GCT self-propelled. 

152mm: M-1937; 
155mm: G-5, 

GHN-45 

105mm: M-56 pack; 

122mm: D-30 towed, M-1938, 

M-1974 (2S1); 
152mm: M-1943, M-1973 (2S3) 

self-propelled; 
155mm: M-114/M-109 

self-propelled 



Includes 122mm: BM-21 
127mm: ASTROS II 
132mm: BM-13, BM-16 



1,000 



4,000 



40 
40 



3,000 



n.a. 

60 
n.a. 
200 



Surface-to-surface missiles 
TOTAL 



FROG-7 
Scud-B 



30 
20 
50 



Mortars 



81mm; 120mm; 160mm 



264 



Appendix 



Table 11. — Continued. 



TYPE 



DESIGNATION 



INVENTORY 



Antitank weapons 
Recoilless rifles 



73mm: SPG-9 
82mm: B-10 
107mm 



Guns 



Antitank guided weapons 



85mm; 100mm towed; 105mm: 

SK-105 self-propelled 
AT-3 Sagger (including 

BRDM-2) 
AT-4 Spigot (reported), SS-11, 

Milan, HOT 



100 

n.a. 

n.a. 
n.a. 



Army Air Corps, 
armed helicopters 
Attack helicopters 



Mil Mi24 Hind, with AT-2 

Swatter 
SA-342 Gazelle (some with 

HOT) 

SA-321 Super Frelon (some with 

Exocet AM-38 ASM) 
SA-316B Alouette III, with 

AS- 12 ASM 
BO- 105, with AS- 11 antitank 

guided weapons 
Hughes-530F 
Hughes-500D 
Hughes-300C 



TOTAL 



40 

50 

10 

30 

56 
26 
30 
30 
272 



Transport helicopters 
Heavy 
Medium 
Light 

TOTAL 



Mi-6 Hook 

Mi-8 

Mi-4 

SA-330 Puma 



10 
100 
20 
10 
140 



Air defense weapons 
Guns 



TOTAL 



23mm: ZSU-23-4 self-propelled; 
37mm: M-1939 and twin; 
57mm: includes ZSU-57-2 

self-propelled; 
85mm; 100mm; 130mm 



4,000 



Surface-to-air missiles 



TOTAL 



SA-2 

SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, SA-9 
Roland 



120 
150 
60 
300 



n.a. — not available. 

'Equipment estimates are tentative because of wartime losses. 



Source: Based on information from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military 
Balance, 1987-1988. London, 1987, 100. 



265 



Iraq: A Country Study 

Table 12. Major Navy Equipment, 1987 

Type and Description Inventory 

Frigates 5 
4 Lupo class with 8 Otomat-2 SSM, 1 X 8 

Albatros/Aspide SAM, 1 helicopter (held in Italy) 

1 Yug (training vessel) 

Corvettes 6 
Assad class, all with 1X4 
Albatros/Aspide SAMs: 

2 with 2 Otomat-2 SSMs, 1 helicopter; 

4 with 6 Otomat-2 SSMs; 

completed (all 6 held in Italy) 

Fast-attack craft (missiles) OSA class, each with 4 Styx SSMs 

(6 of model II, 2 of model I) 8 

Fast-attack craft (torpedoes) 4 
P-6 (may not be operable) 

Large patrol craft: SO-1 3 

Coastal patrol craft: Zhuk (under 100 tons) 5 

Minesweepers 8 

2 Soviet T-43 (ocean); 

3 Yevgenya (ocean); and 
3 Nestin (inshore/river) 

Amphibious 6 
3 Polnocny (LSM l ) 
3 modern cargo (LST 2 ) 

Support ships 5 

1 Stromboli class 

2 Poluchat torpedo support; 

1 Agnadeen tanker; and 1 Transport 

1 Landing ship, medium. 

2 Landing ship tank. 

Source: Based on information from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The 
Military Balance, 1987-1988, London, 1987, 100. 



266 



Appendix 



Table 13. Major Air Force Equipment, 1987 



TYPE 


DESIGNATION 


INVENT 


Bombers 


1 u-io 


Q 
O 




T\i 99 


7 


Fighters 


MiG-29 


28 




IvLlKjr i.ODL\l 


4-0 




JVlirage r-lL-i 


A.(\ 
e t\) 




JVlirage r-itv^D ^rLxocet- 






equipped) 


20 




Mirage F-1EQ-200 


23 




F-7 (Chinese version of MiG-21 






assembled in Egypt) 


70 




ou-/, ou-zu ^ou-4J reportea ) 


n.a. 


Interceptors 




9^ 






ZUO 




MlLr-iy 


a r\ 

w 




JVlirage Jr — l JtL-vi 




Reconnaissance 


MiG-25 


5 


Transport aircraft 


An-z Ljou 


i n 

10 






10 
1 u 




An-24 Coke (retiring) 


O 




An-zo L^url 


o 

I 




11-/0 L^anaia 


1 O 

iy 




11-14 Crate 


19 




DH Heron 


1 


_ . 

1 rainers 


IVllVj-lO, IVllUr-Zl, 1V1Hj-ZjU, 






Su-7U 


n.a. 




Mirage F-1BQ, 


16 




L.-zy Deliin 


00 




T on a lk„ t _„ „ 

L,-jy Albatros 


/I A 

40 




rU-/ lurbo lrainer 


50 




fc,JvlB-312 lucano 


21 


Air-to-air missiles 


R-530 


n.a. 




R-550 Magic 


n.a. 




AA-2, AA-6, AA-7, AA-8 


n.a. 


Air-to-surface missiles 


AS-30 Laser 


200 




Armat 


n.a. 




Exocet AM-39 


542 




AS-4 Kitchen 


n.a. 




AS-5 Kelt 


n.a. 



n.a. — not available. 



Source: Based on information from International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military 
Balance, 1987-1988, London: 1987, 100-1; The Military Balance, 1986-1987, London: 
1986, 98; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and 
Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1987. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, 250-53. 



267 



Bibliography 



Chapter 1 

Abujaber, Kemal. The Arab Baath Socialist Party. Syracuse: Syracuse 

University Press, 1966. 
Batatu, Hanna. The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements 

of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of 

Its Communists, Bathists, and Free Officers. Princeton: Princeton 

University Press, 1978. 
Dann, Uriel. Iraq Under Qassem, 1958-63. New York: Praeger, 1969. 
Davidson, Roderic H. Turkey. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 

Prentice Hall, 1968. 
Devlin, John. The Baath Party: A History from Its Origins to 1966. 

Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976. 
Gallman, Waldemar. Iraq Under General Nuri. Baltimore: Johns 

Hopkins University Press, 1964. 
Ghareeb, Edmund. The Kurdish Question in Iraq. Syracuse: Syracuse 

University Press, 1981. 
Heller, Mark. "Politics and the Military in Iraq and Jordan 

1920-1958: The British Influence," Armed Forces and Society, 4, 

No. 1, Fall 1977, 75-100. 
Helms, Christine Moss. Iraq, Eastern Flank of the Arab World. Wash- 
ington: Brookings Institution, 1984. 
Hitti, Philip K. Makers of Arab History. New York: Harper and Row, 

1968. 

. The Near East in History. Princeton, New Jersey: Van 

Nostrand, 1961. 

Hodgson, Marshall G.S. "How Did the Early Shia Become Sec- 
tarian? ' ' Journal of the American Oriental Society, 7 5 , No . 1 , January- 
March 1955, 1-13. 

Ireland, Philip. Iraq: A Study in Political Development. New York: 
Macmillan, 1938. 

Issawi, Charles (ed.). The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800- 
1914. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966. 

Jawad, Saad. Iraq and the Kurdish Question, 1958-1970. London: 
Ithaca Press, 1981. 

Kedourie, Elie. "Continuity and Change in Modern Iraqi His- 
tory," Asian Affairs [London], June 1975, 140-46. 

Kelidar, Abbas. The Integration of Modern Iraq. New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1979. 



269 



Iraq: A Country Study 



. "Iraq: The Search for Stability," Conflict Studies [London], 

59, July 1975, 1-22. 
Kerr, Malcolm. The Arab Cold War. London: Oxford University 

Press, 1971. 

Khadduri, Majid. Republican Iraq. London: Oxford University 
Press, 1969. 

Socialist Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1968. Washing- 
ton: Middle East Institute, 1978. 

Klieman, Aaron S. Foundations of British Policy in the World: The Cairo 
Conference of 1921. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1970. 

Longrigg, Stephen. Iraq, 1900 to 1950. London: Oxford University 
Press, 1953. 

Longrigg, Stephen Hemsley, and Frank Stoakes. Iraq (Nations of 
the Modern World series). London: Ernest Benn, 1958. 

Marr, Phebe. "Iraq's Leadership Dilemma: A Study in Leader- 
ship Trends, 1948-1968," Middle East Journal, 24, No. 3, Winter- 
Autumn 1970, 283-301. 

The Modern History of Iraq. Boulder, Colorado: Westview 

Press, 1985. 

. "The Political Elite in Iraq." Pages 109-49 in George 

Lenczowski (ed.), Political Elites in the Middle East. Washington: 

American Enterprise Institute, 1975. 
Momen, Moojan. An Introduction to Shii Islam. New Haven: Yale 

University Press, 1985. 
Niblock, Tim. Iraq: The Contemporary State. New York: St. Martin's 

Press, 1982. 

O'Ballance, Edgar. The Kurdish Revolt, 1961-1970. Hamden, Con- 
necticut: Archon Books, 1973. 

Pelletiere, Stephen C. The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. 

Penrose, Edith, and E.F. Penrose. Iraq: International Relations and 
National Development. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978. 

Roberts, J. M. The Pelican History of the World. New York: Penguin 
Books, 1980. 

Roux, George. Ancient Iraq. Cleveland: World Publishing, 
1965. 

Seale, Patrick. The Struggle for Syria. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1965. 

Shwadran, Benjamin. The Power Struggle in Iraq. New York: Council 

for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, 1960. 
Sluglett, Peter. Britain in Iraq, 1914-1932. London: Ithaca Press, 

1976. 



270 



Bibliography 

Sourdel, D. "The Abbasid Caliphate." Pages 104-39 in P.M. Holt, 
Ann K.S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis (eds.), The Cambridge 
History of Islam, I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1970. 

Stafford, R.S. The Tragedy of the Assyrians. London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1935. 

Tarbush, Mohammad A. The Role of the Military in Politics: A Case 
Study of Iraq to 1941. London: Kegan Paul International, 1982. 

Wright, Claudia. "Iraq: New Power in the Middle East," Foreign 
Affairs, 58, Winter 1979-1980, 257-77. 



Chapter 2 

Adams, Doris Goodrich. Iraq's People and Resources (University of 
California Publications in Economics, XVIII). Berkeley: Univer- 
sity of California Press, 1958. 

Adams, Robert McCormick. Irrigation's Impact on Society. Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 1974. 

Alnasrawi, Abbas. Financing Economic Development in Iraq: The Role 
of Oil in a Middle Eastern Economy. New York: Praeger, 1967. 

Arfa, Hassan. The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study. London: 
Oxford University Press, 1966. 

Baali, Fuad. Relation of the People to the Land in Southern Iraq (University 
of Florida Monographs, Social Sciences, No. 31). Gainesville: 
University of Florida Press, 1966. 

"Relationships of Man to the Land in Iraq," Rural 

Sociology, 31, June 1966, 171-82. 

"Social Factors in Iraqi Rural-Urban Migrations," Ameri- 
can Journal of Economic and Sociological Research, 25, October 1966, 
359-64. 

Baram, Amitzia. "The June 1980 Election to the National Assem- 
bly in Iraq," Orient, 27, No. 3, 1981. 

Barth, Fredrik. Principles of Social Organization in Southern Kurdistan 
(University Ethnographic Museum Bulletin, No. 7). Oslo: 
Brodrene Jordensen, 1953. 

Batatu, Hanna. "Iraq's Underground Shia Movements: Charac- 
teristics, Causes, and Prospects," Middle East Journal, 35, No. 4, 
Autumn 1981, 578-94. 

The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: 

A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes, and of Its Com- 
munists, Bathists, and Free Officers. Princeton: Princeton Univer- 
sity Press, 1978. 



271 



Iraq: A Country Study 



Cook, M.A. (ed.) Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East. 

New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. 
Cordesman, Anthony H. The Iran- Iraq War: 1984-1986. Rosslyn, 

Virginia: Eaton Analytical Assessments Center, 1986. 
Coulson, Noel, and Doreen Hinchcliffe. "Women and Law Reform 

in Contemporary Islam." Pages 37-51 in Lois Beck and Nikki 

Keddie (eds.), Women in the Muslim World. Cambridge: Harvard 

University Press, 1978. 
Dann, Uriel. Iraq Under Qassem, 1958-63. New York: Praeger, 1969. 
Economist Intelligence Unit. Iraq: Country Report, 1988, No. 1, 

London: 1988. 

Fernea, Elizabeth W. Guests of the Sheikh. New York: Doubleday, 
1965. 

Fernea, Robert A. Shaykh and Effendi: Changing Patterns of Authority 
among the Shabana of Southern Iraq. Cambridge: Harvard Univer- 
sity Press, 1970. 

Gabbay, Rony. Communism and Agrarian Reform in Iraq. London: 
Croom Helm, 1978. 

Ghareeb, Edmund. The Kurdish Question in Iraq. Syracuse: Syra- 
cuse University Press, 1981. 

Grummond, Stephen. The Iran-Iraq War: Islam Embattled. New: 
York: Praeger, 1982. 

Helms, Christine Moss. Iraq, Eastern Flank of the Arab World. Wash- 
ington: Brookings Institution, 1984. 

"Interview With Saddam Husayn," Al Majallah [London], 
December 8, 1982. 

Iraq. Ministry of Planning. Central Statistical Organization. Eco- 
nomic and Social Progress Under the Revolution. Baghdad: July 1978. 

Ministry of Planning. Central Statistical Organization. 

Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1985. Baghdad: n.d. 

Issawi, Charles. The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800-1914. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966. 

Kelidar, Abbas. The Integration of Modern Iraq. New York: St. Mar- 
tin's Press, 1979. 

Khadduri, Majid. Independent Iraq, 1932-1958. London: Oxford 
University Press, 1970. 

Republican Iraq. London: Oxford University Press, 1969. 

Al-Khafaji, Isam. "State Incubation of Iraqi Capitalism." Pages 4- 
12 in MERIP Middle East Report, No. 142. September-October 
1986. Washington: Middle East Research and Information 
Project. 

Longrigg, Stephen Hemsley. Four Centuries of Modern Iraq. London: 
Oxford University Press, 1925. 



272 



Bibliography 

. Iraq, 1900 to 1950. London: Oxford University Press, 1953. 

Longrigg, Stephen Hemsley, and Frank Stoakes. Iraq (Nations of 
the Modern World series). London: Ernest Benn, 1958. 

Marr, Phebe. The Modern History of Iraq. Boulder, Colorado: West- 
view Press, 1985. 

Pelletiere, Stephen C. The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. 

Simon, Reeva. Iraq Between the Two World Wars. New York: Colum- 
bia University Press, 1986. 

Sluglett, Peter. Britain in Iraq, 1914-1932. London: Ithaca Press, 
1976. 

Sluglett, Peter and Marion Farouk- Sluglett. "Some Reflections on 
the Sunni/Shia Question in Iraq," British Society for Middle East 
Studies [London], 5, 1978, 79-87. 

Thesiger, Wilfred. The Marsh Arabs. New York: Dutton, 1964. 

Viorst, Milton. "Iraq at War. " Foreign Affairs, 65, No. 2, Winter 
1986-87, 349-65. 

Warriner, Doreen. Land Reform and Development in the Middle East: 
A Study of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. London: Oxford University Press 
for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1962. 

Young, Gavin. Return to the Marshes: Life With the Marsh Arabs of 
Iraq. London: Collins, 1977. 

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Joint Publications Research Ser- 
vice, Daily Report: Near East and South Asia; Middle East Economic Digest 
[London]; New York Times; Quarterly Economic Review: Iraq [Lon- 
don]; and Washington Post.) 

Chapter 3 

Adams, Martin E. "Lessons from Agrarian Reform in Iraq," Land 

Reform [Rome], No. 1, 1972, 56-64. 
Alnasrawi, Abbas. Financing Economic Development in Iraq: The Role 

of Oil in a Middle Eastern Economy. New York: Praeger, 1967. 
Badre, Albert Y. "Economic Development of Iraq." Pages 281-328 

in Charles A. Cooper and Sidney S. Alexander (eds.), Economic 

Development and Population Growth in the Middle East. New York: 

American Elsevier Publishing, 1972. 
Brown, Michael E. "The Nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum 

Company," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 10, No. 1, 

February 1979, 107-24. 
Gabbay, Rony. Communism and Agrarian Reform in Iraq. London: 

Croom Helm, 1978. 



273 



Iraq: A Country Study 

International Monetary Fund. Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions: Annual Report, 1987. Washington, 1987. 

"Iraq." Pages 465-77 in The Middle East and North Africa, 1989. 
London: Europa Publications, 1988. 

Iraq. Ministry of Planning. Central Statistical Organization. Annual 
Abstract of Statistics, 1985. Baghdad: n.d. 

Jalal, Ferhang. The Role of Government in the Industrialization of Iraq, 
1950-65. London: Frank Cass, 1972. 

Khadduri, Majid. Socialist Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1968. 
Washington: Middle East Institute, 1978. 

Langley, Kathleen M. The Industrialization of Iraq (Harvard Mid- 
dle Eastern Monograph Series, V). Cambridge: Harvard Univer- 
sity Press, 1967. 

Marr, Phebe. The Modern History of Iraq. Boulder, Colorado: West- 
view Press, 1985. 

Penrose, Edith and E.F. Penrose. Iraq: International Relations 
and National Development. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1978. 

Sayigh, Yusuf Abd Allah. The Determinants of Arab Economic Develop- 
ment. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978. 

The Economics of the Arab World: Development Since 1945. New 

York: St. Martin's Press, 1978. 

United States. Department of Commerce. International Trade 
Administration. Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for 
the United States: Iraq. Washington: June 1986. 

Warriner, Doreen. Land Reform and Development in the Middle East: 
A Study of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. London: Oxford University Press 
for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1962. 

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in 
preparing this chapter. An Nahar Arab Report and Memo [Limassol, 
Cyprus]; Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 
Economic and Energy Indicators and International Energy Statistical Review; 
Economist Intelligence Unit [London], Country Report: Iraq; General 
Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture for 
the Arab World [Beirut], Arab Economic Report; International Mone- 
tary Fund, International Financial Statistics; Joint Publications 
Research Service, Daily Report: Near East and South Asia; Middle East 
[London]; Middle East Economic Digest [London]; Middle East 
International [London]; New York Times; Washington Post; and Whar- 
ton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Middle East Economic 
Outlook. ) 



274 



Bibliography 



Chapter 4 

Abdulghani, Jasim M. Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis . Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. 

Batatu, Hanna. The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements 
of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of 
Its Communists, Bathists, and Free Officers. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1978. 

. "Shi'i Organizations in Iraq: Al-Da'wah al-Islamiyah and 

Al-Mujahidin." Pages 179-200 in Juan R.I. Cole and Nikki R. 
Keddie (eds.), Shi'ism and Social Protest. New Haven: Yale Univer- 
sity Press, 1986. 

' 'Chronology, July 16, 1982— October 15, 1982," Middle East Jour- 
nal, 37, No. 1, Winter 1983, 65-88. 

Ghareeb, Edmund. The Kurdish Question in Iraq. Syracuse: Syra- 
cuse University Press, 1981. 

Halliday, Fred. "Gorbachev and the 'Arab Syndrome': Soviet 
Policy in the Middle East," World Policy Journal [London], 1987, 
415-41. 

. "The USSR and the Gulf War: Moscow's Growing Con- 
cern." Pages 10-11 in MERIP Middle East Report, No. 148. 
September-October 1987. Washington: Middle East Research 
Information Project. 

Helms, Christine Moss. Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World. Wash- 
ington: Brookings Institution, 1984. 

"The Iraqi Dilemma: Political Objectives Versus Mili- 
tary Strategy," American- Arab Affairs, No. 5, September 1983, 
76-85. 

Hiro, Dilip. "Chronicle of the Gulf War." Pages 3-14 inMERIP 
Middle East Report, No. 125-126. July-September 1984. Washing- 
ton: Middle East Research and Information Project. 

"Iraq." Pages 432-42 in The Middle East and North Africa, 1987. 
London: Europa Publications, 1986. 

Ismael, Tareq Y. "Ideology in Recent Iraqi Foreign Policy." 
Pages 109-25 in Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Shaheen Ayubi (eds.), 
The Iran-Iraq War: New Weapons, Old Conflicts. New York: Praeger, 
1983. 

Kempe, Frederick. "Baghdad's Goal: Iraq's Aim in Gulf War Is 
No Longer to Win But to Avoid Losing," Wall Street Journal, 
August 28, 1987, 1, 14. 

Khadduri, Majid. Socialist Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1968. 
Washington: Middle East Institute, 1978. 

Marr, Phebe. The Modern History of Iraq. Boulder, Colorado: West- 
view Press 1985. 



275 



Iraq: A Country Study 



Niblock, Tim. Iraq: The Contemporary State. New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1982. 

Nonneman, Gerd. Iraq, the Gulf States, and the War: A Changing Rela- 
tionship, 1980-1986 and Beyond. London: Ithaca Press, 1986. 

Paxton, John. The Statesman's Yearbook, 1986-87. New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1986. 

Snyder, Jed C. "The Road to Osiraq: Baghdad's Quest for the 
Bomb," Middle East Journal, 37, No. 4, Autumn 1983, 565-93. 

"Syrians, Iraqis Bury Hatchet, but not in Iran," Iran Times, 17, 
No. 35, November 13, 1984, 15-16. 

United States. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 1985. (Report Submitted to 99th United States Con- 
gress, 1st Session. Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 
Representatives, and Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate.) 
Washington: GPO, 1986. 

Viorst, Milton. "Iraq at War," Foreign Affairs , 65, No. 2, Winter 
1986-87, 349-65. 

Zaher, U. "The Opposition." Pages 138-76 in Committee Against 
Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq (CARDRI), (ed.) 
Saddam's Iraq: Revolution or Reaction? London: Zed Books, 1986. 



Chapter 5 

Abbas, A. "The Iraqi Armed Forces, Past and Present." 
Pages 203-26 in Committee Against Repression and for 
Democratic Rights in Iraq (CARDRI), (ed.), Saddam's Iraq: Revo- 
lution or Reaction? London: Zed Books, 1986. 

Abdulghani, Jasim M. Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. 

Axelgard, Frederick W. (ed.) Iraq In Transition: A Political, Economic, 
and Strategic Perspective. Boulder, Colorado: West view Press, 1986. 

El-Azhary, M.S. "The Attitudes of the Superpowers Towards the 
Gulf War," International Affairs [London], 59, No. 4, 1983, 
609-20. 

. The Iran-Iraq War: An Historical, Economic, and Political 

Analysis. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 

Batatu, Hanna. "Iraq's Underground Shia Movements: Charac- 
teristics, Causes, and Prospects," Middle East Journal, 35, No. 4, 
Autumn 1981, 578-94. 

The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: 

A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Com- 
munists, Bathists, and Free Officers. Princeton: Princeton Univer- 
sity Press, 1978. 



276 



Bibliography 



. "Shi'i Organizations in Iraq: Al-Da'wah al-Islamiyah and 

Al-Mujahidin." Pages 179-200 in Juan R.I. Cole and Nikki R. 
Keddie (eds.), Shi'ism and Social Protest. New Haven: Yale Univer- 
sity Press, 1986. 

Bigler, C.S. "Tensions Between International Law and Strategic 
Security — Implications of Israel's Preemptive Raid on Iraq's 
Nuclear Reactor, " Virginia Journal of International Law, 24, No. 2, 
1984, 459-511. 

Bill, James A. "Islam, Politics, and Shi'ism in the Gulf," Middle 
East Insight, 3, No. 3, January-February 1984, 3-12. 

Cordesman, Anthony H. "The Attack on the USS Stark: The 
Tragic Cost of Human Error," Armed Forces [London], 6, No. 10, 
October 1987, 447-50. 

. "The Iran-Iraq War: Attrition Now, Chaos Later," Armed 

Forces Journal, 120, No. 10, May 1983, 36-42, 116-17. 

. "The Iran-Iraq War in 1984: An Escalating Threat to the 

Gulf and the West," Armed Forces Journal, 121, No. 8, March 
1984, 22-30, 75. 

. "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: The First Round," Armed 

Forces Journal, 119, No. 8, April 1982, 32-47. 

"Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: Part Two — Tactics, Tech- 
nology, and Training," Armed Forces Journal, 119, No. 10, June 
1982, 68-85. 

Dawisha, Adeed. "Iraq and the Arab World — The Gulf War and 

After," World Today [London], 37, No. 5, May 1981, 188-94. 
Dawisha, Karen. "Moscow and the Gulf War," World Today 

[London], 37, No. 1, January 1981, 8-14. 
Drysdale, Alasdair and Gerald H. Blake. The Middle East and North 

Africa: A Political Geography. London: Oxford University Press, 

1985. 

Entessar, Nader. "The Kurds in Post-Revolutionary Iran and 
Iraq," Third World Quarterly [London], 6, No. 4, October 1984, 
911-33. 

Evans, David and Richard Campany. "Iran-Iraq: Bloody Tomor- 
rows,' ' United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 111, No. 1 , Janu- 
ary 1985, 33-43. 

Feldman, Shai. "The Bombing of Osiraq — Revisited," International 
Security, 7, No. 1, Fall 1982, 114-42. 

Ghareeb, Edmund. "Iraq and Gulf Security. " Pages 39-64 in Z. 
Michael Szaz (ed.), The Impact of the Iranian Events Upon Persian 
Gulf and United States Security. Washington: American Foreign 
Policy Institute, 1979. 



277 



Iraq: A Country Study 

. "Iraq: Emergent Gulf Power." Pages 197-230 in Hossein 

Amirsadeghi (ed.), The Security of the Persian Gulf. New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1981. 

The Kurdish Question in Iraq. Syracuse: Syracuse University 

Press, 1981. 

Gotlieb, Yosef. "Sectarianism and the Iraqi State." Pages 153-61 
in Michael Curtis (ed.), Religion and Politics in the Middle East. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981. 

Gruemm, H. "Safeguards and Tamuz: Setting the Record 
Straight," International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin [Vienna], 23, 
No. 4, December 1981, 10-14. 

"Gulf War Moves Towards the Final Showdown, ' ' Middle East Eco- 
nomic Digest [London], 31, No. 51, December 19, 1987, 32-33. 

Helms, Christine Moss. Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World. 
Washington: Brookings Institution, 1984. 

Hemphill, Paul P J. "The Formation of the Iraqi Army, 1921-33." 
Pages 88-110 in Abbas Kelidar (ed.), The Integration of Modern 
Iraq. London: Croom Helm, 1979. 

International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, 
1977-1978. London: 1977. 

The Military Balance, 1979-1980. London: 1979. 

. The Military Balance, 1981-1982. London: 1981. 

. The Military Balance, 1983-1984. London: 1983. 

The Military Balance, 1985-1986. London: 1985. 

. The Military Balance, 1986-1987. London: 1986. 

. The Military Balance, 1987-1988. London: 1987. 

Ismael, Tareq Y. Iraq and Iran: Roots of Conflict. Syracuse: Syra- 
cuse University Press, 1982. 

Jansen, G.H. "Iraq: Bleak Outlook," Middle East International [Lon- 
don], February 4, 1983, 6. 

Khadduri, Majid. "The Role of the Military in Iraqi Society." 
Pages 41-51 in Sydney Nettleton Fisher (ed.), The Military in 
the Middle East. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963. 

Socialist Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1968. Washing- 
ton: Middle East Institute, 1978. 

Laffin, John. "The Gulf War." Pages 72-87 in John Laffin (ed.), 
War Annual, 1. London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986. 

Marr, Phebe. The Modern History of Iraq. Boulder, Colorado: West- 
view Press, 1985. 

Muhsin, Jabr. "The Gulf War." Pages 227-44 in Committee 
Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq 
(CARDRI), (ed.), Saddam's Iraq: Revolution or Reaction? London: 
Zed Books, 1986, 



278 



Bibliography 



Nonneman, Gerd. Iraq, the Gulf States, and the War: A Changing Rela- 
tionship, 1980-1986 and Beyond. London: Ithaca Press, 1986. 

Olson, William J. "Iraqi Policy and the Impact of the Iran-Iraq 
War." Pages 165-202 in Robert O. Freedman (ed.), The Mid- 
dle East After the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon. Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1986. 

Penrose, Edith, and E.F. Penrose. Iraq: International Relations and 
National Development. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978. 

Petrossian, Vahe. "The Gulf War," World Today [London], 36, 
No. 11, November 1980, 415-17. 

Quester, George H. "Nuclear Weapons and Israel," Middle East 
Journal, 37, No. 4, Autumn 1983, 547-64. 

Ramazani, R.K. Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle 
East. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. 

Ramberg, Bennett. "Attacks on Nuclear Reactors: The Implica- 
tions of Israel's Strike on Osiraq," Political Science Quarterly, 97, 
No. 4, Winter 1982-83, 653-69. 

Renfrew, Nita M. "Who Started The War?" Foreign Policy, No. 66, 
Spring 1987, 98-108. 

Sciolino, Elaine. "The Big Brother: Iraq Under Saddam Hussein," 
New York Times Magazine, February 3, 1985, 16. 

Sluglett, Peter. "The Kurds." Pages 177-202 in Committee 
Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq 
(CARDRI), (ed.), Saddam's Iraq: Revolution or Reaction? London: 
Zed Books, 1986. 

Snyder, Jed C. "The Road to Osiraq: Baghdad's Quest for the 
Bomb," Middle East Journal, 37, No. 4, Autumn 1983, 565-93. 

Sterner, Michael. "The Iran-Iraq War," Foreign Affairs, 63, No. 1, 
Fall 1984, 128-43. 

Tahir-Kheli, Shirin, and Shaheen Ayubi (eds.) The Iran- Iraq War: 
New Weapons, Old Conflicts. New York: Praeger, 1983. 

Tarbush, Mohammad A. The Role of the Military in Politics: A Case 
Study of Iraq to 1941. London: Kegan Paul International, 1982. 

United States. Department of Defense. Soviet Military Power. 
Washington: 1987. 

Vandenbroucke, Lucien S. "The Israeli Strike Against Osiraq: 
The Dynamics of Fear and Proliferation in the Middle East," 
Air University Review, 35, No. 5, September-October 1984, 35-47. 

Vanly, I.C. "Kurdistan in Iraq." Pages 192-203 in Gerard 
Chaliand (ed.), People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan. 
London: Zed Books, 1980. 

Viorst, Milton. "Iraq At War," Foreign Affairs , 65, No. 2, Winter 
1986-87, 349-65. 



279 



Iraq: A Country Study 



. "A Reporter at Large: The View from the Mustan- 

siriyah.*" New Yorker. Pt. 1. October 12. 1987. 92-114. 
. "A Reporter at Large: The Mew from the Mustan- 

siriyah/' Xew Yorker, Pt. 2.~October 19. 1987. 76-96. 
World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook. 1987. New York: 

Oxford University Press. 1987. 
Yodfat. Aryeh Y. The Sonet Union and the Arabian Peninsula: Soviet 

Policy Towards the Persian Gulf and Arabia. Xew York: St. Martin's 

Press. 1983. 

Zaher. U. "Political Developments in Iraq. 1963-1980." Pages 30- 
53 in Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights 
in Iraq (CARDRI). (ed. ). Saddam's Iraq: Revolution or Reaction^ 
London: Zed Books. 1986. 



280 



Glossary 



Autonomous Region — Governorates of As Sulaymaniyah, Dahuk, 
and Irbil, the Kurdish majority area. In this region — popularly 
known as Kurdistan — Kurdish has status of official language, 
and residents enjoy limited autonomy from central government. 

atabeg — Turkish word that during the period of the Ottoman 
Empire meant governor of a province. 

barrels per day — Production of crude oil and petroleum products 
is frequently measured in barrels per day, often abbreviated 
bpd or bd. A barrel is a volume measure of forty- two United 
States gallons. Conversion of barrels to metric tons depends 
on the density of a specific product. About 7.3 barrels of aver- 
age crude oil, or about 7 barrels of heavy crude oil, weigh 1 
metric ton. Light products, such as gasoline and kerosene, aver- 
age close to eight barrels per metric ton. 

currency — See dinar. 

dinar (ID) — Currency unit consisting of 1,000 fils or 20 dirhams. 
When officially introduced at the end of the British mandate 
(1932), the dinar was equal to, and was linked to, the British 
pound sterling, which at that time was equal to US$4.86. Iraqi 
dinar (ID) equaled US$4.86 between 1932 and 1949 and after 
devaluation in 1949, equaled US$2.80 between 1949 and 1971. 
Iraq officially uncoupled the dinar from the pound sterling as 
a gesture of independence in 1959, but the dinar remained at 
parity with the pound until the British unit of currency was again 
devalued in 1967. One Iraqi dinar remained equal to US$2.80 
until December 1971, when major realignments of world cur- 
rencies began. Upon the devaluation of the United States dollar 
in 1973, the Iraqi dinar appreciated to US$3.39. It remained 
at this level until the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. 
In 1982 Iraq devalued the dinar by 5 percent, to a value equal 
to US$3.22, and sustained this official exchange rate without 
additional devaluation despite mounting debt. In early 1988, 
the official dinar-dollar exchange rate was still ID1 to US$3.22; 
however, with estimates of the nation's inflation rate ranging 
from 25 percent to 50 percent per year in 1985 and 1986, the 
dinar's real transaction value, or black market exchange rate, 
was far lower — only about half the 1986 official rate. 

Free Officers — Term applied retroactively to the group of young 
military officers that planned and carried out the July 1 4 Revo- 
lution in 1958. 



281 



Iraq: A Country Study 

GDP (gross domestic product) — A value measure of the flow of 
domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a 
period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods 
for final consumption and for intermediate production are 
assumed to be included in final prices. GDP is sometimes 
aggregated and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect 
taxes and subsidies are included; when these have been elimi- 
nated, the result is GDP at factor cost. The word gross indi- 
cates that deductions for depreciation of physical assets have 
not been made. 

GNP (gross national product) — GDP (q. v.) plus the net income 
or loss stemming from transactions with foreign countries. GNP 
is the broadest measurement of the output of goods and ser- 
vices by an economy. It can be calculated at market prices, 
which include indirect taxes and subsidies. Because indirect 
taxes and subsidies are only transfer payments, GNP is often 
calculated at factor cost, removing indirect taxes and subsidies. 

hadith — Tradition based on the precedent of Muhammad's non- 
divinely revealed words that serves as one of the sources of 
Islamic law (sharia). 

hijra — Literally to migrate, to sever relations, to leave one's tribe. 
Throughout the Muslim world hijra refers to the migration of 
Muhammad and his followers to Medina. In this sense the word 
has come into European languages as hegira, and it is usually, 
and somewhat misleadingly, translated as flight. 

ID — Iraqi dinar. See dinar. 

Imam — A word used in several senses. In general use and in lower 
case, it means the leader of congregational prayers; as such it 
implies no ordination or special spiritual powers beyond suffi- 
cient education to carry out this function. It is also used figura- 
tively by many Sunni (q. v. ) Muslims to mean the leader of the 
Islamic community. Among Shias (q. v. ) the word takes on many 
complex meanings; in general, it indicates that particular 
descendant of the House of Ali ibn Abu Talib, who is believed 
to have been God's designated repository of the spiritual 
authority inherent in that line. The identity of this individual 
and the means of ascertaining his identity have been major 
issues causing divisions among Shias. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affiliated 
with the United Nations and is responsible for stabilizing inter- 
national exchange rates and payments. The main business of 
the IMF is the provision of loans to its members (including 
industrialized and developing countries) when they experience 



282 



Glossary 



balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry 
conditions that require substantial internal economic adjust- 
ments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries. 
Levant — Historically, the countries along the eastern shores of the 
Mediterranean. 

shaykh — Leader or chief. Word of Arabic origin used to mean either 
a political leader or a learned religious leader. Also used as an 
honorific. 

Shia, from Shiat Ali, the Party of Ali — A member of the smaller 
of the two great divisions of Islam. The Shias supported the 
claims of Ali and his line to presumptive right to the caliphate 
and to leadership of the Muslim community, and on this issue 
they divided from the Sunni (q. v. ) in the great schism within 
Islam. Later schisms have produced further divisions among 
the Shias over the identity and the number of Imams (q.v.). 
Shias revere Twelve Imams, the last of whom is believed to 
be in hiding. 

Shiite — See Shia. 

Sunni (from sunna, orthodox) — A member of the larger of the two 
great divisions of Islam. The Sunnis supported the traditional 
method of election to the caliphate, and they accepted the 
Umayyad line that began with caliph Muawiyah in 661. On 
this issue they divided from the Shias (q. v. ) in the great schism 
within Islam. 



283 



Index 



Abadan, 52, 137, 233, 234 
Abbasid Dynasty, xxiii, 20, 21, 92, 
99-100 

Abbasid Empire, 4, 25-26, 99-100 

Abbasids, 3, 20-21, 23 

Abd al Abbas, 20 

Abd al Hamid (sultan), 29 

Abd al Ilah, 45-49 

Abd Allah, 18 

Abraham (prophet), 9 

Abu Bakr, 15, 17, 89 

Abu Ghurayb, 255 

Abu Musa, 60 

Abu Muslim, 20 

Abu Nidal, 208 

Abu Nidal Organization, 208 

Abu Said (Bahadur the Brave), 25 

Abu Timman, 44 

Achaemenids, 12, 13 

Adams, Robert McCormick, 76 

Ad Dawah al Islamiyah (the Islamic Call), 

xxvi, 64-65, 198, 224, 251 
Ad Dujayl, 244, 253 
Administrative Court, 185 
Adruh, 18 
Afghanistan, 31 
Aflaq, Michel, 53, 188, 194 
Agade, 9 

agrarian reform {see also land reform; rural 
society), 103-5, 157-59 

Agricultural and Industrial Bank, 131 

Agricultural Bank, 131, 132 

Agricultural Census (1971), 104 

agriculture (see also agrarian reform; col- 
lectives; cooperatives; irrigation; land 
reform; migration; water control), xv- 
xvi, 76, 78, 153; expansion of, 156; 
grain crops of, 159-60; production in, 
153, 156-60; rain-fed and irrigation 
crops, 159 

Ahali government, 44 

Ahvaz, 233, 234 

aircraft, combat and support, xviii, 219 
aircraft, commercial, 166-67 
Air Defense Command, 219, 221 
air force, xviii, 219, 233-34, 235 
air force training college, 222 
airports, xvii, 166-67 



Aisha, 17 
Akashat, 149 
Akhbari school, 95 
Akkad, 9 

Akkadians, xxiii, 9 
Akshak, 9 

Al Ahd (the Covenant), 31 
Al Amarah, 26, 74, 101, 166 
Al Anbar, 116 

Al Bakr University for Higher Military 

Studies, 222 
Al Basrah, 20, 26, 98-99, 255-56 
Alexander, 3 

Alexander the Great, 12, 13, 14 
Al Fatah, 209 

Al Faw Peninsula, xxv, xxix, 202, 241 
Al Faw terminal and port, xvi, 31, 136, 

163, 238 
Algeria as mediator, 70 
Algiers Agreement (1975), xxiv, xxviii, 

5, 61, 70, 84 
Al Habbaniyah, 39 
Al Hadithah, 136, 154, 163, 166 
Al Hillah, 34 
Al Hirah, 16 
Ali ibn Muhammad, 23 
Ali (imam), 94 

Al Jamiya al Wataniya al Islamiya (The 

Muslim National League), 34 
Al Jazirah, 71 
Al Kifl, 74 

Al Kufah, 18, 19, 20, 116 

Al Kut, 31, 34 

alluvial plain region, 74 

Al Mamun (caliph), 21, 92 

Al Mansur, 21 

Al Musayyib, 152, 165 

Al Muthanna Governorate, 80, 98 

Al Qadisiyah, 16, 86, 96, 98, 116 

Al Qadisiyah Dam, 154 

Al Qaim, 149 

Al Qurnah, 74, 75, 166, 237 
Amin, 21 
Amman, 63, 209 
Ammash, Salih Mahdi, 188 
Amnesty International, 224, 254 
Amorites, 10 
Amu Darya, 16 



285 



Iraq: A Country Study 



Anatolia, 26 
Anayzah, 33 

Anayzah tribal confederation, 26 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 133 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (1922), 36-37, 38, 39 
Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (1930), 39, 42-43, 46 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company (see also 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; British 
Petroleum; Turkish Petroleum Com- 
pany (TPC)), 133, 134-35 
Anglo-Turco-Iraqi treaty (1926), 38-39 
An (god), 7 

An Najaf, 19, 25, 31, 33, 34, 36, 63, 64, 

69, 94, 163, 232, 250, 251, 255 
An Nasiriyah, 31, 144 
An Nur, 107 
antiaircraft guns, 218 
appliance industry, 153 
Aqaba, 63 
Arab civilization, 79 
Arabia, 15 

Arabian Gulf Academy for Naval Studies, 
222 

Arabian Peninsula, 26, 87, 206-7 
Arabic language (see also classical Arabic; 

Iraqi Arabic; Modern Standard 

Arabic), xiv, 16, 81-82, 177 
Arab-Israeli wars: 1948 war, 47-48, 136; 

June 1967 War, 57-58, 140, 203, 205; 

October 1973 War, 141, 203 
Arab League (League of Arab States), 46, 

52, 60, 205, 208, 209, 210, 215 
Arab Legion, 46 
Arab Liberation Front, 208, 229 
"Arab Nation, The," 188 
Arab Organization of the 15th May, 208 
Arab Revolt (1916), 32 
Arab Revolutionary Movement, 57 
Arabs, 14, 15, 50-52, 81 
Arab Ship Repair Yard, 241 
Arafat, Yasir, 209 
Aramaeans, 14 
Aramaic language, 13, 86 
arid regions, 77 

Arif, Abd ar Rahman, 54, 56-57, 228, 
249 

Arif, Abd as Salaam, 49, 50, 53-55, 56, 
249 

armed forces, 215, 217-27 

Armenian language, xiv 

Armenians, xiv, 81, 86 

armored vehicles, 218 

arms, xviii; artillery pieces as, 218; 



production of, xxviii-xxix; purchases 

of, 203-4, 205, 229-30 
army (see also Ideological Army (Al Jaysh 

al Aqidi)), xviii, 36, 52, 217; Iraqi 

Communist Party activity in, 248-49; 

morale problems of, 222-23; reserves 

of, 217 
Ar Ramadi, 74 
Ar Rutbah, 78, 95, 163 
Arsacids, 14 
Ash Shabana tribe, 102 
Ash Shaykh ash Shuyukh, 163 
Ash Shinafiyah, 155 
Ash Shuaybah, 219 
Ashur, 11 

Ashurbanipal (king), 11 

Ashurnasirpal, 11 

Askari, Jafar al, 32, 37, 44 

Assad, Hafiz al, 63, 194, 209 

As Samawah, 74 

As Samitah, 60 

As Sulaymaniyah, xxiv, 77, 83, 106, 118 
As Sulaymaniyah Governorate, xiv, 186 
Assyria, 3, 10, 12 
Assyrian Rebellion (1918), 41 
Assyrians, xiv, xxiii, 11, 12, 33, 40, 41, 

81, 86 
atabegs, 24, 25 
Atatiirk, 38 

Atatiirk Dam reservoir, 156 
Autonomous Region, xvii, 177, 186-87 
Autonomy Agreement (1970), 186-87, 
196 

auto parts industry, 153 
Axis countries, 45, 46 
Azarbaijan, 25, 83 
Aziz, Tariq, 64, 200, 204 
Az Zubayr, 143 

Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party 
(see also National Command: Baath 
Party; pan-Arab concepts; Regional 
Command: Baath Party; Revolution- 
ary Command Council (RCC)), 5, 50, 
51, 53-54, 57, 61, 64, 87, 104-5, 110; 
altered perceptions of, 207-9; control 
of army by, 242-43; creation of, 188; 
economic focus of, 192; first govern- 
ment of (1963), 189; focus on domes- 
tic issues by, 189, 192; link to 
Revolutionary Command Council of, 
179; militia of (People's Army), xxv, 



286 



Index 



59, 224-25; opposition to, 96-97, 176, 
195-96, 197-99; organization and func- 
tion of, 192-94; principles and pan- 
Arab goals of, xvii, xxiii, 175-76, 186, 
187-88, 192, 215, 228; relations with 
Iraqi Communist Party, 194-96, 
248-49; role in foreign policy of, 200; 
supervision of Autonomous Region by, 
187, 196 

Baath Revolution. See coups d'etat 
Baban Dynasty, 26 
Babylon, xxiii, 3, 10-14, 256 
Babylon Governorate, 80, 104 
Badush, 155 

Baghdad, xvi, xvii, xxiii, xxvi, 3, 4, 16, 19, 
21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 34, 39, 
44, 48, 49, 54, 74, 75, 79, 94, 95, 105-9, 
117, 118, 145, 149, 163, 164, 165, 166, 
194, 209, 210, 219, 221, 222; adminis- 
trative status of, 186; bombing of, 202 

Baghdad Governorate, 80, 98-99, 117 

Baghdad Pact (1955), 49, 228 

Baghdad Television, 199 

Baghdad Treaty, 216 

Bahadur the Brave, 25 

Bahrain, 206, 241 

Bahr al Milh (Sea of Salt), 74 

Baiji refinery and fertilizer plant, xvi, 145, 
152 

Bakhtaran, 233, 234 

Bakr, Ahmad Hasan al, xxiv, 53, 58-59, 

64, 175, 178, 182, 186, 188-89, 194, 

204, 243 
Baku, 133 
Balkh, 24 

Bani Isad tribe, 102 

Bani Lam tribal confederation, 26 

Baniyas, 136 

banking industry, 55, 131-32 

Baqir as Sadr, Ayatollah Muhammad, 

64-65, 198 
Baqubah, xxvii, 76 
barley, 159 

barrages, 74, 75, 154-55 
barter agreements, 126, 169 
Barzani, Idris, 61, 62, 248 
Barzani, Masud, 62, 84, 196, 248 
Barzani, Mustafa (mullah), 52, 56, 

60-62, 84, 196 
Barzani, Ubaydallah, 196 
Basij volunteers (Iranian), 234-36 
Basra, xvi, xvii, xxvii, xxix, 16, 17, 25, 

27, 23, 31, 39, 40, 45, 69, 75, 79-80, 



95, 99, 105-6, 117, 118, 150, 162, 163, 
165, 218, 219, 234, 237, 238; Iranian 
offensives near, 202; oil industry in, 
136; as port, 166 
Basrah Petroleum Company (BPC), 136, 
141 

Batatu, Hanna, 35 

Battle of Buwayb, 16 

Battle of Majnun, 237 

Battle of the Chains, 15 

Battle of the Marshes, 237 

Bazargan, Mehdi, 64 

Bazzaz, Abd ar Rahman, 55, 56 

Beirut, 29 

Bitar, Salah ad Din al, 53, 188 
Black June, 208 

Board of Regulation of Trade, 171 
Bokhara, 24 

border agreement: with Iran (1975), 61; 

with Saudi Arabia (1975), 71 
border disputes {see also Shatt al Arab; 

thalweg), 40, 70 
Border Guard, 252 
border with Kuwait, 70 
Bosporus, 24 
Brazil, xvi, 170 
brick industry, 149 
brigades, xviii, 217 

Britain: control of industry by, 38; Iraq 
as mandate of, xxiii, 5, 32-35, 130-31, 
134, 228; Iraqi relations with, 204; oc- 
cupation of Iraq by, 31-34, 45-46; oil 
company ownership by, 133; relation- 
ship with Assyrians, 41 ; role in Iraq in 
Second World War, 46; role in Iraq of, 
5, 31-32; role in Palestine revolt, 45; 
sale of arms from, 228; trade with Iraq 
of, xvi, 170 

British Oil Development Company 
(BODC) {see also Mosul Petroleum 
Company (MPC)), 135-36 

British Petroleum, 133 

Bubiyan, 60 

Buhayrat al Habbaniyah (lake), 74 
Buhayrat ath Tharthar (lake), 74 
Buwayhids, 23 
Byzantine Empire, 15, 16 



cabinet. See Council of Ministers 
Cairo Conference (1921), 35, 36 
Camp David Accords (1978), xxiv, 63, 
205, 216 



287 



Iraq: A Country Study 



capital flight, 146 
Caspian Sea, 23, 133 
cement industry, 55, 152 
Central Bank of Iraq, 131 
Central Petroleum Organization (CPO), 
142, 144 

CFP. See Compagnie Francaise des 

Petroles-Total 
Chaldeans, xxiii, 11 
Chaldean (Uniate) church, 86 
chemical industry, 152 
chemical warfare, xxvi, 237, 238 
China, 24 

Chinggis (Genghis) Khan, 24-25 
Christian Crusaders, 24 
Christians, xiv, 15, 41, 86, 87; court sys- 
tem of, 184 
cigarette industry, 152 
classical Arabic, 81 
Clayton, Gilbert, 39 
climate, 77-78 

Code of Hammurabi, xxiii, 10 

collectives, xxv, 158-59 

communism, 50, 51, 52 

Conference on Disarmament (1986), 238 

Compagnie Francaise des Petroles-Total, 
126, 134, 135 

conscription/conscripts, xviii, 220-21, 244 

Constituent Assembly (1924), 37 

constitution (see also Provisional Consti- 
tution), 51; new, xxvi, xxx 

construction companies, foreign, 167, 168 

construction industry, xv, 55 

Cooperative Bank, 131 

cooperatives, agricultural, 104, 157-58 

corvettes, xviii, 218 

cotton, 160 

Council of Ministers, 178, 182, 184 
coups d'etat: in 1936, 44, 49; in 1941, 5, 
45-46, 47, 48, 49; in 1958, 3, 5, 49, 
109, 137, 146, 228; 1959 attempt, 51, 
188-89; 1963 (February, November), 
52-53, 54, 189, 243; 1965 attempt, 55; 
in 1968, 57, 146, 175, 189; 1970 at- 
tempt, 243, 255; 1973 attempt, 59, 216, 
255; 1982 attempt, 244 
Court of Cassation, xvii, 185, 187, 254, 
255 

court system (see also Administrative 
Court; Court of Cassation; military 
courts; religious court system; Revolu- 
tionary Court), 184-85, 254-55; appel- 
late districts of, 184 



Cox, Percy, 32, 33, 35, 37 
CPO. See Central Petroleum Organiza- 
tion (CPO) 
credit. See debt, external 
Crete, 46 

Creusot-Loire, 152 

Ctesiphon, 16 

cuneiform, xxiii, 6-7 

currency (see also Iraqi dinar), xv, 130-31 

current account, 123 

Cyrus, 3, 12 

Cyrus the Great, xxiii, 12 



Dahuk, xxiv, 41, 69, 83, 106 
Dahuk Governorate, xiv, 186 
Damascus, 11, 19, 20, 32, 194 
dam construction, 153-55 
Damin, Abd ar Rahman ad, 188 
Darband, 154 
Darius, 3 

Darius the Great, 12 
date industry, 160 
Daud, Ibrahim ad, 27, 57 
Daylam, 23 

debt, external, xxviii, 126, 169, 230 
debt, military, 230 
Decree Number 652, 128 
Dehloran, 234 

Democratic National Front (DNF), Kur- 
dish, 250 

Department of General Intelligence. See 

Mukhabarat 
desert conditions, 78 
desert zone, 71 
Dezful, 220, 233, 234 
Dhi Qar Governorate, 98 
diseases, xiv, 117-18 
divisions, xviii, 217 
divorce, 113 
Diyala, 75 

Diyala Governorate, 76, 98 

Diyala River, 77 

Dobbs, Henry, 37 

Dortyol terminal, xvi, 126, 142 

Doshen-Tappen, 233 

drainage, 155 

drought, 83 

Dubayy, 241 

due process of law, 177-78 
Dukan, 154 
Dulles, Allen, 52 
Durah refinery, 145 



288 



Index 



duststorms, 78 

Dutch Shell Group, 134 



economic agreement with Soviet Union 

(1959), 51 
economic assistance from Persian Gulf 

states, 207 
economic development: industrial, 1 24- 

25; transportation, 162-67 
economic planning, 55, 127 
economic policy: under Baath regime, 

xxv-xxvi, 123-24, 127-30 
education facilities {see also school system), 

xiv, 109, 114, 116, 254 
Egypt, xxiv, 9, 18, 21, 46, 57, 63, 215; 

Iraqi relations with, xxviii, 202; mili- 
tary aid from, 208 
Egyptians in Iraq, 105 
Elamites, 10 

elections: 1922, 37; 1980, 1984, 176, 181 
Electoral Law (1922), 37 
electric power, 167-68 
electrification, rural, 167 
electronics industry, 153 
Elf Aquitaine, 126 

Entreprise des Recherches et des Activites 

Petrolieres (ERAP), 140 
Eridu, 3, 7, 9 

Eritrean Liberation Front, 229 
Ethiopia, 9 

ethnic minorities {see also Kurds), 82-86; 

tension, 189 
Euphrates delta, 15 

Euphrates (Furat) River, xiv, 3, 6, 10, 16, 
17, 21, 27, 30, 31, 35, 40, 71, 74, 75, 
101, 118, 153, 155-56, 166 

Euphrates River vafley, 34, 154, 163 

Europe, 10 

Europe-Persian Gulf railroad route, 166 
export, xvi, 142, 143, 148, 149-50; of 
agricultural products, 160, 169; of elec- 
tric power, 168; promotion of and 
licensing for, 171 
Export Subsidy Fund, 171 
expropriation of land, 157-58 



Faili Kurds, 83 
Faisal (as prince), 32, 35 
Faisal I (as king), xxiii, xxviii, 35-37, 39, 
41, 42 

Faisal II (king), 3, 45, 49 



family law. See Law of Personal Status 

(1959, 1963) 
family structure, 110-14 
Fathah, 155 
Fatima, 17, 89 
fertilizer industry, 149-52 
First Baghdad International Exhibition 

for Military Production, xxix 
fiscal policy, 148 
fishing industry, 162 
Five-Year Plan: First (1965-70), 55; 

Fourth (1981-85), 127; Fifth (1986- 

90), 127, 144 
flood control, 3, 6, 75, 77, 154 
floods, 6, 14, 27, 71, 74, 75, 154, 155 
flour mills, 55 

food processing and packaging industry, 
xv, 152 

foreign policy, 49, 52, 200-209 
foreign relations. See specific countries by 
name 

foreign trade, 131, 166 

Foundation of Technical Institutes, 116 

France, 133-34, 136, 140, 152; Iraqi re- 
lations with, xviii, xxiv, 204-5; sale of 
aircraft, armaments and weapons from, 
xxviii, 203, 205, 219, 228, 230-31; 
trade with Iraq of, 170 

Free Officers' Movement, 45, 50, 51, 53, 
109 

frigates, xviii, 218 
Frontier Guard, xviii, 252 
Futuwah, xviii 

Gailani, Abd ar Rahman al, 37 

GDP. See gross domestic product (GDP) 

General Establishment for Import and 

Export. See Ministry of Trade 
General Federation of Iraqi Chambers of 

Commerce and Industry, 130 
General Organization of Exports, 171 
Geneva Protocol (1925), 238 
geographic zones, 71 
geography, xiii-xiv, 71-75 
Germany, 31; under Nazis, 45, 46 
Germany, Federal Republic, 152-53; 

Iraqi relations with, 204; trade with 

Iraq of, xvi, 170 
Ghazali, Abu Hamid al, 24 
Ghazi (king), xxviii, 42-45 
Gilgamesh, 7 
glass industry, 149 



289 



Iraq: A Country Study 



government administration: decentralized 
nature of, 3-4; effect of rural-to-urban 
migration on, 4-5; local, 185-86 

government role, 102-3; in economic 
planning, 127; in medical services and 
health care, 117 

governorate administration, xvii, 185- 87 

Greater and Lesser Tunbs, 60 

The Great Iraqi Revolution (Ath Thawra 
al Iraqiyya Kubra): 1920, 35 

Great Zab River, 75, 155 

Greek period, 14 

gross domestic product (GDP), xv, 124, 
125, 153 

gross national product (GNP), 142 
guerrillas: Kurdish, 52, 77, 84-85, 106, 
196, 210, 215; Palestinian, 225, 229 
Gulbenkian, Caloust, 133-35 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 245 
Gulf of Aqaba, 143 
Guti, 9 



Habash, George, 208 
Habbaniyah, 154 
hadith, 87 
Haifa, 48, 136 
Hakim family, 199 

Hakim, Muhammad Baqir al, 198, 251 

Hakkari Mountains, 33 

Halabjah, 60, 238 

Hamadan, 2345 

Hammadi, Saadun, 181 

Hammurabi (king), 3, 10 

Hanafi school of jurisprudence, 91, 184 

Hanbali school, 91 

Hanging Gardens of Babylon, xxiii, 11 

Haras al Istiqlal (The Guardians of Inde- 
pendence), 34 

Harun ar Rashid, 21, 92 

Hasan, 18 

Hashim, 20 

Hashimi, Yasin al, 44 

Hashimite (or Hashemite) monarchy, 
xxiii, 5, 49 

Hawizah Marshes, 237 

Hawr al Hammar, 74 

health care, xiv, 117-18 

helicopters, 228 

Hellenization, 14 

Herkki tribe, 83 

highland region, northeast, 71, 73 
Hijaz, 17 



hijra (hegira), 87 
Hindiyah Barrage, 74, 155 
Hindiyah Channel, 74 
Hit, 71 
Hittites, 10 

housing projects. See An Nur; Madinat 

ath Thawra: Saddam City 
Hulagu Khan, 25 
Husayn, Barazan, 253 
Husayn ibn Ali, 32 
Husayn (imam), 19, 94 
Hussein (king of Jordan), xxviii, 49, 63, 

209 

"hydraulic despotism," 154 



Ibn Yusuf ath Thaqafi al Aajjay, 20 
Ibrahim, Izzat, xvii, 179, 182 
ICOO. See Iraqi Company for Oil Oper- 
ations (ICOO) 
Ideological Army (Al Jaysh al Aqidi), 

242-43 
imam, 88 

Imamate, 91-92, 94 

imports, xvi, 147-48, 151, 168; of agricul- 
tural products, 162; of capital goods 
and durables, 169; with concessions, 
169; of food, 153, 169; licenses for, 171 

import substitution policy, 147-48, 170 

independence (1932), 3, 40, 79, 216 

Independent Democrats: Kurdish, 197 

India, 10, 34 

Indus River, 13 

Industrial Bank, 131, 132 

industrial development, 145-53 

inflation, xxix, 48, 125 

infrastructure development, 147, 162-67, 
245 

INOC. See Iraq National Oil Company 
(INOC) 

insurance industry, 55 

internal security, 247-56 

International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), 205, 231-32 

International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), xxvii, 210, 246 

International Labour Organisation 
(ILO), 210 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 210 

International Telecommunications Satel- 
lite Organization (INTELSAT), 167 

Intersputnik satellite station, 167 



290 



Index 



investment, 144; in agriculture, 125; 
by Government, 145-46; in industry, 
124-25, 145; by private sector, 149 
IPC. See Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) 
Iran, 10, 25, 31, 33, 40, 44, 46, 52, 
59-60, 64, 75, 83, 94, 133, 137; aid to 
Kurdish Democratic party by, 196, 

247- 48; border treaty (Baghdad 
Treaty) with (1975), 215, 216; border 
with Iraq, 70; early rulers of Iraq, 
12-14; hegemony in Persian Gulf of, 
xv, 200; invasion by Iraqi troops: 1980, 
xv, 5-6, 200, 215; Iraq border with, 4; 
Iraqi perception of, 207; Islamic Revo- 
lution in, 62; military assistance from, 
61; oil exploration with Iraq, 56 

Iranian forces, 99 
Iranians, 13-16 

Iran- Iraq War (see also tanker war), xvi, 
xxiii, xxv, xxvi-xxvii, xxviii, 65, 69-70, 
232-40; casualties' impact on armed 
forces, 245-46; cease-fire of, xxviii; cost 
for Iraq of, 123-24, 244-45; effect of, 
xxix-xxx, 127-30, 148, 160, 176-77, 
207-8; effect on foreign relations of, 
202; effect on foreign trade of, 168; as 
foreign policy issue, 202, 200; impor- 
tance of transportation for, 162; Iraq 
military in, 217-20; Kurdish sympathy 
with Iran in, 248; naval operations in, 
240 

Iraq Currency Board, 130-31 
Iraqi Arabic, 81 
Iraqi Arab Socialist Union, 54 
Iraqi Aviation Company, 130 
Iraqi Broadcasting and Television Estab- 
lishment, 167 
Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), xvii, 47, 
51, 53, 61, 83, 194-96, 198, 247, 

248- 50 

Iraqi Company for Oil Operations 
(ICOO), 141, 142 

Iraqi dinar, 130-31 

Iraqi Federation of Industries, 149 

Iraqi Red Crescent, 210 

Iraqi-Soviet Joint Commission on Eco- 
nomic and Technical Cooperation, 145 

Iraqi State Railways, 166 

Iraq Levies, 41 

Iraq Life Insurance Company, 132 
Iraq National Oil Company (INOC), 50, 

57, 137-42, 144 
Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) (see also 



Iraq National Oil Company (INOC)), 

38, 50, 56-57, 135-42 
Iraq Reinsurance Company, 132 
Irbil, xxiv, 77, 83, 85, 106, 116, 118 
Irbil Governorate, xiv, 186-87 
iron and steel industry, 152 
irrigation systems, xxiii, 3, 75, 77, 154 
Islam (see also Shia Islam; Sunni Islam), 

xiv, xxiii, 15, 16, 19-20, 23, 81, 86; as 

state religion, 177; tenets of, 86-90 
Islamic Call. See Ad Dawah al Islamiyah 

(the Islamic Call) 
Islamic Development Bank, 151 
Islamic jurisprudence, 184 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 64 
Islamic Revolution (1979), 62, 63, 64, 

206, 207, 215, 247, 251 
Ismailis, 95 
Ismail Shah, 26 

Israel: aid to Kurdish Democratic Party 
by, 196; attitude of Baath Party toward, 
203; Baath Party relations with, 208- 
9; destruction of nuclear facility by, 
231; military aid from, 61; state of, 
69 

Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, 215, 216 
Istanbul, 29 

Italy, 134; Iraqi relations with, 204; trade 
with Iraq of, xvi, 170 

Jacobite (Syrian Orthodox) church, 86 
Jafari school of jurisprudence, 184 
Jalabi, Isam Abd ar Rahim al, 143-44 
Jalayirids, 25 
Jamil al Midfai, 32 

Jamiyat an Nahda al Islamiya (League of 
the Islamic Awakening), 33-34 

Japan: economic assistance by, 149; Iraqi 
relations with, 204; trade with Iraq by, 
xvi, 169-70 

Jasim, Latif Nayyif, 64 

Jassin, Sattar Ahmad, 219 

Jerusalem, 11 

jet fighters, 228 

Jews, xiv, 12, 48, 86, 87; court system of, 

184; emigration of, 108 
Joint Presidency Council, 54 
joint stock companies, 148 
Jordan, xviii, 18, 49, 57, 63, 71, 142, 143, 

163; Iraqi relations with, xxviii, 202 
Jubur, 32 
Judah, 11 



291 



Iraq: A Country Study 



judicial system {see also court system; mili- 
tary courts), xvii, 184-85, 254 
Jumailah tribe, 54, 55 
June 1967 War. See Arab- Israeli wars 

Kaaba, 87 

Karbala, 19, 20, 25, 31, 32, 34, 36, 64, 

69, 94, 251, 255 
Karun River, 75, 233, 234 
Kassites, 10 

Kazzar, Nazim, 59, 243, 253 

KDP. See Kurdish Democratic Party 

(KDP) 
Khabur River, 74, 75 
Khairallah, Adnan, 219 
Khan, 154 
Khanaqin, xvi, 83 
Kharajites, 18 
Kharasan, Hashim al, 144 
Khardeh River, 233 
Khark Island, 237, 238 
Khawr al Amayah, xxix 
Khawr al Amayah terminal, xvi, 142, 166 
Khawr az Zubayr, xvi, 152, 163 
Khoi, Sayyid Abu al Qasim al, 251 
Khomeini, Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah 

Musavi, xxiv, 63, 64, 217, 232, 233, 

250-51 
Khorasan, 20, 21, 23-24 
Khorramshahr, 95, 234 
Khudari, Abd al Khaliq al, 188 
Khuzestan, 52, 61, 233, 234 
Khwarizm shahs, 24 
Kinik group, 23 
kinship groups, 110-12 
Kirkuk, 51, 53, 61, 71, 73, 83, 84, 106, 

118, 142, 163, 219; oil industry in, 133, 

134, 136-37, 142 
Kirmanji (Karamanji) language, 84 
Kish, 9 
Konya, 31 

Korea, Republic of, 163 
Kufah, 16 

Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), 60-62, 
83, 84, 196, 198, 247; split in, 196-97 
Kurdish Progressive Group, 196 
Kurdish resistance, xxx, 5, 41, 62, 247-48 
Kurdish Revolutionary Party, 196 
Kurdistan, xvii, 26, 27, 33, 61, 77, 
186-87, 196, 198, 202, 223, 225, 248, 
249 

Kurds, xiv, xxiv, 5, 26, 37-39, 40, 41, 



45, 50, 51-52, 54, 61, 73, 81, 189; Au- 
tonomous Region for, 177, 186, 196; 
concentration in Iraq of, 82-83; culture 
of, 84; guerrilla activity of, 52, 77, 
84-85, 106, 196, 210, 215; language of, 
xiv, 56, 84, 177; military cooperation 
with Iran of, 202, 207; political parties 
of, 196-97; rebellion of, 56, 186, 196, 
216, 222-23, 233; tribal affiliation of, 
83 

Kut Barrage, 75 

Kuwait, xxv, 40, 52, 60, 143, 145, 163, 
241, 245; border with Iraq, 70; eco- 
nomic assistance of, 207; Iraqi relations 
with, 202, 206-7; trade with Iraq by, 
170 



labor force: agriculture, xv, 153, 158; in- 
dustrial, xv, 148-49, 152 
labor law, 128 
Lagash, 9 

land ownership (see also expropriation of 

land), 177 
land reform, xxiv, 4, 27, 29, 42, 46, 50, 

104 

land reform law (see also Lazmah land re- 
form (1932)), 42, 46, 156, 157 

land tenure system, 156-57 

languages, 84, 177; Arabic, xiv, 16, 
81-82, 177; Aramaic, 13, 86; Arme- 
nian, xiv; Kurdish, xiv, 56, 84, 177; 
Persian, xiv, 16; Turkic, xiv, 69; Turk- 
ish, 30, 85 

Larak Island, 238 

Larsa, 9 

Law Number 80 (see also oil industry), 
137, 140 

Law Number 60 for Major Development 

Projects, 170-71 
Law of Personal Status (1959, 1963), 

111-12, 113-14 
Lazmah land reform (1932), 42, 46, 156 
League of Nations, 5, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 
League of Nations Covenant, 32 
leather industry, 152 
Lebanon, 46, 48, 63, 136, 225, 228, 229 
legal system, 184 
Levant, 46 
Libya, 140 

licensing for foreign trade, 170-71 
Little Zab River, 75 
livestock, 162 



292 



Index 



local government. See governorate ad- 
ministration 
Long-Berenger Agreement (1919), 38 



machinery industry, 152 
Madain, 16 

Madan (Marsh Arabs), 27, 76-77 

Madinat ath Thawra, 107 

Mahmud II, 27 

Malek Shah, 24 

Maliki school, 91 

Mamluks, 23, 27 

manufacturing, xv 

Marduk (god), 13 

Marr, Phebe, 57, 232 

marriage, 112, 113 

Mar Shamun, 41 

Maruf, Taha Muhy ad Din, xvii, 182, 
184 

Mashhad, 92, 94 
Maude, Stanley, 31-32 
Mecca, 15, 19, 26, 32, 35, 87 
Medes, 11 

medical facilities, xiv-xv, 117 
Medina (see also Yathrib), 17, 35, 87 
Mediterranean Sea, xvi, 10, 11, 136, 140, 

142, 163 
Mehrabad, 233 
Mehran, 238 
Merv, 20, 21, 24, 92 
Mesopotamia, xxiii, 3, 6-7, 9-15, 65, 

133-34 
Midhat Pasha, 27, 29 
migration, xxx, 4, 6, 83, 98-99, 104; to 

cities, 105-8, 158 
Milhat ath Tharthar, 77 
military assistance, 61, 228-30 
military budget, xviii, 244-45 
Military College, 188, 219, 244 
Military Court of Cassation, 223 
military courts, 223 

military equipment (see also arms), xviii, 

203, 218 
military intervention, 241-42 
Military Service and Pension Law, 223 
Mina al Bakr terminal, xvi, xxix, 142, 

166 

mineral industry, nonmetallic, xv, 149-52 
Ministry of Culture and Information, 

167, 199-200 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 200 
Ministry of Guidance, 199 



Ministry of Health, 117 

Ministry of Heavy Industry, 148 

Ministry of Industry, 148 

Ministry of Justice, xvii, 184 

Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, 255 

Ministry of Oil, 142, 144 

Ministry of Planning, 104 

Ministry of Trade, 170 

Mirza Muhammad Riza, 34 

Mishraq, 149 

missiles, 218, 219, 228 

Mitterand, Francois, 231 

Mobile Force, 252 

Modern Standard Arabic, 81 

monetary policy, 131 

Mongol invasion, 24-25, 27, 79, 154 

Mongols, xxiii 

Morocco, 21 

Mortgage Bank, 131 

Mosul, 24, 30, 31, 34, 40, 41, 51, 53, 71, 
73, 85, 95, 106, 118, 149, 152, 154, 163, 
165, 166, 219; oil industry in, 133, 136 

Mosul Petroleum Company (MPC), 136 

Mosul Province, 37-39 

motor vehicle industry, 152-53 

Muawiyah, 17, 18, 19, 89 

Mubarak, Husni, xxviii 

Mudarrissi, Muhammad Taqi al, 199 

Muhammad, Aziz, 250 

Muhammad (prophet), xxiii, 15, 16, 17, 
18, 32, 35, 86, 87-91 

Muharram, 94 

Mukhabarat, xviii, 252, 253 

Muntafiq tribal confederation, 26 

Murad IV, 26 

Mustafa Kamal. See Atatiirk 

Mutasim (caliph), 23 

Naft-e Shah, 56 
Naft Khaneh, 56 
Najd, 26 

Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 40, 49, 53, 54-55, 
58 

National Action Charter, 186, 189, 194, 
195 

National Assembly, xvii, 176, 178; organ- 
ization and function of, 181 

National Bank of Iraq (see also Central 
Bank of Iraq), 131 

National Command: Baath Party, 193-94 

National Company for Aviation Services, 
130 



293 



Iraq: A Country Study 



National Council of Revolutionary Com- 
mand (NCRC), 53, 54 

National Defense Council, 56 

National Guard, 54 

nationalism, 5, 29, 33-36, 39, 42-47, 51, 
52, 96; of Kurds, 83 

nationalization, 55, 57, 131. 141, 146 

National Life Insurance Company, 132 

natural gas, xv; use, liquefaction and 
pipeline for, 144-45 

navy, xviii, 218 

Nayif, Abd ar Razzaq an, 55, 57 

NCRC. See National Council of Revolu- 
tionary Command (NCRC) 

Near East Development Corporation, 134 

Nebuchadnezzar (king), 11 

Nestorian church, 86 

Neutral Zone (Iraq-Saudi Arabia), xiv, 
71, 143, 207 

New Delhi, 210 

newspapers, 199 

Neyshabur, 24 

Nineveh, 11, 69, 256 

Nineveh Governorate, 104 

Nizam al Mulk, 24 

Non-Aligned Movement, 202, 203, 210, 
228 

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 205 
Northern Petroleum Organization 

(NPO), 142, 144 
North Rumaylah field, 137, 141, 145 
NPO. See Northern Petroleum Organiza- 
tion (NPO) 



officer corps, 109 

Oghuz Turks, 23 

oil companies, foreign, 140-41 

Oil Exploration Company, 144 

oil industry {see also natural gas), xv, xxix, 
4, 38, 48, 50, 56, 133; drilling rights 
of, 71; effect of Iran-Iraq War on, 168; 
exports of, 142-43, 168; fields, 73, 137, 
141, 145; hydrocarbon reserves of, 144; 
investment in, 144, 145; refining sec- 
tor of, 145; revenues of, 109, 123-25, 
127, 137, 141-43, 146, 148, 203, 245; 
service agreements with oil companies, 
140-41; terminals in Iraq for, 142; 
transportation for, 142 

oil pipelines. See pipelines, oil 

Oman, 62, 206-7 



OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) 

Operation Dawn V, 236 

Operation Ramadan, 234 

Operation Undeniable Victory, 234 

opposition groups, 188 

opposition (to Baath) organizations, 
197-99 

Organic Law, 37 

Organization of Arab Petroleum Export- 
ing Countries, 210 
Organization of Islamic Action, 199, 251 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), 137-43, 203, 210 
Osiraq nuclear reactor, 168, 204-5, 231 
Ottoman Decentralization Party, 29 
Ottoman Empire, 4, 29-31, 38, 45, 70, 
79, 87, 98, 133, 135, 216, 220, 228 
Ottoman Land Code (1858), 156 
Ottoman Turks, xxiii, 3, 25-26, 27 
Oxus River, 16, 23 

Pachachi, Hamdi al, 46 
Palestine, 11, 32, 136; partition of (1947), 
47 

Palestine Liberation Front, 208 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 

xxviii, 208 
Palestine revolt (1936-39), 45 
pan-Arab concepts, 44, 54, 58, 175, 228, 
232; of economic unity, 177; "The 
Arab Nation," 188, 189, 192 
paper industry, 152 

paramilitary forces (see also Futuwah 

(Youth Vanguard)); People's Army, 

xviii, 217, 224-25 
Paris Peace Conference (1919), 32 
Parthians (or Arsacids), 14 
Pasdaran (Iranian Revolutionary Guard), 

233, 234-36 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), 62, 

83, 84, 197, 198, 248 
patrol boats, 218 
penal code (1969), 253 
Penal Code of the Popular Army, 224 
People's Army (Al Jaysh ash Shaabi) (see 

also Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection 

Party)), xviii, xxv, xxvii, 217, 224, 250, 

252 

People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, 

60, 62-63 
People's Militia. See People's Army 



294 



Index 



People's Resistance Force, 50, 51 
Perez de Cuellar, Javier, xxvii, 238 
Permanent Bureau of the Arab Jurists' 

Federation, xxvi 
Persia. See Iran 
Persian Empire, 12-13 
Persian Gulf, xvi, xxviii, 10, 13, 27, 56, 

61, 74, 135, 136, 140, 141, 155, 163, 

200, 216, 237, 238 
Persian language, xiv, 16 
Pesh Merga, 60, 61 
petrochemical industry, 152 
petroleum sector. See oil industry 
Petroline, xvi 
Phoenicia, 11, 14 
phosphate rock industry, 149 
physicians, 117 
pipelines, gas, 144 

pipelines, oil, xvvi, xxix, 48, 56-57, 135, 
136, 140, 142-43, 209, 210 

plague, 27 

police, xviii, 252 

Police College, 252 

Police Preparatory School, 252 

Popular Army. See People's Army 

Popular Front for the Liberation of Pales- 
tine (PFLP), 208; Special Operations 
Branch, 208 

Popular Front for the Liberation of the 
Occupied Arabian Gulf, 60 

population, xiv, 78-80; growth in cities 
of, 105-9; redistribution of, 97-99 

ports, xvi, 166 

Portsmouth Treaty (1948), 47 
presidency, 178 

Presidential Guard Force, xviii, 217, 252 

price controls, xxix, 254 

prisoners of war, 246 

private sector: imports of, 170; industries 

of, 145-46, 148-49 
privatization, xxv, xxx, 42, 129-30, 148; 

of agriculture, 159; of airline, 167 
Progressive National Front (PNF) {see also 

Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection 

Party)), xvii, 176, 194-97, 249; High 

Council of, 195 
Progressive Nationalists: Kurdish, 197 
protection, 148 

Provisional Constitution (1970), xvii, 
xxiv, 58, 59, 175, 181, 199; principles 
expressed in, 177-78 

public health system, 117-18 

Public Service Council, 182 



PUK. See Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 

(PUK) 
purges, 58, 216, 242, 249 

Qabus (sultan), 62 

Qasim, Abd al Karim, 49, 50-53, 103, 

188-89, 228 
Qasim government, 107, 146, 249 
Qasr-e Shirin, 65, 234 
Qatar, xxv, 206, 207 
Qom, 92, 94 
Quraysh tribe, 15 
Qusaybah, 164 

radio: broadcasting, 199; transmission, 
167 

Radio Iraq, 199 
Rafidayn Bank, 131-32 
railroads, xvi, 163-66 
rainfall, 77-78, 153, 154 
Ramadan, 88, 94 
Ramadan, Taha Yasin, 225 
Ras al Khaymah, 60 
Rashid, 219 
Rashid Airbase, 222 
Rashid Ali, 5, 45-46, 47, 48 
Rawanduz, 61 

Rawi, Abd al Ghani ar, 243 
Razzaq, Arif Abd ar, 55 
RCC. See Revolutionary Command Coun- 
cil (RCC) 
Real Estate Bank, 131, 132 
reconstruction, xxix 
Red Line Agreement, 135 
Red Sea, 143 
refineries, 145 
refugees, 61 

Regional Command: Baath Party, xvii, 

97, 193 
Regional Congress, 193 
religion, xiv, 7 

religious court system, 184-85 
Reserve College, 221 
reserve units, military, 221 
reservoirs, 154 

Resolution 598, UN Security Council, 
xxvii 

Resolution 1646, of the RCC, 130 
revenues: from export of electric power, 
168; from oil export, 48, 50, 109, 
123-25, 127, 137, 141-43, 146, 148, 
168-69, 203, 245 



295 



Iraq: A Country Study 



Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), 
xvii, xxiii-xxiv, xxvi, 58, 59, 60, 96-97, 
128-30; link to National Assembly of, 
182; organization and function of, 175, 
178, 179, 181; repression by, 217; Reso- 
lution 1646, 130; Resolution 1370, 224; 
role in foreign policy of, 200 

Revolutionary Court, 185 

revolutionary courts, 223, 254, 255 

Revolution of July 14(1958), 49, 50, 51, 
56, 75 

Reza (Imam), 92 

rice, 101, 159-60 

Rikabi, Fuad, 51, 53 

roads, xvi, 163 

Romans, 14 

rural society {see also agrarian reform; 

tribal society; villages), xxiv, 98, 99 
Rustam, 15, 16 



Saadi, Ali Salih as, 53-54 
Saadun, Abd al Muhsin as, 37, 39 
Saadun family, 26 
Sadat, Anwar, 63 
Saddam City, 107 
Saddam Dam, 154 

Saddam Husayn, xxiv-xxv, 51, 61, 65, 
87, 96, 178, 184, 192, 204, 210, 232, 
238, 243; administration of, 167, 171, 
175, 182, 200, 202; assassination at- 
tempt on, 244; consolidation of power 
by, xxvi, 62-63; economic reform of, 
127-29; emergence of, 5, 58-59, 
188-89; as leader of Baath Party, xvii, 
105, 175-76, 194, 209, 217; role in 
government and party of, 219 

Saddam Hussein, See Saddam Husayn 

Sadr, Musa as (imam), 251 

Safavid Empire, 25-26 

Safavids, 26 

Safwan, 163 

Said, Nuri as, 32, 39-40, 44-49, 52 
SAIRI. See Supreme Assembly for the 

Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI) 
Salah ad Din I refinery, 145 
Samanids, 21 
Samarkand, 24, 25 
Samarra, 71, 154, 165 
Samarrai, Salih Mahdi as, 243 
Sanandaj, 234 

San Remo Conference (1920), 32, 38, 
133-34, 136, 141 



Sardis, 12 
Sargon I (king), 9 
Sassanid Empire, 15, 16, 86 
Sassanids, 14, 15 

Saudi Arabia, xvi, xxiv, xxv, xxix, 40, 46, 
60, 62, 71, 143, 245; economic as- 
sistance from, 207; Iraqi relations with, 
202, 206-7 

schools, theological, 90-91, 92, 95 

school system, 114, 116 

Sea Isle City, 241 

secret societies, 33-34 

sectarian tension, 189 

Security Forces, xviii 

Security Troops, 252 

Seleucia, 14 

Selim the Grim, 26 

Seljuks, 23-24 

Semitic languages, 81 

Sennacherib (king), 11 

Septimius Severus, 14 

services, xv 

settlements, 75-77 

Shafii school of jurisprudence, 184 

Shah Abbas, 26 

shah of Iran, xxiv, xxv, 52, 56, 59-61, 

63, 84 
Shakir, Saadun, 253 
Shammar, 32 

Shammar tribal confederation, 26 
Shanshal, Abd al Jabar, 219-20 
sharia courts, 185 
Sharjah, 60 

Shatt al Arab, xxiv, xxvii-xxviii, 31, 44, 
52, 56, 60, 61, 63, 70, 75, 106, 160, 
166, 200, 207, 218, 232, 233, 234, 238 

Shatt al Gharraf, 75 

Shatt al Hillah, 74 

shaykhs, 4, 5, 26-27, 36, 39, 42, 45, 50, 

94, 100-101 
Shia Arabs, xiv, 189 
Shia clergy, 198 

Shia Islam, xxiv, 20, 23, 25, 26, 63, 81, 
91-95 

Shia revival movements, 247 

Shias, xiv, xxx, 18, 19, 23, 30, 34, 35, 

36, 39, 40, 45, 50, 63-64, 90, 95-97, 

107 

Shiat Ali, 3, 89-90 

Shihab, Hammad, 58, 243 

Shirazi (imam), 34 

Shishakli, Adib, 48-49 

shoe manufacturing industry, 152 



296 



Index 



Shuwairah, 152 
Sidqi, Bakr, 42, 44-45 
Siffin, Plain of, 17 
Simel (Sumayyil), 42 
Sinai Peninsula, 49 
Sinjar, 83 

Sinjar Mountains, 85 
Sirri Island, 238 
Slaibi, Said, 54 

social structure {see also tribal society), 
49-50, 52-53, 109-10; in urban centers, 
108 

social welfare, 118, 127 

SOMO. See State Organization for Mar- 
keting Oil (SOMO) 

SONO. See State Organization for North- 
ern Oil (SONO) 

SOOP. See State Organization of Oil 
Projects (SOOP) 

Sorchi tribe, 83 

Southern Petroleum Organization (SPO), 
142 

South Yemen. See People's Democratic 
Republic of Yemen 

Soviet Union, 46, 126-27, 215; assistance 
with railroad construction by, 163; eco- 
nomic cooperation with Iraq of, 145; 
gas pipeline construction by, 144; Iraqi 
relations with, xvii-xviii, 202, 203-4; 
military aid from, 229; oil development 
assistance by, 141; relations with Iraq 
of, xxiv, 51 ; role in Iran-Iraq War, 241 ; 
sale of arms and aircraft by, 204, 219, 
228-29; treaty with, 61 

Spain, xvi, 21, 170 

SPO. See Southern Petroleum Organiza- 
tion (SPO) 
Standard Oil of New Jersey, 135 
State Enterprise for Iraqi Airlines, 130, 
166 

state farms. See collectives 

State Organization for Marketing Oil 

(SOMO), 142 
State Organization for Northern Oil 

(SONO), 142 
State Organization of Oil Projects 

(SOOP), 142, 144, 145 
state-owned enterprises, 127-30, 137, 

141, 144, 146, 148, 152, 192 
state religion, 86 
state security organizations, xviii 
Staudenmaeir, William O., 235 
steel industry, 55 



Strait of Hormuz, 207, 241 
Sublime Porte, 30 
Suez Canal, 29, 140 
Suffarids, 21 
sugar industry, 160 
Sulayman, Hikmat, 41, 44 
Suleyman II, 27 
Suleyman the Magnificent, 26 
sulfuric acid industry, 149 
sulfur industry, 149 
Sultan, Abd Allah, 188 
Sumer, 3, 6-7, 9, 10 
Sumerians, xxiii, 6-7, 9 
sunna, 87 

Sunni Arabs, xiv, 81, 189 
Sunni Islam, xxiv, 20-21, 23, 26, 81, 87, 
232 

Sunnis, xiv, xxx, 19-20, 23, 24, 30, 34, 
35, 36, 39, 44, 50, 58, 63, 85-86, 
90-91, 95-97; as ruling class, 95-96 

Sunni-Shia relations, 17, 26, 40, 95-97 

Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revo- 
lution in Iraq (SAIRI), 198-99, 251 

Susa, 12 

Susangerd, 234 

Suwaidi, Tawfiq, 47 

Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), 38, 216 

Syria, xvi, xviii, 11, 20, 30, 32, 35, 40, 
46, 48, 54, 56-57, 63, 71, 74, 83, 136, 
140, 142, 153, 155, 163, 228; military 
aid from, 61; rival Baath government 
in, xxv, 209 

Syrian Catholic church, 86 

Syrian Desert, 71 



Tabriz, 25, 233 
Tahirids, 21 

Talabani, Jalal, 62, 84, 197, 248 

Talfah, Adnan Khayr Allah, xxvi, 59 

Talfah, Khayr Allah, 59 

Talfah family, 194 

Talib, Ali ibn Abu, 3, 17-20, 89-90 

Talib, Naji, 56-57 

Tamerlane (Timur the Lame), 25 

tanker war, 240-41 

tanks, 218 

tanneries, 55 

TAPU land law (1858), 27, 30 
tariffs, 148 

technical assistance, 203 
technocrats, xxiv 

Techno-Export (Soviet Union), 145 



297 



Iraq: A Country Study 



Tehran, 56, 234, 251 
telecommunications system, 167 
telephones, 167 

television: broadcasting, 199; transmis- 
sion, 167 

temperatures, 78 

Temujin, 24 

textile industry, xv, 152 

thalweg, 60, 61, 70, 232 

Thompson-CSF, 153 

Tiglath-Pileser III (king), 1 1 

Tigris (Dijlis) River, xiv, 3, 6, 10, 11, 14, 
21, 26, 27, 30, 35, 71, 74, 75, 101, 118, 
135, 153, 155, 166 

Tigris-Euphrates confluence, xxiii, 74, 
75, 237 

Tigris-Euphrates river valley, 14 

Tigris Valley, 11, 154 

Tikrit, xxiv, 58, 59, 116, 194, 222, 244 

Tikritis, 58, 59 

tobacco industry, 55, 160 

topography, xiv 

Townshend, Charles, 31 

trade barriers, 148 

trade deficit, 168 

trade policy, 170 

trade unions, 50, 51, 128 

trading companies, 170 

Trajan, 14 

Transjordan, 32, 45, 46 

Transoxiana, 23 

transportation, 162-67 

transport equipment industry, 152 

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 

with Soviet Union (1972), 203, 228 
Treaty of Mohammara (1922), 70 
Treaty of Sevres (1920), 37-38 
treaty setting Kuwait-Iraq border (1913), 

70 

treaty with Iran (1937), 70 
tribal affiliation, 83 
tribal revolts, 42 

tribal society {see also shaykhs), 99-103 
Tripoli, 48, 136 

Tsevetmetpromexport (TSMPE), 144 

Tudeh Party, 250 

Tughril, 24 

Tughril Beg, 23 

Tulayah, 163 

Tunisia, 21 

Turkestan, 14, 24 

Turkey, 4, 30, 31, 33, 38, 41, 44, 71, 74, 
83, 126, 142, 153, 155-56, 163, 168; 



relations with, 209-10; trade with Iraq 

of, xvi, 170 
Turkic language, xiv 
Turkish language, 30 
Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) {see 

also Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC)), 

38, 133-35 
Turkomans, xiv, 51, 69, 81, 85-86 
Turks, 23, 35 
Tuwaitha, 204 

Twelver or Ithna-Ashari sect, 95 
Twentieth Brigade, 54 



Ubayd Allah, 19 

Umar (caliph), 16, 17, 18, 86, 89 
Umar Khayyam, 24 
Umayyad Dynasty, 19, 40, 90, 92 
Umayyads, 20, 21 

Umm Qasr, xvi, xxviii, 60, 166, 218 

Unified Political Command, 54 

uniforms and insignia, 224 

United Arab Emirates (UAE), xxv, 60, 
206, 207, 241 

United Arab Republic (UAR), 54 

United National Front, 188 

United Nations (UN), xxvii, 46, 210; par- 
tition of Palestine by, 47; report on 
chemical weapon use, 238 

United Nations (UN) Food and Agricul- 
ture Organization (FAO), 104 

United Nations (UN) Security Council: 
cease-fire resolution for Iran-Iraq War, 
200, 204; Resolution 598, xxvii 

United States: aid to Kurdish Democratic 
Party by, 196; Arms Control and Dis- 
armament Agency, 229; Central Intel- 
ligence Agency, 52; Department of 
Defense, 229; Department of State, 
xxviii; Iraqi relations with, xviii, 202, 
205-6; military assistance from, 61; 
Navy SEAL commandos, 241; owner- 
ship in TPC of, 134; role in Iran-Iraq 
War, 241; trade with Iraq of, 170 

University of Al Mustansiriyah, 116 

University of Baghdad, 116 

University of Basra, 116 

University of Mosul, 116 

University of Salah ad Din, 116 

University of Technology, 116 

university system, 116 

upland regions, 71 

Ur, 3, 9-10 



298 



Index 



urban growth, 105-9 
urbanization, 98 
urban society, xxiv, 98 
Urmia, 33, 234 
Uruk, 7, 9 

USS Stark, xxviii, 241 

Usuli school, 95 

Uthman (caliph), 17, 18, 89-90 

Uzaym, 75 

vegetable production, 160 
veterans, 246 
villages, 102-3 

volunteer military service, 221 

wadis, 71, 74 

Walid, Khalid ibn al, 15 

Warbah, 60 

war casualties, 245-46 

War College. See Al Bakr University for 
Higher Military Studies 

water control (see also barrages; dam con- 
struction; floods; irrigation), distribu- 
tion system for, 101; diversion by other 
countries, 155-56 

water resources, 153-56 

water supply, 153 

Wathbah uprising (1948), 47, 49 

West Al Qurnah oil field, 145 



Western influence, 97 
wheat, 159 
widows, 246 

Wilson, Arnold Talbot, 32, 33, 34 
winds, 78 

women, xxx, 113; in armed forces, 220, 
221 

World Health Organization (WHO), 210 

Yahya, Tahir, 57 

Yanbu, xvi, xxix, 143 

Yathrib (Medina), 87 

Yazid I, 19 

Yazidis, xiv, 85 

Yemen, 14, 46 

Young Arab Society, 29 

Young Turks, 29, 30-31 

Young Turks' Revolution of 1908, 29 

Yugoslavia, 170 

Yusuf, Yusuf Salman, 248 



Zagros Mountains, 78, 83 

Zakhu, 41, 60 

Zangid Dynasty, 24 

Zanj, 23 

Zaydis, 95 

Zibari tribe, 83 

ziggurats, 7 

Ziyad ibn Abihi, 20 



299 



Published Country Studies 



(Area Handbook Series) 



v_/ v_/ V7 \J U 


A fcrhani ctan 

L\. IcillCllllOLClll 


550-153 


Ghana 


550-98 


Albania 


550-87 


Greece 


550-44 


Algeria 


550-78 


Guatemala 


550-59 


Angola 


550-174 


Guinea 


550-73 


Argentina 


550-82 


Guyana 


5^0-1 69 


An qItji 1 1 7\ 


550-151 


Honduras 


550-176 


Austria 


550-165 


Hungary 


550-175 


Bangladesh 


550-21 


India 


550-170 


Belgium 


550-154 


Indian Ocean 


550-66 


Bolivia 


550-39 


Indonesia 


550-20 


Brazil 


550-68 


Iran 


550-168 


Bulgaria 


550-31 


Iraq 


550-61 


Burma 


550-25 


Israel 


550-37 


Burundi/Rwanda 


550-182 


Italy 


550-50 


Cambodia 


550-30 


Japan 


550-166 


Cameroon 


550-34 


Jordan 


550-159 


Chad 


550-56 


Kenya 


550-77 


Chile 


550-81 


Korea, North 


550-60 


China 


550-41 


Korea, South 


550-26 


Colombia 


550-58 


Laos 


550-33 


Commonwealth Caribbean, 


550-24 


Lebanon 




Islands of the 






550-91 


Congo 


550-38 


Liberia 


550-90 


Costa Rica 


550-85 


Libya 


550-69 


Cote d'lvoire (Ivory Coast) 


550-172 


Malawi 


550-152 


Cuba 


550-45 


Malaysia 


550-22 


Cyprus 


550-161 


Mauritania 


550-158 


Czechoslovakia 


550-79 


Mexico 


550-36 


Dominican Republic/Haiti 


550-76 


Mongolia 


550-52 


Ecuador 


550-49 


Morocco 


550-43 


Egypt 


550-64 


Mozambique 


550-150 


El Salvador 


550-88 


Nicaragua 


550-28 


Ethiopia 


550-157 


Nigeria 


550-167 


Finland 


550-94 


Oceania 


550-155 


Germany, East 


550-48 


Pakistan 


550-173 


Germany, Fed. Rep. of 


550-46 


Panama 



301 



550- 


-156 


Paraguay 


£ K A 




rersian Lruli > 


550- 


-42 


Peru 


550- 


-72 


Philippines 


^ ^a 
DDU- 


1 AO 


r olana 


550- 


-181 


Portugal 


jjU- 


1 AA 


Romania 


DOU- 


-51 


Saudi Arabia 


t^A 


7A 

- /U 


Senegal 


550- 


1 OA 

-180 


c : t 

oierra Leone 


550- 


-184 


Singapore 


550- 


-86 


Somalia 


550- 


AO 

-93 


South Africa 


c^A 
DDU- 


-yo 


Soviet Union 


550- 


1 *7A 

-1/9 


Spain 


550- 


-96 


Sri Lanka 


550- 


-27 


Sudan 


550- 


-47 


Syria 


550- 


-62 


Tanzania 


550- 


-53 


Thailand 



550-89 Tunisia 

550-80 Turkey 

550-74 Uganda 

550-97 Uruguay 

550-71 Venezuela 

550-32 Vietnam 

550-183 Yemens, The 

550-99 Yugoslavia 

550-67 Zaire 

550-75 Zambia 

550-171 Zimbabwe 



302 



PIN: 004200-000 



